## UNIT V: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Stratification</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality and Hierarchy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Exclusion</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of Social Stratification</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity and race as systems of stratification</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Mobility</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## UNIT VI: WORK AND ECONOMIC LIFE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social organization of work in different types of society</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social importance of work and occupations</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal and informal organization of work</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific management</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human relations movement</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## UNIT VII: POLITICS AND SOCIETY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marxist approaches to power</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite theory</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of the State</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of Citizenship</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of Democracy</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest/ Pressure Groups</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agitation</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Movements</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## UNIT VIII: RELIGION AND SOCIETY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theories of Religion</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of religious practices</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociological classifications of religious movements</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion in modern society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion and Science</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secularization</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT IX: FAMILY, MARRIAGE &amp; KINSHIP</th>
<th>PAGE NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the family universal?</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of the family</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary family networks</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Diversity</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Changing Functions of the Family</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineage and Descent</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Division of Labour</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriarchy</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT X: SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN SOCIETY</th>
<th>PAGE NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meaning and Definition of Social change</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of social change</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents of social change</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological factors of social change</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social legislation and social change</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and social change</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

In all societies people differ from each other on the basis of their age, sex and personal characteristics. Human society is not homogeneous but heterogeneous. Apart from the natural differences, human beings are also differentiated according to socially approved criteria. So socially differentiated men are treated as socially unequal from the point of view of enjoyment of social rewards like status, power, income etc. That may be called social inequality. The term social inequality simply refers to the existence of socially created inequalities.

Social stratification is a particular form of social inequality. All societies arrange their members in terms of superiority, inferiority and equality. Stratification is a process of interaction or differentiation whereby some people come to rank higher than others.

In other words, when individuals and groups are ranked, according to some commonly accepted basis of valuation in a hierarchy of status levels based upon the inequality of social positions, social stratification occurs. Social stratification means division of society into different strata or layers. It involves a hierarchy of social groups. Members of a particular layer have a common identity. They have a similar life style.

The Indian Caste system provides an example of stratification system. The society in which divisions of social classes exist is known as a stratified society. Modern stratification fundamentally differs from stratification of primitive societies. Social stratification involves two phenomena (i) differentiation of individuals or groups on the basis of possession of certain characteristics whereby some individuals or groups come to rank higher than others, (ii) the ranking of individuals according to some basis of evaluation.

Social stratification as a process

Social stratification is a process through which groups and social categories in societies are ranked as higher or lower to one another in terms of their relative position on the scales of prestige, privileges, wealth and power. A distinction could be made between the criteria which place emphasis upon the ascribed or innate qualities with which the strata are relatively endowed and those which are acquired by the strata though their own achievement. Ascription and achievement are, therefore, two types of scales which generally define the normative principles which work as determinants of social stratification in all societies.

Social stratification is also historical process. It emerged as a social institution of societies at a certain level of social evolution and social development. The hunting and food gathering societies had individual levels of social differentiation, for example, a top hunter or shaman acquired higher status due to his personal qualities or skills which society considered to be mystical or divine in origin; or differentiation could be in terms of age and sex of the members of the society. But owing to the limits on the population growth due to less developed production technologies and precarious and often nomadic nature of these societies, their social structure was quite simple endowed as it was with elementary skills among people for communication (limited vocabulary), simple technologies, elementary forms of belief systems, and rules of social control such societies did not produce any produce any substantial economic surpluses and accumulation of wealth for any member was impossible. Such simpler societies did have social differentiation, but were without the institution of social stratification.
Social stratification as an institution evolved when the technologies of production underwent basic changes. Innovations of animal husbandry and agriculture necessitated more complex technologies and settled forms of community life. These economies also began to generate economic surpluses and accumulation of wealth either in the form of cattle or food grains. With assured food resources population began to grow as never before and barter and exchange of commodities began to take place on a larger scale. In course of time, tools of exchange were invented which could reflect values of commodities. This led to a growth of sections of societies who had more control on wealth and power. With development of relatively complex technologies and division of labour, not only specialized groups emerged but a division between the rural and urban centers also came into existence in course of time. The complexity of social structure necessitated more elaborate institutions of social control over the emerging new social realities; such as institutionalized form of religion, strata of functionaries specialized into different forms of work, culture specialists and the ruling classes etc. The institution of social stratification came into being as a result of an evolutionary functional necessity at such a historical moment.

There are three major organizing principles of social stratification. These are status, wealth and power. Sociological observations of many societies over a period of time have revealed some linkages among these principles in any evolutionary process. For example, even in societies which did not have the institution of social stratification such as the food gathering and hunting communities, some individuals enjoyed higher social status and were treated as leaders. The magicians (shamans), persons with exceptional skills in hunting or in any other sphere of social economic and defense were accorded higher status in the community. Yet, it did not result into the arrival of the institution of social stratification because such accrual of individual distinction contributed to social differentiation which could be on the basis of merit, age, gender or any other marker in society. Social stratification comes into being in societies when social gradation or ranking is done on the basis of an entire group of people such as the gradations based on caste and class in our society.

Definitions of social stratification:
1. Ogburn and Nimkoff: ‘The process by which individuals and groups are ranked in more or less enduring hierarchy of status is known as stratification”

2. Lundberg: “A stratified society is one marked by inequality, by differences among people that are evaluated by them as being “lower” and “higher”.

3. Gisbert: “Social stratification is the division of society into permanent groups of categories linked with each other by the relationship of superiority and subordinations”.

4. Williams: “Social Stratification refers to “The ranking of individuals on a scale of superiority-inferiority-equality, according to some commonly accepted basis of valuation.”

5. Raymond W. Murray: “Social stratification is horizontal division of society into “higher” and “lower” social units.”

6. Melvin M Tumin: Social stratification refers to “arrangement of any social group or society into hierarchy of positions that are unequal with regard to power, property, social evaluation and psychic gratification”.

Origin of Stratification:
Regarding the origin of stratification many views have been given.

(i) According to Davis, social stratification has come into being due to the functional necessity of the social system.

(ii) Professor Sorokin attributed social stratification mainly to inherited difference in environmental conditions.

(iii) According to Karl Marx, social factors are responsible for the emergence of different social strata, i.e. social stratification.

(iv) Gumplovioz and others contended that the origin of social stratification is to be found in the conquest of one group by another.

(v) According to Spengler, social stratification is founded upon scarcity which is created whenever society differentiates in terms of functions and powers.

(vi) Racial differences accompanied by dissimilarity also lead to stratification.

Types of Social Stratification:

Social stratification is based upon a variety of principles. So we find different type of stratification.

The major types of stratification are (i) Caste (ii) Class (iii) Estate (iv) Slavery

(i) Caste is a hereditary endogamous social group in which a person’s rank and its accompanying rights and obligations are ascribed on the basis of his birth into a particular group. For example- Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudra Caste.

(ii) Class- Stratification on the basis of class is dominant in modern society. In this, a person’s position depends to a very great extent upon achievement and his ability to use to advantage the inborn characteristics and wealth that he may possess.

(iii) Estate system of medieval Europe provides another system of stratification which gave much emphasis to birth as well as to wealth and possessions. Each estate had a state.

(iv) Slavery had economic basis. In slavery, every slave had his master to whom he was subjected. The master’s power over the slave was unlimited.

Characteristics of Social Stratification:

On the basis of the analysis of the different definitions given by eminent scholars, social stratification may have the following characteristics.
(a) Social stratification is universal:

There is no society on this world which is free from stratification. Modern stratification differs from stratification of primitive societies. It is a worldwide phenomenon. According to Sorokin “all permanently organized groups are stratified.”

(b) Stratification is social:

It is true that biological qualities do not determine one’s superiority and inferiority. Factors like age, sex, intelligence as well as strength often contribute as the basis on which statuses are distinguished. But one’s education, property, power, experience, character, personality etc. are found to be more important than biological qualities. Hence, stratification is social by nature.

(c) It is very old:

Stratification system is very old. It was present even in the small wondering bonds. In almost all the ancient civilizations, the differences between the rich and poor, humble and powerful existed. During the period of Plato and Kautilya even emphasis was given to political, social and economic inequalities.

(d) It is in diverse forms:

The forms of stratification are not uniform in all the societies. In the modern world class, caste and estate are the general forms of stratification. In India a special type of stratification in the form of caste is found. The ancient Aryans were divided into four varnas: the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. The ancient Greeks were divided into freemen and slaves and the ancient Romans were divided into the patricians and the plebians. So every society, past or present, big or small is characterized by diverse forms of social stratification.

(e) Social stratification is consequential:

Social stratification has two important consequences one is “life chances” and the other one is “life style”. A class system not only affects the “life-chances” of the individuals but also their “life style”.

The members of a class have similar social chances but the social chances vary in every society. It includes chances of survival and of good physical and mental health, opportunities for education, chances of obtaining justice, marital conflict, separation and divorce etc.

Life style denotes a style of life which is distinctive of a particular social status. Life-styles include such matters like the residential areas in every community which have gradations of prestige-ranking, mode of housing, means of recreation, the kinds of dress, the kinds of books, TV shows to which one is exposed and so on. Life-style may be viewed as a sub-culture in which one stratum differs from another within the frame work of a commonly shared over-all culture.
CONCEPTS
EQUALITY

“Unstratified society with real equality of its members is a myth that has never been realized in the history of mankind.” – P.A. Sorokin

Equality is a modern value. It is also used as a measure of modernity and of the whole process of modernization. Equality is associated with the development of the nation state, political egalitarianism and social justice. Equality, both as a value and a principle, took a concrete shape in the slogan “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity”, given in the French Revolution of 1789.

Traditional societies (except primitive ones), be it caste-based Hindu society or Western feudal societies based on estate system, were largely inegalitarian in nature. Hence, equality as a value and a concept is of recent origin, making an appearance during the post-Renaissance and Enlightenment period.

However, the concept of equality has developed through various stages. For example, during the French Revolution, one of the major cry of people was for equality before law. Protesting against the exploitative estate system, people demanded that in the eyes of law all should be treated equal. Soon this led to the demand for political equality which resulted in universal adult suffrage. Turner writes that “the modern notion of equality cannot be divorced from the evolution of citizenship.”

Further, as the criticism against the exploitative capitalist system grew, demand for socio-economic equality also mounted. Marxist scholars argued that unless there is socio-economic equality, equality before law and political equality would remain illusory (not real). As a result the notion of welfare state developed and various reforms such as land reforms, tax reforms (progressive taxation) etc., were initiated to promote greater socio-economic equality.

John Rawls in his well-known work ‘A Theory of Justice’ deals with the question of “equality” from the point of social justice than merely as a political concept. Rawls realized that a society could not avoid inequalities among its people. Inequalities result from such things as one’s inherited characteristics, social class, personal motivation, etc. Even so, Rawls insisted that a just society should find ways to reduce inequalities in areas where it can act. He advocated that societies should strive to provide for “fair equality of opportunity” to all its members. One way for a society to do this would be to eliminate discrimination. Another way would be to provide everyone easy access to education. Rawls relates equality to the basic structure of society that governs the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages.

In recent times, feminist scholars have been very vocal about the issues related with gender equality. The advocates of gender equality have extended their argument to the human rights of transgenders and decriminalization of Article 377 of Indian Penal Code related to homosexuality.

Equality, however, is meaningless unless we can answer the question: equal in what? In social sciences, the term equality has very different implications, depending upon what is being apportioned.
Since time immemorial, men have dreamt of an egalitarian society

**Foundational Equality:** is the idea that human beings are ‘born equal’ in the sense that their lives are of equal moral value.

**Formal equality:** refers to the formal status of individuals in society in terms of their rights and entitlements. Its clearest expression is in the form of legal equality (equality before law) and political equality (universal suffrage and one person–one vote, one vote–one value).

**Equality of opportunity:** means that everyone has the same starting point, or equal life chances. Equality of opportunity concept developed in response to the inadequacies of formal equality. In a society marked by gross economic inequality, formal equality would serve little purpose. As a result it was argued that people should have a fair chance or level playing field in society. They should have equality in terms of various rights and resources so that they can nurture their talent. In other words, equality of opportunity tries to ensure equality of conditions so that people can become unequal based on their merit. Thus developed the concepts of welfare state and social justice to ensure equality of opportunity. For example, right to education is now a fundamental right in India. Similarly, UPSC has set Graduation as the minimum eligibility criterion for the candidates belonging to different castes, class or religion to complete in the Civil Services Examination conducted annually.

**Equality of outcome:** refers to an equal distribution of rewards. It is usually reflected in social equality, an equal distribution of income, wealth and other social goods. Marx’s dream of communist society was largely based upon this form of equality.

Although foundational equality as a philosophical principle, and formal equality as a legal and political principle are widely accepted, at least in liberal-democratic societies, deep controversy continues to surround the idea of equality of outcome or rewards.
Arguments in favour of social or material equality:

- It strengthens social cohesion and community by creating a common identity and shared interests;
- It promotes justice in that the most obvious forms of social inequality are the result of unequal treatment by society rather than unequal natural endowment;
- It enlarges freedom in the sense that it safeguards people from poverty and satisfies basic needs, enabling them to achieve fulfillment;
- It is the only meaningful form of equality in that all other equalities rest upon it: genuine legal and political equality require that people have access to equal social resources.

Arguments against social equality:

- It is unjust because it treats unequals equally and therefore fails to reward people in line with their talents and capacities;
- It results in economic stagnation in that it removes incentives and caps aspirations;
- It can be achieved only through state intervention and a system of ‘social engineering’, meaning that it always infringes upon individual liberty;
- It results in drab uniformity; diversity is vanquished and with it the vigour and vitality of society.

Men have long dreamed of an egalitarian society, a society in which all members are equal. Karl Marx too in his theory of social change had predicted the arrival of communist society, a truly egalitarian society, without classes, without contradictions. However, in reality, the egalitarian society remains a dream.

INEQUALITY AND HIERARCHY

Human society is marked by great diversity, be it biological, psychological or social. Individuals or groups may differ either in terms of their biological attributes like age, sex, and race, or psychological attributes like aptitude, intelligence and motivation, or social attributes, such as wealth, power and prestige.

When such different categories of people are treated alike (or equal) and one is not treated as more significant than the other, it is called Social Differentiation. According to Dipankar Gupta, difference or social differentiation is salient when diversity in human society is understood in a ‘qualitative sense’. According to this scheme, categories of individuals or groups are not arranged vertically or hierarchically, but horizontally or even separately. It is because the constitutive elements of these differences are such that any attempt to see them hierarchically would do offence to the logical property of these very elements. Such an arrangement can be easily illustrated in the case of language, religion or nationalities. It would be futile to hierarchize language, or religions or nationalities. India is an appropriate place to demonstrate this. The various languages that are spoken in India speak eloquently of a horizontal categorization where differences are paramount. Secular India again provides an example of religious diversity where religions are not hierarchized or unequally privileged in law, but have the freedom to exist separately in full knowledge of their intrinsic differences.
Inequality is prevalent in almost all known societies

However, the concept of difference or social differentiation offers limited success in understanding the organization of human society in reality and the egalitarian society still remains a dream. All human societies from the simplest to the most complex have some form of social inequality. Inequality is both assumed as a fact of everyday life and denounced as an offence to a civilized society. In particular, power and prestige are unequally distributed between individuals and social groups. In many societies there are also marked differences in the distribution of wealth.

- **Power**: refers to the degree to which individuals or groups can impose their will on others, with or without the consent of those others.
- **Prestige**: relates to the amount of esteem or honour associated with social positions, qualities of individuals and styles of life.
- **Wealth**: refers to material possessions defined as valuable in particular societies.

Please note that when the differences among individuals or groups are recognized but not evaluated or associated with social rewards, then it is called social differentiation. But, when these differences among people are socially evaluated in terms of superiority or inferiority leading to unequal distribution of rewards (wealth, prestige or power) it results in social inequality.

**Hierarchy** is one special form of social inequality, which implies a ranking of individuals or groups according to some criterion of evaluation (for example, wealth, prestige or power) accepted as relevant within the system. According to Louis Dumont, hierarchy implies the regular ordering of a phenomenon on a continuous scale ‘such that the elements of the whole are ranked in relation to the whole’.
It is important to note here that equality of opportunity is a political ideal that is opposed to caste hierarchy but not to hierarchy per se. Hierarchy in itself may either be assigned (ritualistic, based on birth) or achieved (secular, based on merit).

For example, Hindu society in traditional India was divided into five main strata: four varnas or castes, and a fifth group, the outcastes, whose members were known as untouchables. Each caste is subdivided into jatis or sub-castes, which in total number many thousands. Jatis are occupational groups – there are carpenter jatis, goldsmith jatis, potter jatis, and so on.

**Castes are ranked in terms of ritual purity.** The Brahmins or priests, members of the highest caste, personify purity, sanctity and holiness. They are the source of learning, wisdom and truth. Only they can perform the most important religious ceremonies. At the other extreme, untouchable are defined as unclean and impure, a status which affects all their social relationships. They must perform unclean and degrading tasks such as the disposal of dead animals. They must be segregated from members of the caste system and live on the outskirts of villages. Their presence pollutes to the extent that even if the shadow of an untouchable falls across the food of a Brahmin it will render it unclean. In general, the hierarchy of prestige based on notions of ritual purity is mirrored by the hierarchy of power. The Brahmins were custodians of the law, and the legal system which they administered was based largely on their pronouncements. Inequalities of wealth were usually linked to those of prestige and power. In a largely rural economy, the Brahmins tended to be the largest landowners and the control of land was monopolized by members of the two highest castes. Thus, in a caste society, the assignment of individuals to various positions in the social hierarchy is fixed by birth. The child acquires the social status of his or her parents. Social mobility is limited in a caste society, and the process whereby one is admitted to a different level of the hierarchy is open only to some individuals depending on their initial ascriptive social status.

In contrast, in relatively open societies, where equality of opportunity prevails, the assignment of individuals to various positions in the social hierarchy is determined by some form of competitive process, and all members of society are eligible to compete on equal terms. Thus, open societies are marked by hierarchies based on secular dimension.

Thus the basis of hierarchy is unequal distribution of rewards, viz. wealth, prestige and power. So, when these rewards are unequally distributed in a given society, social hierarchy results. Social hierarchy may involve ranking of individuals or ranking of groups.

When social hierarchy involves ranking of groups, we call it social stratification. Social stratification is a particular form of social inequality. It refers to the presence of social groups which are ranked one above the other, usually in terms of the amount of power, prestige and wealth their members possess. Those who belong to a particular group or stratum will have some awareness of common interests and a common identity. They will share a similar life style which to some degree will distinguish them from members of others social strata. Thus, the members of a particular stratum have a common identity, like interests and a similar life style. They enjoy or suffer the unequal distribution of rewards in society as members of different social groups. For example: Indian caste system consists of castes in four Varnas; Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. And a fifth group of ‘Untouchables’. Castes are ranked in terms of ritual purity. The caste system involves a hierarchy of prestige, power and wealth.
Social stratification, however, is only one form of social inequality. **It is possible for social inequality to exist without social strata.** For example, some sociologists have argued that it is no longer correct to regard western industrial society, particularly the USA, as being stratified in terms of a class system. They suggest that social classes have been replaced by a continuous hierarchy of unequal positions. Where there were once classes, whose member had a consciousness of kind, a common way of life and shared interests, there is now an unbroken continuum of occupational statuses which command varying degrees of prestige and economic reward. Thus it is suggested that a hierarchy of social groups has been replaced by a hierarchy of individuals.

Inequality of stratification can exist in 2 ways:
- Cumulative inequality of stratification
- Dispersed inequality of stratification

**Cumulative inequality of stratification** results when the status position of any social group overlaps on all the dimensions of societal rewards, viz. wealth, prestige, power, education, etc. Karl Marx considers that inequality tends to be cumulative in nature.

**Dispersed inequality of stratification** results when a particular social group enjoys high status position on one dimension but does not automatically enjoys similar status position on other dimensions of societal rewards.

For example, traditional caste system, particularly in north India, was marked by cumulative inequality of stratification. Brahmins enjoyed higher position on all axis of societal rewards viz. social prestige, power, education and wealth, while the untouchables occupied the lowest position in the caste hierarchy along these dimensions. However, in modern India, cumulative inequality of stratification has given way to dispersed inequality of stratification on account of various welfare initiatives taken by Indian state such as policy of protective discrimination in educational institutions and government services, land reforms, reserved seats in political institutions, etc. Though Brahmins still occupy high prestige on account of their higher ritual position in the caste hierarchy but in the last few decades several lower caste groups have witnessed upward mobility in terms of education, power and wealth. While modern education, reservation policy and land reforms improved their economic position (land owning castes), their sheer numbers (numerical majority) facilitated their dominance in political sphere. For example, Yadavs of U.P. and Bihar, Chamars of western Uttar Pradesh, Meenas of Rajasthan, etc.

Gerhard Lenski also talks about two related and important concepts:

- **Status crystallization** – is the situation where an individual or a group is high or low on all the three dimensions of social rewards (traditional caste system).

- **Status inconsistency** – results when an individual or a group is high on one dimension, but low on another (caste system in modern India).

Status inconsistency results in the feeling of **relative deprivation → protest → conflict.**

For example, Dr. Ambedkar enjoyed a very high status in terms of his educational qualification yet he, and his caste (Mahar), occupied the lowest status in the ritual hierarchy of the
caste system. Thus, leading to frustration, collective mobilization and protest against the inhuman and exploitative caste system. Ambedkar called for the annihilation of the caste system for the emancipation of Dalits. Thus, the emergence of Dalit movement could be best accounted by status inconsistency and feeling of relative deprivation. However, this is only one of the explanations for the rise of Dalit movement.

Andre Beteille talks about two types of stratification systems:

**Harmonic system of stratification** is the one in which the norms and values of society legitimize social inequality.

For example, traditional caste system – *Purushasukta* hymn of the tenth mandala of the Rig Veda – The *Purushashukta* hymn of Rigveda tells us that the *brahmana* emanated from the mouth of the primeval man (*Brahma*), the *kshatriya* from his arms, the *vaishya* from his thighs and the *shudra* from his feet. The particular limbs associated with these divisions and the order in which they are mentioned probably indicate their status in the society of the time, though no such interpretation is directly given in the hymn. In this particular account of the creation not only is the origin of the classes interpreted theologically, but also a divine justification is sought to be given to their functions and status. This may be a *post facto* rationalization of the occupations and of the positions that the various groups came to occupy in the social hierarchy.

Through its *Guna* theory, Brahmanism seeks to justify the social hierarchy of varna system (hitherto taken for granted) in terms of different qualities and capacities of the individuals. In the *Bhagavadgita* the Creator is said to have apportioned the duties and functions of the four varnas according to the inherent qualities and capacities of the individuals. This theory claims that all existing things, animated and inanimated, inherent three qualities (*Gunas*) in different apportionment. *Sattva* qualities include wisdom, intelligence, honesty, goodness and other positive qualities. *Rajas* include qualities like passion, pride, valour and other passionate qualities. *Tamas* qualities include dullness, stupidity, lack of creativity and other negative qualities. Thus, brahmans are predominated by *sattvaguna*, kshatriyas by *rajasguna*, vaishyas by *rajas* and *tamasguna* and shudras by *tamasguna*. Of course, this theory fails to explain how the individuals at the very beginning of creation came to be possessed of peculiar qualities and capacities. This theory of origin, though it slurs over the above difficulty, tries to provide a rational sanction for the manifestly arbitrary divisions. God separated the people into four varnas, not merely because they were created from different limbs of his body nor again out of his will, but because he found them endowed with different qualities and capacities.

With the *doctrine of Karma*, the lawgivers of the age propagated the view that the conscientious practice of the duties proper to one’s own varna, led to a birth in a higher varna and thus to salvation. (After having legitimized the caste-based inequality, lawmakers of the age sought to reinforce it with the doctrine of *Karma*. However, interestingly, the *Karma* theory instead of being inner-worldly, tended to be other-worldly in its effect.)

Thus, the prevailing norms and values of society in the traditional caste system legitimized as well as reinforced social inequality on various grounds and by various means. Beteille argues that inequalities in such a system do not generate conflict. Conflict in harmonic system of stratification is minimal and does not threaten the existence or stability of the system.
Disharmonic system of stratification is the one in which norms and values of society prescribe equality but in reality there is inequality. In other words, while the normative order prescribes equality, the existential reality is marked by inequality.

For example, in modern India, the constitution (normative order) enshrines the values of equality, liberty and fraternity but the contemporary reality is marked by gross socio-economic inequalities, political marginalization, prejudices and discrimination.

This generates high aspirations among the people, giving rise to the sense of relative deprivation, protest and radical social movements. Beteille argues that disharmonic system of stratification is marked by greater conflict (Naxalite-Maoist insurgency, SIMI (Students Islamic Movement of India), etc.)

NATURAL VERSUS SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

In social sciences, the question of the relationship between biologically based and socially created inequality has proved extremely difficult to answer. For example, many stratification systems are accompanied by beliefs which state that social inequalities are biologically based. Such beliefs are often found in systems of racial stratification where, for example, Whites claim biological superiority over Blacks and see this as the basis for their dominance.

The French Philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau provided one of the earliest examinations of this question. He refers to biologically based inequality as ‘natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind or the soul’. By comparison, socially created inequality ‘consists of the different privileges which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others, such as that of being more rich, more honored, more powerful, or even in a position to exact obedience’. Rousseau believed that biologically based inequalities between men were small and relatively unimportant whereas socially created inequalities provide the major basis for systems of social stratification. Most sociologists would support this view.

However, it could still be argued that biological inequalities, no matter how small, provide the foundation upon which structures of social inequality are built. This position is difficult to defend in the case of certain forms of stratification. In the caste system, an individual’s status is fixed by birth. A person belongs to his parents’ jati and automatically follows the occupation of the jati into which he was born. Thus no matter what the biologically based aptitudes and capacities of an untouchable, there is no way he can become a Brahmin. Unless it is assumed that superior genes are permanently located in the Brahmin caste, and there is no evidence that this is the case, then there is probably no relationship between genetically based and socially created inequality in traditional Hindu society. The rise of Ambedkar, for example, defies the very logic of the argument of any biological basis of social inequality.

A similar argument can be advanced in connection with the feudal or estate system of medieval Europe. Stratification in the feudal system was based on landholding. The more land an individual controlled, the greater his wealth, power and prestige. The position of the dominant stratum, the feudal nobility, was based on large grants of land from the king. Their status was hereditary, land and titles being passed on from father to son. It is difficult to sustain the argument
that feudal lords ultimately owed their position to biological superiority when a son, no matter what his biological make-up, inherited the status of his father.

The most stubborn defense of the biological argument has been provided for systems of racial stratification. In the USA, Black Americans, who make up 12% of the population, have traditionally formed a distinct social stratum at the base of the stratification system. The majority of Blacks occupied the most menial and subservient occupational statuses, being employed as agricultural labourers and as unskilled and semiskilled manual workers in industry. In the mid-1960s, the average income for Black families was only 54% of the average for White families. Blacks had little political power being scarcely represented in local and national government: in 1962, in the southern states, only six Blacks were elected to public office. This system of racial stratification has often been explained in terms of the supposed genetically based inferiority of Blacks. In particular, it has been argued that Blacks are innately inferior to Whites in terms of intelligence. ‘Scientific’ support for this view has been provided by intelligence tests which indicate that on average Blacks score fifteen points below Whites.

However, most sociologists would argue that systems of racial stratification have a social rather than a biological basis. They would maintain that systematic discrimination against Blacks, made possible by the power of the dominant stratum, accounts for the system of racial stratification in USA. Thus Blacks have been excluded from high status occupations because of lack of power rather than the quality of their genes. Support for this view is provided by evidence from the late 1960s and 1970s. During the mid-1960s, in the USA, laws were passed banning racial discrimination in areas such as employment, politics and education. Blacks are now moving out of the lowest stratum in ever increasing numbers. By 1971, seventy Blacks were elected to political office in the southern states. Although the figure is small, it represents a dramatic increase. Black family income is slowly approaching the White average. From 1960 to 1970, the %age of Blacks employed in professional, managerial and technical occupations rose steadily and in some cases doubled. This evidence suggests that social rather than biological mechanisms were responsible for traditional status of Blacks in USA.

The question of the relationship between intelligence and social inequality is particularly difficult to answer. The average intelligence quotient of Blacks in America is still significantly below that of Whites. In addition, Blacks are still disproportionately represented in the lower levels of the stratification system. Since it is generally agreed that intelligence has a genetic component, can it not be argued that social inequality has a biological basis? A few preliminary remarks can be made to refute this view. Firstly, intelligence is based on both genetic and environmental factors; the two are inseparable. Thus an individual’s social background will affect his performance in an IQ test. In particular, the deprivations he experiences as a member of a low social stratum will reduce his IQ score. Secondly, many researchers argue that intelligence tests are based on White middle-class knowledge and skills and are therefore biased against Blacks. Thirdly, the tests measure only a small part of the range of mental abilities. Most sociologists would therefore conclude that the social status of Blacks in the USA is the result of a social rather than a biological mechanism.

So far the question of what exactly constitutes biological inequality has not been answered. It can be argued that biological differences become biological inequalities when men define them as such. Thus Andre Beteille states that, ‘Natural inequality is based on differences in quality, and qualities are not just there, so to say, in nature; they are as human beings have
defined them, in different societies, in different historical epochs’. Biological factors assume significance in many stratification systems because of the meanings assigned to them by different cultures. For example, old age has very different meanings in different societies. In traditional aborigine societies in Australia it brought high prestige and power since the elders directed the affairs of the tribe. But in Western societies, the elderly are usually pensioned off and old age assumes a very different meaning. Even with a change of name to senior citizen, the status of old age pensioner commands little power or prestige. So-called racial characteristics are evaluated on the basis of similar principles, that is values which are relative to time and place. The physical characteristic of Blacks in America were traditionally defined as undesirable and associated with a range of negative qualities. However, with the rise of Black Power during the late 1960s, this evaluation was slowly changed with slogans such as ‘Black is beautiful’. It can therefore be argued that biological differences become biological inequalities only to the extent that they are defined as such. They form a component of some social stratification systems simply because members of those systems select certain characteristics and evaluate them in a particular way. Andre Beteille argues that the search for a biological basis for social stratification is bound to end in failure since the ‘identification as well as the gradation of qualities is a cultural and not a natural process’.

Beliefs which state that systems of social stratification are based on biological inequalities can be seen as rationalizations for those systems. Such beliefs serve to explain the system to its members: they make social inequality appear rational and reasonable. They therefore justify and legitimate the system by appeals to nature. In this way a social contrivance appears to be founded on the natural order of things.

Thus, when natural or social differences, come to be socially evaluated or associated with social rewards (wealth, power, prestige), social hierarchy results, giving rise to natural or social inequality.

POVERTY

According to the World Bank, in 2010, an estimated 2.4 billion people lived on less than $2 US per day (World Bank, 2013). The World Health Organization reported in 2011 that 25,000 children under age 5 die each day as a result of their impoverished status (Partnership, 2011), and some 57 million poor children of primary school age were not in the classroom in 2013 (UNESCO, 2013). Virtually every nation (and indeed every international governmental organization) expresses concern about this issue, even if it does not identify it as a top priority. Still, as of 2007, 80 percent of the world's population lived in nations in which income differentials are widening, signifying that antipoverty efforts have yet to have a significant impact (Shah, 2013).

Defining poverty has always been something of an arbitrary undertaking, relative to the field in which it is being studied. For the purposes of analyzing poverty from a sociological standpoint, for instance, poverty may be defined as the state in which an individual lacks the resources or capabilities to participate in and contribute to a society. This approach is distinctive from economic definitions, which center more on the individual's income and expenditures (such as the measurements of impoverishment employed by the World Bank) as the target for analysis. The sociological approach to examining the causes of poverty stem from a review of the external elements that affect the individual's status; poverty, therefore, is relative to the geographic location in which the individual lives as well as the context in which that individual lives within the society (Smeeding, 2002).
Sociological theories about poverty generally fall into two ideological frameworks. Liberal-leaning thinkers tend to view poverty as the product of systemic failure to provide the needed resources and tools for citizens to avoid falling into (or to reemerge from) poverty. Conservatives, on the other hand, see poverty as the result of individual choice or misstep, failing to take advantage of the resources and tools they need to get out of poverty.

Much sociological theory is directed at understanding social change. Social theorists throughout history have rarely talked about poverty as such, but nonetheless their insights into the economic ordering and structure of society offer valuable ideas for understanding poverty. Marx and Engels, writing in Victorian Britain, pointed to the stark divide between the impoverished working classes who had nothing to sell but their labour and the capitalist classes who, by virtue of owning the means of production, were able to exploit this labour to their profit.

Sociologist Max Weber, writing around the turn of the 20th century, pointed to the importance not just of economic factors in producing and sustaining inequality, but also the influence of power, status and prestige in perpetuating dominant relations. Emile Durkheim, on the other hand, emphasised the functional necessity of social inequality for the well-being of society. Echoes of these early theoretical ideas can be seen in sociological thinking, to a greater or lesser degree, right up to the present day.
Poverty and the ‘undeserving poor’

Much sociological thinking on poverty, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, has revolved around the relative importance of social structures and individual agency in explaining the prevalence and perpetuation of poverty over time. The social and political propensity to mark out some people as being somehow responsible for their own hardship has a long history. In many accounts, particularly popular and political ones but also some academic studies, the emphasis has been on the supposedly ‘undeserving poor’, citing individual behaviours, supposed fecklessness or moral failings as key causes of poverty.

More recently, it has been argued that the welfare system is responsible for encouraging and supporting claimants into welfare dependency. Further recent variations of these ideas point to ‘culture of worklessness’, ‘troubled families’ or families who have never worked as key explanations for poverty. Sociologists have been keen to use empirical evidence to challenge these dominant, individual and often psychological explanations for poverty. They point to the importance of the broader context and the kinds of opportunities open to people as being more important than individual behaviours and choices in explaining and understanding poverty.

The close association made between poverty and individual behaviours means that it can sometimes be difficult to disentangle poverty from related issues such as unemployment or receipt of welfare. This is especially the case in some current popular and political discourse, which ignores the fact that not all unemployed people are poor and nor are all of those experiencing poverty out of work. The tendency to conflate poverty with other social issues such as unemployment, welfare receipt or substance abuse, or to uncritically cite these conditions as explanations of poverty, is tied up with the tendency to portray poverty as a problem created by those experiencing it. It is also indicative of a more general tendency to downplay the significance of poverty altogether.

The ‘cultural turn’, consumption and social class

Sociologists use the concept of social class extensively in their research, and most agree that social class has an economic base. In recent years, some have argued that social class distinctions have become more complex and fuzzy and less significant for lifestyles and life experiences. It has been suggested that opportunities for identity formation have opened up and become more reflective of individual choice than they were in the past. It is argued that individuals now have greater control over their own destinies. Consumption practices (what people buy and consume) are often cited as a key mechanism by which people can demonstrate their individuality and create their own individual identities.

Consumption, however, has also become an increasingly important element of distinction and stratification. Those experiencing poverty often find it difficult to partake in expected consumption behaviours. Furthermore, wider society often subjects the spending habits and patterns of those in the greatest poverty to stigmatisation.

So, while access to consumption might seem to open up opportunities for people to construct their lifestyles and identities in ways reflecting their own individual preferences and choices, it can also reinforce and support social class divisions and distinctions. Furthermore, social class positioning continues to be an important influence on many, if not all, aspects of people’s lives, including educational attainment, jobs and leisure activities.
Poverty, stigma and shame

Poverty and material deprivation are important drivers of stigma and shame. The depiction of those in poverty as ‘the other’ often occurs through the use of particular language, labels and images about what it means to be in poverty. These processes take place at different levels and in different sections of society. Those working in welfare sectors, for example, might negatively – and mostly mistakenly – point to individual character traits and behaviour when explaining the key reasons for unemployment. This is a process of negatively stereotyping those who are disadvantaged. While these labels are often applied from the top down, towards those experiencing poverty by those who are not, people in poverty can also buy into and perpetuate such stereotypes and stigmatisation. This is the consequence of the pressure those in poverty face to disassociate themselves from the stigma and shame associated with poverty.

Capitalism and the changing labour market

For a long time, successive governments have lauded work as the best route out of poverty. Yet the changing face of the labour market and work itself means that employment is no longer a guaranteed passport away from poverty, if indeed it ever was. In the current context, working conditions for many have worsened, public sector jobs have rapidly declined, unemployment and underemployment have been increasing, and low-paid and part-time work have proliferated. Low-paid work, or ‘poor work’ as it is sometimes referred to, is now an integral and growing aspect of the contemporary labour market. It is a particular problem for those countries which have followed an economy based on aggressive free-market principles. As a result, in-work poverty is an increasingly important explanation for contemporary poverty.

Poverty, Prejudice & Racism

In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson declared a “war on poverty” shortly after assuming the presidency. Assembling the Kerner Commission, Johnson sent a team of experts to review what was a significant issue in the United States. Their first report focused not on a wide range of social groups suffering from poverty, but instead on a single social group — blacks. The report assessed crime among black communities and a legacy of discrimination rather than the overall economy or the other factors that can contribute to continued impoverishment ("Economic, social and family factors craft inner city hurdles," 2008). By doing so, critics have since argued, the Johnson administration missed an important opportunity to address a broad-reaching issue.

One cannot deny that poverty levels are much higher on average among blacks and other minority groups than among Caucasians. In the United States, 25.8 percent of black Americans, 23.3 percent of Hispanics, and 27 percent of American Indians lived below the poverty line between 2007 and 2011; in comparison, only 11.6 percent of whites and 11.7 percent of Asians were living in similar economic conditions (Macartney, Bishaw & Fontenot, 2013).
Underlying Government Disparities?

The disparities among racial and ethnic groups living in poverty lead many scholars to assert that the government system in question distributes resources and services on an unequal basis. In fact, many conclude that undercurrents of racism lend to social stratification.

There is a considerable amount of evidence that might support such theories, spanning across a broad range of characteristics of poverty. One study of poverty in the United States suggests that monetary policy designed to bolster the labor markets falls short of protecting all social groups: An underlying theme of discrimination among policymakers leads to a lack of protections for various races, leaving them unprotected during times of economic downturn and likely to experience shorter tenures of employment (Rodgers, 2008). Another area of systemic inequality exists in housing disparities in the US — according to census data, 73 percent of whites were classified as homeowners in mid-2013 as compared to 42 percent of blacks and 46 percent of Hispanics (Callis & Kresin, 2013). One study revealed that three out of every four residents of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty were either black or Hispanic (Little, 2008).

International Examples

In Europe, a steady increase in immigration has brought myriad low-income racial and ethnic groups into major urban centers. To some, blame for the impoverished economic and social status of these groups rests on their intransigence. In one editorial, the author lamented that "Europe's current social problems stem, in part, from an increasingly Islamicized immigrant population that is ambivalent about integrating fully into secular French, Dutch, or German culture".

In what has long been considered the clearest example of racial disparity, South Africa has taken great strides to undo the inequities put into place during the apartheid era. Since that government gave way to a democratic regime led by blacks in the early 1990s, there remains an overwhelming sense of inequity in income and labor markets. There is also a much lower rate of upward mobility among blacks than whites in the formerly segregated nation (Liebbrandt & Woolard, 2001).

Racism: A Cause Of Poverty?

Is racism to blame for poverty in a multicultural/multiracial society? This question has been asked throughout modern history, with an equal number of reasonable studies exploring the issue on both sides. Certainly, the overwhelming majority of impoverished social groups in such systems around the world seem heavily populated by so-called minorities. In 1962, Michael Harrington suggested that long-standing structural and cultural racism in the United States played a role in stratifying society, with people of color and certain ethnicities on the lower end of the spectrum. In his seminal work, The Other America, he argued that racism has permeated society in such a way that poverty became something of a tradition, handed down from generation to generation (Wolf, 2007).

Then again, the fact that most industrialized nations are taking dramatic steps to undo the remnants of racism and ethnocentrism from their institutions and yet poverty rates have by and large only plateaued (in some locations, they continue to increase) suggests that there may be other factors at work. This paper next turns to a review of the heaviest geographic concentrations of poor in the world, offering evidence of other factors at play.
The Geography of Poverty

There is little argument that poverty occurs in every society, from underdeveloped nations to the wealthiest countries. Still, the study of poverty, at least from a sociological perspective, hinges on an important fact: Poverty usually can be tracked to a physical location or set thereof within a larger system.

The idea of geography as a major contributor to poverty (and for that matter, wealth) is not new. In the latter eighteenth century, Scottish economist Adam Smith postulated that the best way to develop a successful, healthy economy is to implement a free-market system. Smith's theory can be quickly supported, as nations of North America, western Europe, Australia, and East Asia, all free-market economies, are among the wealthiest in the world. In fact, of the top 1 percent of the wealthiest individuals in the world, half reside in the United States (Milanović, 2011).

Conclusion

Sociology provides a powerful tool for thinking about poverty. ‘Thinking sociologically’ can help us to better comprehend social issues and problems. It allows us to understand personal troubles as part of the economic and political institutions of society, and permits us to cast a critical eye over issues that may otherwise be interpreted simplistically or misinterpreted. In looking at poverty, myths and misconceptions dominate both popular and political discussions. Sociological thinking can be helpful in trying to disentangle poverty from a range of related concepts and largely pejorative discussions about a variety of social problems.

Some attention has recently been devoted to the discussion of rising inequality. In the current context, economic inequality is getting more extreme, with those at the very top growing ever richer while the majority are finding life increasingly harsh and poverty rates are increasing. Much of the sociological evidence reviewed in this study has been concerned with the reproduction of (social class) inequalities over time. Research has shown that the majority of the British public accept that wealth can buy opportunities, but conversely most also believe in the notion of a meritocracy and that hard work is the best way to get on in life. Yet evidence shows that true equality of opportunity simply does not exist.

Using a framework of inequality (and equality) allows scope to think more closely about issues of class perpetuation and their relationship with poverty. It is not happenchance that countries with low rates of relative income poverty tend to have a strong focus on equality. Sociological theory can alert people to how a growing emphasis on individual responsibility and behaviour might make class inequality and the importance of opportunity structures less obvious. Despite this, it remains the case that where people start out in life continues to have a significant influence on where they are likely to end up. Starting out life in poverty means a greater risk of poverty later on in life.
SOCIAL EXCLUSION

In almost all human societies, exclusion in some or the other form exists. Certain groups or individuals are excluded from the mainstream society. They are deprived of some opportunities which are needed for the full blossom of human life. While, the way in which individuals or groups are excluded is context-specific, certain social differences continue to serve as grounds for exclusion. These differences include belonging to a particular ethnic, religious, caste, gender, or age group; or living in a particular geographic area; or having certain physical or mental disabilities. Various forms of social differences overlap and intersect in complex ways over time.

Compared with established concepts such as poverty, class or social mobility, social exclusion has a relatively short history. The term itself was coined in the 1970s by French politician Rene Lenoir to describe that section of the French population that had been cut-off or marginalized from mainstream society and had slipped through the ‘welfare net’. The concept has particular resonance in countries which share with France a Republic tradition, in which social cohesion is held to be essential in maintaining the contract on which society is founded.

Social exclusion terminology was adopted at a European Union level in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Right-wing governments, including the Thatcher government in the UK, did not recognize the existence of poverty in their own countries, while commentators on the left were becoming increasingly concerned about the social polarization associated with rapidly growing income inequality. By the 1980s, the concept had a prominent place in the European political agenda and today, the European Social Charter guarantees all citizens of the European Union protection against poverty and social exclusion. By the mid-1990s, use of the term ‘social exclusion’ by Labour politicians in the UK was commonplace, and the Social Exclusion Unit was set up shortly after the 1997 General Election. Please note that while poverty and income inequality were high on the agenda of Old Labour in UK, social exclusion was the central theme of New Labour. New Labour in UK, for example Tony Blair, was keen to establish that social exclusion was more than traditional ‘poverty’. It is more damaging to individual self esteem, corrosive for society as a whole and is more likely to be passed down from generation to generation than material poverty.

In the international arena, the United Nations Development Programme has been at the forefront of attempts to conceptualize social exclusion across the developed and developing world. A series of country studies led to the formulation of a rights-focused approach, which regards social exclusion as lack of access to the institutions of civil society (legal and political systems), and to the basic levels of education, health, and financial well-being necessary to make access to those institutions a reality.

There are a multitude of definitions of social exclusion but no single official definition of the concept exists, and apart from the shared notions of marginalization and non-participation, particular definitions often emphasize different aspects of exclusion. The Social Exclusion Unit described social exclusion as ‘what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown’.
The statement alerts us to the possibility that communities and not simply individuals can experience social exclusion. In addition, different forms of exclusion are cumulative and do not stand in isolation from each other. They are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. For example, poor health can impact on employability or family breakdown may impact on a child’s educational performance and poor quality housing can undermine physical and mental health. Ruth Levitas focuses on this interconnectedness and the multidimensional nature of social exclusion. There is also an acknowledgement that exclusion is not just an individual experience but has wider implications related to the question social cohesion.

Ruth Levitas argues that social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional process. It involves the denial or lack of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability to participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in society, whether in economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion society as a whole.

Walker and Walker, drawing on T H Marshall’s framework, identify social exclusion as denial of citizenship. They recognize that exclusion is not simply an absolute state but that it has gradations: The dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any social, economic, political and cultural systems which determine the social integration of a person in society. Social exclusion may, therefore, be seen as the denial (or non-realization) of the civil, political and social rights of citizenship.

Social exclusion: a more powerful concept than poverty?

How useful is the concept of 'social exclusion' and does it have greater explanatory power than poverty? Similarly, does social exclusion offer us enhanced insights into the experiences of marginalized group and communities? Many would argue that poverty is a narrower, more limited concept than social exclusion. Poverty focuses essentially on the distribution of material resources, on matters related to income, wealth and consumption. Social exclusion is a broader, more multidimensional notion which focuses on economic, political, cultural and social detachment (Walker and Walker, 1997).

G.J. Room has argued that the notion of poverty is primarily focused upon distributional issues: the lack of resources at the disposal of an individual or household. In contrast, notions such as social exclusion focus primarily on relational issues: in other words, adequate social participation, lack of integration and lack of power, etc.

Poverty and social exclusion often go hand in hand. Poverty is frequently a significant element in social exclusion and can trigger social exclusion. However, the relationship is contingent rather than categorical; someone can be socially excluded without being poor. For example, there is no evidence that the experience of sexual minorities is essentially defined by poverty. Nevertheless, their lives continue to be defined by a social, cultural and political exclusion. They continue to be vulnerable to hate crimes and have their sexuality denied legitimacy. Likewise, not all people with a physical disability may be poor but will experience a degree of social exclusion, most obviously a lack of accessibility which impacts on their mobility and on social relations. Some elderly people may not be poor but in an ageist society they will experience a degree of social exclusion. The value of social exclusion lies in the fact that it offers explanatory insights beyond that of poverty.
Social exclusion and mental health

The Social Exclusion Unit report described people with mental health issues as ‘one of the most excluded groups in society’. It is clear that the concept of poverty fails to capture and explain their experience, although poverty is often part of their lives.

For some of us, an episode of mental distress will disrupt our lives so that we are pushed out of the society in which we were fully participating. For others, the early onset of distress will mean social exclusion throughout our adult lives, with no prospect of training for a job or a future in meaningful employment. Loneliness and loss of self-worth lead us to believe we are useless, and so we live with this sense of hopelessness, or far too often chose to end our lives. Repeatedly when we become ill we lose our homes, we lose our jobs and we lose our sense of identity.

The severity of the social exclusion experienced by people with a mental health problem is well documented – poor physical health, high level of unemployment, social isolation, vulnerability to stigma and suspicion. The Social Exclusion Unit recognized that these deprivations are interconnected and may form a ‘cycle of deprivation’. Some elements in this cycle are particularly significant. In terms of work, it has been said that there is greater discrimination against those with a record of mental illness than those with a criminal record. People with mental health problem have one of the lowest employment rates of all disabled groups. Unemployment can be an important driver of social exclusion as it often has significant financial, social and psychological implication. Financially, unemployment means restricted power to consume in a society in which consumption is an important source of status. Exclusion from employment means a loss of, or reduced, social networks and psychologically, our sense of identity, our sense of self, is often defined by our occupation. As Secker argues:

In addition to the negative impact on confidence, self-esteem and mental health itself, unemployment can result in restricted income, fewer opportunities to meet other people or develop skill, and loss of a productive identity that, for many people, is central to a sense of belonging within society.

Through such studies, one begins to develop a sense of the intensity of social exclusion experienced by people with mental health problems.

The concept of social exclusion alerts us to dynamic and complex process; the way in which different forms of deprivation do not exist independent of each other but interact and are mutually reinforcing. Poor mental health can be both a cause and consequence of social exclusion, and mental illness can cause or intensify social exclusion; similarly, social exclusion can deepen mental illness. While the concept of poverty will remain a vital tool for student of social policy, social exclusion expands the realm of our enquiries into issues of marginalization and disadvantage that may not be related to income and wealth.

Competing discourses of social exclusion

There is no simple, single, accepted definition of social exclusion and the concept implies diverse things to different people with politicians of different political persuasions seeking to
harness the concept for diverse ends. There are competing discourses of social exclusion which variably stress that the causes of social exclusion may be seen as being located at the level of the individual, the family, or locally, nationally or even globally.

Ruth Levitas (2005) has made an important contribution to our understanding and identifies three discourses of social exclusion. Please note that social exclusion discourses are underpinned by different assumptions about the way in which society is structured and the distribution of power within it. They offer opposing accounts of the causes and extent of, and solutions to, social exclusion.

The first discourse identified by Levitas is a Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD). Here, individuals and communities are seen as deviant, immoral, impulsive, welfare dependent, unhealthy and criminal. Often, poor parenting and the notion of the dysfunctional family is implicated. Deviant values and norms are passed from generation to generation (deviant culture). There is often a spatial dimension to this discourse, with an identified ‘underclass’ concentrated in deprived neighbourhoods, characterized by high levels of crime, poverty, unemployment and poor health, and low levels of educational attainment. This kind of analysis, notably associated with the work of American political scientist Charles Murray, has attracted a powerful sociological and political critique. It is worth noting that cultures do not develop in a vacuum but can be understood as a response to a particular set of material conditions. In other words, individuals or communities cannot be understood in isolation from their relationship to wider societal structures and groups. The application of a MUD-type discourse is ideologically driven and diverts attention away from social divisions such as ‘race’ and ‘class’, which are rendered insignificant in explaining and understanding the deviance and social protest.

The second discourse identified by Levitas is the Social Integrationist Discourse (SID). Here, social exclusion is viewed primarily as a consequence of exclusion from the paid labour market. SID was at the forefront of New Labour’s attack on social exclusion where access to paid work was seen as the most effective way of overcoming social exclusion and entry into the labour market was considered to be the key to inclusion. It was stated that ‘The best defence against social exclusion is having a job, and the best way to get a job is to have a good education, with the right training and experience’. Under New Labour’s conditional welfare state, welfare policy became a way of integrating people into the labour market. This strategy involved using a mixture of ‘carrots’ such as benefit incentives, and ‘sticks’, i.e. the threat of a reduction or withdrawal of benefits for those who failed to recognize their responsibilities to work. There is a moral dimension to SID, as paid work is seen to offer more than simply income. The employed citizen is a ‘responsible’ citizen and exposure to the discipline of the workplace is viewed as important because it is said to give a structure to unemployed people’s lives.

The idea that work is the key to social inclusion has an attractive simplicity but Levitas herself is less than convinced. A social integrationist discourse seems to suggest that those in employment are equally included but this ignores the hierarchical structure of the paid labour market and the fact that much work is poorly paid, insecure and casual and that many people who work hard remain in poverty despite their best efforts. It makes no reference to the status of the working poor – those who remain poor in spite of being in paid work. Inclusion in the labour market through marginal, low paid, insecure jobs under poor working conditions does not constitute genuine poverty free social inclusion. Also, work within this discourse is very narrowly defined – it is paid work. Levitas argues that many of those excluded are employed. They are
simply not in paid employment; rather they are engaged in informal, familial, ‘caring’ work. Such work, generally carried out by women, is often invisible, undervalued and unrecognized. More broadly, a SID lacks sociological rigour. It closes down analysis prematurely by failing to consider adequately the structural causes of unemployment.

In the third discourse identified by Levitas, the **Redistributionist Discourse** (RED), a social exclusion is viewed as a consequence of poverty and structural inequality. If SID was a defining idea of New Labour, then RED is associated with Old Labour and socialism. Here, poverty is not seen as a residual problem but as an inevitable product of capitalism. Social exclusion is therefore rooted in de-industrialization, global economic change and a rolling back of the welfare state. The other two discourses, i.e. MUD and SID, are seen as distraction or diversions which shift attention from the broader processes that cause social exclusion. New questions begin to emerge under RED, about power and the way it is exercised. If someone is excluded, than someone or something is doing the excluding. The focus is on the structural causes of that exclusion, and not simply the operation of the labour market or the individual ‘immorality’ of the excluded.

If the causes of social exclusion are seen as structural, then structural change is required to counter it, for example a programme of redistribution (through state intervention) including a reform of the taxation system and an expansion of welfare benefits and public services: ‘RED broadens out from its concern with poverty into a critique of inequality, and contrasts exclusion with a version of citizenship which calls for substantial redistribution of power and wealth’. RED offers a radically different perspective on the social disturbances, refuting any notion of ‘pure criminality’. Thus rioting or any form of social protest is not simply a meaningless, abnormal phenomenon but is deeply rooted in the history and culture of a given society. Social protest can be understood as a form of political action – as a meaningful, if chaotic, protest by those who are socially excluded.

It is important to recognize Levitas’ discourses as artificial constructs. They are ideal type accounts – grounded in reality but not capturing the diversity and complexity of that reality; nonetheless they have heuristic value and offer a framework to develop competing understanding of social exclusion. Thus it would be misleading to suggest, in a simple way, that MUD is a discourse of the New Right, or SID of New Labour or RED of Old Labour; the reality of policy is more complex.

It is important to go beyond the simple binary (i.e. consisting of only two parts) divisions in our understanding of social exclusion. For example, mental illness may be the defining experience of a person or group but it does not exist in isolation from other aspects of difference, and people with mental health issues are not a homogenous group. The experience of a person with mental illness may also be defined by their class, gender, ethnicity, etc. In other words, mental illness can be an important driver of social exclusion but when this condition is associated with membership of an ethnic minority community, for example, that exclusion can be sharpened and even more debilitating.

Finally, social exclusion is not simply an issue for the socially excluded. It has wider significance for issues of equality, citizenship, social stability and cohesion. **Social exclusion is not just a problem for those who are excluded; it is a problem for social structure and social**
solidarity generally. If significant numbers of people are excluded...then social order will likely become more polarized and unequal – and ultimately perhaps more unstable for all.

Defining Social Exclusion

Social exclusion, or social marginalisation, is the social disadvantage and relegation to the fringe of society. It is a term used widely in Europe and was first used in France. It is used across disciplines including education, sociology, psychology, politics and economics.

Social exclusion is the process in which individuals or people are systematically blocked from (or denied full access to) various rights, opportunities and resources that are normally available to members of a different group, and which are fundamental to social integration and observance of human rights within that particular group (e.g., housing, employment, healthcare, civic engagement, democratic participation, and due process).

Alienation or disenfranchisement resulting from social exclusion can be connected to a person's social class, race, skin color, religious affiliation, ethnic origin, educational status, childhood relationships, living standards, or appearance. Such exclusionary forms of discrimination may also apply to people with a disability, minorities, LGBTQ+ people, drug users, institutional care leavers, the elderly and the young. Anyone who appears to deviate in any way from perceived norms of a population may thereby become subject to coarse or subtle forms of social exclusion.

The outcome of social exclusion is that affected individuals or communities are prevented from participating fully in the economic, social, and political life of the society in which they live. This may result to a resistance in form of demonstrations, protests, or lobbying from the excluded people.

Most of the characteristics listed in this article are present together in studies of social exclusion, due to exclusion's multidimensionality.

Another way of articulating the definition of social exclusion is as follows: Social exclusion is a multidimensional process of progressive social rupture, detaching groups and individuals from social relations and institutions and preventing them from full participation in the normal, normatively prescribed activities of the society in which they live.

In an alternative conceptualization, social exclusion theoretically emerges at the individual or group level on four correlated dimensions: insufficient access to social rights, material deprivation, limited social participation and a lack of normative integration. It is then regarded as the combined result of personal risk factors (age, gender, race); macro-societal changes (demographic, economic and labor market developments, technological innovation, the evolution of social norms); government legislation and social policy; and the actual behavior of businesses, administrative ogranisations and fellow citizens.

Individual exclusion

"The marginal man...is one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic cultures....his mind is the crucible in which two different and refractory cultures may be said to melt and, either wholly or in part, fuse."

Social exclusion at the individual level results in an individual's exclusion from meaningful participation in society. An example is the exclusion of single mothers from the welfare system prior to welfare reforms of the 1900s. The modern welfare system is based on the concept of entitlement to
the basic means of being a productive member of society both as an organic function of society and as compensation for the socially useful labor provided. A single mother's contribution to society is not based on formal employment, but on the notion that provision of welfare for children is a necessary social expense. In some career contexts, caring work is devalued and motherhood is seen as a barrier to employment. Single mothers were previously marginalized in spite of their significant role in the socializing of children due to views that an individual can only contribute meaningfully to society through "gainful" employment as well as a cultural bias against unwed mothers. When the father's sole task was seen as the breadwinner, his marginalization was primarily a function of class condition. Solo fatherhood brings additional trials due to society being less accepting of males 'getting away with' not working and the general invisibility/lack of acknowledgement of single fathers in society. Acknowledgement of the needs participatory fathers may have can be found by examining the changes from the original clinical report on the father's role published by the American Academy of Pediatrics in May 2004. Eight week paternity leave is a good example of one social change. Child health care providers have an opportunity to have a greater influence on the child and family structure by supporting fathers and enhancing a father's involvement.

More broadly, many women face social exclusion. Moosa-Mitha discusses the Western feminist movement as a direct reaction to the marginalization of white women in society. Women were excluded from the labor force and their work in the home was not valued. Feminists argued that men and women should equally participate in the labor force, in the public and private sector, and in the home. They also focused on labor laws to increase access to employment as well as to recognize child-rearing as a valuable form of labor. In some places today, women are still marginalized from executive positions and continue to earn less than men in upper management positions.

Another example of individual marginalization is the exclusion of individuals with disabilities from the labor force. Grandz discusses an employer's viewpoint about hiring individuals living with disabilities as jeopardizing productivity, increasing the rate of absenteeism, and creating more accidents in the workplace. Cantor also discusses employer concern about the excessively high cost of accommodating people with disabilities. The marginalization of individuals with disabilities is prevalent today, despite the legislation intended to prevent it in most western countries, and the academic achievements, skills and training of many disabled people.

There are also exclusions of lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender (LGBT) and other intersexual people because of their sexual orientations and gender identities. The Yogyakarta Principles require that the states and communities abolish any stereotypes about LGBT people as well as stereotyped gender roles.

"Isolation is common to almost every vocational, religious or cultural group of a large city. Each develops its own sentiments, attitudes, codes, even its own words, which are at best only partially intelligible to others.

**Community exclusion**

Many communities experience social exclusion, such as racial (e.g., black) (e.g., Untouchables or Low Castes or Dalits in Indian Caste System) and economic (e.g. Romani) communities.

One example is the Aboriginal community in Australia. Marginalization of Aboriginal communities is a product of colonization. As a result of colonialism, Aboriginal communities lost their land, were forced into destitute areas, lost their sources of livelihood, and were excluded from the labor market. Additionally, Aboriginal communities lost their culture and values through forced assimilation and
lost their rights in society. Today various Aboriginal communities continue to be marginalized from society due to the development of practices, policies and programs that "met the needs of white people and not the needs of the marginalized groups themselves". Yee also connects marginalization to minority communities, when describing the concept of whiteness as maintaining and enforcing dominant norms and discourse. Poor people living in run-down council estates and areas with high crime can be locked into social deprivation.

**Other contributors** Social exclusion has many contributors. Major contributors include race, income, employment status, social class, geographic location, personal habits and appearance, education, religion and political affiliation.

**Global and structural factors**

Globalization (global-capitalism), immigration, social welfare and policy are broader social structures that have the potential to contribute negatively to one's access to resources and services, resulting in the social exclusion of individuals and groups. Similarly, increasing use of information technology and company outsourcing have contributed to job insecurity and a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Alphonse, George & Moffat (2007) discuss how globalization sets forth a decrease in the role of the state with an increase in support from various "corporate sectors resulting in gross inequalities, injustices and marginalization of various vulnerable groups'. Companies are outsourcing, jobs are lost, the cost of living continues to rise, and land is being expropriated by large companies. Material goods are made in large abundances and sold at cheaper costs, while in India for example, the poverty line is lowered in order to mask the number of individuals who are actually living in poverty as a result of globalization. Globalization and structural forces aggravate poverty and continue to push individuals to the margins of society, while governments and large corporations do not address the issues.

Certain language and the meaning attached to language can cause universalizing discourses that are influenced by the Western world, which is what Sewpaul (2006) describes as the "potential to dilute or even annihilate local cultures and traditions and to deny context specific realities". What Sewpaul (2006) is implying is that the effect of dominant global discourses can cause individual and cultural displacement, as well as an experience of "de-localization", as individual notions of security and safety are jeopardized. Insecurity and fear of an unknown future and instability can result in displacement, exclusion, and forced assimilation into the dominant group. For many, it further pushes them to the margins of society or enlists new members to the outskirts because of global-capitalism and dominant discourses.

With the prevailing notion of globalization, we now see the rise of immigration as the world gets smaller and smaller with millions of individuals relocating each year. This is not without hardship and struggle of what a newcomer thought was going to be a new life with new opportunities. Ferguson, Lavalette & Whitmore (2005) discuss how immigration has had a strong link to access of welfare support programs. Newcomers are constantly bombarded with the inability to access a country's resources because they are seen as "underserving foreigners". With this comes a denial of access to public housing, health care benefits, employment support services, and social security benefits. Newcomers are seen as undeserving, or that they must prove their entitlement in order to gain access to basic support necessities. It is clear that individuals are exploited and marginalized within the country they have emigrated.
Welfare states and social policies can also exclude individuals from basic necessities and support programs. Welfare payments were proposed to assist individuals in accessing a small amount of material wealth (Young, 2000). Young further discusses how "the provision of the welfare itself produces new injustice by depriving those dependent on it of rights and freedoms that others have…marginalization is unjust because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and recognized way". There is the notion that by providing a minimal amount of welfare support, an individual will be free from marginalization. In fact, welfare support programs further lead to injustices by restricting certain behaviour; as well the individual is mandated to other agencies. The individual is forced into a new system of rules while facing social stigma and stereotypes from the dominant group in society, further marginalizing and excluding individuals (Young). Thus, social policy and welfare provisions reflect the dominant notions in society by constructing and reinforcing categories of people and their needs. It ignores the unique-subjective human essence, further continuing the cycle of dominance (Wilson & Beresford).

Unemployment

Whilst recognising the multi-dimensionality of exclusion, policy work undertaken at European Union level focuses on unemployment as a key cause of, or at least correlating with, social exclusion. This is because in modern societies, paid work is not only the principle source of income with which to buy services, but is also the fount of individuals' identity and feeling of self-worth. Most people's social networks and sense of embeddedness in society also revolve around their work. Many of the indicators of extreme social exclusion, such as poverty and homelessness, depend on monetary income which is normally derived from work. Social exclusion can be a possible result of long-term unemployment, especially in countries with weak welfare safety nets. Much policy to reduce exclusion thus focuses on the labour market:

On the one hand, to make individuals at risk of exclusion more attractive to employers, i.e. more "employable". On the other hand, to encourage (and/or oblige) employers to be more inclusive in their employment policies.

The EU’s EQUAL Community Initiative investigated ways to increase the inclusiveness of the labour market. Work on social exclusion more broadly is carried out through the Open Method of Coordination(OMC) among the Member State governments.

Religion

Some religious traditions recommend excommunication of individuals said to deviate from a religious teaching, and in some instances shunning by family members. Some religious organisations permit the censure of critics.

Across societies, individuals and communities can be socially excluded on the basis of their religious beliefs. Social hostility against religious minorities and communal violence occur in areas where governments do not have policies restricting the religious practice of minorities. A study by the Pew Research Center on international religious freedom found that 61% of countries have social hostilities that tend to target religious minorities. The five highest social hostility scores were for Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Bangladesh.

Links between exclusion and other issues

The problem of social exclusion is usually tied to that of equal opportunity, as some people are more subject to such exclusion than others. Marginalisation of certain groups is a problem even in many economically more developed countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, where the majority of the population enjoys considerable economic and social opportunities.
In the last few years, there has been research focused on possible connections between exclusion and brain function. Studies published by the University of Georgia and San Diego State University found that exclusion can lead to diminished brain functioning and poor decision making. Such studies corroborate with earlier beliefs of sociologists. The effect of exclusion may likely correlate with such things as substance abuse and crime.

Social inclusion

Social inclusion, the converse of social exclusion, is affirmative action to change the circumstances and habits that lead to (or have led to) social exclusion. The World Bank defines social inclusion as the process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people, disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take part in society. The World Bank's 2019 World Development Report on The Changing Nature of Work suggests that enhanced social protection and better investments in human capital improve equality of opportunity and social inclusion.

Social Inclusion ministers have been appointed, and special units established, in a number of jurisdictions around the world. The first Minister for Social Inclusion was Premier of South Australia Mike Rann, who took the portfolio in 2004. Based on the UK's Social Exclusion Unit, established by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1997, Rann established the Social Inclusion Initiative in 2002. It was headed by Monsignor David Cappo and was serviced by a unit within the department of Premier and Cabinet. Cappo sat on the Executive Committee of the South Australian Cabinet and was later appointed Social Inclusion Commissioner with wide powers to address social disadvantage. Cappo was allowed to roam across agencies given that most social disadvantage has multiple causes necessitating a "joined up" rather than a single agency response. The Initiative drove a big investment by the South Australian Government in strategies to combat homelessness, including establishing Common Ground, building high quality inner city apartments for "rough sleeping" homeless people, the Street to Home initiative and the ICAN flexible learning program designed to improve school retention rates. It also included major funding to revamp mental health services following Cappo's "Stepping Up" report, which focused on the need for community and intermediate levels of care and an overhaul of disability services. In 2007 Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd appointed Julia Gillard as the nation's first Social Inclusion Minister.

Consequences of social exclusion

Health in gay men, results of psycho-emotional damage from marginalization from a heteronormative society, suicide, and drug addiction.

Scientists have been studying the impact of racism on health. Amani Nuru-Jeter, a social epidemiologist at the University of California, Berkeley and other doctors have been hypothesizing that exposure to chronic stress may be one way racism contributes to health disparities between racial groups. Arline Geronimus, a research professor at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research and a professor at the School of Public Health, and her colleagues found that psychosocial associated with living in extreme poverty can cause early onset of age-related diseases. The 2015 study titled, "Race-Ethnicity, Poverty, Urban Stressors, and Telomere Length in a Detroit Community-based Sample" was conducted in order to determine the impact of living conditions on health and was performed by a multi-university team of social scientists, cellular biologists and community partners, including the Healthy Environments Partnership (HEP) to measured the telomere length of poor and moderate-income people of White, African-American and Mexican race.

Philosopher Axel Honneth thus speaks of a "struggle for recognition", which he attempts to theorize through Hegel's philosophy. In this sense, to be socially excluded is to be deprived from social
recognition and social value. In the sphere of politics, social recognition is obtained by full citizenship; in the economic sphere (in capitalism) it means being paid enough to be able to participate fully in the life of the community.

**In philosophy** The marginal, the processes of marginalisation, etc. bring specific interest in postmodern and postcolonial philosophy and social studies. Postmodernism question the "center" about its authenticity and postmodern sociology and cultural studies research marginal cultures, behaviours, societies, the situaiton of the marginalized individual, etc.

**Implications for social work practice** Upon defining and describing marginalization as well as the various levels in which it exists; one must now explore its implications for social work practice. Mullaly (2007) describes how "the personal is political" and the need for recognizing that social problems are indeed connected with larger structures in society, causing various forms of oppression amongst individuals resulting in marginalization. It is also important for the social worker to recognize the intersecting nature of oppression. A non-judgmental and unbiased attitude is necessary on the part of the social worker. The worker must begin to understand oppression and marginalization as a systemic problem, not the fault of the individual.

Working under an anti-oppression perspective would then allow the social worker to understand the lived, subjective experiences of the individual, as well as their cultural, historical and social background. The worker should recognize the individual as political in the process of becoming a valuable member of society and the structural factors that contribute to oppression and marginalization (Mullaly, 2007). Social workers must take a firm stance on naming and labeling global forces that impact individuals and communities who are then left with no support, leading to marginalization or further marginalization from the society they once knew.

The social worker should be constantly reflexive, work to raise the consciousness, empower, and understand the lived subjective realities of individuals living in a fast-paced world, where fear and insecurity constantly subjugate the individual from the collective whole, perpetuating the dominant forces, while silencing the oppressed.

Some individuals and groups who are not professional social workers build relationships with marginalized persons by providing relational care and support, for example, through homeless ministry. These relationships validate the individuals who are marginalized and provide them a meaningful contact with the mainstream.

**Juridical concept** There are countries, Italy for example, that have a legal concept of social exclusion. In Italy, "esclusione sociale" is defined as poverty combined with social alienation, by statute, that instituted a state investigation commission named to make an annual report to the government on legally expected issues of social exclusion.

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, a document on international human rights instruments affirms that "extreme poverty and social exclusion constitute a violation of human dignity and that urgent steps are necessary to achieve better knowledge of extreme poverty and its causes, including those related to the program of development, in order to promote the human rights of the poorest, and to put an end to extreme poverty and social exclusion and promote the enjoyment of the fruits of social progress. It is essential for States to foster participation by the poorest people in the decision making process by the community in which they live, the promotion of human rights and efforts to combat extreme poverty."
THEORIES OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

FUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Functionalist theories of stratification set their explanations in the framework of larger theories which seek to explain the operation of society as a whole. They assume that society has certain basic needs or functional prerequisites that must be met if it is to survive. They therefore look to social stratification to see how far it meets these functional prerequisites.

Functionalisst assume that the parts of society form an integrated whole and thus they examine the ways in which the social stratification system is integrated with other parts of society. They maintain that a certain degree of order and stability is essential for the operation of social systems. They therefore consider how stratification systems help to maintain order and stability in society.

Talcott Parsons - stratification and values
Like many functionalists, Talcott Parsons believed that order, stability and cooperation in society are based on value consensus - a general agreement by members of society concerning what is good and worthwhile. Parsons argued that stratification systems derive from common values. If values exist, then it follows that individuals will be evaluated and placed in some form of rank order. In other words, those who perform successfully in terms of society’s values will be ranked highly and they will be likely to receive a variety of rewards. At a minimum they will be accorded high prestige because they exemplify and personify common values.

For example, if a society places a high value on bravery and generosity, as was the case with the Sioux Indians in North America, those who excel in terms of these qualities will receive a high rank in the stratification system. The Sioux warrior who successfully raided the Crow and Pawnee Indians - the traditional enemies of his tribe - capturing their horses and distributing them to others, would receive a variety of rewards. He might be given a seat on the tribal council, a position of power and prestige. His deeds would be recounted in the warrior societies and the women would sing of his exploits. Other warriors would follow him in raids against neighbouring tribes and the success of these expeditions might lead to his appointment as a war chief. In this way, excellence in terms of Sioux values was rewarded by power and prestige.

Because different societies have different value systems, the ways of attaining a high position will vary from society to society. Parsons argued that American society values individual achievement and efficiency, and ‘puts primary emphasis on productive activity within the economy’. Thus, successful business executives who have achieved their position through their own initiative, ability and ambition, and run efficient and productive businesses, will receive high rewards.

Parsons’ argument suggests that stratification is an inevitable part of all human societies. If value consensus is an essential component of all societies, then it follows that some form of stratification will result from the ranking of individuals in terms of common values. It also follows from Parsons’ argument that there is a general belief that stratification systems are just, right and proper, because they are basically an expression of shared values. Thus American business executives are seen to deserve their rewards because members of society place a high value on their skills and achievements. This is not to say there is no conflict between the haves and have-nots, the highly rewarded and those with little reward. Parsons recognised that in Western industrial society there will be certain tendencies to arrogance on the part of some winners and to resentment and to a sour grapes” attitude.
on the part of some losers’. However, he believed that this conflict was kept in check by the common value system which justifies the unequal distribution of rewards.

**Organisation and planning**

Functionalists tend to see the relationship between social groups in society as one of cooperation and interdependence. In complex industrial societies, different groups specialise in particular activities. As no one group is self-sufficient, it alone cannot meet the needs of its members. It must, therefore, exchange goods and services with other groups, and so the relationship between social groups is one of reciprocity (mutual give and take).

This relationship extends to the strata in a stratification system. An oversimplified example is the argument that many occupational groups within the middle class in Western society plan, organise and coordinate the activities of the working class. Each class needs and cooperates with the other, since any large-scale task requires both organisation and execution. In societies with a highly specialized division of labour, such as industrial societies, some members will specialise in organisation and planning while others will follow their directives. Parsons argued that this inevitably leads to inequality in terms of power and prestige.

Organization on an ever increasing scale is a fundamental feature of such a system. Such organization naturally involves centralization and differentiation of leadership and authority; so that those who take responsibility for coordinating the actions of many others must have a different status in important respects from those who are essentially in the role of carrying out specifications laid down by others.

Thus those with the power to organise and coordinate the activities of others will have a higher social status than those they direct. As with prestige differentials, Parsons argued that inequalities of power are based on shared values. Power is legitimate authority in that members of society as a whole generally accept it as just and proper. It is accepted as such because those in positions of authority use their power to pursue collective goals that derive from Society’s central values. Thus the power of the American business executive is seen as legitimate authority because it is used to further productivity, a goal shared by all members of society. This use of power therefore serves the interests of society as a whole.

In summary, Parsons saw social stratification as both inevitable and functional for society.

1. It is inevitable because it derives from shared values which are a necessary part of all social systems.
2. It is functional because it serves to integrate various groups in society.

Power and prestige differentials are essential for the coordination and integration of a specialised division of labour. Finally, inequalities of power and prestige benefit all members of society since they serve to further collective goals which are based on shared values.

Parsons has been strongly criticised on all these points. Other sociologists have seen stratification as a divisive rather than an integrating force. They have regarded it as an arrangement whereby some gain at the expense of others, and they have questioned the view that stratification systems derive ultimately from shared values. We will examine these criticisms in detail in later sections.

**KINGSLEY DAVIS AND WILBERT E. MOORE**
The most famous functionalist theory of stratification was first presented in 1945, in an article by the American sociologists Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, entitled *Some principles of stratification*.

**Effective role allocation and performance**

Davis and Moore began with the observation that stratification exists in every known human society. They attempted to explain in functional terms, the universal necessity which calls forth stratification in any social system. They argued that all social systems share certain functional prerequisites which must be met if the system is to survive and operate efficiently. One such functional prerequisite is effective role allocation and performance. This means that:

1. All roles must be filled.
2. They must be filled by those best able to perform them.
3. The necessary training for them must be undertaken.
4. The roles must be performed conscientiously.

Davis and Moore argued that all societies need some mechanism for ensuring effective role allocation and performance. This mechanism is social stratification, which they saw as a system that attaches unequal rewards and privileges to the different positions in society.

If the people and positions that make up society did not differ in important respects there would be no need for stratification. However, people differ in terms of their innate ability and talent, and positions differ in terms of their importance for the survival and maintenance of society. Certain positions are more functionally important than others. These require special skills for their effective performance and the number of individuals with the necessary ability to acquire such skills is limited.

A major function of stratification is to match the most able people with the functionally most important positions. It does this by attaching high rewards to those positions. The desire for such rewards motivates people to compete for them, and in theory the most talented will win through. Such positions usually require long periods of training that involve certain sacrifices, such as loss of income. The promise of high rewards is necessary to provide an incentive to encourage people to undergo this training and to compensate them for the sacrifice involved. It is essential for the well-being of society that those who hold the functionally most important positions perform their roles diligently and conscientiously. The high rewards built into these positions provide the necessary inducement and generate the required motivation for such performance. Davis and Moore therefore concluded that social stratification is a 'device by which societies ensure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons'.
Differences in wealth and power are good because they motivate all sections of the society.

Above, Donald Trump, whose flamboyant lifestyle inspires many Americans.

Functional importance
Davis and Moore realised that one difficulty with their theory was showing clearly which positions are functionally most important. A position may be highly rewarded without necessarily being functionally important. They suggested that the importance of a position can be measured in two ways:

1. It can be measured by the degree to which a position is functionally unique, there being no other positions that can perform the same function satisfactorily. Thus it could be argued that doctors are functionally more important than nurses, since their position carries with it many of the skills necessary to perform a nurse’s role but not vice versa.

2. The second measure of importance is the degree to which other positions are dependent on the one in question. Thus it may be argued that managers are more important than routine office staff since the latter are dependent on direction and organisation from management.

To summarise, Davis and Moore regarded social stratification as a functional necessity for all societies. They saw it as a solution to a problem faced by all social systems, that of ‘placing and motivating individuals in the social structure’. They offered no other means of solving this problem and implied that social inequality is an inevitable feature of human society. They concluded that differential rewards are functional for society, because they contribute to the maintenance and well-being of social systems.
MELVIN M. TUMIN’S CRITIQUE OF DAVIS AND MOORE
Davis and Moore’s theory provoked a lengthy debate. Melvin Tumin, their most famous opponent, produced a comprehensive criticism of their ideas.

Functional importance
Tumin began by questioning the adequacy of their measurement of the functional importance of positions. Davis and Moore tended to assume that the most highly rewarded positions are indeed the most important. Many occupations, however, which afford little prestige or economic reward, can be seen as vital to society. Tumin therefore argued that some labour force of unskilled workmen is as important and as indispensable to the factory as some labour force of engineers.

In fact, a number of sociologists have argued that there is no objective way of measuring the functional importance of positions. Whether lawyers and doctors are considered as more important than farm labourers and refuse collectors is simply a matter of opinion.

Power and rewards
Tumin argued that Davis and Moore ignored the influence of power on the unequal distribution of rewards. Differences in pay and prestige between occupational groups may be due to differences in their power rather than their functional importance.

The pool of talent
Davis and Moore assumed that only a limited number of individuals have the talent to acquire the skills necessary for the functionally most important positions. Tumin regarded this as a very questionable assumption, for two reasons:
1. An effective method of measuring talent and ability has yet to be devised.
2. The pool of talent in society may be considerably larger than Davis and Moore assumed. As a result, unequal rewards may not be necessary to harness it.

Training
Tumin also questioned the view that the training required for important positions should be regarded as a sacrifice and therefore in need of compensation. He pointed to the rewards of being a student - leisure, freedom and the opportunity for self-development. He noted that any loss of earnings can usually be made up during the first ten years of work and continuing high pay after that may not be justified.

Motivation
The major function of unequal rewards, according to Davis and Moore, is to motivate talented individuals and allocate them to the functionally most important positions. Tumin rejected this view. He argued that social stratification can, and often does, act as a barrier to the motivation and recruitment of talent. The hurdles which people from lower strata need to overcome in order to succeed can be daunting and can discourage rather than motivate people. This is reflected in the tendency for those from lower social classes to leave the education system earlier than those from higher classes. For example, children from middle-class backgrounds are still much more likely to progress to higher education than those from working-class backgrounds.

Tumin also argued that Davis and Moore failed to consider the possibility that those who occupy highly rewarded positions erect barriers to recruitment. Occupational groups often use their power to restrict access to their positions, so creating a high demand for their services and increasing the
rewards they receive. For example, Tumin claimed that the American Medical Association deliberately restricted entry into the profession to ensure a shortage of doctors in order to maintain their high wages.

**Inequality of opportunity**

Tumin concluded that stratification, by its very nature, can never adequately perform the functions which Davis and Moore assigned to it. He argued that those born into the lower strata can never have the same opportunities for realising their talents as those born into the higher strata. Tumin maintained:

It is only when there is a genuinely equal access to recruitment and training for all potentially talented persons that differential rewards can conceivably be justified as functional. And stratification systems are apparently inherently antagonistic to the development of such full equality of opportunity.

**Social divisions**

Finally, Tumin questioned the view that social stratification functions to integrate the social system. He argued that differential rewards can encourage hostility, suspicion and distrust among the various segments of a society. From this viewpoint, stratification is a divisive rather than an integrating force. Tumin concluded that in their enthusiastic search for the positive functions of stratification, functionalists have tended to ignore or play down its many dysfunctions.

**MARXIST THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION**

Marxist perspectives provide a radical alternative to functionalist views of the nature of social stratification. They regard stratification as a divisive rather than an integrative structure. They see it as a mechanism whereby some exploit others, rather than as a means of furthering collective goals.

Marxists focus on social strata rather than social inequality in general. Functionalists, such as Parsons and Davis and Moore, say little about social stratification in the sense of clearly defined social strata whose members have shared interests. However, this view of social stratification is central to Marxist theory.

**Classes**

1. In all stratified societies there are two major social groups: a ruling class and a subject class.
2. The power of the ruling class comes from its ownership and control of the means of production (land, capital, labour power, buildings and machinery).
3. The ruling class exploits and oppresses the subject class.
4. As a result, there is a basic conflict between the two classes.
5. The various institutions of society, such as the legal and political systems, are instruments of ruling-class domination and serve to further its interests.
6. Only when the means of production are communally owned will classes disappear, thereby bringing an end to the exploitation and oppression of some by others.

From a Marxist perspective, systems of stratification derive from the relationships of social groups to the means of production. Marx used the term ‘class’ to refer to the main strata in all stratification systems, although most modern sociologists would reserve the term for strata in capitalist society. From a Marxist viewpoint, a **class is a social group whose members share the same relationship to the means of production.**
For example, in a feudal epoch, there are two main classes distinguished by their relationship to land (the crucial element of the means of production in an agricultural society). They are the feudal nobility who own the land, and the landless serfs who work the land. Similarly, in a capitalist era, there are two main classes: the bourgeoisie or capitalist class, which owns the means of production, and the proletariat or working class, whose members own only their labour which they hire to the bourgeoisie in return for wages.

**Classes and historical epochs**

Marx believed that Western society had developed through four main epochs: primitive communism, ancient society, feudal society and capitalist society. Primitive communism is represented by the societies of prehistory and provides the only example of a classless society. From then on, all societies are divided into two major classes: masters and slaves in ancient society, lords and serfs in feudal society, and capitalists and wage labourers in capitalist society.

During each historical epoch, the labour power required for production was supplied by the subject class, that is, by slaves, serfs and wage labourers respectively. The subject class is made up of the majority of the population, whereas the ruling or dominant class forms a minority. The relationship between the two major classes is discussed below.

Classes did not exist during the era of primitive communism, when societies were based on a socialist mode of production. In a hunting and gathering band, the earliest form of human society, the land and its products were communally owned. The men hunted and the women gathered plant food, and members of the band shared the produce. Classes did not exist since all members of society shared the...
Marxists view social stratification as exploitative

same relationship to the means of production. Every member was both producer and owner; all provided labour power and shared the products of their labour.

Hunting and gathering is a subsistence economy, which means that production only meets basic survival needs. Classes emerge when the productive capacity of society expands beyond the level required for subsistence. This occurs when agriculture becomes the dominant mode of production. In an agricultural economy, only a section of society is needed to produce the food requirements of the whole society. Many individuals are thus freed from food production and are able to specialise in other tasks. An increasingly more complex and specialised division replaces the rudimentary division of labour of the hunting and gathering band.

For example, in the early agricultural villages, some individuals became full-time producers of pottery, clothing and agricultural implements. As agriculture developed, surplus wealth- that is, goods above the basic subsistence needs of the community - was produced. This led to an exchange of goods, and trading developed rapidly both within and between communities. This was accompanied by the development of a system of private property. Goods were increasingly seen as commodities or articles of trade over which the individual rather than the community had right of ownership.

**Private property** and the accumulation of surplus wealth form the basis for the development of class societies. In particular, they provide the preconditions for the emergence of a class of producers and a class of non-producers. Some people are able to acquire the means of production, and others are therefore obliged to work for them. The result is a class of non-producers that owns the means of production, and a class of producers that owns only its labour.
Dependency and conflict
From a Marxist perspective, the relationship between the major social classes is one of mutual
dependence and conflict. Thus, in capitalist society, the bourgeoisie and proletariat are dependent
upon each other. Wage labourers must sell their labour power in order to survive, as they do not own a
part of the means of production and lack the means to produce goods independently. They are
therefore dependent for their livelihood on the capitalists and the wages they offer. The capitalists, as
non-producers, are dependent on the labour power of wage labourers, since, without it, there would be
no production.

However, the mutual dependency of the two classes is not a relationship of equal or symmetrical
reciprocity. Instead, it is a relationship of exploiter and exploited oppressor and oppressed. In
particular, the ruling class gains at the expense of the subject class and there is therefore a conflict of
interest between them. This may be illustrated by Marx’s view of the nature of ownership and
production in capitalist society.

The capitalist economy and exploitation
The basic characteristics of a capitalist economy may be summarised as follows:
1. Capital may be defined as money used to finance the production of commodities for private gain.
2. In a capitalist economy, goods, and the labour power, raw materials and machinery used to produce
them, are given a monetary value.
3. The capitalists invest their capital in the production of goods.
4. Capital is accumulated by selling those goods at a value greater than their cost of production.

Capitalism therefore involves the investment of capital in the production of commodities with the aim
of maximising profit in order to accumulate more capital. Money is converted into commodities by
financing production; those commodities are then sold and converted back into money at such a price
that the capitalists end up with more money than they started with.

A minority, the capitalist class, privately owns capital. In Marx's view, however, this capital is gained
from the exploitation of the mass of the population the working class. Marx argued that capital, as
such, produces nothing. Only labour produces wealth. Yet the wages paid to the workers for their
labour are well below the value of the goods they produce.

The difference between the value of wages and commodities is known as surplus value. The
capitalists appropriate this surplus value in the form of profit. Because they are non-producers, the
bourgeoisie are therefore exploiting the proletariat, the real producers of wealth. Marx maintained that
in all class societies, the ruling class exploits and oppresses the subject class.

Power and the superstructure
Political power, in Marxist theory, comes from economic power. The power of the ruling class
therefore stems from its ownership and control of the means of production. As the superstructure of
society - the major institutions, values and belief systems- is seen to be largely shaped by the
economic infrastructure, the relations of production will be reproduced in the superstructure.
Therefore, the dominance of the ruling class in the relations of production will be reflected in the
superstructure. In particular, the political and legal systems will reflect ruling-class interests since, in
Marx's words, 'the existing relations of production between individuals must necessarily express
themselves also as political and legal relations'.

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For instance, the various ownership rights of the capitalist class will be enshrined in and protected by the laws of the land. Thus the various parts of the superstructure can be seen as instruments of ruling-class domination and as mechanisms for the oppression of the subject class.

In the same way, the position of the dominant class is supported by beliefs and values that are systematically generated by the infrastructure. Marx referred to the dominant concepts of class societies as ruling-class ideology, since they justify and legitimate ruling-class domination and project a distorted picture of reality. For example, the emphasis on freedom in capitalist society, illustrated by phrases such as the ‘free market’, ‘free democratic societies’ and ‘the free world’, is an illusion that disguises the wage slavery of the proletariat.

Ruling-class ideology produces false class consciousness, a false picture of the nature of the relationship between social classes. Members of both classes tend to accept the status quo as normal and natural and are largely unaware of the true nature of exploitation and oppression. In this way, the conflict of interest between the classes is disguised and a degree of social stability is produced, but the basic contradictions and conflicts of class societies remain unresolved.

Class and social change

Class struggle
Marx believed that the class struggle was the driving force of social change. He stated that the history of all societies up to the present is the history of the class struggle.

A new historical epoch is created by the development of superior forces of production by a new social group. These developments take place within the framework of the previous era. The merchants and industrialists who spearheaded the rise of capitalism emerged during the feudal era. They accumulated capital, and laid the foundations for industrial manufacture, factory production and the system of wage labour, all of which were essential components of capitalism. The superiority of the capitalist mode of production led to a rapid transformation of the structure of society. The capitalist class became dominant, and although the feudal aristocracy maintained aspects of its power well into the 19th century, it was fighting a losing battle.

The class struggles of history have been between minorities. Capitalism, for instance, developed from the struggle between the feudal aristocracy and the emerging capitalist class, both groups in numerical terms forming a minority of the population. Major changes in history have involved the replacement of one form of private property by another and of one type of production technique by another: capitalism involved the replacement of privately owned land and an agricultural economy by privately owned capital and an industrial economy.

Marx believed that the class struggle that would transform capitalist society would involve none of these processes. The protagonists would be the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, a minority versus a majority. Private property would be replaced by communally owned property. Industrial manufacture would remain as the basic technique of production in the new society.

Marx believed that the basic contradictions contained in a capitalist economic system would lead to its eventual destruction. The proletariat would overthrow the bourgeoisie and seize the means of production, the source of power. Property would be communally owned and, since all members of
society would now share the same relationship to the means of production, a classless society would result. Since history is the history of the class struggle, history would now end. The communist society that would replace capitalism would contain no contradictions, no conflicts of interest, and would therefore be unchanging. However, certain changes were necessary before the dawning of this utopia.

Working class suffer from alienation in capitalist society

Class consciousness
Marx distinguished between a ‘class in itself’ and a ‘class for itself’. A class in itself is simply a social group whose members share the same relationship to the means of production. Marx argued that a social group only fully becomes a class when it becomes a class for itself. At this stage, its members have class consciousness and class solidarity. Class consciousness means that false class consciousness has been replaced by a full awareness of the true situation, by a realisation of the nature of exploitation. Members of a class then develop a common identity recognise their shared interests and unite, so creating class solidarity. The final stage of class consciousness and class solidarity is reached when members realise that only by collective struggle can they overthrow the ruling class, and take positive steps to do so. Marx believed that the following aspects of capitalist society would eventually lead to the proletariat developing into a ‘class for itself’.

1. Capitalist society is by its very nature unstable. It is based on contradictions and antagonisms that can only be resolved by its transformation. In particular, the conflict of interest between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat cannot be resolved within the framework of a capitalist economy. The basic conflict of interest involves the exploitation of workers by the capitalists.

2. Marx believed that this first contradiction would be highlighted by a second: the contradiction between social production and individual ownership. As capitalism developed, the workforce was increasingly concentrated in large factories where production was a social enterprise. Social production juxtaposed with individual ownership illuminates the exploitation of the proletariat. Social production also makes it easier for workers to organise themselves against the capitalists. It facilitates communication and encourages recognition of common circumstances and interests.
3. Polarisation of the classes
Apart from the basic contradictions of capitalist society, Marx believed that certain factors in the natural development of a capitalist economy would hasten its downfall. These factors would result in the polarisation of the two main classes: the gap between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will become greater and the contrast between the two groups will become more stark. Such factors include:

i. The increasing use of machinery will result in a homogeneous working class. Since machinery obliterates the differences in labour, members of the proletariat will become increasingly similar. The differences between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers will tend to disappear as machines remove the skill required in the production of commodities.

ii. The difference in wealth between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will increase as the accumulation of capital proceeds. Even though the real wages and living standards of the proletariat may rise, its members will become poorer in relation to the bourgeoisie. This process is known as pauperisation.

iii. The competitive nature of capitalism means that only the largest and most wealthy companies will survive and prosper. Competition will depress the intermediate strata- those groups lying between the two main classes- into the proletariat. Thus the petty bourgeoisie, the owners of small businesses, will sink into the proletariat. At the same time the surviving companies will grow larger and capital will be concentrated into fewer hands.

These three processes - the obliteration of the differences in labour, the pauperisation of the working class, and the depression of the intermediate strata into the proletariat - will result in the polarisation of the two major classes.

Marx believed he could see the process of polarisation in 19th-century Britain. He wrote that 'society as a whole is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps… bourgeoisie and proletariat'. The battle lines were now clearly drawn: Marx hoped that the proletarian revolution would shortly follow and the communist utopia of his dreams would finally become a reality.

Marx’s work on class has been examined in detail because it continues to influence many sociologists and it has influenced many of the debates within the sociology of stratification.

WEBERIAN THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

The work of the German sociologist Max Weber represents one of the most important developments in stratification theory since Marx. Weber believed that social stratification results from a struggle for scarce resources in society. Although he saw this struggle as being primarily concerned with economic resources, it can also involve struggles for prestige and for political power.

Market situation
Like Marx, Weber saw class in economic terms. He argued that classes develop in market economies in which individuals compete for economic gain. He defined a class as a group of individuals who share a similar position in a market economy, and by virtue of that fact receive similar economic rewards. Thus, in Weber's terminology, a person’s class situation is basically their market situation. Those who share a similar class situation also share similar life chances. Their economic position will
directly affect their chances of obtaining those things defined as desirable in their society, for example access to higher education and good-quality housing.

Like Marx, Weber argued that the major class division is between those who own the forces of production and those who do not. Thus those who have substantial property holdings will receive the highest economic rewards and enjoy superior life chances. However, Weber saw important differences in the market situation of the propertyless groups in society. In particular, the various skills and services offered by different occupations have differing market values. For instance, in capitalist society, managers, administrators and professionals receive relatively high salaries because of the demand for their services. Weber distinguished the following class groupings in capitalist society:

1. The propertied upper class
2. The propertyless white-collar workers
3. The petty bourgeoisie
4. The manual working class

In his analysis of class, Weber disagreed with Marx on a number of important issues:

1. Factors other than the ownership or non-ownership of property are significant in the formation of classes. In particular, the market value of the skills of the propertyless groups varies, and the resulting differences in economic return are sufficient to produce different social classes.

2. Weber saw no evidence to support the idea of the polarisation of classes. Although he saw some decline in the numbers of the petty bourgeoisie (the small property owners) due to competition from large companies, he argued that they enter white-collar or skilled manual trades rather than being depressed into the ranks of unskilled manual workers. More importantly, Weber argued that the white-collar ‘middle class’ expands rather than contracts as capitalism develops. He maintained that capitalist enterprise and the modern nation-state require a ‘rational’ bureaucratic administration that involves large numbers of administrators and clerical staff. Thus Weber saw a diversification of classes and an expansion of the white collar middle class, rather than a polarisation.

3. Weber rejected the view, held by some Marxists, of the inevitability of the proletarian revolution. He saw no reason why those sharing a similar class situation should necessarily develop a common identity, recognise shared interests and take collective action to further those interests. For example, Weber suggested that individual manual workers who are dissatisfied with their class situation may respond in a variety of ways. They may grumble, work to rule, sabotage industrial machinery, take strike action, or attempt to organise other members of their class in an effort to overthrow capitalism. Weber admitted that a common market situation might provide a basis for collective class action, but he saw this only as a possibility.

4. Weber rejected the Marxist view that political power necessarily derives from economic power. He argued that class forms only one possible basis for power and that the distribution of power in society is not necessarily linked to the distribution of class inequalities.

**Status situation**

While class forms one possible basis for group formation, collective action and the acquisition of political power, Weber argued that there are other bases for these activities. In particular, groups form
because their members share a similar status situation. Whereas class refers to the unequal distribution of economic rewards, status refers to the unequal distribution of social honour.

Occupations, ethnic and religious groups, and, most importantly, lifestyles, are accorded differing degrees of prestige or esteem by members of society. A status group is made up of individuals who are awarded a similar amount of social honour and therefore share the same status situation. Unlike classes, members of status groups are almost always aware of their common status situation. They share a similar lifestyle, identify with and feel they belong to their status group, and often place restrictions on the ways in which outsiders may interact with them.

Weber argued that status groups reached their most developed form in the caste system of traditional Hindu society in India. Castes and sub-castes were formed and distinguished largely in terms of social honour lifestyles were sharply differentiated and accorded varying degrees of prestige.

**Social closure**

Castes also provide a good example of the process described by Weber as social closure. Social closure involves the exclusion of some people from membership of a status group. In the caste system, social closure is achieved through prohibitions that prevent members of a caste from marrying outside their caste. The caste system is an extreme example of social closure, since the exclusion of outsiders from the status group is so complete.

Another example of social closure was the apartheid system in South Africa, which lasted from the 1940s until 1992. The population was divided into whites, Asians, black Africans and coloured people descended from more than one race. These different groups were kept apart in public places (for example, they were required to use different public toilets), they had to live in different neighbourhoods and they were prohibited from marrying someone from a different group. Not surprisingly, the better facilities and neighbourhoods were reserved for the dominant white population.

Other status groups erect less formidable barriers to entry. In modern Britain, studies of elite self-recruitment suggest that those who have attended public schools usually fill certain types of job, such as senior positions in the civil service. Although individuals who went to state schools have some chance of entering these jobs, public-school-educated elites largely reserve such positions for themselves and their children.

**Class and status groups**

In many societies, class and status situations are closely linked. Weber noted that ‘property as such is not always recognised as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity. However, those who share the same class situation will not necessarily belong to the same status group. For example, the nouveaux riches (the newly rich) are sometimes excluded from the status groups of the privileged because their tastes, manners and dress are defined as vulgar.

Status groups can cut across class divisions. For example, homosexuals from different class backgrounds are involved in gay rights organisations and events such as the annual Gay Pride celebration in Britain.

Weber’s observations on status groups are important because they suggest that in certain situations status rather than class provides the basis for the formation of social groups. In addition, the presence
of different status groups within a single class, and of status groups which cut across class divisions, can weaken class solidarity and reduce the potential for class consciousness. These points are illustrated by Weber’s analysis of ‘parties’.

**Parties**

Weber defined parties as groups that are specifically concerned with influencing policies and making decisions in the interests of their membership. In Weber’s words, parties are concerned with the acquisition of social power.

Parties include a variety of associations, from the mass political parties of Western democracies to the whole range of pressure or interest groups, which include professional associations, trade unions, and organisations such as the Automobile Association, Greenpeace and the RSPCA. Parties often, but do not necessarily, represent the interests of classes or status groups. In Weber’s words “Parties may represent interests determined through class situation or status situation...In most cases they are partly class parties and partly status parties, but sometimes they are neither.”

The combination of class and status interests can be seen in a group such as the Nation of Islam in the USA. As well as being a religious group it is also active in trying to achieve political change. It represents a status group but it also represents class interests— the majority of its members are working-class.

Weber’s view of parties suggests that the relationship between political groups and class and status groups is far from clear-cut. Just as status groups can both divide classes and cut across class boundaries, so parties can divide and cut across both classes and status groups. Weber’s analysis of classes, status groups and parties suggests that no single theory can pinpoint and explain their relationship. The interplay of class, status and party in the formation of social groups is complex and variable and must be examined in particular societies during particular time periods.

Marx attempted to reduce all forms of inequality to social class and argued that classes formed the only significant social groups in society. Weber argues that the evidence provides a more complex and diversified picture of social stratification.

**ETHNICITY AND RACE AS SYSTEMS OF STRATIFICATION**

**WHAT IS ETHNICITY?**

An ethnic group (or ethnicity) is a group of people whose members identify with each other, through a common heritage, often consisting of a common language, a common culture (often including a shared religion) and/or an ideology that stresses common ancestry or endogamy. Another definition is "...a highly biologically self-perpetuating group sharing an interest in a homeland connected with a specific geographical area, a common language and traditions, including food preferences, and a common religious faith". 

According to Eriksen, current sociology is concerned not so much with the definition of ethnicity but with attempts to respond to increasingly politicised forms of self-representation by members of different ethnic groups and nations. This is in the context of debates over multiculturalism in countries, such as the United States and Canada, which have large immigrant populations from many different cultures, and post-colonialism in South Asia.
Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 has been awarded to Yazidi human rights activist Nadia Murad (above). Yazidis are a minority ethnic group in Iraq who have faced persecution for centuries.

Weber maintained that ethnic groups were *künstlich* (artificial, i.e. a social construct) because they were based on a subjective belief in shared *Gemeinschaft* (community). Secondly, this belief in shared. Third, group formation resulted from the drive to monopolise power and status. This was contrary to the prevailing naturalist belief of the time, which held that socio-cultural and behavioral differences between peoples stemmed from inherited traits and tendencies derived from common descent, then called "race".

Another influential theorician of ethnicity was Fredrik Barth, whose "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" in 1969 went further than Weber in stressing the constructed nature of ethnicity. To Barth, ethnicity was perpetually negotiated and renegotiated by both external ascription and internal self-identification. Barth's view is that ethnic groups are not discontinuous cultural isolates, or logical *a prioris* to which people naturally belong. He wanted to part with anthropological notions of cultures as bounded entities, and ethnicity as primordialist bonds, replacing it with a focus on the interface between groups. "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries", therefore, is a focus on the interconnectedness of ethnic identities. Barth writes: ".categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories."
Anthropologist Ronald Cohen claimed that the identification of "ethnic groups" in the usage of social scientists often reflected inaccurate labels more than indigenous realities:... the named ethnic identities we accept, often unthinkingly, as basic givens in the literature are often arbitrarily, or even worse inaccurately, imposed. In this way, he pointed to the fact that identification of an ethnic group by outsiders, e.g. anthropologists, may not coincide with the self-identification of the members of that group.

Social scientists have thus focused on how, when, and why different markers of ethnic identity become salient. Thus, anthropologist Joan Vincent observed that ethnic boundaries often have a mercurial character. Ronald Cohen concluded that ethnicity is "a series of nesting dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness". He agrees with Joan Vincent's observation that (in Cohen's paraphrase) "Ethnicity... can be narrowed or broadened in boundary terms in relation to the specific needs of political mobilization. This may be why descent is sometimes a marker of ethnicity, and sometimes not: which diacritic of ethnicity is salient depends on whether people are scaling ethnic boundaries up or down, and whether they are scaling them up or down depends generally on the political situation.

Approaches to understanding ethnicity

Different approaches to understanding ethnicity have been used by different social scientists when trying to understand the nature of ethnicity as a factor in human life and society. Examples of such approaches are: primordialism, essentialism, perennialism, constructivism, modernism and instrumentalism.

- "Primordialism", holds that ethnicity has existed at all times of human history and that modern ethnic groups have historical continuity into the far past. For them, the idea of ethnicity is closely linked to the idea of nations and is rooted in the pre-Weber understanding of humanity as being divided into primordially existing groups rooted by kinship and biological heritage.

- "Essentialist primordialism" further holds that ethnicity is an a priori fact of human existence, that ethnicity precedes any human social interaction and that it is basically unchanged by it. This theory sees ethnic groups as natural, not just as historical. This understanding does not explain how and why nations and ethnic groups seemingly appear, disappear and often reappear through history. It also has problems dealing with the consequences of intermarriage, migration and colonization for the composition of modern day multi-ethnic societies.

- "Kinship primordialism" holds that ethnic communities are extensions of kinship units, basically being derived by kinship or clan ties where the choices of cultural signs (language, religion, traditions) are made exactly to show this biological affinity. In this way, the myths of common biological ancestry that are a defining feature of ethnic communities are to be understood as representing actual biological history. A problem with this view on ethnicity is that it is more often than not the case that mythic origins of specific ethnic groups directly contradict the known biological history of an ethnic community.

- "Geertz's primordialism", notably espoused by anthropologist Clifford Geertz, argues that humans in general attribute an overwhelming power to primordial human "givens" such as blood ties, language,
territory, and cultural differences. In Geertz’ opinion, ethnicity is not in itself primordial but humans perceive it as such because it is embedded in their experience of the world.

• "Perennialism" holds that ethnicity is ever changing, and that while the concept of ethnicity has existed at all times, ethnic groups are generally short lived before the ethnic boundaries realign in new patterns. The opposing perennialist view holds that while ethnicity and ethnic groupings has existed throughout history, they are not part of the natural order.

• "Perpetual perennialism" holds that specific ethnic groups have existed continuously throughout history.

• "Situational perennialism" holds that nations and ethnic groups emerge, change and vanish through the course of history. This view holds that the concept of ethnicity is basically a tool used by political groups to manipulate resources such as wealth, power, territory or status in their particular groups' interests.

Accordingly, ethnicity emerges when it is relevant as means of furthering emergent collective interests and changes according to political changes in the society. Examples of a perennialist interpretation of ethnicity are also found in Barth, and Seidner who see ethnicity as ever-changing boundaries between groups of people established through ongoing social negotiation and interaction.

• "Instrumentalist perennialism", while seeing ethnicity primarily as a versatile tool that identified different ethnic groups and limits through time, explains ethnicity as a mechanism of social stratification, meaning that ethnicity is the basis for a hierarchical arrangement of individuals. According to Donald Noel, a sociologist who developed a theory on the origin of ethnic stratification, ethnic stratification is a "system of stratification wherein some relatively fixed group membership (e.g., race, religion, or nationality) is utilized as a major criterion for assigning social positions". Ethnic stratification is one of many different types of social stratification, including stratification based on socio-economic status, race, or gender. According to Donald Noel, ethnic stratification will emerge only when specific ethnic groups are brought into contact with one another, and only when those groups are characterized by a high degree of ethnocentrism, competition, and differential power. Ethnocentrism is the tendency to look at the world primarily from the perspective of one's own culture, and to downgrade all other groups outside one's own culture. Some sociologists, such as Lawrence Bobo and Vincent Hutchings, say the origin of ethnic stratification lies in individual dispositions of ethnic prejudice, which relates to the theory of ethnocentrism. Continuing with Noel's theory, some degree of differential power must be present for the emergence of ethnic stratification. In other words, an inequality of power among ethnic groups means "they are of such unequal power that one is able to impose its will upon another". In addition to differential power, a degree of competition structured along ethnic lines is a prerequisite to ethnic stratification as well. The different ethnic groups must be competing for some common goal, such as power or influence, or a material interest, such as wealth or territory. Lawrence Bobo and Vincent Hutchings propose that competition is driven by self-interest and hostility, and results in inevitable stratification and conflict.

• "Constructivism" sees both primordialist and perennialist views as basically flawed, and rejects the notion of ethnicity as a basic human condition. It holds that ethnic groups are only products of human social interaction, maintained only in so far as they are maintained as valid social constructs in societies.
"Modernist constructivism" correlates the emergence of ethnicity with the movement towards nation states beginning in the early modern period. Proponents of this theory, such as Eric Hobsbawm, argue that ethnicity and notions of ethnic pride, such as nationalism, are purely modern inventions, appearing only in the modern period of world history. They hold that prior to this, ethnic homogeneity was not considered an ideal or necessary factor in the forging of large-scale societies.

Ethnicity and race:

The concept of ethnicity differs from the closely related term race in that "race" refers to grouping based mostly upon biological criteria, while "ethnicity" also encompasses additional cultural factors. Members of an ethnic group are usually conscious of belonging to that ethnic group; moreover ethnic identity is further marked by the recognition from others of a group's distinctiveness.

Before Weber, race and ethnicity were often seen as two aspects of the same thing. Around 1900 and before the essentialist primordialist understanding of ethnicity was predominant, cultural differences between peoples were seen as being the result of inherited traits and tendencies. This was the time when "sciences" such as phrenology claimed to be able to correlate cultural and behavioral traits of different populations with their outward physical characteristics, such as the shape of the skull. With Weber's introduction of ethnicity as a social construct, race and ethnicity were divided from each other. A social belief in biologically well-defined races lingered on.

In 1950, the UNESCO statement, "The Race Question", signed by some of the internationally renowned scholars of the time (including Ashley Montagu, Claude Levi-Strauss, Clauford von Magellan desch Singrones Strauss, Julian Huxley, etc.), suggested that: "National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups: and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connection with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed when the term 'race' is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term 'race' altogether and speak of 'ethnic groups'."

In 1982 anthropologist David Craig Griffith summed up forty years of ethnographic research, arguing that racial and ethnic categories are symbolic markers for different ways that people from different parts of the world have been incorporated into a global economy:

The opposing interests that divide the working classes are further reinforced through appeals to "racial" and "ethnic" distinctions. Such appeals serve to allocate different categories of workers to rungs on the scale of labor markets, relegating stigmatized populations to the lower levels and insulating the higher echelons from competition from below. Capitalism did not create all the distinctions of ethnicity and race that function to set off categories of workers from one another. It is, nevertheless, the process of labor mobilization under capitalism that imparts to these distinctions their effective values.

According to Wolf, races were constructed and incorporated during the period of European mercantile expansion, and ethnic groups during the period of capitalist expansion. Often, ethnicity also connotes shared cultural, linguistic, behavioural or religious traits. For example, to call oneself Jewish or Arab is to immediately invoke a clutch of linguistic, religious, cultural and racial features that are held to be common within each ethnic category.
Ethnicity in specific regions

United States
In the United States of America, the term "ethnic" carries a different meaning from how it is commonly used in some other countries due to the historical and ongoing significance of racial distinctions that categorize together what might otherwise have been viewed as ethnic groups. For example, various ethnic, "national," or linguistic groups from Africa, Asia and the Pacific Islands, Latin America and Indigenous America have long been aggregated as racial minority groups (currently designated as African American, Asian, Latino and Native American or American Indian, respectively).

While a sense of ethnic identity may coexist with racial identity (Chinese Americans among Asian or Irish American among European or White, for example), the long history of the United States as a settler, conqueror and slave society, and the concomitant formal and informal inscription of racialized groupings into law and social stratification schemes has bestowed upon race a fundamental social identification role in the United States.

"Ethnicity theory" in the US refers to a school of thinking on race that arose in response first to biological views of race, which underwrote some of the most extreme forms of racial social stratification, exclusion and subordination. However, in the 1960s ethnicity theory was put to service in debates among academics and policy makers regarding how to grapple with the demands and resistant (sometimes "race nationalist") political identities resulting from the great civil rights mobilizations and transformation. Ethnicity theory came to be synonymous with a liberal and neocconservative rejection or diminution of race as a fundamental feature of US social order, politics and culture. Ethnicity theorists embraced an individualist, quasi-voluntarist notion of identity, which downplayed the significance of race as structuring element in US history and society. Michael Omi and Howard Winant have argued in their book *Racial Formation in the United States: from the 1960s to the 1990s* that ethnicity theory fails to grapple effectively with the meaning and material significance of race in the US and offer a theory of racial formation as an alternative view.

The terms "Black" and "African American," while different, are both used as ethnic categories in the US. In the late 1980s, the term "African American" was posited as the most appropriate and politically correct race designation. While it was intended as a shift away from the racial inequities of America's past often associated with the historical views of the "Black race", it largely became a simple replacement for the terms Black, Colored, Negro and the like, referring to any individual of dark skin color regardless of geographical descent. The term "White" generally describes people whose ancestry can be traced to Europe, the Middle East and including European-colonized countries in the Americas, Australasia and South Africa among others. All the aforementioned are categorized as part of the "White" racial group, as per US Census categorization. This category has been split into two groups: Hispanics and non-Hispanics (e.g. White non-Hispanic and White Hispanic.)

Europe has a large number of ethnic groups; Pan and Pfeil (2004) count 87 distinct "peoples of Europe", of which 33 form the majority population in at least one sovereign state, while the remaining 54 constitute ethnic minorities within every state they inhabit. The total number of national minority populations in Europe is estimated at 14% of 770 million population.
Russia has numerous recognized ethnic groups besides the 80% ethnic Russian majority. The largest group are the Tatars (3.8%). Many of the smaller groups are found in the Siberian part of Russia.

China officially recognizes 56 ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Han Chinese. Many of the ethnic minorities maintain their own cultures, languages and identity although many are also becoming more westernised. Han predominate demographically and politically in most areas of China, although less so in the annexed provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang (East Turkestan), where the Han are in the minority. The one-child policy only applies to the Han.

RACE AS A FORM OF STRATIFICATION

Human population may be classified into different races as above

The Concept of Race

Race is one of those terms which are used with a variety of meanings. It is sometimes taken as synonymous with nationality; thus people speak of the French, the American, the Chinese race etc. In another sense it is applied to groups of people speaking the same language, as the German or the Aryan race, Aryan being a cultural designation given on the basis of language. Not infrequently the term race refers to any group of men who have been bound together for a considerable time by a common habitat, common history and tradition, common language and religion, and common social, political, and economic institutions, as the ancient Greeks or Jews. But the most authentic meaning of race is physiological and as such it is usually taken to be a collection of individuals sharing in common certain observable physiological traits transmissible by biological inheritance.

The traits in which race presumably consists are ordinarily pigmentation or skin-colour, head-shape, stature, eye-colour, lip-form, prognathism, and hair-form: straight, smooth, wavy, curly, and the like. Any of these features or combinations of them may be taken as the basis for race classification. Thus, while some anthropologists regard colour as the proper basis, others prefer hair-form, or some other. In this guise the race classification of Deniker, Huxley, or Haddon, once very popular, are now being superseded by others based on more recent discoveries. Even a classification of race based on blood types would be theoretically possible, but the well-known fact that the various types of blood are to be
found practically in every group of human beings, and that it is not a feature easily observable, renders it useless as a basis for race classification. While admitting that racial traits are now widely mixed in the various groups of mankind, one may wonder whether there was a time when pure types could be found from which the present mixed races originated. But this supposition is not warranted by what we know of mankind. The hypotheses of an early existence of pure races, write Dunn and Dobzhansky, are however, definitely refuted by scientific data:

Race mixture has been on during the whole of recorded history. Incontrovertible evidence from studies on fossil human remains, shows that even in prehistory, at the very dawn of humanity, mixing of different stocks (at least occasionally) took place. Mankind has always been, and still is, a mongrel lot.

The supposition of the existence of pure original races becomes still more difficult if we take into account that, most probably mankind derived, as we shall study later, not from many but from one original stock. The method followed by some early anthropologists in selecting certain existing racial features and building some ideal racial types with them, only leads to the establishment of some imaginary prototypes (never found in real life) as the substratum of the present-day races.

From this it follows that what can be held with certainty about race as a physiological or biological concept may be reduced to the following points:

(a) There are in mankind real physiological traits by which men differ from each other.
(b) Some of these traits are widely predominant in certain groups, especially among primitives.
(c) These traits are transmitted by biological inheritance.
(d) These groups of men, as characterised by those traits which distinguish them from other groups, are known by the name of race or races.
Thus we may divide the races of mankind into Mongolic, Negroid, Australian, and Caucasian, and subdivide the last mentioned into Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean. But, though physiological and biological differences are a fact, the concept of race built on them is an abstraction by which we divide men into conventional groups based on the frequency in which certain traits appear in them; yet, there is a great deal of overlapping of the same traits as found in various groups. At the same time individual differences found among the members of the same group are also significant. Thus, if the average cranial capacity of the Japanese is 1,485 cubic centimetres and that of the Chinese 1,456, we may be certain that many Japanese and Chinese will be found with a capacity superior to the higher of the two measures and inferior to the lower. Race, in truth, is an abstract, conventional, and statistical concept built on physiological differences. If race were widely recognized to be nothing more than a physiological notion it would lose all its importance as a social phenomenon; but the widespread opinion, even today is that race is correlated with intelligence, culture and other qualities so that races may be divided into a superior and an inferior, while miscegenation, or the union between a superior and an inferior race, as tending to bring down the superior, is to be avoided. Moreover, if race is taken to be an index of what man and society are, or a determinant factor of man's capacity and worth, then the question of race becomes extremely important. In this sense it becomes the question of man, and man is the most fascinating subject with which the social sciences deal. It was in this vein that Madison Grant wrote:

Race has played a far larger part than either language and nationality in moulding the destinies of man; race implies heredity, and heredity implies all the moral, social and intellectual characteristics and traits which are the springs of politics and government.

Actually this was, in one way or another, the view of racialist authors who in the heyday of nationalism and imperialism propagated their views with an astonishing lack of critical sense which, nevertheless, flattered those groups that believed that they belonged to the so-called Nordic race or to some section of the elect. Among the most conspicuous racialist authors we find, besides Madison Grant, Count A. J. de Gobineau, H. S. Chamberlain, and Alfred there are authors like Lucien Levy-Bruhl and, in our days, Hans Kelsen, who have largely contributed to spread the idea that there is a difference in kind between the mind of the primitives and that of modern men.

In La mentalite primitif, Levy-Bruhl held that primitive man had a ‘pre-logical’ mentality by which his mental operations and world outlook were presumably different in kind from those of civilized man. But when this theory was subjected to a close scrutiny he honestly acknowledged that he had overemphasized the unfavourable aspects of ‘primitive’ man, but he always believed that his inferiority to that of modern man was only of degree, not of kind. More recently Hans Kelsen affirmed that ‘primitive’ men are deprived of causal thinking; have a weak individual consciousness, and are submerged in the consciousness of the group; are incapable of forming abstract concepts including that of time, and have no idea of individual personality. Here, and the same may be said of the vast array of literature exalting one race above another, many issues are involved that can only be disentangled by studying the following points: First, whether the differences that separate man from beast, including also the higher animals, are only of degree or of kind; second, whether the differences existing among the various groups of men are of kind or only of degree; and third, if they are of degree, what is the significance that they have in social life. We shall now deal with these questions in the following sections.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MAN AND BEAST

In order to answer this question we must single out certain features by which we can distinguish whether the differences between man and beast are of kind or not. The physiological criterion is not enough because, even if by it the difference could be found, the process of doing it is beyond the understanding of the non-specialized student. Hence the criterion more commonly accepted is that concerned with language and culture including art, systems of thought, religion and morality. All these factors can be included under the general concept of culture which is an expression of intelligence. If, therefore, only man is properly endowed with intelligence from which culture and language proceed then the difference between him and the beast is of kind or specific.

Relying on the experiments of Spearman and other psychologists both ancient and modern, we may define intelligence as the power existing in man of knowing his own experience and deducing relations, especially correlates, as expressed in conceptual language and culture. This definition implies that when the ability to perceive logical relations between things is present, then the mind possesses the power of integrating (not merely associating) various orders of things through new mental syntheses. Thanks to this power of integration, language as well as culture in its various manifestations become not only possible, but, in a way, inevitable. To see the rivers flowing and to make the necessary movements to drink of their waters is not greatly significant from the social viewpoint animals do the same but to realize that rivers are similar in many ways, to unify them under general concept, to perceive that they are moving roads and can be used for navigation, that the water they carry has many practical applications and is made up of certain elements etc., is really the manifestation of intelligence and the development of culture with language as its most characteristic concomitant.

That man is endowed with this gift is but too obvious. Moreover, the accomplishments from which the concepts of intelligence and culture have been derived are man’s accomplishments. But the question is to know whether animals possess intelligence at all, or whether it is the privilege of man alone. It was Darwin in the Descent of Man (1871), who set forth to prove that ‘there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties, and after having examined many cases he draws the conclusion that the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind. After Darwin a host of evolutionists held fundamentally to this view which appeared to be confirmed by various experiments on animals such as der kluge Hans (the clever Hans, a horse) and the Elberfeld horse who were supposed to solve mathematical problems; and the anthropoid apes of Wolfgang Koehler and others, who were said to behave in an intelligent way. While these and other more recent experiments did certainly show that animals, especially the higher animals, had a plasticity of behaviour which discredits the mechanistic animal psychology of the Cartesian philosophers, yet they are far from proving that beasts have intelligence in the strict sense, as we define it. The greatest flaw of these experiments is to mistake external performance for the psychological operations underlying this performance. When bees, left to themselves, build as a matter of fact their hexagonal cells for storing honey, they externally seem to show more intelligence than the ordinary man to whom this appropriate device would have only occurred after much deliberation; and the same is the case with birds building their nests and singing their songs. Yet nobody would grant to bees or to birds more intelligence than to man; and the reason is because the way in which animals perform their ingenious works is quasi- mechanical and stereotyped, whereas the works done by man, even when they are inferior, are done with anticipation and thought. As R. A. Wilson says in refuting Darwin and his followers, these authors forget in their experiments and observations what is more important, namely, the total or central unifying mental faculty of man’ which is fundamentally superior to the central unifying mental faculty of animals,’ and only rely on the sub-faculties or partial aptitudes which
sometimes are more developed in animals than in man. In fact, the clearest confirmation of this conclusion is that animals never develop 'anything approximating to true language’, culture or any system of thought or science, and this is fatal for the theory that admits intelligence in animals in the strict sense.

Some followers of Darwin tried to defend their position by arguing that ‘the difference in mental development between the lowest type of savage, the Fuegian, for example, and a fully civilized and cultivated man is greater than the difference between the same savage and the anthropoid ape. But to this Wilson makes the following reply: If we were to take a six-month-old Fuegian infant and place him in an educated English-speaking home in Canada with its common educational opportunities, what and where would he be in twenty years? He would be first of all in complete working possession of a highly developed language, the instrument by which man has the world of mind into which he has entered and in which he realizes his characteristic destiny. Then, by means of this language he would have elaborated concretely for himself the various parts of this mental world in history, geography, literature, mathematics, science and would stand in much the same position as any Canadian boy who had a long line of civilized ancestors The seeming gulf between the savage and civilized man would be practically bridged in a quarter of a single life span.

Now put the chimpanzee's six-month-old offspring in the same home and environment, and at twenty years he would know none of these things. He is excluded by some impassable barrier from man's mental world, the world which man has actualized and elaborated by means of language,

This barrier of language is the Rubicon which animals can never pass because they lack the only instrument which could bring them across it intelligence. This conclusion is fully confirmed by modern investigators on animal psychology as Dr D. Katz who, after having sympathetically analyzed the behaviour of animals through most significant experiments conducted up to now, concludes:

Man alone commands speech in the strict sense, and with it symbolic thought. Only language and later writing, make possible the handing down of a tradition from one generation to another Social imitation is of course also found among the animals, but it remains confined to definite concrete situations. Consequently animals stay on the same level, and thousands of years have passed without advance. Animals have no culture.

And then, giving to the term intelligence’ a wider meaning which we would translate for ‘plasticity of behaviour’, and using the term ‘reason’ for intelligence in the strict sense, the same author continues:

We cannot deny that animals have intelligence. But man alone has the gift of reason. The new born child comes into the world helpless, and equipped with only a few ready-made reflexes and instincts. But one day he discovers that things have names and that to know its name is to have power over the thing. It is perhaps the greatest single discovery of his life. Words are the magic key to the treasures of man’s history. If it be asked why chimpanzees, though endowed with a neuromuscular equipment and brain almost like those of man, never say anything, our answer is, because they have nothing to say, because they lack intelligence.

With this agrees Gruender’s remark: If they had indeed the perception of their own experience, and had a mind capable of educing correlates and working the general syntheses of things with their corresponding mental symbols, they would indeed have much to say; they would have culture; but this is the privilege of man alone.
THE UNITY OF MANKIND

Now that we have seen that the differences between man and beast are specific or of kind, it is time we turn our attention to a parallel problem which consists in ascertaining whether the differences existing between the various types of men are also of kind or merely of degree. The importance of this question, together with the previous one, for practical life, becomes manifest at once if we consider that the evolutionist, while admitting the difference of degree between men and animals, has no difficulty in using these as means exclusively placed at the service of man; and therefore, there is the danger that, by the same token, those who believe in the existence of a superior race may come to hold logically enough that the inferior, even if he is such only in degree, is meant to serve the superior, as animals serve men. And thus, at a stroke, the ancient principle of slavery by nature becomes logically revalidated.

But the feelings of modern man are quite at variance with this. If the distance between man and beast were merely of degree we would not be justified in using animals as means, as we do not feel justified in, and even revolt from, using an idiot or a child as tools or slaves even though their minds are underdeveloped. And conversely, if the difference between men and animals is of kind no major difficulty stands in the way of our using them as means, while the persuasion that all men are brothers or belong to the same species prevents us logically, if not practically, from using any of them as chattels or means for our own selfish ends. That naive type of evolutionism which tends to shorten the distance from man to beast, cuts both ways: on the one hand it raises the brute to the category of man and on the other, lowers man to the level of the brute.

The procedure followed by those who admit essential differences between primitive and modern men consists in emphasizing the undesirable traits of the former to a very marked extent. We have already seen the opinions of Morgan, Levy-Bruhl, and Kelsen, to whom Sir John Lubbock and Darwin himself could be added, but their assertions serve only to make those of us smile who have been moving among preliterates as among friends. It is true that they labour under their own social and psychological handicaps, and are at a disadvantage in modern life when compared with the more sophisticated city man; but this is the product of cultural factors and social tradition; there is nothing inborn or racial in it; and given the required conditions, all can be surmounted in one or more generations.

One young Katkari belonging to one of the most backward hill tribes living in the Western Ghats who has been taught plumbing; in accuracy, neatness and resourcefulness he is superior to men of his civilized colleagues. Another young man of the same tribe, in spite of having lived his whole life in the hills and attended only the primary school in the missionary settlement of Kune, Khandala, managed to pass all the examinations required except the last, to qualify him to become schoolmaster. In the same settlement the women and young girls all Katkaris produce, under the direction of the Sisters, such magnificent needlework and embroidery that they are the envy of their so-called more advanced sisters. Much more can be said of the more advanced tribes like the Warlis, Oraons and Mundas, among whom we find party leaders, lawyers, doctors and high Church dignitaries. The above mentioned supposition by R. A. Wilson about the Fuegian boy educated in a modem environment has nothing chimerical about it: nor has its counterpart about the chimpanzee, because in the many experiments on civilization made on them the old proverb has been once more confirmed: Apes are apes even if clothed in scarlet.
Reciprocally regarding the most simple peoples as the Andaman Islanders, the Veddas of Ceylon, the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, and the African Pygmies, historians tell us of their kindness, ingenuity, law-abidingness, artistic genius and inventiveness in spite of the limited material at their disposal. The aggressiveness and brutality of some of them, as in the Andaman Islanders or Australians which is not worse than that of the so-called superior races—can be reasonably explained on historical grounds because frequently they have been the victims of every attack and depredation from their more powerful neighbours.

The perception and realization of truth, goodness, and beauty, which are the roots of culture, and the natural manifestation of human intelligence are not the privilege of a few chosen groups but the birthright of all mankind, including the primitive. Here we may adduce the testimony of Jacobs and Stern that makes up for many:

Preliterate and prescientific people are constitutionally as capable of clear definition or of logic as are the inheritors of European civilization. However the cultural heritage of the Europeans, because of its wealth and specialization of skills, has facilitated the devising of a set of canons of logic, methods of scientific procedure, and premises freed of animistic or other forms of supernatural associations....

The distinction between prelogical and logical made by Levy Bruhl does not set Europeans or Caucasoids apart from others as much as it sets apart a small group of highly skilled and literate persons with educational, scientific or technological background from the masses of human beings, Caucasoids and others, who have lacked such backgrounds, which are made possible by industrialization and universal secularized education.

Both authors end by saying: Anthropologists are agreed that inventiveness, insight, originality, and creativity are found in every population. As a matter of fact, a practical system of astronomy and navigation used by the natives of the Caroline Islands in Micronesia, was discovered which had all the characters of a rudimentary science.' The complexity of most of the preliterate languages, and their richness in classificatory terms of kin relationships go also a long way to show the keenness and flexibility of the preliterate mind.

The powers of perception and realization of beauty, which were once denied to preliterate peoples, have been finally acknowledged by all anthropologists. The taste for music and dancing of the Guarani Indians of South America and the hill tribes of the Western Ghats; the love of nature of the Maori and Chotanagpur tribes; the expressive ivory carvings of the Eskimoes and the skill with which they embellish their pipe-stems; the paintings and engravings of the Bushmen, and the marvellous paleolithic paintings of Altamira and other caves of the Pyrenees are witness to the universality of the artistic powers of man. As Marrett puts it: Whether one chooses to label it primitive or advanced, the cult of beauty in one or other of its myriad manifestations is ever there to cheer humanity on its way.

A whole literature could be produced to confirm the ideas expressed in these lines which show conclusively that there is no intrinsic difference in mind or in any other fundamental human trait between preliterate man as we know him, and his more civilized counterpart. ‘The savage,’ says A. M. Tozzer, ‘is a rational being, morally sound and in any respect worthy of a place in the Universal Brotherhood of Man.’
This unity of mankind has been further upheld on scientific and especially on biological grounds by the UNESCO Committee of Experts on Race problems which includes some of the most eminent scientists of the world. These in their public declaration in Paris in July 1950 concisely stated:

**Scientists have reached general agreement in recognizing that mankind is one: that all men belong to the same species of Homo Sapiens.** It is further generally agreed among scientists that all men are probably derived from the same common stock; and that such differences as exist between different groups of mankind are due to the operation of evolutionary factors, of differentiation such as isolation, the drift and random fixation of the material particles which control heredity (the genes), changes in the structure of those particles, hybridization and natural selection.

Moreover, when you come to think of it, if all types of blood groups may practically be found in every race and there are no absolute differences in which one race is all one blood type and another all of another type; if in the germ cells of every human being, irrespectively of race and culture, we find the same number of chromosomes which distinguish them from the individuals of any other species; if, in addition to this the various races, even the most disparate, can mix for procreation without any evil result from the biological or moral viewpoint, it follows that the various races or cultures are but different branches of the same human tree. Egon von Eickstedt, the German biologist, is quite definite on this point:

All of our deductions and our assumptions; everything that we know about the anatomical and palaebiological characteristics of man's ancestry, everything that geology and anthropology have yielded us so far, indeed, favours a so-called monophyletic descent of man. At least the notion of a human descent that took place once and monophyletically lends itself more appropriately to the kaleidoscopic, interlocking and shifting phases of humanization than does the notion of polyphytism.

**MENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMAN GROUPS**

The third question which we have proposed to study is whether there are differences, especially mental, between groups in such wise that, in spite of the unity of mankind, we may still speak of mentally superior or inferior races. This question has been sometimes mistaken for the previous one, though the differences between them are obvious. In the previous question we have seen that all men are members of the same human species and belong to the vast family of mankind; but in the present problem we ask whether, owing to certain biological factors hereditary in the race brought about by geographical isolation or other cultural or environmental agencies, certain groups of men are mentally or intrinsically inferior to others.

There is no doubt that there are mental differences between groups. If it were possible to take the I.Q. of all human groups, we would observe wide variations. But the point at issue is to know whether these variations are racial or inborn, and not merely the transitory effect of environment, history or tradition.

The most common tests from which mental differences have been inferred are differences in cranial capacity, brain-weight, and the finer configuration of the brain.

Various statistical tables have been constructed that seem to show a correlation between the cranial capacity of a group and their intelligence or culture. Thus the Andamanese have an average capacity
of 1,281 cubic cm., for men, and 1,148 for women; the Veddas 1,250 and 1,139 respectively; while the brain capacity of Europeans is 1,450 for men, and 1,300 for women. On the other hand, the average given for the Chinese is 1,456; the nomadic Kalmucks 1,466; the Japanese 1,486; the Kaffir 1,540; and the Ama Xosa 1,570. If the correlation between brain capacity and intelligence holds, the Ama Xosa should be the most intelligent race of mankind followed closely by the Kaffir. But if to this is added that among the Greenland Eskimoes persons have been found with a brain capacity of 1,452 cubic cm. and among the pygmy tribes one of 1,600, it is obvious that on this chapter no conclusion can be drawn about race superiority or inferiority.

The same may be said about brain-weights. The Europeans are supposed to have an average of 1,361 grammes, the U.S.A. Negroes 1,316; Annamites 1,241; Japanese 1,367; Buriats 1,380; Chinese 1,428; while the Peschera of Tierra del Fuego, who sometimes were considered half-animal, are similar to the Europeans in brain-weight.

Many examinations were made concerning the finer structure of the brain. But the number of cases was so reduced and the individual differences so wide, that Kohlbrugge himself, the first authority on this matter, was bound to confess that there are no varieties of brain confined exclusively to any race, and that very likely the finer structure of the brain is not a race character.

The boldest experiments carried out to discover the inborn mental differences, of the various races were those conducted by the American Army during World War I, as well as the famous tests of Binet, Terman, Goodenough, Freeman etc. In these tests it was found that the I.Q. of the Negroes was lower than that of the whites; such was also the case with American Indians and Mexicans as compared with the same. But the criticisms levelled against the reliability of the tests and the conclusions derived from them are devastating.

Even supposing that the tests were fair and objective a thing which in spite of the ability and honesty of the investigators cannot be easily admitted— some of the findings clearly suggested that the differences found were not due to inborn but to environmental factors. Thus in certain northern states of U. S. A. the Negroes attained a score higher than that of the whites in some of the southern states.

Most tests of European groups in America, including the Army tests, registered also a definite superiority of northern Europeans over central and southern European immigrants. The British Isles, Germany and Holland fared better than the rest, while Italians and Poles were at the bottom of the scale, much to the delight of the partisans of Nordic superiority who saw their prejudices once more confirmed against the Alpine and Mediterranean groups.

But here again both the accuracy of the tests and the legitimacy of the inferences were questioned by anthropologists as Otto Klineberg, Garth, Freeman and others. So in the intelligence tests that Otto Klineberg applied to school children of various parts of France, Germany and Italy, the superiority of the city children over those of the country asserted itself a superiority clearly due to environmental factors. These tests did not reveal any superiority of the northern children over the Alpine or Mediterranean or vice versa. Thus the Paris children scored the highest with 219.0 points followed by those of Hamburg 216.4: and Rome 211.8; while the lowest were the French Alpine 180.2, the French Nordic 178.8, and the Italian Mediterranean 173.0 (a poor consolation prize, indeed, for the Nordic racist!).
Besides this experimentation, the wide range of variations within the same group, the doubts as to whether the persons tested were fair samples of the various groups, or the groups themselves represented as many races; the difficulties of isolating language handicaps or of making adequate provisions for differences in education, tradition, and economic conditions, raised many doubt sand misgivings in the minds of the investigators themselves. One of them, C. C. Brigham, who believed that the American Army tests had shown the superiority of the Nordics, wrote nine years later in 1930: Comparative studies of various national and racial groups may not be made with existing tests.... In particular, one of the most pretentious of these comparative racial studies the writers own was without foundation. The fact of the matter, as Hooton avers, is the following:

There are no objective scientific techniques for the measurement of intelligence, temperament, economic capacity et cetera, that are capable of indiscriminate application to peoples possessing radically different cultures and living under diverse conditions of economic and social environment. Some progress has indeed been made in the devising of non-literate, universal intelligence tests applicable to all peoples in whatever environment. Results of such tests, however, cannot yet be accepted as true appraisals of racial quality.

Race superiority has tried also to find support in the history of civilization, which shows (according to the supporters of this theory) that the Nordic race has always been leading the rest. Yet in one of the most searching studies of recent times about the rise and fall of civilizations, Arnold Toynbee has found that in the course of history the so-called Nordics have contributed to four and, possibly, five civilizations, including the Indie; the Alpine to seven, the Mediterranean to ten, the Brown (Dravidians and Malays) to two: the Yellow race to three, the Red race of America to two. By the definition of civilization all preliterate peoples, including the African Negroes, have been excluded; but this does not show that they are incapable of civilization or that all the peoples included in the above mentioned races have contributed to some of them. As Toynbee himself writes: There are far many white peoples that are as innocent of having made any contribution to civilization as the blacks themselves.

We may conclude from these observations that there are in mankind differences in racial traits on the one hand and in mental habits and culture on the other, but neither has it been proved that they are intrinsically correlated, nor that there is any race or nation intrinsically inferior to another regardless of external factors, of which tradition and education are the most important. In this sense race has to be discarded as an agency of social change, though we have included this question in this part of historical and even logical reasons. Yet we cannot a priori deny the possibility that a racial group, owing to some peculiar biological traits, maybe mentally inferior to another, because it is well known that biological or physiological phenomena do influence our mental operations. But this supposition is too theoretical to be trustworthy. Neither the concept of race that we have admitted, nor the extensive mixture of races that has always existed in humanity and is now on the increase, nor any type of reliable tests, experiments or observations have hitherto provided any probable grounds for such a hypothesis.

But even if this were proved, the racialist claims would not be fully justified, because no man is born to serve another man; nor is the mentally superior always superior in moral and social qualities; nor is his contribution to society more valuable than that of his less gifted brother. It is a well known fact that most of the evils of mankind have been engineered by intelligent ruthless people. The Socratic dictum that ‘knowledge is virtue’ has not unfortunately been confirmed by facts. Finally, it seems clear enough that the rich and the poor, the intelligent and the ignorant, the healthy and the
handicapped, the white and the coloured, all being equally members of the great human family have a similar role to fulfill in society where peacefulness must be substituted for strife and co-operation for conflict.

**RACE PREJUDICE: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES**

After what has been discussed one may wonder what remains of the meaning and significance of race. From the physiological point of view as a method for classifying men according to their external features, the concept of race is still valid; but as a human and sociological concept as a concept intended to understand the nature of man, society and culture it has hardly any value. This was the opinion of the UNESCO scientists who, in the Montagu and A. Goldenweiser, the former of whom advocated that the concepts of race being so weighed down with false meaning, were dropped altogether from the field of science; and the latter concluded that What the anthropologist finds is man to whom nothing human is foreign: all the fundamental traits of the psychic makeup of man anywhere are present everywhere.

If the meaning of race is so empty and yet at certain periods and in certain places race prejudice and strife become so rampant, there must be some causes which are responsible for this state of affairs. These we must now review in the following paragraphs.

The first statement that must be made about race prejudice is that it is not, as many seem to believe, inborn. Both in the U.S.A., and in India we have frequently seen children, even babies, of various races playing gaily together without any hindrance or prejudice. The poisonous plants of prejudice and discrimination make their appearance when elders, friends, or other persons of prestige inculcate in the minds of children ideas about avoiding certain kinds of persons 'cause they are bad an dirty or something to the same effect, and are even punished if they are seen playing with them. The seeds of prejudice may have been sown so early in the child’s life as to appear to be sometimes inborn but there are no scientific proofs to support this contention while there are many to disprove it.

Besides the wrong type of education as a source of race prejudice, we may reduce the others to the following headings:

**ETHNOCENTRISM:** Ethnocentrism is the exaggerated esteem that people have of themselves whereby they despise foreigners or feel superior to them. In one way or another every group shares in this inasmuch as it is a spontaneous growth or intensification of the we feeling, which unites the members of the same group. When this feeling grows to exaggerated proportions, we have real chauvinism even among preliterate peoples, who sometimes call themselves we the men. Such is the meaning of the term ‘Illinois’, which this group of Amerindians gave to themselves; as is the case with the ancient Kols of India whose name was probably derived from Ho or Har, which in Mundari means ‘man’.

Ethnocentrism in itself is not race prejudice, but it may become so if cultural differences and the presumptive inferiority of the ‘out-group’ become associated with physiological traits which are supposed to be the reason of such inferiority.

**ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES:** Another cause of race prejudice may result from the economic advantages which in certain circumstances may accrue to the dominant group. When there is a section of the community which is considered to be inferior; where many of them get lower jobs without any
hope of improvement, then a perennial source of cheap labour is placed at the service of the dominant group who will not hesitate to take full advantage of it even if it renders it difficult or impossible to raise the standard of life of the labourers who belong to the dominant group. The history of ancient Greece and Rome amply shows how aristocracies can prosper at the expense of slaves; while in the U.S.A., the cheap labour provided by the Negroes in the southern states, made it possible to take full advantage of the newly invented cotton gin and other processes for extracting sugar from cane owing to which those states became potentially opulent areas. In these cases the question of race comes as a pretext for, or as a rationalization of, the status quo which tends to perpetuate it.

POLITICAL ADVANTAGES: Racial prejudices are frequently fostered by the dominant group in order to keep or strengthen their political supremacy. When this happens the racial group which is discriminated against may be deprived or put at a disadvantage in exercising the right to vote or holding an office while the dominant group keeps in its hands the resources of power. Such is the case in South Africa, in some of the southern states of U.S.A. and in other regions of the world.

COMPENSATION FOR FRUSTRATION: Sometimes a racial group may be regarded as a scapegoat by the dominant group in order to vent on it its social or individual frustration, which may be brought about by other factors such as the ineptitude or dishonesty of certain individuals of the ruling group. Thus in Nazi Germany the Jews were made the scapegoat of the Nazis so that these could throw on them the blame for Germany’s defeat in World War and their failure to establish later a stable political system. In these cases it often happens that a man who fails to secure a job may easily believe that his failure is due to the intrigues and machinations of the individuals of a certain racial group whom he has learnt to characterize as low, mean, and unscrupulous.

IGNORANCE: This is perhaps one of the most fertile sources of race prejudice. This may be due to lack of contact with the group in question, to psychological barriers standing between groups, or to unfavourable ideas which one person may harbour or may have assimilated about a certain race. But neither local nor psychological distances between groups lead by themselves to race prejudice. This happens when some of the above mentioned factors find in ignorance a powerful ally, or when, because of it, we have formed in our minds an unfavourable stereotype about a group. Stereotypes,’ says Rose, are exaggerations of certain physical traits or cultural characteristics which are found among some members of the minority group and are attributed to all members of the group. Thus persons are known, not by their personal characteristics, but by those with which the group has been stigmatized. Thus the Chinese are supposed to be laundry men, the English phlegmatic, and the Scots tightfisted. The stereotypes, which are by no means fixed, fulfill the role of condensing our knowledge of other people in a single formula; thus saving us the time and trouble of finding out things for ourselves while inflating our collective Ego’, with the satisfaction that we are superior to others. The result is cheap and unfounded prejudice towards the other groups. The stereotype may sometimes be based on a true trait of the group to which it is applied, but even in these cases it becomes more often than not a caricature of reality.

PSEUDO-SCIENCE: Very akin to ignorance as a source of racial prejudice is any pseudo-scientific theory on which a sector of society may try to justify its distrust of another group. Thus the theory of the gradual evolution of man has been interpreted as justifying the ‘superiority’ of those races which are supposed to be more advanced in the scale of evolution. Some of the theories on which racialists have tried to confirm their claims have already been studied in these pages.
In order to counteract race prejudice it is not sufficient to show the weakness of its foundations, as has already been done; it is also necessary to develop in all a wider perspective of things and to educate properly the new generation on the right lines. When the prejudiced Nordic youth sees that the Latin or the Negro, whom he has learnt to despise, are kind, intelligent, and well bred, all his prejudices fall to the ground. The expansion of communications with its corresponding multiplication of contacts is a factor which undoubtedly tends to break down race barriers whenever they exist, as the present influx of tourism is doing.

Another consideration against race discrimination is that in the long run it does not pay either economically or politically. It means a nation that is divided with a minority in it which can have no loyalty or love towards its oppressors. It implies a large expenditure in police, courts and jails, and a vast machinery to enforce ghettos and colour bars. It makes heavy demands on the rulers as they have to answer the press campaigns carried abroad in favour of the persecuted group; it has also to satisfy those foreign powers who are pledged to abide by those conventions in favour of minorities and racial groups voted in such international bodies as the UNO and the International Court of the Hague.

Finally the existence of many nations in which race prejudice is absent in spite of the existence of various races in them, is the most convincing argument that race prejudice is not due to race and can be solved whenever it exists. There is in Central and South America, as well as in the Caribbean Islands a higher %age of Negroes than in the United States and certainly many more native Indians. Yet there is no race problem, no colour bar, no apartheid there at all; intermarriages are frequent and the coloured or mixed inhabitants occupy high places in the state, including sometimes the supreme magistracy of the nation. As witness of this there was Benito Juarez, a full blooded American Indian, who was three times president of Mexico in the middle of the last century. Race riots or lynchings are unknown in these vast regions. If this state of affairs cannot be extended to other nations it means that there is something radically wrong with them. It is sometimes argued by supporters of racial discrimination that the inferior position of the Latin American nations in comparison with North America is the best proof that race mixture is harmful to a nation. To this we reply that, setting aside the fact that the notions of superiority and inferiority are largely subjective, the fact remains that those nations that have sacrificed a part of their prospects of material and social welfare by extending a hand to their coloured citizens have written one of the most beautiful and inspiring episodes in the history of mankind which largely compensates for any material loss.

Summary

The race question is taken as a particular case of the problem between heredity and environment which are forces of social change. A race is a group of people having in common certain observable physiological traits which are transmitted by biological inheritance. Such traits are, for example, skin colour, facial index, hair form etc. In order to study this problem we must first ask whether there is any specific distinction between man and beast; secondly, whether there are any human groups that differ from others in kind; and thirdly, if the difference between these is only of degree, what are the legitimate inferences which may be drawn from this.

The answer to the first problem is in the affirmative. The criterion selected to ascertain this is intelligence defined in the strict sense, namely, as the power to know one’s own experience and to deduce relations and correlates, as manifested in language and culture. In this sense animals, even the higher animals, are without it, as observation and experiment show. Their flexibility of adaptation and facility to imitate things do not demand intelligence in the strict sense.
The answer to the second question is in the negative. All races of men possess intelligence and culture as manifested in language, social institutions, and in the striving after the realization of truth, goodness, and beauty, from which arise science, morality, and art. The ‘prelogical’ mentality attributed to the ‘primitives’ by Levy-Bruhl has been disowned by the same author and later attempts to prove the essential inferiority of the ‘primitives,’ have been proved inconclusive. Furthermore, from the biological viewpoint, all races of men most probably originate from the same trunk, and there is no ‘master race’ born to command as there is no slave race born to obey. All men, without distinction of race, belong to the great family of mankind.

To the third question we have given the answer that the physical variations existing in man are not intrinsically correlated with intelligence or culture. The differences found in them may be explained by tradition, education, and environment. There are undoubtedly psychological and mental differences among men based on inborn or inherited factors, but these are not proved to be racial, but individual; they exist between individuals of the same group, and are scattered among all groups. The concept of race is physiological, statistical, and conventional; it tells us nothing about the intrinsic superiority or inferiority of any human group. The mental or cultural differences existing between groups are historical or environmental.

Race prejudice is not inborn. It is usually due to defective education, to ignorance, to the prospect of economic or political advantages accruing to the dominant group, and to the need of a scapegoat on which to vent the frustrations, individual or collective, of the ruling group. The use of stereotypes, as ready-made devices to caricature other groups unfavourably and enhance one’s own, has also helped race prejudice; while the growth of pseudo-scientific theories of race have been seized upon as a ‘scientific’ way of justifying race prejudice and exploitation.

But in the long run race prejudice does not pay. It can be eliminated by education and appropriate training as any other social vice can. The fact that in many nations, as in Latin America, race discrimination does not exist, is already an encouraging sign in this respect.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Mobility means movement, and social mobility refers to the movement from one social position to another in the given social structure of the society. This social position may be with reference to economic, occupation, income, and so on. In context of social stratification, social mobility implies an upward or downward movement of people from one social stratum to another within a stratification system.

Even though no actual system of stratification is completely rigid or flexible, yet on the basis of degree of social mobility that a system allows, systems of stratification have been classified into two types, viz., open and closed system.

In an open system of stratification, the boundaries between the social strata are relatively more flexible. Open systems are assumed to have greater degree of social mobility. A completely open society, which exists only in theory, would be one in which all individuals could achieve the status for which their natural talents, abilities, and inclinations best suited them. A person can achieve a higher status on the basis of individual ability and effort, or merit. Statuses that can be
gained by the direct effort of the individual, often through competition, are called achieved statuses, the best examples being most occupational positions in modern societies. American class system is an example of open system of stratification. An open society would not be a society of equals; there would still be inequality stemming from unequal social positions. But these social positions would be gained solely by personal achievement and merit. However, as stated earlier, in reality, no absolute open society exists. Even in the so-called open class societies of the west, restrictions and hindrances of various kinds are found to persist which restrict free social mobility. Though the modern industrial societies are increasingly becoming meritocratic and open yet the class of origin has a significant bearing on the life chances (for example, educational attainment, training in specialized skills) of an individual or group and its prospects for upward mobility.

In a closed system, on the other hand, the boundaries between social strata are rigid. A completely closed society, also purely hypothetical, would be one in which all individuals were assigned a status at birth or at a certain age, which could never be changed either for better or worse. Such statuses are called ascriptive statuses. Here status is ascribed to the individuals by society more or less arbitrarily and permanently on the basis of traits over which they have no control such as birth, skin colour, gender or age group etc. In a closed system social position is usually hereditary; individual ability and efforts generally do not count. Caste system in India and feudal society in Europe are the best examples of closed system of social stratification. But certain amount of mobility exists even in the closed systems. For example, in France, there were two kinds of nobles: the nobles of the sword and the nobles of the robe. The nobles of the robe were nobles not by birth but by title. Similarly, in the traditional Indian caste system, some degree of mobility was facilitated through the practices of hypergamy and Sanskritisation. Hypergamy (or anuloma) is that form of marriage in which the ritual status of a man is higher than that of his prospective wife. Please note that although the norms of caste endogamy were widely prevalent in traditional Hindu society yet the practice of hypergamy or anuloma form of marriage provided one of the avenues of social mobility to the family and caste group of the girl from the lower caste when she gets married to a man from higher caste.

M. N. Srinivas argues that even in traditional India, caste system permitted some degree of mobility through the process of ‘Sanskritisation’. The term Sanskritisation was first used by M. N. Srinivas in the course of his study of the Coorgs in erstwhile State of Mysore. According to Srinivas, “Sanskritisation is a process by which a ‘low’ Hindu caste, or tribe or other group changes its customs, ritual, ideology, and way of life in the direction of a high, and frequently, ‘twice-born’ caste.” Sanskritisation is an endogenous source of upward mobility for a caste. The mobility caused by this process, however, leads to only positional changes in the system. It does not result in structural change. Change occurs within the caste hierarchy. The caste system itself does not change.

Social mobility is primarily of two types, vertical mobility and horizontal mobility. Vertical mobility refers to the movement from one social position to another position of higher or lower rank. Thus, there can be upward vertical mobility or downward vertical mobility. Horizontal mobility, on the other hand, refers to movement of a person from one social position to another position of the same rank. It does not bring about a change in the social position of the individual or group that has moved. For example, if a teacher is transferred in the same rank from one school to another school, it is an instance of horizontal mobility. But if the teacher gets promotion in the school where he is working or where he is transferred, than it will be a case of vertical mobility.
While discussing the dimensions of vertical mobility, it is also important to note that mobility may be inter-generational or intra-generational. **Inter-generational mobility** refers to the mobility between generations. Here the measure of mobility would be whether and to what extent the children have achieved a social position higher than that of their parents in the case of upward mobility or lower in case of downward mobility. For example, when the son of a peon becomes an officer, it is a case of inter-generational upward mobility. However, if the son of an officer becomes a clerk, than it is a case of inter-generational downward mobility.

**Intra-generational mobility** refers to the social mobility of an individual within his or her own lifetime. In other words, it refers to the upward or downward mobility that the same individual experiences at different points in his lifetime. For example, when a clerk gets promoted to the rank of section officer, it is a case of intra-generational upward mobility. However, if a section officer is demoted to clerk, than it is a case of intra-generational downward mobility.

**Seymour M. Lipset** and **Reinhard Bendix** in their study titled *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (1959) indicated that fully industrialized, bureaucratically organized societies like the United States tend to be most open, while the most closed societies are preindustrial, especially agricultural, societies based on kinship.

**Thomas Fox** and S.M. **Miller** in their study “Economic, Political and Social Determinants of Mobility: An International Cross-sectional Analysis” (1965) sought to identify the determinates of upward mobility in many different nations. Their research uncovered two conditions that seem to encourage a high degree of upward social mobility: **an advanced stage of development of an industrial economy**, and **a large educational enrolment**. As societies become more and more industrialized, the unskilled, low-salaried jobs at the bottom of the occupational status ranking are slowly eliminated, for these are the jobs most easily performed by machines. Simultaneously, more jobs are added at the middle and upper levels, to manipulate and control the flow of machine-produced goods and information. The vertical mobility resulting from such system changes – rather than individual achievement – is called **structural mobility**. But the higher ranking job opportunities will not be fully utilized unless the children of lower-level parents are given the knowledge and training necessary to achieve them. Compulsory public education and the opportunity for low-cost, unrestricted higher education provide this necessary condition.

**STUDIES ON SOCIAL MOBILITY**

The first major study of intergenerational mobility in England and Wales was conducted by **David Glass** and his associates in 1949. In his study Glass developed a seven class model based on **occupational prestige** as the criterion and compared the status of sons with the status of their fathers. Overall, the study indicated a fairly high level of intergenerational mobility. However, for the most part, the change in status is not very great. **Most mobility is short range**, sons generally moving to a category either adjacent or close to that of their fathers. There is little long range mobility either from top to bottom or vice versa. In the higher status categories there is a considerable degree of self-recruitment – a process by which members of a stratum are recruited from the sons of those who already belong to that stratum. Family background appears to have an important influence on life chances. The higher the occupational status of the father, the more likely the son is to obtain a high status position. Glass’s study therefore reveals a significant degree of inequality of opportunity.
Oprah Winfrey, who rose from poverty to become a media mogul, symbolizes social mobility in contemporary American society.

After 1949, the next major study of social mobility in England and Wales was conducted in 1972, popularly known as the Oxford Mobility Study. The results cannot be compared in detail with those of the 1949 study since different criteria were used as a basis for constructing the various strata. Where Glass used a classification based on occupational prestige, the Oxford study categorized occupations largely in terms of their market rewards. One of the most striking differences between the 1972 and 1949 surveys is the amount of long range mobility, particularly, mobility out of the manual working class. For example, the study indicated that 7.1% of the sons of class 7 fathers are in class 1 in 1972. However, despite the relatively high rate of long range upward mobility, a large proportion (45.7%) of the sons of class 1 fathers are themselves in class 1 in 1972. The combination of a fairly high degree of inheritance of privileged positions and a relatively high rate of long range upward mobility is probably due to the fact that there is literally more room at the top. The occupations which make up class 1 expanded rapidly in the twenty or so years before 1972. They have grown at such a rate that they can only be filled by recruitment from below. Class 1 father simply do not produce sufficient sons to fill class 1 occupations in the next generation.

Various reasons have been given to account for the rate of social mobility in industrial society. Firstly, there is considerable change in the occupational structure. For example, in Britain, the proportion of manual workers in the male labour force has declined from 70% in 1921 to 55% in 1971. Thus, for each succeeding generation, there are more white-collar and fewer blue-collar and fewer blue-collar jobs available. This helps to account for the finding of the Oxford study that upward mobility considerably exceeds downward mobility. Secondly, manual and non-manual
fertility rates differ. In particular, working-class fathers have generally had more children than middle-class fathers. This differential fertility can also be seen as a reason for the relatively high rate of upward mobility. As the Oxford study indicated, class 1 fathers did not produce sufficient sons to fill the rapidly growing numbers of class 1 occupations. As a result recruitment from lower strata was essential to fill those positions. Thirdly, many sociologists have argued that occupational status in industrial society is increasingly achieved on the basis of merit. Jobs are allocated in terms of talent and ability rather than through family and friendship connections. Education is seen to play a key part in this process. The educational system grades people in terms of ability, and educational qualifications have a growing influence on occupational status and reward. Since educational opportunities are increasingly available to all young people, no matter what their social background, the result is more open society and a higher rate of social mobility. Social mobility, therefore, can be seen as an index of economic development.

According to a 2012 Pew Economic Mobility Project study 43% of children born into the bottom quintile (bottom 20%) remain in that bottom quintile as adults. Similarly, 40% of children raised in the top quintile (top 20%) will remain there as adults. Looking at larger moves, only 4% of those raised in the bottom quintile moved up to the top quintile as adults. Around twice as many (8%) of children born into the top quintile fell to the bottom. 37% of children born into the top quintile will fall below the middle. These findings have led researchers to conclude that "opportunity structures create and determine future generations' chances for success. Hence, our lot in life is at least partially determined by where we grow up, and this is partially determined by where our parents grew up, and so on."

Several large studies of mobility in developed countries in recent years have found the US among the lowest in mobility. Miles Corak in his study titled “Do Poor Children Become Poor Adults?” found that of nine developed countries, the United States and United Kingdom had the lowest intergenerational vertical social mobility with about half of the advantages of having a parent with a high income passed on to the next generation. The four countries with the lowest "intergenerational income elasticity", i.e. the highest social mobility, were Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Canada with less than 20% of advantages of having a high income parent passed on to their children. Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz contends that "Scandinavian countries changed their education systems, social policies and legal frameworks to create societies where there is a higher degree of mobility. That made their countries more into the land of opportunity that America once was."

Sources and causes of social mobility

I. Structural factors:

1. Expansion of industrial economy
   - change in the occupational structure
   - agrarian – industrial – post-industrial (farming) (manufacturing) (service sector)
   - with industrialization and mechanization – manual jobs decline – unskilled jobs taken over by machines – technical and high skill jobs require specialized skills and knowledge
   - manual labourers and farmers – unskilled and less educated –
witnessed downward mobility

- For example, in USA – in 1900 – agricultural workers constituted 40% of labour force. But, in 2000, agricultural workers constitute only 4% of the total labour force.

- in the age of globalization – international competition – even well educated managers, technicians and other professionals witnessed downward mobility – because of outsourcing of jobs (BPOs)

- but at the same time, industrialization and the growth of service sector has led to the diversification of the occupational structure – leading to the creation of numerous high status jobs.

2. Government sponsored mass education programmes

- such as National Literacy Mission, etc. – opening up various industrial training institutes (ITIs) – for specialized knowledge and vocational skills

3. Lower birth rate in higher classes

- as economy expands, more higher positions are created
- but, due to low birth rate, self-recruitment in higher classes is not sufficient enough
- as a result, people from lower classes get an opportunity to occupy higher positions so created.

II. Individual factors (high education, talent, achievement motivation, hard work, etc.)

Some personal characteristics are achieved, such as education, talent, motivation and hard work. Others are ascribed, such as family background, race and gender. As has been suggested, both achieved and ascribed qualities have a hand in determining the degree of mobility an individual or group attain in a given society. But the popular belief in equal opportunity would lead us to expect career success to be attained through achievement more than ascription. Is achievement then, really the more powerful determining force in upward mobility?

According to most sociological studies, achievement may appear on the surface to be the predominant factor, but it is actually subject to the influence of ascription. It is well known that the more education people have, the more successful they are in their careers. But the amount of education people have is related to their family background. Thus, compared with children from blue-collar families, children from white-collar families can be expected to get more education and then have a better chance for career mobility. [Case studies: Jencks et al. (1994), Erickson and Jonsson (1996)]
III. Social factors

1. Government policy of redistribution and social justice
   - for example, land reforms, reservation policy, etc.
   - has facilitated upward mobility of socially and economically weaker sections of society in India, such as scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, other backward classes, etc.

2. Collective mobilization
   - in wake of the democratization of societies
   - dalit movement, backward class movements, peasant movements, etc.

Consequences of social mobility

Sociologists are interested in social mobility for a number of reasons. Firstly, the rate of social mobility may have an important effect on class formation. For example, Anthony Giddens suggests that if the rate of social mobility is low, class solidarity and cohesion will be high. Most individuals will remain in their class of origin and this will ‘provide for the reproduction of common life experiences over generations’. As a result distinctive class subcultures and strong class identifications will tend to develop. Secondly, a study of social mobility can provide an indication of the life chances of members of society. For example, it can show the degree to which a person’s class of origin influences his chances of obtaining a high status occupation. Thirdly, it is important to know how people respond to the experience of social mobility. For example, do the downwardly mobile resent their misfortune and form a pool of dissatisfaction which might threaten the stability of society?

The nature and extent of social mobility in Western industrial societies pose a number of questions concerning class formation and class conflict. Marx believed that a high rate of social mobility would tend to weaken class solidarity. Classes would become increasingly heterogeneous as their members ceased to share similar backgrounds. Distinctive class subcultures would tend to disintegrate since norms, attitudes and values would no longer be passed from generation to generation within a single stratum. Class identification and loyalty would weaken since it would be difficult for mobile individuals to feel a strong consciousness of kind with other members of the class in which they found themselves. As a result, the intensity of class conflict and the potential for class consciousness would be reduced.

Ralf Dahrendorf believes that this situation has arrived in modern Western societies. He argues that as a result of the high rate of social mobility, the nature of conflict has changed. In an open society, there are considerable opportunities for individual advancement. There is therefore less need for people to join together as members of a social class in order to improve their situation. In Dahrendorf’s words, ‘instead of advancing their claims as members of homogeneous groups, people are more likely to compete with each other as individuals for a place in the sun’. As a result class solidarity and the intensity of specifically class conflict will be reduced. Dahrendorf then goes a step further and questions whether the rather loose strata of mobile individuals can still be called social classes. But he stops short of rejecting the concept of class, arguing that, ‘although mobility diminishes the coherence of groups as well as the intensity of class conflict, it does not eliminate either.’
A number of sociologists have attempted to assess the effects of mobility on social order. Frank Parkin has seen the relatively high rate of upward mobility as a ‘political safety valve’. It provides opportunities for many able and ambitious members of the working class to improve their situation. As a result, the frustration which might result, if opportunities for upward mobility were absent, is prevented from developing. To some degree this will weaken the working class. Research from a number of Western societies indicates that upwardly mobile individuals tend to take on the social and political outlooks of the class into which they move. American studies in particular suggest that those who move upward into the middle class often become more conservative than those born into it. Thus the upwardly mobile pose no threat to social stability. Indeed, they can be seen to reinforce it.

Similar conclusions have been drawn from studies of downward mobility. American sociologists Harold Wilensky and Hugh Edwards examined the response of ‘skidders’ – persons moving down into the working class – to the experience of social demotion. They found that the downwardly mobile tend to be more politically conservative than those born into and remaining within the working class. The experience of downward mobility did not lead them to reject the social order and so threaten the stability of society. Instead they clung to middle class values, anticipating upward mobility and a restoration of their former status. Their presence in the working class tends to weaken that class since they are not really a part of it. Thus both upward and downward mobility tend to reinforce the status quo. Both introduce conservative elements into social strata, both appear to weaken working-class solidarity and therefore reduce the intensity of class conflict.

Further, studies substantiate the fact that downward mobility can cause great personal stress and psychological disruption. Warren Breed, for example, found that suicide rates are markedly higher among the downwardly mobile than either the nonmobile or the upwardly mobile. But it is not always realized that upward mobility can also cause stress and disruption along with many other undesirable consequences. Upward mobility has been linked to schizophrenia and psychoneurosis; persons who are upwardly mobile exhibit more prejudice against low status people than do nonmobile individuals at the same level; and upward mobility often puts a great strain on the relationship between parents and children.

Upward mobility is not always advantageous for the society at large. High rates of mobility may mean that individuals are moving too fast and too frequently to be easily assimilated into their new levels. Moreover, in a society such as that of the United States in which upward mobility is both valued and highly visible, expectations may be over aroused. Although many want to be upwardly mobile, not everyone can succeed. This phenomenon of rising expectations is frequently cited as a source of social discontent and civil strife.

The more closed society, however, operating with low mobility and ascribed statuses, has problems that are far more serious. Parentage is no guarantee of capability, as the history of any hereditary monarchy will verify. A father of extraordinary ability may have sons and daughters of only mediocre talents, and vice versa. Yet social efficiency demands that high born undesirables sink into obscurity and talented persons of lower classes rise to positions of power and influence. In addition to being inefficient in its assignment of people to jobs, a closed society is extravagant with human resources: it does not encourage achievement from everyone.
It is interesting to speculate about a future society based almost entirely on achievement or merit. We can only imagine the psychological consequences on those persons of lowest status who were at the bottom knowing, as would everyone else, that they truly lacked merit. In a brilliant satire entitled *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, Michael Young imagines a future British society in which talent and social roles would be perfectly matched, in which the most able individuals would fill the functionally most important positions. Social status would be achieved on the basis of merit in a society where all members have an equal opportunity to realize their talents. Following Michael Young’s usage of the term, such a system of role allocation has come to be known as a meritocracy.

Young questions the proposition that a stratification system based on meritocratic principles would be functional for society. He notes the following dysfunctional possibilities. Firstly, members of the lower strata may become totally demoralized. In all previous stratification systems they have been able to divert blame from themselves for their lowly status by providing reasons for their failure. They could claim that they never had the opportunity to be successful whereas those who filled the top jobs owed their position to their relatives, friends and the advantages of birth. However, in a meritocracy, those at the bottom are clearly inferior. As a result they may become demoralized. Since all members of a meritocracy are socialized to compete for the top jobs and instilled with ambition, failure could be particularly frustrating. In a meritocracy, talent and ability are efficiently syphoned out of the lower strata. As a result these groups are in a particularly vulnerable position because they have no able members to represent their interests.

Members of the upper strata in a meritocracy deserve their position; their privileges are based on merit. In the past they had a degree of self-doubt because many realized that they owed their position to factors other than merit. Since they could recognize ‘intelligence, wit and wisdom’ in members of the lower strata, they appreciated that their social inferiors were at least their equal in certain respects. As a result they would accord the lower orders some respect and the arrogance which high status tends to encourage would be tempered with a degree of humility. All this may change in a meritocracy. Social inferiors really are inferior, those who occupy the top positions are undoubtedly superior. Young argues that this may result in an upper stratum free from self-doubt and the restraining influence of humility. Its members may rule society with arrogance and haughty self-assurance. They may despise the lower strata whose members may well find such behavior offensive. This may result in conflict between the ruling minority and the rest of society.

Although Young’s picture of a meritocracy is fictional, it indicates many of the possible dysfunctional elements of such a system. It suggests that a society based on meritocratic principles may not be well integrated. It indicates that a stratification system which operates in this way may, on balance, be dysfunctional. Young’s ideas are important because they cast serious doubt on liberal views of a just society. Many liberal reforms have aimed to create greater equality of opportunity, to give every member of society an equal chance of becoming unequal. Michael Young’s picture of a fully operative meritocracy suggests that the liberal dream of a fair and just society may produce far from perfect reality.

The United States, however, is not moving toward that state of affairs very rapidly. Several studies have indicated that in recent decades the United States has moved slowly, if at all, toward a more open society. Indeed, the amount of vertical mobility in the United States today is only a small %age of what it would be if people born at all levels had a truly equal chance to attain any given status.
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF SOCIETY

- SLAVE SOCIETY, FEUDAL SOCIETY & INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Social organizations or institutions arise out of social needs and situations of members. These organizations are the means through which individuals adjust their behaviour to environmental conditions.

Lapiere says that "social organization consists of all the ways by which men live and work together, more especially of all the programmed, ordered and coordinated relations of the members of the society." Social organisations at different levels organize and give expression to collective behaviour. They coordinate and crystallize numerous interests of individuals and groups.

Marxist theory of historical materialism understands society as fundamentally determined by the material conditions at any given time - this means the relationships which people enter into with one another in order to fulfill their basic needs, for instance to feed and clothe themselves and their families. In general Marx and Engels identified five successive stages of the development of these material conditions in Western Europeans may be given.

**Slave Society**

The Second Stage: may be called Slave Society, considered to be the beginning of "class society" where private property appears.

- **Class:** here the idea of class appears. There is always a slave-owning ruling class and the slaves themselves.
- **Statism:** the state develops during this stage as a tool for the slave-owners to use and control the slaves.
- **Agriculture:** people learn to cultivate plants and animals on a large enough scale to support large populations.
- **Democracy and Authoritarianism:** these opposites develop at the same stage. Democracy arises first with the development of the republican city-state, followed by the totalitarian empire.
- **Private Property:** citizens now own more than personal property. Land ownership is especially important during a time of agricultural development.

The slave-owning class "own" the land and slaves, which are the main means of producing wealth, whilst the vast majority have very little or nothing. The propertyless included the slave class, slaves who work for no money, and in most cases women, who were also dispossessed during this period. From a Marxist perspective, slave society collapsed when it exhausted itself. The need to keep conquering more slaves created huge problems, such as maintaining the vast empire that resulted (i.e. The Roman Empire). It is ultimately the aristocracy born in this epoch that demolishes it and forces society to step onto the next stage.

**Feudal Society**

The Third Stage: may be called Feudalism; it appears after slave society collapses. This was most obvious during the European Dark Ages when society went from slavery to feudalism.
• **Aristocracy**: the state is ruled by monarchs who inherit their positions, or at times marry or conquer their ways into leadership.

• **Theocracy**: this is a time of largely religious rule. When there is only one religion in the land and its organizations affect all parts of daily life.

• **Hereditary classes**: castes can sometimes form and one's class is determined at birth with no form of advancement. This was the case with India.

• **Nation-state**: nations are formed from the remnants of the fallen empires. Sometimes to rebuild themselves into empires once more. Such as England's transition from a province to an empire.

During feudalism there are many classes such as kings, lords, and serfs, some little more than slaves. Most of these inherit their titles for good or ill. At the same time that societies must create all these new classes, trade with other nation-states increases rapidly. This catalyzes the creation of the merchant class.

Out of the merchants' riches, a capitalist class emerges within this feudal society. However there are immediate conflicts with the aristocracy. The old feudal kings and lords cannot accept the new social changes the capitalists want for fear of destabilizing or reducing their power base, among various other reasons that are not all tied to power or money.

These proto-capitalist and capitalist classes are driven by the profit motive but are prevented from developing further profits by the nature of feudal society where, for instance, the serfs are tied to the land and cannot become industrial workers and wage earners. Marx says, *Then begins an epoch of social revolution* (the French Revolution of 1789, the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, etc.) since the social and political organization of feudal society (or the *property relations* of feudalism) is preventing the development of the capitalists' productive forces.

**Capitalist Society**

In Karl Marx's critique of political economy and subsequent Marxian analyses, the capitalist mode of production refers to the systems of organizing production and distribution within capitalist societies. The capitalist mode of production proper, based on wage-labour and private ownership of the means of production and on industrial technology, began to grow rapidly in Western Europe from the Industrial Revolution, later extending to most of the world. The capitalist mode of production is characterized by private ownership of the means of production, extraction of surplus value by the owning class for the purpose of capital accumulation, wage-based labour and—at least as far as commodities are concerned—being market-based.

Under the capitalist mode of production:

• Both the inputs and outputs of production are mainly privately owned, priced goods and services purchased in the market.

• Production is carried out for exchange and circulation in the market, aiming to obtain a net profit income from it.

• The owners of the means of production (capitalists) are the dominant class(bourgeoisie) who derive their income from the surplus product produced by the workers and appropriated freely by the capitalists.

• A defining feature of capitalism is the dependency on wage-labor for a large segment of the population; specifically the working class (proletariat) do not own capital and must live by selling their labour power in exchange for a wage.
Distinguishing characteristics of Capitalist Society

Capitalist society is epitomized by the so-called circuit of commodity production, M-C-M' and by renting money for that purpose where the aggregate of market actors determine the money price M, of the input labor and commodities and M' the struck price of C, the produced market commodity. It is centered on the process M → M', "making money" and the exchange of value that occurs at that point. M' > M is the condition of rationality in the capitalist system and a necessary condition for the next cycle of accumulation/production. For this reason, Capitalism is "production for exchange" driven by the desire for personal accumulation of money receipts in such exchanges, mediated by free markets. The markets themselves are driven by the needs and wants of consumers and those of society as a whole in the form of the bourgeois state. These wants and needs would (in the socialist or communist society envisioned by Marx, Engels and others) be the driving force, it would be "production for use". Contemporary mainstream (bourgeois) economics, particularly that associated with the right, holds that an "invisible hand", through little more than the freedom of the market, is able to match social production to these needs and desires.

"Capitalism" as this money-making activity has existed in the shape of merchants and money-lenders who acted as intermediaries between consumers and producers engaging in simple commodity production (hence the reference to "merchant capitalism") since the beginnings of civilization. What is specific about the “capitalist mode of production” is that most of the inputs and outputs of production are supplied through the market (i.e. they are commodities) and essentially all production is in this mode. For example, in flourishing feudalism most or all of the factors of production including labor are owned by the feudal ruling class outright and the products may also
be consumed without a market of any kind, it is production for use within the feudal social unit and for limited trade.

This has the important consequence that the whole organization of the production process is reshaped and reorganized to conform with economic rationality as bounded by capitalism, which is expressed in price relationships between inputs and outputs (wages, non-labor factor costs, sales, profits) rather than the larger rational context faced by society overall. That is, the whole process is organized and reshaped in order to conform to "commercial logic". Another way of saying this is that capital accumulation defines economic rationality in capitalist production. In the flourishing period of capitalism, these are not operating at cross purposes and thus capitalism acts as a progressive force (e.g. against feudalism). In the final stages, capitalism as a mode of production achieves complete domination on a planetary basis and has nothing to overcome but itself, the final (for it, capitalism, viewed as a Hegelian process, not for historical development per se) negating of the negation posited by orthodox Marxism.

In this context, Marx refers to a transition from the “formal subsumption” of production under the power of capital to the “real subsumption” of production under the power of capital. In what he calls the “specifically capitalist mode of production”, both the technology worked with and the social organization of labour have been completely refashioned and reshaped in a commercial (profit and market-oriented) way—the "old ways of producing" (for example, crafts and cottage industries) had been completely displaced by the then new industrialism.

Capitalism as an economic system and mode of production can be summarized by the following:

- Capital accumulation: production for profit and accumulation as the implicit purpose of all or most of production, constriction or elimination of production formerly carried out on a common social or private household basis.
- Commodity production: production for exchange on a market; to maximize exchange-value instead of use-value.
- Private ownership of the means of production: ownership of the means of production by a class of capital owners, either individually, collectively or through a state that serves the interests of the capitalist class.
- Primacy of wage labor: near universality of wage labor, whether so-called or not, with coerced work for the masses in excess of what they would need to sustain themselves and a complete saturation of bourgeois values at all levels of society from the base reshaping and reorganization described above.

Defining structural criteria of Capitalism

The essential defining characteristics of the capitalist mode of production are as follows:

- The means of production (or capital goods) and the means of consumption (or consumer goods) are mainly produced for market sale; output is produced with the intention of sale in an open market; and only through sale of output can the owner of capital claim part of the surplus-product of human labour and realize profits. Equally, inputs of production are supplied through the market as commodities. The prices of both inputs and outputs are mainly governed by the market laws of supply and demand (and ultimately by the law of
value). In short, a capitalist must use money to fuel both the means of production and labor in order to make commodities. These commodities are then sold to the market for a profit. The profit once again becomes part of a larger amount of capital which the capitalist reinvests to make more commodities and ultimately more and more capital.

- Private ownership of the means of production ("private enterprise") as effective private control and/or legally enforced ownership, with the consequence that investment and management decisions are made by private owners of capital who act autonomously from each other and—because of business secrecy and the constraints of competition—do not coordinate their activities according to collective, conscious planning. Enterprises are able to set their own output prices within the framework of the forces of supply and demand manifested through the market and the development of production technology is guided by profitability criteria.

- The corollary of that is wage labour ("employment") by the direct producers, who are compelled to sell their labour power because they lack access to alternative means of subsistence (other than being self-employed or employers of labour, if only they could acquire sufficient funds) and can obtain means of consumption only through market transactions. These wage earners are mostly "free" in a double sense: they are “freed” from ownership of productive assets and they are free to choose their employer.

- Being carried out for market on the basis of a proliferation of fragmented decision-making processes by owners and managers of private capital, social production is mediated by competition for asset-ownership, political or economic influence, costs, sales, prices and profits. Competition occurs between owners of capital for profits, assets and markets; between owners of capital and workers over wages and conditions; and between workers themselves over employment opportunities and civil rights.

- The overall aim of capitalist production under competitive pressure is (a) to maximise net profit income (or realise a net superprofit) as much as possible through cutting production costs, increasing sales and monopolisation of markets and supply; (b) capital accumulation, to acquire productive and non-productive assets; and (c) privatize both the supply of goods and services and their consumption. The larger portion of the surplus product of labor must usually be reinvested in production since output growth and accumulation of capital mutually depend on each other.

- Out of preceding characteristics of the capitalist mode of production, the basic class structure of this mode of production society emerges: a class of owners and managers of private capital assets in industries and on the land, a class of wage and salary earners, a permanent reserve army of labour consisting of unemployed people and various intermediate classes such as the self-employed (small business and farmers) and the “new middle classes” (educated or skilled professionals on higher salaries).

- The finance of the capitalist state is heavily dependent on levying taxes from the population and on credit—that is, the capitalist state normally lacks any autonomous economic basis (such as state-owned industries or landholdings) that would guarantee sufficient income to sustain state activities. The capitalist state defines a legal framework for commerce, civil
capitalist development, occurring on private initiative in a socially uncoordinated and unplanned way, features periodic crises of over-production (or excess capacity). This means that a critical fraction of output cannot be sold at all, or cannot be sold at prices realising the previously ruling rate of profit. The other side of over-production is the over-accumulation of productive capital: more capital is invested in production than can obtain a normal profit. The consequence is a recession (a reduced economic growth rate) or in severe cases, depression (negative real growth, i.e. an absolute decline in output). As a corollary, mass unemployment occurs.

Communist Society

Sometime after socialism is established society leaps forward, and everyone has plenty of personal possessions, but no one can exploit another person for private gain through the ownership of vast monopolies, and so forth. Classes are thus abolished, and class society ended. Communism will have spread across the world and be worldwide. Eventually the state will "wither away" and become obsolete, as people administer their own lives without the need for governments or laws. Thus, stateless communism or pure communism is established, which has the following features:

- Statelessness: there are no governments, laws, or nations any more.
- Classlessness: all social classes disappear, everyone works for everyone else.
- Propertylessness: there is no money or private property, all goods are free to be consumed by anyone who needs them.

In The Communist Manifesto Marx describes communism as: “When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class; if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”

SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF WORK AND OCCUPATIONS

Work and Occupation have assumed utmost social importance today. They have not only social importance but also economic, psychological and human significance.

(i) They Satisfy the Material Needs of Man. Work and Occupations are a fundamental necessity in life. Society depends upon the production of food, machine, various utensils and articles of daily use, newsprint, etc. The very existence of man depends upon the production of necessities of life. Work and Occupations are the means of producing them.

(ii) They Satisfy Man's Social and Psychological Needs Also. Work is not the same thing as physical effort or the expenditure of energy. What is and what is not work is socially defined. It is not
In modern society, workplace provides the main social setting for the individuals.

a quality inherent in any particular act. It is true that without the achievement of certain level of production, society could not survive. However, there are also the leisure classes, the non-working people. In reality, even the leisure classes do some kind of work. Those who are able to live without work normally do work, because, work gives them a valued status, in society in other people’s eyes, and therefore, in their eyes. Work and occupations meet certain obligations, to be seen as significant people, and to feel significant to themselves. Much work, however, is far removed from food production, or even from direct production of commodities at all. With the growth of service industries in the modern economy, fewer and fewer people work at producing material objects and more and more work at manipulating paper and people - Peter Worsley. Thus, people work more today to satisfy social and psychological needs.

(iii) People Work Not Just for Money. It is wrong to assume that man always works or is in some occupation or the other, just for money. It is true that in a subsistence economy money, or its equivalent economic reward is of paramount importance-life in fact, depends on it. In this case money is a key motivating factor. But when the situation improves and money becomes sufficient or abundant, it loses its importance. Security, good working conditions, opportunity for promotion, mental satisfaction, status, etc., usually become more important. As Gisbert writes : Money, or the economic factor while remaining always a reason, may not act at all in particular circumstance, either as a motive or as an incentive.

(iv) Work-Occupation and Mental Health. Work and occupations have great therapeutic qualities for mental illness. Men have often resorted to external occupations in order to keep the mind healthy and free from mischief. Dr. H. Simon, the Director of Gutersloh Mental Hospital in Germany, recommended as a remedy for mental patients meaningful work in order to link them with their community and break the isolation both internal and external, with which the mental patients are threatened. He stresses in particular- The necessity of finding an occupation especially suited to the patient as an individual.
Among other qualities of work, it may also be stressed that it is not only a bond or social union, but also an important requisite for mental health. It has been proved to be one of the best remedies to break the mental isolation of the patient by renewing the social contacts with his fellow men. - J. Gisbert.

(v) Work in Industrial Society is a Major Key to Social Placement and Evaluation. When we ask the question what is he?— the kind of answer we normally expect may be He is an engineer or He is an advocate, or He is a professor. Such answers reveal not only the kind of technical function a person fulfils in society, but they also indicate the social placement or status of an individual. Hence in most studies of social stratifications Occupation is used as a criterion of social class or status. People do, in fact, use occupation as a means of classifying or ranking people. Thus a man's work may affect his social standing.

(vi) Work has become Central’ to the Life of Man Today. Work is central to the life of man in that it gives the worker a sense of identity, not just in the eyes of others but in his own eyes. Work may be a source of satisfaction to the individual even where it is not necessarily recognised by others as important, valuable or desirable. Marx said that work should always be an expression of personality and never become just an instrument of livelihood. Workers should never be made to feel themselves to be mere cogs in a complicated machine, performing unsatisfying tasks. He forewarned that man would become dehumanised if inhuman conditions are thrust upon his work and workplace. If a man has to work under such conditions, it may be just a means to an end. If a person loses occupations or
becomes unemployed, he loses not only money but, more than that, self-respect and the respect of others.

(vii) The Moral Evaluation of Work. The concept of work is invested with varying degrees of moral evaluation. Jean Calvin, the founder of Calvinism, emphasised that work is not only an economic need but also a moral necessity. Calvin said that man, in order to prove worthy of God’s Creation, was morally obliged to work; that is, to work for the production of wealth. Wealth, he asserted, was not for enjoyment but for the investment, that is, for further production of wealth. Accordingly idleness and its synonyms are not merely the state of non-working but are, in fact, also redolent with moral disapproval. The Marxists have also stressed that Work is the basis of social life, a co-operative and creative activity that lifts man above the animals.

(viii) The Social Evaluation of Work. It must be admitted that different kinds of work are valued differently by different people. Within a single society there is no general agreement as to what constitutes real work and who are the real workers. Some kinds of work are regarded as more fulfilling or more dignified. Thus the terms vocation, career or profession, or occupation, all carry slightly higher prestige than the word job. The clerks may show their distaste towards mere physical toil, (that is, manual labour) in terms of Plebian resentment of obligatory back breaking labour. Similarly, the manual workers may have their resentment against clerical workers.

(ix) Work and Unemployment. The role that work plays in the life of many may easily be seen in case of unemployment. "Men dread unemployment, not merely because it means loss of money, but mostly because it means loss of life. To find oneself without work in society, without the social connections and hopes rooted in work, is like experiencing the withering away of one's very life. P. Gisbert. Loss of work is acknowledged by modern psychologists as a toxic condition which demands for its rehabilitation special remedies social as well as psychological. "Permanent unemployment is a real threat to mental health". The popular saying an idle mind is a devil's workshop is meaningful in this context. Probably it is because of this, the time of retirement is looked upon with so much dread by ageing men. For some of them the shock is such that they never recover from it in their lives. The abnormally high rate of death within the first year of retirement in many nations is a clear proof of this fact.

Summary: Thus, it is clear that work is universal and natural to men. Man wants to be in some occupation or other whether or not he really loves it, or likes it. But, as a rule, men like work, as constant experience shows. Even a common man feels that it is better to be in some filthy job or occupation than not to be employed anywhere in any profession. In spite of the existence of work avoidance the fact is that man likes work. The idea of hating it never conquered any society. This is confirmed by the various inquiries conducted in various parts including India. Work now is universally recognised as a necessary condition of civilised life. This fact has its own political implications. It has now become obligatory for all the responsible governments to provide opportunities for the citizens to work. In Communist countries right to work has been accepted as a fundamental right and incorporated in their constitutions. Even in India, there is a demand to include the right to work in the list of fundamental rights by making the relevant amendments to the constitution. The unemployed people are given maintenance allowance in many countries. That shows importance of the work.
FORMAL AND INFORMAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK

There are two types of organization structure, that can be formal organization and informal organization. An organisation is said to be formal organisation when the two or more than two persons come together to accomplish a common objective, and they follow a formal relationship, rules, and policies are established for compliance, and there exists a system of authority.

On the other end, there is an informal organisation which is formed under the formal organisation as a system of social relationship, which comes into existence when people in an organisation, meet, interact and associate with each other. In this article excerpt, we are going to discuss the major differences between formal and informal organisation.

**Definition of Formal Organization**

By the term formal organisation, we mean a structure that comes into existence when two or more people come together for a common purpose, and there is a legal & formal relationship between them. The formation of such an organisation is deliberate by the top level management. The organisation has its own set of rules, regulations, and policies expressed in writing.

The basic objective of the establishment of an organisation is the attainment of the organisation’s goal. For this purpose, work is assigned, and authorities are delegated to each member and the concept of division of labour and specialisation of workers are applied and so the work is assigned on the basis of their capabilities. The job of each is fixed, and roles, responsibilities, authority and accountability associated with the job is clearly defined.

In addition to this, there exists a hierarchical structure, which determines a logical authority relationship and follows a chain of command. The communication between two members is only through planned channels.

**Definition of Informal Organization**

An informal organisation is formed within the formal organisation; that is a system of interpersonal relationships between individuals working in an enterprise, that forms as a result of people meet, interact and associate with one another. The organisation is created by the members
spontaneously, i.e. created out of socio-psychological needs and urge of people to talk. The organisation is featured by mutual aid, cooperation, and companionship among members.

In an informal organisation, there are no defined channels of communication, and so members can interact with other members freely. They work together in their individual capacities and not professional.

There is no defined set of rules and regulations that govern the relationship between members. Instead, it is a set of social norms, connections, and interaction. The organisation is personal i.e. no rules and regulations are imposed on them, their opinions, feelings, and views are given respect. However, it is temporary in nature, and it does not last long.

The nature of the informal organization becomes more distinct when its key characteristics are juxtaposed with those of the formal organization.

Key characteristics of the informal organization:

- evolving constantly
- grass roots
- dynamic and responsive excellent at motivation
- requires insider knowledge to be seen treats people as individuals like
- flat and fluid
- cohered by trust and reciprocity difficult to pin down
- collective decision making
- essential for situations that change quickly or are not yet fully understood

Key characteristics of the formal organization:

- enduring, unless deliberately altered top-down
- missionary static
- excellent at alignment plain to see
- equates "person" with "role" hierarchical
- bound together by codified rules and order easily understood and explained
- critical for dealing with situations that are known and consistent

Key Differences Between Formal and Informal Organization

The difference between formal and informal organisation can be drawn clearly on the following grounds:

1. Formal Organization is an organisation in which job of each member is clearly defined, whose authority, responsibility and accountability are fixed. Informal Organization is formed within the formal organisation as a network of interpersonal relationship when people interact with each other.
2. Formal organisation is created deliberately by top management. Conversely, informal organisation is formed spontaneously by members.

3. Formal organisation is aimed at fulfilling organisation’s objectives. As opposed to an informal organisation is created to satisfy their social and psychological needs.

4. Formal organisation is permanent in nature; it continues for a long time. On the other hand, informal organisation is temporary in nature.

5. The formal organisation follows official communication, i.e. the channels of communication are pre-defined. Unlike informal organisation, the communication flows in any direction.

6. In the formal organisation, the rules and regulations are supposed to be followed by every member. In contrast to informal communication, there are norms, values, and beliefs, that work as a control mechanism.

7. In the formal organisation, the focus is on the performance of work while in the case of an informal organisation, interpersonal communication is given more emphasis.

8. The size of a formal organisation keeps on increasing, whereas the size of the informal organisation is small.

Analysis of the Informal organization

The informal organization is the interlocking social structure that governs how people work together in practice. It is the aggregate of norms, personal and professional connections through which work gets done and relationships are built among people who share a common organizational affiliation or cluster of affiliations. It consists of a dynamic set of personal relationships, social networks, communities of common interest, and emotional sources of motivation. The informal organization evolves, and the complex social dynamics of its members also.

Tended effectively, the informal organization complements the more explicit structures, plans, and processes of the formal organization: it can accelerate and enhance responses to unanticipated events, foster innovation, enable people to solve problems that require collaboration across boundaries, and create footpaths showing where the formal organization may someday need to pave a way.

FUNCTIONS OF THE INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

Keith Davis suggests that informal groups serve at least four major functions within the formal organizational structure.

Perpetuate the cultural and social values
They perpetuate the cultural and social values that the group holds dear. Certain values are usually already held in common among informal group members. Day-to-day interaction reinforces these values that perpetuate a particular lifestyle and preserve group unity and integrity. For example, a college management class of 50 students may contain several informal groups that constitute the informal organization within the formal structure of the class. These groups may develop out of
fraternity or sorority relationships, dorm residency, project work teams, or seating arrangements. Dress codes, hairstyles, and political party involvement are reinforced among the group members.

**Provide social status and satisfaction**

They provide social status and satisfaction that may not be obtained from the formal organization. In a large organization (or classroom), a worker (or student) may feel like an anonymous number rather than a unique individual. Members of informal groups, however, share jokes and gripes, eat together, play and work together, and are friends—which contributes to personal esteem, satisfaction, and a feeling of worth.

**Promote communication among members**

The informal group develops a communication channel or system (i.e., grapevine) to keep its members informed about what management actions will affect them in various ways. Many astute managers use the grapevine to "informally" convey certain information about company actions and rumors.

**Provide social control**

They provide social control by influencing and regulating behavior inside and outside the group. Internal control persuades members of the group to conform to its lifestyle. For example, if a student starts to wear a coat and tie to class, informal group members may razz and convince the student that such attire is not acceptable and therefore to return to sandals, jeans, and T-shirts. External control is directed to such groups as management, union leadership, and other informal groups.

**DISADVANTAGES OF THE INFORMAL ORGANIZATION**

Informal organizations also possess the following potential disadvantages and problems:

**Resistance to change**

Perpetuation of values and lifestyle causes informal groups to become overly protective of their "culture" and therefore resist change. For example, if restriction of output was the norm in an autocratic management group, it must continue to be so, even though management changes have brought about a more participative administration. This culture makes employees more rigid.

**Role conflict**

The quest for informal group satisfaction may lead members away from formal organizational objectives. What is good for and desired by informal group members is not always good for the organization. Doubling the number of coffee breaks and the length of the lunch period may be desirable for group members but costly and unprofitable for the firm. Employees' desire to fulfill the requirements and services of both the informal group and management results in role conflict. Role conflict can be reduced by carefully attempting to integrate interests, goals, methods, and evaluation systems of both the informal and formal organizations, resulting in greater productivity and satisfaction on everyone's behalf.

**Rumor**

The grapevine dispenses truth and rumor with equal vengeance. Ill-informed employees communicate unverified and untrue information that can create a devastating effect on employees. This can undermine morale, establish bad attitudes, and often result in deviant or, even violent behavior. For example, a student who flunks an exam can start a rumor that a professor is making sexually harassing
advances toward one of the students in class. This can create all sorts of ill feelings toward the professor and even result in vengeful acts like "egging" the residence or knocking over the mail box.

Social control promotes and encourages conformity among informal group members, thereby making them reluctant to act too aggressively or perform at too high a level. This can harm the formal organization by stifling initiative, creativity, and diversity of performance. In some British factories, if a group member gets "out of line", tools may be hidden, air may be let out of tires, and other group members may refuse to talk to the deviant for days or weeks. Obviously, these types of actions can force a good worker to leave the organization.

Benefits of the informal organization

Although informal organizations create unique challenges and potential problems for management, they also provide a number of benefits for the formal organization.

Blend with formal system
Formal plans, policies, procedures, and standards cannot solve every problem in a dynamic organization; therefore, informal systems must blend with formal ones to get work done. As early as 1951, Robert Dubin recognized that "informal relations in the organization serve to preserve the organization from the self-destruction that would result from literal obedience to the formal policies, rules, regulations, and procedures". No college or university could function merely by everyone following the "letter of the law" with respect to written policies and procedures. Faculty, staff, and student informal groups must cooperate in fulfilling the spirit of the law" to effectuate an organized, sensibly run enterprise.

Lighten management workload
Managers are less inclined to check up on workers when they know the informal organization is cooperating with them. This encourages delegation, decentralization, and greater worker support of the manager, which suggests a probable improvement in performance and overall productivity. When a professor perceives that students are conscientiously working on their term papers and group projects, there are likely to be fewer "pop tests" or important progress reports. This eases the professors load and that of the students and promotes a better relationship between both parties.

Fill gaps in management abilities
For instance, if a manager is weak in financial planning and analysis, a subordinate may informally assist in preparing reports through either suggestions or direct involvement.

Act as a safety valve
Employees experience frustration, tension, and emotional problems with management and other employees. The informal group provides a means for relieving these emotional and psychological pressures by allowing a person to discuss them among friends openly and candidly. In faculty lounge conversations, frustrations with the dean, department head, or students are "blown off" among empathetic colleagues.

Encourage improved management practice
Perhaps a subtle benefit of informal groups is that they encourage managers to prepare, plan, organize, and control in a more professional fashion. Managers who comprehend the power of the informal organization recognize that it is a "check and balance" on their use of authority. Changes and
projects are introduced with more careful thought and consideration, knowing that the informal organization can easily kill a poorly planned project.

Understanding and dealing with the environmental crisis
The IRG Solution: hierarchical incompetence and how to overcome it (1984) argued that central media and government-type hierarchical organizations could not adequately understand the environmental crisis we were manufacturing, or how to initiate adequate solutions. It argued that what was required, was the widespread introduction of informal networks or Information Routing Groups which were essentially a description of social networking services prior to the internet.

Real world examples of harnessing the power of the information organization

1. Rapid growth. Starbucks, which grew from 100 employees to over 100,000 in just over a decade, provides structures to support improvisation. Starbucks chairman Howard Schultz said, “You can't grow if you're driven only by process, or only by the creative spirit. You've got to achieve a fragile balance between the two sides of the corporate brain.”

2. Learning organization. Following a four-year study of the Toyota Production System, Steven J. Spear and H. Kent Bowen concluded in Harvard Business Review that the legendary flexibility of Toyota's operations is due to the way the scientific method is ingrained in its workers – not through formal training or manuals (the production system has never been written down) but through unwritten principles that govern how workers work, interact, construct, and learn.

3. Idea generation. Texas Instruments credits its "Lunatic Fringe"—"an informal and amorphous group of TI engineers (and their peers and contacts outside the company)," according to Fortune Magazine—for its recent successes. “There's this continuum between total chaos and total order” Gene Frantz, the hub of this informal network, explained to Fortune. "About 95% of the people in TI are total order, rand I thank God for them everyday, because they create the products that allow me to spend money. I'm down here in total chaos, that total chaos of innovation. As a company we recognize the difference between those two and encourage both to occur.

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT

Scientific management is a theory of management that analyzes and synthesizes workflows. Its main objective is improving economic efficiency, especially labour productivity. It was one of the earliest attempts to apply science to the engineering of processes and to management. Scientific management is sometimes known as Taylorism after its founder, Frederick Winslow Taylor.

Pursuit of economic efficiency

Flourishing in the late 19th and early 20th century, scientific management built on earlier pursuits of economic efficiency. It favored empirical methods to determine efficient procedures rather than perpetuating established traditions. Thus it was followed by a profusion of successors in applied science, including time and motion study, the Efficiency Movement, Fordism, operations management, operations research, industrial engineering, management science, manufacturing engineering, logistics, business process management, business process reengineering, lean
manufacturing, and Six Sigma. There is a fluid continuum linking scientific management with the later fields, and the different approaches often display a high degree of compatibility.

Taylor rejected the notion, which was universal in his day, that the trades, including manufacturing, were resistant to analysis and could only be performed by craft production methods. In the course of his empirical studies, Taylor examined various kinds of manual labor. For example, most bulk materials handling was manual at the time. He looked at shoveling in the unloading of railroad cars full of ore; lifting and carrying in the moving of iron pigs at steel mills; the manual inspection of bearing balls; and others. He discovered many concepts that were not widely accepted at the time. For example, by observing workers, he decided that labor should include rest breaks so that the worker has time to recover from fatigue, either physical (as in shoveling or lifting) or mental (as in the ball inspection case). Workers were allowed to take more rests during work, and productivity increased as a result.

Scientific management requires a high level of managerial control over employee work practices and entails a higher ratio of managerial workers to laborers than previous management methods. Such detail-oriented management may cause friction between workers and managers.

Taylor observed that some workers were more talented than others, and that even smart ones were often unmotivated. He observed that most workers who are forced to perform repetitive tasks tend to work at the slowest rate that goes unpunished. This slow rate of work has been observed in many industries and many countries and has been called by various terms. Taylor used the term "soldiering", a term that reflects the way conscripts may approach following orders, and observed that, when paid the same amount, workers will tend to do the amount of work that the slowest among them does. Taylor describes soldiering as "the greatest evil with which the working-people... are now afflicted."

This reflects the idea that workers have a vested interest in their own well-being, and do not benefit from working above the defined rate of work when it will not increase their remuneration. He therefore proposed that the work practice that had been developed in most work environments was crafted, intentionally or unintentionally, to be very inefficient in its execution. He posited that time and motion studies combined with rational analysis and synthesis could uncover one best method for performing any particular task, and that prevailing methods were seldom equal to these best methods. Crucially, Taylor himself prominently acknowledged that if each employee's compensation was linked to their output, their productivity would go up. Thus his compensation plans usually included piece rates. In contrast, some later adopters of time and motion studies ignored this aspect and tried to get large productivity gains while passing little or no compensation gains to the workforce, which contributed to resentment against the system.

By factoring processes into discrete, unambiguous units, scientific management laid the groundwork for automation and off-shoring, prefiguring industrial process control and numerical control in the absence of any machines that could carry it out. Taylor and his followers did not foresee this at the time; in their world, it was humans that would execute the optimized processes.

**Taylor's view of workers**

Taylor often expressed views of workers that may be considered insulting. He recognized differences between workers, stressed the need to select the right person for the right job, and
championed the workers by advocating frequent breaks and good pay for good work. He often failed to conceal his condescending attitude towards less intelligent workers, describing them as "stupid" and comparing them to draft animals in that they have to have their tasks managed for them in order to work efficiently.

Taylorism, anomie, and unions

With the division of labor that became commonplace as Taylorism was implemented in manufacturing, workers lost their sense of connection to the production of goods. Workers began to feel disenfranchised with the monotonous and unfulfilling work they were doing in factories. Before scientific management, workers felt a sense of pride when completing their good, which went away when workers only completed one part of production. "The further 'progress' of industrial development... increased the anomic or forced division of labor," the opposite of what Taylor thought would be the effect. Partial adoption of Taylor's principles by management seeking to boost efficiency, while ignoring principles such as fair pay and direct engagement by managers, led to further tensions and the rise of unions to represent workers' needs.

Taylor had a largely negative view of unions, and believed they only led to decreased productivity. Although he opposed them, his work with scientific management led disenfranchised workers to look to unions for support.

Early decades: Making jobs unpleasant

Under scientific management, the demands of work intensified. Workers became dissatisfied with the work environment and became angry. During one of Taylor's own implementations at the Watertown Arsenal in Massachusetts, a strike led to an investigation of Taylor's methods by a U.S. House of Representatives committee. The committee reported in 1912, concluding that scientific management did provide some useful techniques and offered valuable organizational suggestions, but that it also gave production managers a dangerously high level of uncontrolled power. After an attitude survey of the workers revealed a high level of resentment and hostility towards scientific management, the Senate banned Taylor's methods at the Arsenal.

Scientific management lowered worker morale and exacerbated existing conflicts between labor and management. As a consequence, the method inadvertently strengthened labor unions and their bargaining power in labor disputes, thereby neutralizing most or all of the benefit of any productivity gains it had achieved. Thus its net benefit to owners and management ended up as small or negative. It took new efforts, borrowing some ideas from scientific management but mixing them with others, to produce more productive formula.

Later decades: Making jobs disappear

Scientific management may have exacerbated grievances among workers about oppressive or greedy management. It certainly strengthened developments that put workers at a disadvantage: the erosion of employment in developed economies via both offshoring and automation. Both were made possible by the deskilling of jobs, which was made possible by the knowledge transfer that scientific management achieved. Knowledge was transferred both to cheaper workers and from workers into tools. Jobs that once would have required craft work first transformed to semiskilled work, then unskilled. At this point the labor had been commoditized, and thus the
competition between workers (and worker populations) moved closer to pure than it had been, depressing wages and job security. Jobs could be off-shored (giving one human's tasks to others—which could be good for the new worker population but was bad for the old) or they could be rendered nonexistent through automation (giving a human's tasks to machines). Either way, the net result from the perspective of developed-economy workers was that jobs started to pay less, then disappear. The power of labor unions in the mid-twentieth century only led to a push on the part of management to accelerate the process of automation, hastening the onset of the later stages just described.

In a central assumption of scientific management, "the worker was taken for granted as a cog in the machinery." While scientific management had made jobs unpleasant, its successors made them less remunerative, less secure, and finally nonexistent as a consequence of structural unemployment.

Principles of Taylor are still being pursued by Kaizen and Six Sigma and similar methodologies, which are based on the development of working methods and courses based on systematic analysis rather than relying on tradition and rule of thumb.

Taylorism is, according to Stephen P. Waring, considered very controversial, despite its popularity. It is often criticized for turning the worker into an "automaton" or "machine". Due to techniques employed with scientific management, employees claim to have become overworked and were hostile to the process. Criticisms commonly came from workers who were subjected to an accelerated work pace, lower standards of workmanship, lower product-quality, and lagging wages. Workers defied being reduced to such machines, and objected to the practices of Taylorism. Many workers formed unions, demanded higher pay, and went on strike to be free of control issues. This ignited class conflict, which Taylorism was initially meant to prevent. Efforts to resolve the conflicts included methods of scientific collectivism, making agreements with unions, and the personnel management movement.

In the middle of 1960 some counter-movements to Taylorism arose. Representatives of the so-called Human Relations movement urged humanization and democratization of the working world. The criticism of Taylorism supports the unilateral approach of labor. Strictly speaking, Taylorism is not a scientific theory. All theories of F. W. Taylor are based on experiments. On the basis of samples, conclusions were made, which were then generalized. There is no representativeness of the selected sample.

Another reason for criticizing Taylor's methods stemmed from Taylor's belief that the scientific method included the calculations of exactly how much time it takes a man to do a particular task, or his rate of work. However, the opposition to this argument is that such a calculation relies on certain arbitrary, non-scientific decisions such as what constituted the job, which men were timed, and under which conditions. Any of these factors are subject to change, and therefore can produce inconsistencies.

Taylor’s Legacy

Scientific management was one of the first attempts to systematically treat management and process improvement as a scientific problem. It may have been the first to do so in a "bottom-up" way and found a lineage of successors that have many elements in common. With the
advancement of statistical methods, quality assurance and quality control began in the 1920s and 1930s. During the 1940s and 1950s, the body of knowledge for doing scientific management evolved into operations management, operations research, and management cybernetics. In the 1980s total quality management became widely popular, and in the 1990s "re-engineering" went from a simple word to a mystique. Today's Six Sigma and lean manufacturing could be seen as new kinds of scientific management, although their evolutionary distance from the original is so great that the comparison might be misleading. In particular, Shigeo Shingo, one of the originators of the Toyota Production System, believed that this system and Japanese management culture in general should be seen as a kind of scientific management.

Peter Drucker saw Frederick Taylor as the creator of knowledge management, because the aim of scientific management was to produce knowledge about how to improve work processes. Although the typical application of scientific management was manufacturing, Taylor himself advocated scientific management for all sorts of work, including the management of universities and government. For example, Taylor believed scientific management could be extended to "the work of our salesmen". Shortly after his death, his acolyte Harlow S. Person began to lecture corporate audiences on the possibility of using Taylorism for "sales engineering" (Person was talking about what is now called sales process engineering—engineering the processes that salespeople use—not about what we call sales engineering today.) This was a watershed insight in the history of corporate marketing.

Google's methods of increasing productivity and output can be seen to be influenced by Taylorism as well. The Silicon Valley company is a forerunner in applying behavioral science to increase knowledge worker productivity. In classic scientific management as well as approaches like lean management or business process reengineering leaders and experts develop and define standard. Leading high-tech companies use the concept of nudge management to increase productivity of employees. More and more business leaders start to make use of this new scientific management.

Today's militaries employ all of the major goals and tactics of scientific management, if not under that name. Of the key points, all but wage incentives for increased output are used by modern military organizations. Wage incentives rather appear in the form of skill bonuses for enlistments.

Scientific management has had an important influence in sports, where stop watches and motion studies rule the day. (Taylor himself enjoyed sports, especially tennis and golf. He and a partner won a national championship in doubles tennis. He invented improved tennis racquets and improved golf clubs, although other players liked to tease him for his unorthodox designs, and they did not catch on as replacements for the mainstream implements)

Modern human resources can be seen to have begun in the scientific management era, most notably in the writings of Katherine M. H. Blackford, who was also a proponent of eugenics.

Practices descended from scientific management are currently used in offices and in medicine (e.g. managed care) as well.

In the 21st century the tendency to overcome Taylorism is very great. The trend is moving away from assembly line work, since people are increasingly being replaced by machines in production plants and sub-processes are automated, so that human labor is not necessary in these cases. The
desire for automated workflow in companies is intended to reduce costs and support the company at the operational level.

Furthermore, it can be observed that many companies try to make the workplace as comfortable as possible for the employees. This is achieved by light flooded rooms, Feng Shui methods in the workplace or even by creative jobs. The efficiency and creativity of the employees is to be promoted by a pleasant atmosphere at the workplace. Approaches of the Scientific Management, in which attempts are also made to make the work environment pleasant, are partly recognizable here.

In the works of Gouldner and Crozier, the recognition of the plurality of industrial forms is being discussed. In the 21st century, we have a modern corporate management, where managers are given the available positions in companies and are given the right to take legal action.

The working world of the 21st century is mainly based on Total Quality Management. This is derived from quality control. In contrast to Taylorism, by which products are produced in the shortest possible time without any form of quality control and delivered to the end customer, the focus in the 21st century is on quality control at TQM. In order to avoid error rates, it is necessary to hire specialists to check all the products which have been manufactured before they are delivered to the end customer. The quality controls have improved over time, and incorrect partial processes can be detected in time and removed from the production process.

Taylorism approaches are largely prevalent in companies where machines can not perform certain activities. Certain sub-processes are still to be carried out by humans, such as the sorting out of damaged fruit in the final process before the goods are packed by machines. It turns out that the quality control is ultimately to be verified by the individual man. Certain activities remain similar to the approach of Taylorism. There are no "zero error programs", employees have to be trained to reduce error rates.

Through the invention of the management one managed positions, which are equipped with disposition rights. The positions are occupied by paid employees and form the basis for the current, modern corporate management. In order to be able to perceive these positions, it was no longer necessary to bring in resources such as capital, but instead qualifications were necessary. Written rights are also passed on to employees, which means that the leaders of an organization tend to fall into the background and merely have a passive position.

The structure and size of a company must be distinguished. Depending on which dispositions are predominant, the size of the company, the sector, and the number of employees in an organization, one can examine whether approaches of Taylorism are prevalent. It is believed to be predominant in the automotive industry. In spite of the fact that a lot of activities have been replaced by machines during the production, it is ultimately the person who can check the quality of a product.

Taylorism led to a performance increase in companies. All superfluous working steps are avoided. The company benefits from the productivity of the workers and this in turn from higher wages. Unused productivity resources were effectively exploited by Taylorism.

Today's work environment in the 21st century benefits from the humanity of working conditions. Corporate strategies are increasingly focused on the flexibility of work. Flexible adaptation to
demand should be possible. The qualifications of the employees, the work content as well as the work processes are determined by the competition situation on the market. The aim is to promote self-discipline and the motivation of employees in order to achieve their own tasks and at the same time to prevent monotonous work. Technical progress has led to more humane working conditions since inhumane work steps are done by the machines.

Taylorism's approach is called inhuman. The increased wage alone is not a permanent incentive for the workers to carry out the same monotonous work. Worker-friendly work structures are required. People no longer want to be perceived merely as executive organ. The complete separation from manual and headwork leads to a lack of pleasure in the execution of the work steps.

In the 21st century the rising level of education leads to better trained workers, but the competitive pressure also rises. The interplay of economic as well as the pressure to innovate also lead to uncertainty among employees. The national diseases in the 21st century have become burn-out phenomena and depressions, often in conjunction with the stress and the increased performance pressure in the work.

**HUMAN RELATIONS MOVEMENT**

Human relations theory refers to the researchers of organizational development who study the behaviour of people in groups, in particular workplace groups and other related concepts in fields such as industrial and organizational psychology. It originated in the 1930's Hawthorne studies, which examined the effects of social relations, motivation and employee satisfaction on factory productivity. The movement viewed workers in terms of their psychology and fit with companies, rather than as interchangeable parts, and it resulted in the creation of the discipline of human relations management.

Elton Mayo stressed the following:

1. The power of natural groups, in which social aspects take precedence over functional organizational structures.
2. The need for reciprocal communication, in which communication is two way, from worker to chief executive, as well as vice versa.
3. The development of high quality leadership to communicate goals and to ensure effective and coherent decision making.

It has become a concern of many companies to improve the job-oriented interpersonal skills of employees. The teaching of these skills to employees is referred to as "soft skills" training. Companies need their employees to be able to successfully communicate and convey information, to be able to interpret others' emotions, to be open to others' feelings, and to be able to solve conflicts and arrive at resolutions. By acquiring these skills, the employees, those in management positions, and the customer can maintain more compatible relationships.

**Arguments against Mayo's involvement in human relations**

Mayo's work is considered by various academics to be the counterpoint of Taylorism and scientific management. Taylorism, founded by Frederick W. Taylor, sought to apply science to the
management of employees in the workplace in order to gain economic efficiency through labour productivity. Elton Mayo's work has been widely attributed to the discovery of the 'social person', allowing for workers to be seen as individuals rather than merely robots designed to work for unethical and unrealistic productivity expectations.

The widely perceived view of human relations is said to be one that completely contradicts the traditional views of Taylorism. Whilst scientific management tries to apply science to the workforce, the accepted definition of human relations suggests that management should treat workers as individuals, with individual needs. In doing so, employees are supposed to gain an identity, stability within their job and job satisfaction, which in turn make them more willing to co-operate and contribute their efforts towards accomplishing organisational goals. The human relations movement supported the primacy of organizations to be attributed to natural human groupings, communication and leadership. However, the conventional depiction of the human relations 'school' of management, rising out of the ashes of scientific management is argued to be a rhetorical distortion of events.

Firstly, it has been argued that Elton Mayo's actual role in the human relations movement is controversial and although he is attributed to be the founder of this movement, some academics believe that the concept of human relations was used well before the Hawthorne investigations, which sparked the human relations movement. Bruce and Nyland (2011) suggest that many academics preceded Mayo in identifying a concept similar to that of the human relations movement even going as far to suggest that the output and information collected by the Hawthorne investigations was identified well before Mayo by Taylor. In addition, Wren and Greenwood (1998) argue that Taylor made important contributions to what inspires human motivation, even though his ultimate findings were somewhat different from the human relations movement.

Another name which has been attributed to pre-existing human relations ideas is that of Henry S. Dennison. The one time president of the Taylor Society has been linked to both Taylorist principles as well human relation ideals thus creating a nexus between Taylorism and human relation thought. Dennison demonstrated an activist concern both with the rationale and character of workers, and with the control and management undertaken by managers of the business enterprise.

In order to assess the validity of human relations as a benchmark for rights within the workplace, the contribution of Taylorism in comparison to human relations must be established. Taylorism and scientific management entailed to be a "complete mental revolution" and as Taylor explained, Taylorism sought to encourage managers and labourers to "take their eyes off of the division of the surplus as the important matter, and together turn their attention toward increasing the size of the surplus." This notion of management appealed to the employer as it addressed organisational problems, inefficiencies and adverse employer-employee relations. Scientific management aimed to use science and qualitative data in the selection of employees and facilitate the use of employee databases and performance reviews. Firstly, scientific management aimed to reduce inefficiency through studying the time and motions in work tasks. The object of time studies was to determine how fast a job should and could be done. Secondly, Taylor purported to introduce specific quantitative goals to individual employees in order to provide challenging time restraints and thus increasing productivity. Most importantly, Taylor sought to increase productivity through organization of behaviour.
The theoretical goals of human relations were no different from those of Taylorism. In essence, both viewpoints sought to make the workplace a more efficient and worker-friendly place. Although some more specific goals and outcomes of each movement were different, each, broadly speaking, aimed to advance the workplace and create a coherent group of individuals, while still maintaining a hierarchical system with managers in control. The notion of Taylorism was supportive of improvement in pay and conditions in workplaces under the proviso that workers were paid in accordance to their output. However, human relations claimed to eliminate such calls entirely suggesting radical and maybe even unrealistic idea.
MARXIST APPROACHES TO POWER

Marxists have analysed power relations in many ways. But four interrelated themes typify their overall approach. The first of these is a concern with power relations as manifestations of a specific mode or configuration of class domination rather than as a purely interpersonal phenomenon lacking deeper foundations in the social structure.

Most political scientists see power as a zero-sum game. If one side wins, the other side loses.

The significance thus attached to class domination by no means implies that all forms of power are always exercised by social actors with clear class identities and class interests. It means only that Marxists are mainly interested in the causal interconnections between the exercise of social power and the reproduction or transformation of class domination. Indeed, Marxists are usually well aware of other types of subject, identity, antagonism, and domination. But they consider these phenomena largely in terms of their relevance for, and their over-determination by, class domination. Second, Marxists are concerned with the links – including discontinuities as well as continuities – between economic, political, and ideological class domination. Despite the obvious centrality of this issue, however, it prompts widespread theoretical and empirical disagreements. For different Marxist approaches locate the bases of class power primarily in the social relations of production, in control over the state, or in intellectual hegemony over hearts and minds. I will deal with these alternatives below. Third, Marxists note the limitations inherent in any exercise of power that is rooted in one or another form of class domination and try to explain this in terms of structural contradictions and antagonisms inscribed therein. Thus Marxists tend to assume that all forms of social power linked to class domination are inherently fragile, unstable, provisional, and temporary and that continuing struggles are needed to reproduce the conditions for class domination, to overcome resistance, and to naturalize or mystify class power. It follows, fourthly, that Marxists also address questions of strategy and
tactics. They provide empirical analyses of actual strategies intended to reproduce, resist, or overthrow class domination in specific periods and conjunctures; and they often engage in political debates about the most appropriate identities, interests, strategies, and tactics for dominated classes and other oppressed groups to adopt in order most effectively to challenge their subaltern position.

**Power as a Social Relation**

Marxists are interested in the first instance in power as capacities rather than power as the actualization of such capacities. They see these capacities as socially structured rather than as socially amorphous (or random). Thus Marxists focus on capacities grounded in structured social relations rather than in the properties of individual agents considered in isolation. Moreover, as these structured social relations entail enduring relations, there are reciprocal, if often asymmetrical, capacities and vulnerabilities. A common paradigm here is Hegel's master-slave dialectic — in which the master depends on the slave and the slave on the master. Marx's equivalent paradigm case is, of course, the material interdependence of capital and labour. At stake in both cases are enduring relations of reproduced, reciprocal practices rather than one-off, unilateral impositions of will. This has the interesting implication that power is also involved in securing the continuity of social relations rather than producing radical change. Thus, as Isaac notes, 'rather than A getting B to do something B would not otherwise do, social relations of power typically involve both A and B doing what they ordinarily do. The capitalist wage relation is a particularly useful example here. For, in voluntarily selling their labour-power for a wage, workers transfer its control and the right to any surplus to the capitalist. A formally free exchange thereby becomes the basis of factory despotism and economic exploitation. Nonetheless, as working class resistance in labour markets and the labour process indicate, Marxists note that the successful exercise of power is also a conjunctural phenomenon rather than being guaranteed by unequal social relations of production. They regard the actualization of capacities to exercise power and its effects, if any, as always and everywhere contingent on circumstances. Moreover, as capacities to exercise power are always tied to specific sets of social relations and depend for their actualization on specific circumstances, there can be no such thing as power in general or general power — only particular powers and the sum of particular exercises of power.

**Class Domination**

Marxism differs from other analyses of power because of its primary interest in class domination. In contrast, for example, Weberian analyses give equal analytical weight to other forms of domination (status, party); or, again, radical feminists prioritize changing forms of patriarchy. But Marxists' distinctive interest in class domination is not limited to economic class domination in the labour process (although this is important) nor even to the economic bases of class domination in the wider economy (such as control over the allocation of capital to alternative productive activities). For Marxists see class powers as dispersed throughout society and therefore also investigate political and ideological class domination. However, whereas some Marxists believe political and/or ideological domination derive more or less directly from economic domination, others emphasize the complexity of relations among these three sites or modes of class domination.
Even Marxists who stress the economic bases of class domination also acknowledge that politics is primary in practice. For it is only through political revolution that existing patterns of class domination will be overthrown. Other Marxists prioritize the political over the economic not just (if at all) in terms of revolutionary struggles but also in terms of the routine reproduction of class domination in normal circumstances. This makes the state central to Marxist analyses not only regarding political power in narrow terms but also to class power more generally. For the state is seen as responsible for maintaining the overall structural integration and social cohesion of a 'society divided into classes'.

**Economic Class Domination**

Marxism is premised on the existence of antagonistic modes of production. Production involves the material appropriation and transformation of nature. A mode of production comprises in turn a specific combination of the forces of production and social relations of production. The productive forces comprise raw materials, means of production, the technical division of labour corresponding to these raw materials and the given means of production, and the relations of interdependence and cooperation among the direct producers in setting the means of production to work. The social relations of production comprise social control over the allocation of resources to different productive activities and over the appropriation of any resulting surplus; the social division of labour (or the allocation of workers to different activities across different units of production); and class relations grounded in property relations, ownership of the means of production, and the form of economic exploitation. Some Marxists emphasize the primacy of the forces of production in producing social change but the majority view (and current wisdom) is that the social relations of production are primary. Thus most Marxists now regard the social relations of production rather than the productive forces as the basis for economic class domination. Indeed, it is these social relations that shape the choice among available productive forces and how they get deployed in production.

Given the primacy of the relations of production in economic class domination, some Marxists emphasize the power relations rooted in organization of the labour process. This is considered the primary site of the antagonism between capitalists and workers and is the crucial site for securing the valorization of capital through direct control over labour-power. Various forms of control are identified (e.g., bureaucratic, technical, and despotic), each with its own implications for forms of class struggle and the distribution of power between capital and labour. Other Marxists study the overall organization of the production process and its articulation to other aspects of the circuit of capital. Thus emphasis is placed on the relative importance of industrial or financial capital, monopoly capital or small and medium enterprises, multinational or national firms, firms interested in domestic growth or exports. Different modes of economic growth are associated with different patterns of power. Atlantic Fordism, for example, based on a virtuous circle of mass production and mass consumption in relatively closed economies, was compatible for a time with an institutionalized compromise between industrial capital and organized labour. This supported the Keynesian welfare national state with its distinctive forms of economic, social, and political redistribution. But increasing globalization combined with capital's attempts to increase labour market flexibility have undermined these conditions and encouraged a neo-liberal assault on the postwar compromise in several countries.
Political Class Domination

Marxist accounts of political class domination begin with the state and its direct and indirect roles in securing the conditions for economic class domination. The state is emphasized for various reasons: first, since market forces themselves cannot secure all the conditions needed for capital accumulation and are prone to market failure, there is a need for some mechanism standing outside and above the market to underwrite it and compensate for its failures; second, economic and political competition between capitals necessitates a force able to organize their collective interests; third, the state is needed to manage the many and varied repercussions of economic exploitation within the wider society. Marxists argue that only if the state can secure sufficient institutional integration and social cohesion will the extra-economic conditions for rational economic calculation and, a fortiori, capital accumulation be secured. This requires a sovereign state that is relatively autonomous from particular class interests and can articulate and promote a broader, national-popular interest. Where this project respects the decisive economic nucleus of the society, then the state helps to secure economic as well as political class domination. This is often held to be more likely in bourgeois democratic political regimes than dictatorial regimes (Moore 1957; Barrow 1993; Gramsci 1971; Offe 1984; Poulantzas 1978; and Jessop 1990).

There are three main Marxist approaches to the state: instrumentalist, structuralist, and 'strategic-relational'. Instrumentalists see the state mainly as a neutral tool for exercising political power: whichever class controls this tool can use it to advance its own interests. Structuralists argue that who controls the state is irrelevant because it embodies a prior bias towards capital and against the subaltern classes. And strategic-relational theorists argue that state power is a form-determined condensation of the balance of class forces in struggle. I now illustrate these three views for the capitalist state. Different examples would be required for states associated with other modes of production.

Instrumentalists regard the contemporary state as a state in capitalist society. Ralph Miliband expresses this view well in writing that the “ruling class” of capitalist society is that class which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as an instrument for the domination of society. More generally, those who talk of the 'state in capitalist society' stress the contingency of state-economy relations. For, despite the dominance of capitalist relations of production in such a society, the state itself has no inherently capitalist form and performs no necessarily capitalist functions. Any functions it does perform for capital occur because pro-capitalist forces happen to control the state and/or because securing social order also happens to secure key conditions for rational economic calculation. If the same state apparatus were found in another kind of system, however, it might well be controlled by other forces and perform different functions.

Structuralists regard the state as a capitalist state because it has an inherently capitalist form and therefore functions on behalf of capital. This view implies a correspondence between form and function such that the state is necessarily capitalist. But what makes a state form capitalist and what guarantees its functionality for capital? Structuralists argue that the very structure of the modern state means that it organizes capital and disorganizes the working class. Claus Offe writes that the state's exclusion from direct control over the means of production (which are held in private hands) means that its revenues depend on a healthy private sector; therefore, it must, as a condition of its own reproduction as a state apparatus, ensure the profitability of capital. Subordinate classes can secure material concessions only within the limits of the logic of capital – if they breach these limits, such concessions must be rolled back. But capital in turn is unable to press its economic
advantages too far, however, without undermining the political legitimacy of the state. For, in contrast to earlier forms of political class domination, the economically dominant class enjoys no formal monopoly of political power. Instead the typical form of bourgeois state is a constitutional state and, later, a national-popular democratic state. This requires respect for the rule of law and the views of its citizens.

Poulantzas extended Marx's insight that capital is not a thing but a social relation to propose that the state is also a social relation. Marx showed how continued reproduction of the material and institutional forms of the capital relation shaped the dynamic of capital accumulation and the economic class struggle – but the dominance of these forms could not in and of itself guarantee capital accumulation. This depended on capital's success in maintaining its domination over the working class in production, politics, and the wider society. In his later work Poulantzas applied this insight to the capitalist state. He saw the modern form of state as having certain in-built biases but argued these were insufficient in themselves to ensure capitalist rule. Indeed, they even served to reproduce class conflict and contradictions within the state itself so that the impact of state power depended heavily on the changing balance of forces and the strategies and tactics pursued by class and non-class forces alike.

**Ideological Class Domination**

Marx and Engels first alluded to ideological class domination when they noted in The German Ideology that 'the ruling ideas of any age are the ideas of the ruling class' and related this phenomenon to the latter's control over the means of intellectual production. Their own work developed several perspectives on ideological class domination – ranging from the impact of commodity fetishism through the individualism generated by political forms such as citizenship to the struggles for hearts and minds in civil society. Marxist interest in the forms and modalities of ideological class domination grew even stronger with the rise of democratic government and mass politics in the late nineteenth century and the increased importance of mass media and national popular culture in the twentieth century. Various currents in so-called 'Western Marxism' have been strongly interested in ideological class domination – especially whenever a radical socialist or communist revolution has failed to occur despite severe economic crisis or, indeed, during more general periods of working class passivity. Successive generations of the Frankfurt School have been important here but there are many other approaches that work on similar lines.

A leading figure who has inspired much work in this area is Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Communist active in the interwar period. Gramsci developed a very distinctive approach to the analysis of class power. His chief concern was to develop an autonomous Marxist science of politics in capitalist societies, to distinguish different types of state and politics, and thereby to establish the most likely conditions under which revolutionary forces might eventually replace capitalism. He was particularly concerned with the specificities of the political situation and revolutionary prospects in the 'West' (Western Europe, USA) as opposed to the 'East' (i.e., Tsarist Russia) – believing that a Leninist vanguard party and a revolutionary coup d'état were inappropriate to the 'West'.

**The Articulation of Economic, Political, and Ideological Domination**

The relations among economic, political, and ideological domination can be considered in terms of the structurally-inscribed selectivity of particular forms of domination and the strategies that help
to consolidate (or undermine) these selectivities. The bias inscribed on the terrain of the state as a site of strategic action can only be understood as a bias relative to specific strategies pursued by specific forces to advance specific interests over a given time horizon in terms of a specific set of other forces each advancing their own interests through specific strategies. Particular forms of state privilege some strategies over others, privilege the access of some forces over others, some interests over others, some time horizons over others, some coalition possibilities over others. A given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power. And it will be more suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy than others because of the modes of intervention and resources that characterize that system. All of this indicates the need to examine the differences among types of state (e.g., feudal vs capitalist), state forms (e.g., absolutist, liberal, interventionist), modes of political representation (e.g., democratic vs despotic), specific political regimes (e.g., bureaucratic authoritarian, fascist, and military or parliamentary, presidential, mass plebiscitary, etc.), particular policy instruments (e.g., Keynesian demand management vs neo-liberal supply-side policies), and so on.

Whereas Jessop, building on Poulantzas, tends to emphasize the structural moment of 'strategic selectivity', Gramsci focused on its strategic moment. In particular, against the then prevailing view that the economic base unilaterally determined the juridico-political superstructure and prevailing forms of social consciousness, Gramsci argued that there was a reciprocal relationship between the economic 'base' and its politico-ideological 'superstructure'. He studied this problem in terms of how 'the necessary reciprocity between structure and superstructure' is secured through specific intellectual, moral, and political practices that translate narrow sectoral, professional, or local interests into broader 'ethico-political' ones. Only thus, he wrote, does the economic structure cease to be an external, constraining force and become a source of initiative and subjective freedom (1971: 366-7). This implies that the ethico-political not only co-constitutes economic structures but also gives them their rationale and legitimacy. Where such a reciprocal relationship exists between base and superstructure, Gramsci spoke of an 'historic bloc'. He also introduced the concepts of power bloc and hegemonic bloc to analyse respectively the alliances among dominant classes and the broader ensemble of national-popular forces that were mobilized behind a specific hegemonic project. The concept of hegemonic bloc refers to the historical unity not of structures (as in the case of the historical bloc) but of social forces (which Gramsci analysed in terms of the ruling classes, supporting classes, mass movements, and intellectuals). A hegemonic bloc is a durable alliance of class forces organized by a class (or class fraction) which has proved itself capable of exercising political, intellectual, and moral leadership over the dominant classes and the popular masses alike. Gramsci notes a key organizational role here for 'organic intellectuals', i.e., persons able to develop hegemonic projects that express the long-term interests of the dominant or subaltern classes in 'national-popular' terms. Gramsci also emphasized the need for a 'decisive economic nucleus' to provide the basis for long-term hegemony and criticized efforts to construct an 'arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed' hegemony which ignored economic realities.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Marxist approach to power and its exercise involves the following four interests: (1) power and class domination; (2) the mediations among economic, political, and ideological class domination; (3) the limitations and contradictions of power that are grounded in the nature of capitalism as a system of social relations; and (4) the role of strategy and tactics. These interests indicate both the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. First, in privileging class domination,
Marxism tends to ignore other forms of social domination – patriarchal, ethnic, 'racial', hegemonic masculinities, inter-state, regional or territorial, etc.. At best these figure as factors that overdetermine the forms of class domination and/or get modified by changes in class relations. Second, there is a risk of overemphasizing the structural coherence of class domination at the expense of its disjunctures, contradictions, countervailing tendencies, etc.. Notions of a unified ruling class belie the messiness of actual configurations of class power – the frictions within and across its economic, political, and ideological dimensions, the disjunctions between different scales of social organization, the contradictory nature and effects of strategies, tactics, and policies, the probability of state as well as market failures, and the capacity of subaltern forces to engage in resistance. Many concrete analyses reveal this messiness and complexity but these qualities often go unreflected in more abstract Marxist theorizing. Third, Marxists risk reducing the limits of economic, political, and ideological power to the effect of class contradictions. But there are other sources of failure too. Finally, whilst an emphasis on strategy and tactics is important to avoid the structuralist fallacy that capital reproduces itself quasi-automatically and without need of human action, there is a risk of voluntarism if strategy and tactics are examined without reference to specific conjunctures and broader structural contexts.

ELITE THEORY

In political science and sociology, elite theory is a theory of the state that seeks to describe and explain power relationships in contemporary society. The theory posits that a small minority, consisting of members of the economic elite and policy-planning networks, holds the most power— and this power is independent of democratic elections. Through positions in corporations or on corporate boards, and influence over policy-planning networks through financial support of foundations or positions with think tanks or policy-discussion groups, members of the "elite" exert significant power over corporate and government decisions. An example of this belief is in the Forbes magazine article (published in December 2009) entitled The World's Most Powerful People, in which Forbes purported to list the 67 most powerful people in the world (assigning one "slot" for each 100,000,000 of human population). The basic characteristics of this theory are that power is concentrated, the elites are unified, the non-elites are diverse and powerless, elites' interests are unified due to common backgrounds and positions and the defining characteristic of power is institutional position.

Even when entire groups are ostensibly completely excluded from the state's traditional networks of power (historically, on the basis of arbitrary criteria such as nobility, race, gender, or religion), elite theory recognizes that "counter-elites" frequently develop within such excluded groups. Negotiations between such disenfranchised groups and the state can be analyzed as negotiations between elites and counter-elites. A major problem, in turn, is the ability of elites to co-opt counter-elites.

Elite theory opposes pluralism, a tradition that assumes that all individuals, or at least the multitude of social groups, have equal power and balance each other out in contributing to democratic political outcomes representing the emergent, aggregate will of society. Elite theory argues either that democracy is a utopian folly, as it is traditionally viewed in the conservative Italian tradition, or that democracy is not realizable within capitalism, as is the view of the more Marxist-compatible contemporary elite theory permutation.
Pareto argued that elites possess either lion-like or fox-like qualities that are required to rule

Italian school of elitism

Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), and Robert Michels (1876–1936), were cofounders of the Italian school of elitism, which influenced subsequent elite theory in the Western tradition. The outlook of the Italian school of elitism is based on two ideas:

1. Power lies in position of authority in key economic and political institutions.
2. The psychological difference that sets elites apart is that they have personal resources, for instance intelligence and skills, and a vested interest in the government; while the rest are incompetent and do not have the capabilities of governing themselves, the elite are resourceful and strive to make the government work. For in reality, the elite would have the most to lose in a failed state.

Vilfredo Pareto Pareto emphasized the psychological and intellectual superiority of elites, believing that they were the highest accomplishes in any field. He discussed the existence of two types of elites: 1. Governing elites 2. Non-governing elites. He also extended the idea that a whole elite can be replaced by a new one and how one can circulate from being elite to non-elite.

Gaetano Mosca Mosca emphasized the sociological and personal characteristics of elites. He said elites are an organized minority and that the masses are an unorganized majority. The ruling class is composed of the ruling elite and the sub-elites. He divides the world into two
groups: 1. Ruling class 2. Class that is ruled. Mosca asserts that elites have intellectual, moral, and material superiority that is highly esteemed and influential.

Robert Michels Sociologist Michels developed the iron law of oligarchy where, he asserts, social and political organizations are run by few individuals, and social organization and labor division are key. He believed that all organizations were elitist and that elites have three basic principles that help in the bureaucratic structure of political organization:

1. Need for leaders, specialized staff and facilities
2. Utilization of facilities by leaders within their organization
3. The importance of the psychological attributes of the leaders

Contemporary elite theory

C.W. Mills’ Power Elite

C. Wright Mills Mills published his book The Power Elite in 1956, claiming a new sociological perspective on systems of power in the United States. He identified a triumvirate of power groups—political, economic and military—which form a distinguishable, although not unified, power-wielding body in the United States.

Mills proposed that this group had been generated through a process of rationalization at work in all advanced industrial societies whereby the mechanisms of power became concentrated, funneling overall control into the hands of a limited, somewhat corrupt group. This reflected a decline in politics as an arena for debate and relegation to a merely formal level of discourse. This macro-scale analysis sought to point out the degradation of democracy in "advanced" societies and the fact that power generally lies outside the boundaries of elected representatives.
A main influence for the study was Franz Leopold Neumann's book, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944, a study of how Nazism came to power in the German democratic state. It provided the tools to analyze the structure of a political system and served as a warning of what could happen in a modern capitalistic democracy.

*Elite theorists argue that a handful few are ruling American society*

G. William Domhoff, in his controversial book Who Rules America?, researched local and national decision making process networks seeking to illustrate the power structure in the United States. He asserts, much like Hunter, that an elite class that owns and manages large income-producing properties (like banks and corporations) dominate the American power structure politically and economically.

Floyd Hunter The elite theory analysis of power was also applied on the micro scale in community power studies such as that by Floyd Hunter (1953). Hunter examined in detail the power of relationships evident in his "Regional City" looking for the "real" holders of power rather than those in obvious official positions. He posited a structural-functional approach that mapped hierarchies and webs of interconnection within the city—mapping relationships of power between businessmen, politicians, clergy etc. The study was promoted to debunk current concepts of any "democracy" present within urban politics and reaffirm the arguments for a true representative democracy. This type of analysis was also used in later, larger scale, studies such as that carried out by M. Schwartz examining the power structures within the sphere of the corporate elite in the United States.
PLURALISM

Classical pluralism is the view that politics and decision making are located mostly in the framework of government, but that many non-governmental groups use their resources to exert influence. The central question for classical pluralism is how power and influence are distributed in a political process. Groups of individuals try to maximize their interests. Lines of conflict are multiple and shifting as power is a continuous bargaining process between competing groups. There may be inequalities but they tend to be distributed and evened out by the various forms and distributions of resources throughout a population. Any change under this view will be slow and incremental, as groups have different interests and may act as "veto groups" to destroy legislation. The existence of diverse and competing interests is the basis for a democratic equilibrium, and is crucial for the obtaining of goals by individuals. A situation of open competition for electoral support within a significant part of the adult population—ensures competition of group interests and relative equality. Pluralists stress civil rights, such as freedom of expression and organization, and an electoral system with at least two parties. On the other hand, since the participants in this process constitute only a tiny fraction of the populace, the public acts mainly as bystanders. This is not necessarily undesirable for two reasons: (1) it may be representative of a population content with the political happenings, or (2) political issues require continuous and expert attention, which the average citizen may not have. Important theorists of pluralism include Robert A. Dahl, David Truman, and Seymour Martin Lipset.

Pluralist conception of power

The list of possible sources of power is virtually endless: legal authority, money, prestige, skill, knowledge, charisma, legitimacy, free time, and experience. Pluralists also stress the differences between potential and actual power as it stands. Actual power means the ability to compel someone to do something and is the view of power as a causation. Dahl describes power as a "realistic relationship, such as A's capacity for acting in such a manner as to control B's responses". Potential power refers to the possibility of turning resources into actual power. Cash, one of many resources, is only a stack of bills until it is put to work. Malcolm X, for example, was certainly not a rich person growing up, but received money from many groups after his prison term and used other resources such as his forceful personality and organizational skills. He had a greater impact on American politics than most wealthy people. A particular resource like money cannot automatically be equated with power because the resource can be used skillfully or clumsily, fully or partially, or not at all.

The pluralist approach to the study of power, states that nothing categorical about power can be assumed in any community. The question then is not who runs a community, but if any group in fact does. To determine this, pluralists study specific outcomes. The reason for this is that they believe human behavior is governed in large part by inertia. That said, actual involvement in overt activity is a more valid marker of leadership than simply a reputation. Pluralists also believe that there is no one particular issue or point in time at which any group must assert itself to stay true to its own expressed values, but rather that there are a variety of issues and points at which this is possible. There are also costs involved in taking action at all – not only losing, but expenditure of time and effort. While a structuralist may argue that power distributions have a rather permanent nature, this rationale says that power may in fact be tied to issues, which vary widely in duration. Also, instead of focusing on actors within a system, the emphasis is on the leadership roles itself.
By studying these, it can be determined to what extent there is a power structure present in a society.

Three of the major tenets of the pluralist school are (1) resources and hence potential power are widely scattered throughout society; (2) at least some resources are available to nearly everyone; and (3) at any time the amount of potential power exceeds the amount of actual power.

Finally, and perhaps most important, no one is all-powerful unless proven so through empirical observation. An individual or group that is influential in one realm may be weak in another. Large military contractors certainly throw their weight around on defense matters, but how much sway do they have on agricultural or health policies? A measure of power, therefore, is its scope, or the range of areas where it is successfully applied as observed by a researcher. Pluralists believe that with few exceptions power holders usually have a relatively limited scope of influence. Pluralism does leave room for an elitist situation- Should a group A continuously exert power over multiple groups. For a pluralist to accept this notion, it must be empirically observed and not assumed so by definition.

For all these reasons power cannot be taken for granted. One has to observe it empirically in order to know who really governs. The best way to do this, pluralists believe, is to examine a wide range of specific decisions, noting who took which side and who ultimately won and lost. Only by keeping score on a variety of controversies can one begin to identify actual power holders. Pluralism was associated with behavioralism.

A contradiction to pluralist power is often cited from the origin of one's power. Although certain groups may share power, people within those groups set agendas, decide issues, and take on leadership roles through their own qualities. Some theorists argue that these qualities cannot be transferred, thus creating a system where elitism still exists. What this theory fails to take into account is the prospect of overcoming these qualities by garnering support from other groups. By aggregating power with other organizations, interest groups can over-power these non-transferable qualities. In this sense, political pluralism still applies to these aspects.

**Elite pluralism**

Elite pluralists agree with classical pluralists that there is "plurality" of power; however, this plurality is not "pure" as some people and groups have more power than others. For example, some people have more money than others, so they can pay to have their opinion put across better (i.e. more advertising) than the working class can. This inequality is because society has "elites"; people who have more power, perhaps through money, inheritance or social tradition than others.

Basically, it claims that elites play a big role in decision making. The idea behind reads as follow: in democracies the people participate in electing the elites who will represent them and, at the end, the ones who are going to make the laws. As Davita S. Glasberg and Deric Shannon highlights, "political elites are not a monolithic, unified interest group representing their own narrow group of interests but rather are diverse, competitive elites representing a wide range of interests". They have to compete in "the political market place" in order to gain voters being the power equally distributed between all the potential voters. Moreover, the stability in the system is achieved through this competition among the elites, as they have to negotiate in order to pass a bill. And, sometimes, they have to change their positions and points of view in order to reach a common
point. Elites respect and follow the policy-making procedures because they are accountable of their acts and they can be replaced through legal procedures of through new elections.

**Neo-pluralism**

While Pluralism as a political theory of the state and policy formation gained its most traction during the 1950s and 1960s in America, some scholars argued that the theory was too simplistic (Connolly (1969) The Challenge to Pluralist Theory) – leading to the formulation of neo-pluralism. Views differed about the division of power in democratic society. Although neo-pluralism sees multiple pressure groups competing over political influence, the political agenda is biased towards corporate power. Neo-pluralism no longer sees the state as an umpire mediating and adjudicating between the demands of different interest groups, but as a relatively autonomous actor (with different departments) that forges and looks after its own (sectional) interests. Constitutional rules, which in pluralism are embedded in a supportive political culture, should be seen in the context of a diverse, and not necessarily supportive, political culture and a system of radically uneven economic sources. This diverse culture exists because of an uneven distribution of socioeconomic power. This creates possibilities for some groups – while limiting others – in their political options. In the international realm, order is distorted by powerful multinational interests and dominant states, while in classical pluralism emphasis is put on stability by a framework of pluralist rules and free market society.

**CONCEPTS CONCEPT OF THE STATE**

I SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATE

The concept of the state has figured as the central theme of traditional political theory. R.G. Gettel (Political Science) defined political science as the science of the state, while J.W. Gamer claimed that political science begins and ends with the state. In modern political theory, the significance of the concept of the state has been fluctuating. Some exponents of the behavioural approach in political science have even suggested abandoning the concept of the state altogether. Their main objection is that this concept does not help in understanding political reality or the political process because, (a) the term ‘state’ refers to a formal concept while real politics transcends the formal organization of the state; (b) the ‘state’ is usually conceived in terms of the ‘ends’ of the state which drags us to the realm of moral philosophy, far removed from the real world of politics; and (c) the concept of the state postulates a particular type of organization which excludes top organizations of certain societies, real or imaginary, and thus introduces the idea of ‘pre-state’ societies and ‘stateless’ societies. This leads to the assumption that political organization is not a universal phenomenon. David Easton, in his Political System An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (1953), observed:

One person sees the state as the embodiment of the moral spirit, its concrete expression; another, as the instrument of exploitation used by one class against others. One author defines it as simply an aspect of society, distinguishable from it only analytically; another, as simply a synonym for government; and still another, as a separate and unique association among a large number of other associations such as the church, trade unions, and similar voluntary groups.
After dwelling on these ambiguities in some detail Easton came to the conclusion that the word ‘state’ ought to be abandoned entirely. It is important to note that distaste for the term ‘state’ was confined to some exponents of liberal political theory, especially to some American political scientists. Marxist political theory continued to use the term state to denote a specific form of political organization: the terms ‘slave-owning state’, ‘feudal state’, ‘capitalist state’, ‘socialist/communist state’, as well as ‘pre-state society’ and ‘stateless society’ are the current coins of Marxist political theory. Even the empirically-oriented political scientists of the liberal tradition used the term ‘state-building’, especially in the context of developing societies, which signified a renewed interest in the concept of the ‘state’ as an institutional and constitutional mechanism. Then, in the 1980s attention swung back to the state, as exemplified by T. Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In’ (Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, edited by P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol; 1985). However, in contrast to the earlier concept of the state as an institutional structure, it was redefined as an active agent of shaping and reshaping society. It is thus evident that, in spite of some initial suspicions and objections, the concept of the state never became entirely redundant for the study of politics. What is, then, meant by the term ‘state’?

**Meaning of the State**

It is significant that though some sort of political organization has existed since ancient times, such as, Greek city-states and the Roman empire, yet the concept of the ‘state’ as such is comparatively modern. The contemporary concept of the state owes its origin to Machiavelli (1469-1527) who expressed this idea in early sixteenth century as ‘the power which has authority over men’ (The Prince). This was an important idea because it describes the nature of the state, not the end of the state which was a question of political philosophy rather than political sociology or political science. This peculiar feature of the state has been the focus of attention of many recent thinkers. Max Weber (1864-1920), a famous German sociologist, sought to evolve a ‘sociological’ definition of the state (1920):

Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends... Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force. (From Max Weber, tr. and ed. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills)

From this standpoint, Weber arrives at the following definition which is widely acknowledged in modern political theory: ‘A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’.

R.M. Maclver, in his famous work The Modern State (1926), sought to distinguish the state from other kinds of associations in that it embraces the whole of people in a specific territory and it has the special function of maintaining social order. It performs this function through its agent, the government, ‘which speaks with the voice of law’. Similarly, R.M. Maclver and C.H. Page (Society: An Introductory Analysis; 1950) have pointed out: The state is distinguished from all other associations by its exclusive investment with the final power of coercion. Harold J. Laski, in An Introduction to Politics (1931), similarly points out:

Whereas all other associations are voluntary in character, and can bind the individual only as he chooses membership of them, once he is a resident of some given state, legally he has no choice but to obey its commands. The state, so to say, is the crowning-point of the modern social edifice, and it is in its supremacy over all other forms of social grouping that its special nature is to be found.
Frederick M. Watkins defines the state as a geographically delimited segment of human society united by common obedience to a single sovereign. Watkins lays special emphasis on the element of sovereignty—the characteristic of the supreme law-making authority whose decisions are final. The supremacy of the commands of the state, is an essential element which distinguishes it from all other associations of men. Geoffrey K. Roberts (A Dictionary of Political Analysis; 1971) has tried to evolve a working definition of the state as a territorial area in which a population is governed by a set of political authorities, and which successfully claims the compliance of the citizenry for its laws, and is able to secure such compliance by its monopolistic control of legitimate force.

**Elements of the State**

In the light of the various definitions of the state, it is customary to identify the state by its constituent elements which include: population, territory, government and sovereignty.

**Population**

The state is a human institution. The population is, therefore, an essential element of the state. However, the population can constitute a state only when it is united by the condition of interdependence, consciousness of common interest, and general regard for a set of common rules of behaviour and institutions.

The size of population for constituting a state cannot be fixed, yet it is always better that such population is self-sufficient to meet all the needs of life. If it is required to procure any goods or services from other states, it should usually be able to pay for them, although the possibility of foreign aid, as a temporary measure, cannot be ruled out. In any case, economic self-sufficiency is essential for the stability of a state.

The population of a state need not belong to a single race, religion, language or culture. A homogeneous population is no longer considered an essential feature of the modern state. The modern state claims to reconcile the interests of various groups of its citizens.

**Territory**

Territory is another essential element of a state. Other associations either exist within the state or they extend their sphere to several states; they do not need separate territory. But the state must possess a territory where its authority is accepted without dispute or challenge.

A state comes into existence only when its population is settled in a fixed territory. Friedrich Engels, in his Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884), notes that the formation of the state is accompanied by a division of population according to territory. In the pre-state society when people live as nomadic tribes, moving from one place to another in search of food, the members of the tribe are held together by the ties of kinship. With the formation of the state, citizens are allowed to exercise their rights and duties wherever they settle, irrespective of gens and tribes. The organization of citizens according to locality is the common feature of all states.

The territory of a state includes the land, water and air-space within its boundary. It also extends usually to a distance of three miles into the sea from its coast, and is known as territorial waters, which may be sought to be extended further in times of war.

Territory symbolizes the sphere of sovereignty of the state. Territory provides for natural resources for the sustenance of the population of the state. Territory provides for a sense of security and immense
opportunities for a fuller life for its residents; it is an object of sentimental attachment people love and worship their motherland and are prepared to make supreme sacrifices for the protection and maintenance of the territorial integrity of their state.

Like population, the size of the territory of a state cannot be fixed. Territory is usually a geographical phenomenon, dividing different states by sea, mountains or other big natural barriers. Sometimes territories are demarcated mainly on a political basis rather than on a geographical basis. In such cases, the people’s sense of identification with a particular state becomes the basis of territorial demarcation. Reallocation of territories can bring about a merger or alteration of the existing states or emergence of new states.

**Government**

Government is still another essential element of the state. According to J.W. Garner (Political Science and Government), government is the agency or machinery through which common policies are determined and by which common affairs are regulated and common interests promoted. If the state represents an abstract concept, government is its concrete form. In other words, authority of the state is exercised by government; functions of the state are performed by government. Laws of the state are made, declared and enforced by government; justice is dispensed by the judicial organ of government. Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and for the provision of common services defence, issue of currency, foreign relations, roads, bridges, and even transport, communications, water, electricity, health and education, etc. and it is entitled to levy taxes for the provision of all such services. Without government, the people are a chaotic mass of disjointed particles, without common aims, common interests or a common organization.

A citizen has to deal with government of the state; any transaction between different states, including war, takes place through the medium of their governments.

However, government and state should not be treated as co-terminous. Governments may rise and fall without disturbing identity of the state, so long as they are formed and dissolved according to the established custom, procedure of constitution of the state. But a state will lose its identity if it is suppressed by an alien power so much so that the established procedure of forming a government is also suspended.

**Sovereignty**

Finally, sovereignty also constitutes an essential element of the state. Sovereignty denotes the supreme or ultimate power of the state to make laws or take political decisions establishing public goals, fixing priorities and resolving conflicts as also enforcing such laws and decisions by the use of legitimate force. In fact, sovereignty denotes the final authority of the state over its population and its territory. This authority may be exercised by the government of the day, but it essentially belongs to the state from which it is derived by the government.

It is by virtue of its sovereignty that a state declares through the agency of the government its laws and decisions and issues commands which are binding on all citizens, claims obedience thereto, and punishes the offenders. It is also by virtue of its sovereignty that a state similarly deals independently with other states.

Commands of the state are treated as superior to those of any other association or institution, even to the dictates of social customs or conscience of individual, because sovereignty is the sole preserve of the state. As Max Weber (1920) points out: The right to use physical force is ascribed to other...
institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the right to use violence.

Other associations are either voluntary or based on custom or necessity. The right to use legitimate coercion in its own right is exclusive prerogative of the state.

A state continues to exist so long as it is armed with sovereignty. If a state loses its sovereignty because of internal revolt or external aggression, the result is anarchy and disappearance of the state as such.

Some writers regard ‘international recognition’ as an essential element of the state. This denotes formal recognition of the sovereignty of the state over a given territory and population by other states. International recognition, however, is the outcome of the sovereignty of the state, not a condition of its existence. When a new state, like Bangladesh, comes into existence, it may be recognized by some states immediately while other states may withhold their recognition for quite a long time. Much depends on the foreign policy of a state whether to recognize the new state immediately or to delay it. USA had withheld recognition of the new states of USSR and People’s Republic of China for decades after they came into existence, but they did exist as states. Hence, international recognition is only incidental to the sovereignty of the state, not a fundamental element of the state itself.

II RELATIONSHIP OF STATE WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

STATE AND SOCIETY

The term ‘state’ is sometimes used synonymously with ‘society’. However, such usage arises from confusion intentional or unintentional. A distinction between state and society is desirable, not only for scientific precision but also for saving individual from absolutist, authoritarian and totalitarian rule.

The state is usually described as ‘society politically organized’. Society is an association of human beings which fulfils all their needs of life from cradle to grave. The state fulfils their particular need of political organization it subjects them to binding laws and decisions to provide for order and security, and common services. When a society is governed by a common set of rules, regulations and a supreme decision-making authority, only then does it qualify for being a state. Society binds men into multifarious relationships all such relationships do not fall in the domain of a state. Social relationships are usually determined by necessity, custom, courtesy, morality, mutual understanding, agreement or even contract; political relations are mainly determined by command and obedience. Social relations cover a large variety of subjects, to meet all the needs of human life physical, emotional, intellectual, spiritual, and so on.

Society may coincide with the state, especially when society takes the form of a nation. Thus, Indian society and the Indian state denote associations of the same set of persons. But that is not always the case. There can be a society within the state, such as, a village community. Social relationships can extend beyond the state also. Thus, you can have friends, relatives, acquaintances, sympathizers, admirers, clients, customers or even colleagues beyond the national frontiers of your state. They belong to your society, but not to your state. Then, there can be a society without a state. Primitive
tribes who constitute society need not constitute a state. Even the groups of hunters, root-diggers and food-gatherers of a primitive type form a society though they are not aware of the idea of the state.

STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Originally the terms civil society and ‘political society’ were used as coterminous. Thus the term ‘civil society’ was applied synonymously with ‘state’. But under the complex conditions of present-day society it is necessary to recognize the distinctive features of civil society.

Initially the ancient Roman thinker Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) used the term ‘civil society’ in the sense of the state in the first century B.C. But in his view it was not merely the external structure of the state. It stood for a society whose members lived together as citizens, abided by civil laws and led a civilized, cultured and dignified life. In this sense, the barbarian communities did not qualify to be described as civil societies.

Seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) equated civil society with political society. He observed that when people relinquish the state of nature and set up a government for the protection of their natural right to life, liberty and property, they enter into civil society. Thus civil society is a means to establish discipline, order and security for the human community. Eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean Jaques Rousseau (1712-78) also treated ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ as coterminous. It provides for legal equality of all citizens who thus become equal in the eye of law in spite of their natural differences.

STATE OF NATURE

The hypothetical condition in which people live before the formation of the state.

German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) sought to distinguish ‘civil society’ from the state which were based in ‘universal egoism’ and ‘universal altruism’ respectively. In Hegel’s view, civil society represented an organization in which an individual dealt with all other individuals (apart from the members of his family) as means to serve his self-interest. It is the sphere of economic activities where an individual tries to know the need of others and to satisfy them in order to satisfy his own needs. Another German philosopher Karl Marx (1818 83) accepted Hegel’s description of civil society, but he did not accept Hegel’s distinction between civil society and the state, Marx believed that in actual practice civil society represented the state itself. It recognized individual as a citizen and conceded equality of all individuals in the eye of law. But since the economic power in the contemporary civil society was in the hands of capitalist class, law also served the interests of this class.

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), an Italian Marxist, identified two levels of the superstructure of capitalist society: (a) civil society which was nearer the base; and (b) political society which exercised overall control. Civil society includes family, school and church which transmit capitalist value-system to the new generation; political society includes police, judiciary, prisons, etc. Civil society embodies ‘structures of legitimation’; political society embodies ‘structures of coercion’. Together they form ‘structures of domination’. Capitalist society largely depends on the efficiency of the institutions of civil society for its stability.
Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), a Neo-Marxist philosopher in America, argued that Hegel’s distinction between civil society and the state was particularly significant for an analysis of the problems of contemporary society. He noted that under the modern capitalism civil society had eclipsed the state whereas under the modern communism the state had eclipsed civil society. We must secure independence of both institutions in order to restore civil liberties of the citizens.

In short, distinction between the state and civil society must be maintained in order to prevent authoritarianism. In the contemporary discourse, the term ‘civil society’ is also used to describe the ‘intermediate’ associations between individual (or family) and the state. It is the product of ‘freedom of association’. It is the bedrock of civil liberties. It serves as a channel of communication between individuals and the state and functions as a shock-absorber in event of mounting tension between individuals and state.

STATE AND GOVERNMENT

Government is regarded as an essential element of the state. In actual practice, the state is represented by the government. Governments exercise all authority and functions on behalf of the state. However, the terms ‘state’ and ‘government’ should not be used synonymously. ‘State’ represents a wider and more stable entity than ‘government’. As R.M. Maelver (The Web of Government; 1965) has elucidated:

When we speak of the state we mean the organization, of which government is the administrative organ. Every social organization must have a focus of administration, an agency by which its policies are given specific character and translated into action. But the organization is greater than the organ. In this sense, the state is greater and more inclusive than government. A state has a constitution, a code of laws, a way of setting up its government, a body of citizens. When we think of this whole structure we think of the state.

Thus, so long as a state maintains its identity and independence, governments may be formed and dissolved according to the established procedure without affecting the character of the state. But a state itself may lose its identity when it is suppressed and conquered by an alien power and its constitution or the established procedure of forming a legitimate government is suspended. The subjugated people may, however, retain or revive their feeling of national solidarity and re-establish their state in due course.

The state serves as a symbol of unity of the people. The image of the state inspires unity among the people and provides them with an identity as a nation. It arouses national pride and a spirit of sacrifice among the people. Government only represents a working arrangement to carry out functions of the state. Government commands our obedience; the state commands our loyalty. Government may be good or bad, efficient or inefficient, but the state will continue to be a symbol of our national greatness. We may criticize or condemn the government, and still acclaim the greatness of our state!

STATE AND NATION

The modern state usually takes the form of a nation-state. The frontiers of the state are called national frontiers; the interest of the state is described as national interest; the character of the people of a state is called its national character. Relations between different states are known as international relations.
At the outset, a nation may be distinguished from nationality. Nationality usually denotes a set of people inspired by a feeling of unity based on common race, language, religion, culture, geographical compactness, common political aspirations and historical development. Most of these factors are based on birth and provide little scope for expanding the horizons of social relationships. Feelings of nationality separate one set of people from other such sets. Sometimes this is accompanied by a sense of one’s own superiority, or a sense of disdain for others which may lead to tensions, wars and other disastrous consequences. In any case, the feeling of nationality grows from a relatively narrow base.

Some writers define nation on the same basis as nationality and then advocate a separate state for each nationality. This view is no longer held valid. A nation grows on a much wider base. It refers to people living in a defined territory, inspired by a sense of unity, common political aspirations, common interests, common history and common destiny though they may belong to different nationalities. In other words, groups of people of different races, with different religions, languages and cultures, etc. may live together and feel united as citizens of the same state, owing their undivided allegiance to that state. Thus, nationhood transcends the conditions of birth and extends to the permanent residents of a state. Members of a nation of course, distinguish themselves from other nations. They may sometimes be prejudiced against other peoples. Yet a logical outcome of the idea of a nation postulates equality among nations, their co-existence and cooperation. Since 1920, the principle of national self-determination has been almost universally accepted which has led to the establishment of nation-states, and rapid development of international law to regulate relations between nation-states.

**NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION**

The principle that each nation has the right to be independent and to choose a suitable form of government for itself. At the end of the First World War (1914-18), Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) conceived of it primarily as a criterion for the break-up of the empires defeated in the war, i.e. Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman empires. Around this time, V. I. Lenin (1870-1924) conceived of this principle essentially as the ground for granting independence to dependent nations from colonial and imperial domination.

After the Second World War (1939-45), the United Nations upheld this principle through various international documents. Thus UN General Assembly resolution on the independence of colonial peoples (1960), two UN covenants on human rights (1966), UN General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations among States (1970) and the Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975) have gradually transformed it into a general legal principle of the international community.

The developing countries, i.e. the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America who won their independence from colonial and imperial domination after the Second World War (1939-45), are faced today with the gigantic task of nation building. Most of them evolved a national sentiment during their struggle for independence, but disruptive tendencies started to emerge after they achieved their independence. Nation-building involves inculcating a feeling of unity and the process of their integration into compact groups. The attempt is, however, bound to remain elusive unless they contain their widening economic disparities and free themselves completely from the foul play of neo-colonial powers who continue to exploit them despite their political independence.
III RISE AND GROWTH OF THE MODERN NATION-STATE

The modern state is largely identified as the nation-state. The state has acquired its present form through a long historical process extending over thousands of years. The state itself was the product of the interplay of several factors, including kinship, religion, property, war, technical development, and political consciousness. The family was the first institution to emerge from the state of savagery, which brought some sense of attachment, obligation, order and security, in the life of man. Originally, man’s family was traced from the mother which gave rise to the matriarchal family. This, in due course, gave way to the patriarchal family when woman was reduced to being the property of man. The family gave rise to a larger social organization. Initially, kinship or blood-relationship provided a strong tie for people to live together and to fulfill their needs through division of labour. In due course, some consistent patterns of behaviour and relationships of domination and subordination emerged. Social life came to be regulated by custom and authority. This eventually led to the evolution of the state.

Sociologists have generally identified the following forms of state in the course of its historical evolution: the tribal state; the Oriental empire; the Greek city-state; the Roman world empire; the feudal state; and, finally, the modern nation-state.

The Tribal State

The earliest form of tribal organization of authority command and obedience is described as the tribal state. The tribal states were usually small in size. These were governed by chiefs, often assisted by advisory councils. Some of them were nomadic; others were permanently settled in definite areas. While the main purpose of their existence was the preservation of internal order and the waging of aggressive or defensive war, they often retained strong traces of common birth, common religion, and common economic interests. The aborigines of Australia represent this type. The tribes of the Western hemisphere, before they came into contact with Europe, also belonged to this category.

The Oriental Empire

In course of time, population increased; new techniques of production were evolved and new sources of natural bounty were discovered. A warm climate, fertile soil, abundance of water and sunlight and vast areas free from geographical barriers, helped men to accumulate wealth and to evolve new forms of social organization. In the fertile valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates, the Ganges, the Yellow River, and Yangtze, which are called the cradles of civilization, wealth accumulated and cities arose. Such areas, furnishing abundant food with little effort, attracted surrounding peoples belonging to different kinship groups. This was followed by their conflict and intermingling which eventually resulted in the creation of the state.

The Greek City-State

As civilization spread to the region around the Aegean and the Mediterranean, new geographical forms gave rise to new forms of social organization. Europe is a peninsula where land is broken by the sea into small units permitting communication, but making invasion from Asia difficult in those days. The peculiar location of Greece helped in the evolution of a new form of political organization in the ancient days. The mountains and the sea divided this area into numerous valleys and islands. These could be easily defended, yet, because of the sea, these were not isolated. In contrast to the uniformity of Asia, the variety and moderation of nature in Greece developed a different mental attitude and genius. Here, small communities were settled in secluded valleys, guarded by mountains and the sea,
yet in constant contact with the outside world through their harbours. Quite naturally, they evolved their political organization into city-states.

**The Roman World Empire**

After the downfall of the Greek city-states, the main line of political development passed westward to Rome. In due course, Rome became the centre of civilization. It was situated in the centre of Europe, at the head of navigation of the only important river. The various settlements on the neighbouring hills were soon united with Rome by conquest or by federation. This led to a fusion of various types of people. Thus, in Rome the rigid fetters of custom were broken earlier than usual. Relations of various tribes were governed by compromise or treaty. This led to the growth of Rome’s wonderful system of law. The process of conquest eventually resulted in the formation of Empire.

**The Feudal State**

After the decline and fall of the Roman empire, central authority was eroded. In the Medieval Age which began in the fifth century of the Christian era, powers began to be exercised by feudal chiefs, i.e. the landlords holding big estates. This led to a hierarchical political organization with the king as the supreme lord at the top, and serfs at the bottom. In fact, the king exercised only superficial control as the lord over the feudal vassals who enjoyed the real power within their domain. The serfs were landless peasants, obliged to pass on a very major share of their produce to their feudal lords. Thus, society still remained divided into the exploiter and exploited classes the lords and the serfs, respectively.

**The Modern Nation-State**

With the dissolution of the feudal system and erosion of the authority of the church, new individualism appeared which demanded greater freedom for man. A new political system was needed in accordance with the new ideas and new conditions. This took the form of the nation-state. As population became stationary and common interests developed, it became increasingly evident that new states would, in general, follow geographic and ethnic lines. Bonds of nationality and language, strengthened by natural boundaries, grouped the feudal fragments into more and more permanent combinations. This process led to the emergence of France, Spain, England, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Russia, and, later, Germany and Italy as the nation-states. This separation of territories into distinct states, each with its own national spirit, destroyed the idea of a common superior and paved the way for the rise of international law and the modern theory of the sovereignty and legal equality of states.

The earlier nation-states were largely monarchies. However, since the eighteenth century, there has been a slow transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy and democracy in large parts of Europe. In some countries, such as, England, the transition to democracy has been relatively peaceful, while in France it was brought about by a violent revolution. In any case, with the growth and expansion of democracy, the principles of liberty, equality, popular sovereignty and rule of law came to be established as the principles of government in a large part of Europe.

The process of formation of the modern nation-state started in Europe as early as the sixteenth century. However, European nations did not seek to extend this principle to all mankind. The industrial revolution and the emergence of a new industrial-merchant class in European countries opened up new avenues of prosperity for these people. But, at the same time, they required new sources of raw material, cheap labour and new markets for consumption of their industrial products. This led them to an exploration of new territories and expansion of their colonial net to the countries
of Asia, Africa and Latin America, with the obvious intention of exploiting the natural and human resources of these countries. Though the colonial powers sought to exalt their own role in the garb of such phrases as the white man’s burden’, yet they indulged in the maximum possible exploitation of the subject peoples. Thus, nineteenth-century Europe is characterized by a strange paradox: a nation-state with liberty, equality and rule of law at home, and imperialistic exploitation abroad.

Political consciousness and national movements started emerging in the subject peoples in the twentieth century, especially after the First World War (1914-18). Besides, people in some countries were otherwise suffering under despotic rule. The political aspirations of the oppressed people of different countries brought about two important changes in the twentieth century: (a) socialist revolutions inspired by Marxist ideology, first in Russia (1917), and later in China (1949) and other countries; and (b) attainment of independence by the peoples of Asia and Africa from their colonial rulers, especially after the Second World War (1939-45), such as, India, Pakistan, Burma, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, Ghana, Fiji, Vietnam, Indonesia, Libya, Syria, Zimbabwe and Namibia. These new nations along with Latin American countries are collectively described as the Third World or the developing nations. Their social, economic and political life was shattered during the colonial rule; and they are now faced with the gigantic task of development, challenge of poverty and disruptive forces within, largely because of the exploitation of the masses by their ruling classes, sometimes in collusion with foreign powers. A large number of these nations have been subjected to military dictatorship and oppression.

Marxian socialism, which brought about socialist systems in the world, advocated a world-wide organization of workers. Initially, it did not subscribe to the idea of confining workers movements to national boundaries. However, harsh realities of human nature and practical necessity forced the people of the socialist states to accept and perpetuate their position as nation-states. A large number of socialist states have now relinquished socialism and are now heading towards liberalization as independent nation-states. Similarly, the new nations of the Third World have also stabilized as nation-states.

The stability of the nation-state system has led to a vast development of international law and international organizations (like the United Nations and its specialized agencies) to regulate the behaviour of nation-states, international transactions, to ensure collaboration in the development of science and technology, art, literature and culture as also to tackle global problems like prevention of atmospheric pollution, sharing of rare but essential resources, saving humanity from injustice, and so on.

However, exploitation in the international sphere continues in many new, subtle forms, such as neocolonialism. The new nations require machinery and know-how from advanced nations to build up their own industrial-technological base. They get these things at the expense of their rare and valuable resources, and thus they are increasingly impoverished. The pattern of import-export of developing nations reveals how cheap they sell their own material and labour involved in their products, and how expensively they acquire the material and labour involved in the products of foreign nations! Even foreign aid to developing nations has become a source of their exploitation. Besides, large numbers of talented persons from the developing nations, highly educated and trained in their own countries at huge public expense, migrate every year to serve the advanced nations! These are highly complex problems which need to be sorted out and tackled in order to save humanity from mounting exploitation and injustice.
IV NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

All modern nation-states adopt a national flag that represents the nation.

The concept of nation-state is the focus of two conflicting ideologies, viz. nationalism and internationalism. Nationalism denotes a sentiment as well as an ideology. As a sentiment it involves an individual’s attachment to his nation. A nationalist in this sense accords primacy to his national interest over all other interests. As an ideology nationalism postulates that the structure of a state or its political organization should be founded on nationhood. In other words, each nation should constitute an independent state; and each state should represent a particular nation. The people who identify themselves as a natural community, and claim to be the members of a nation must live under a political system of their own choice; they should enjoy an equal status with other nations in the world community; and no nation should be kept under the domination or supremacy of any other nation.

If the members of a community regard themselves as a nation, they can create or invent some elements of nationhood in order to strengthen their national sentiment. For example, they can evolve their national language’, adopt a national flag’, ‘national anthem’ and other symbols of national glory, build memorials of ‘national heroes’ before whom the entire nation bows its head; and they can inspire the members of the nation through popular songs, paintings and statues depicting heroic episodes of their national history.

If a community has evolved national consciousness but its territory is occupied by a colonial or imperial power, it can organize itself for the struggle of independence. It is called ‘national movement’. In short, nationalism pays highest importance to one’s loyalty and commitment to one’s nation.
On the other hand, internationalism does not regard nation-state as the centre of political organization, nor it accepts nation as the object of individual’s undivided loyalty. It insists that mankind should evolve larger organizations in order to achieve some great objectives. Broadly speaking, we may discern two streams of internationalism: (a) international communism; and (b) a principle of international organization. International communism is associated with the teachings of Marx (1818-83) and Engels (1820-95). In Communist Manifesto (1848) they observed that workers have no country of their own. They exhorted workers of the world to unite to bring about socialist revolution all over the world. In their view, socialist revolution was necessary for the emancipation of humanity. This could not be confined to the boundaries of a particular nation.

As a principle of international politics internationalism implies that in view of the growing contact between different parts of the world, a nation-state is no longer capable of fulfilling all the needs of its members, not to speak of mankind as such. Hence peoples of different nation-states should form larger international organizations and cooperate to serve the common interest of mankind. In the case of a clash between national interest and universal human interest, human interest should be given precedence. In this sense, internationalism repudiates the idea of my country, right or wrong. It insists that each nation-state should accept reasonable restraints on its sovereignty in the interests of world peace, collective security and observance of international law.

It is important to note that an earlier version of internationalism believed in international cooperation in military, commercial, educational and cultural spheres in the mutual interest of the nations concerned. But the United Nations called for international cooperation in order to maintain world peace and to eradicate hunger, disease, illiteracy and superstition from various parts of the world. In the contemporary world, the problems of environmental pollution, terrorism and drug-trafficking have assumed global dimensions. Internationalists should come forward to muster vigorous international cooperation to fight against these evils on the global scale.

V CRISIS OF THE NATION-STATE

In the history of mankind various types of state systems were evolved in different ages, but none of them could provide for enduring peace and security to people. Greek city-states were fighting against each other. Roman empire was able to control peoples of different races but it failed to arouse a sense of social solidarity among them. In the medieval age the Pope and the Emperor wanted to create a universal system on the basis of religious unity, but when different countries became aware of their national identities, the medieval empire was dissolved.

Today nation-state is also facing the similar problem. It has proved more efficient than the medieval empire to provide mankind with security and happiness, but under the changed conditions it seems unable to perform its role. With the beginning of the twenty-first century, search for a new form of organization has begun which should be able to fulfil hopes and aspirations of humanity. But there is no certainty about the future form of the state.

In the modern age nation and state are generally regarded as concomitant, but many examples will prove otherwise. Some communities are scattered over different parts of the world who entertain a sense of unity on the basis of common culture, common language and common religion and profess national consciousness on that ground, but they are unable to organize themselves as a single state. For example, the Kurds are scattered over Iraq, Iran and Turkey although they recognize themselves as one nation.
Then there are states in which different ethnic groups live together but they have not been able to assimilate themselves into one nation. Countries like Lebanon and Cyprus remained afflicted with civil wars for very long. Former USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia have been divided into many parts due to such disruptive tendencies.

Many people have migrated to other countries in search of opportunities for advancement, and have become naturalized citizens of those countries. But they are so deeply attached to the language, culture, faith and customs of the countries of their origin that they are prepared to make sacrifices for the welfare of those countries. For examples, the Chinese who have settled abroad are still making substantial contribution to the advancement of China.

One major function of a nation-state is to provide for security to its residents. But due to the invention of lethal weapons and probability of their use by other countries, no nation-state has remained capable of providing full security to its residents. Thus if a country resorts to a nuclear attack on others with the help of advanced missiles, it would prove disastrous to humanity far and wide. Further, it would cause so much atmospheric pollution that no part of the globe is likely to be spared by its effect.

Even otherwise the atmospheric pollution caused by the disposal of the industrial waste is not confined to the boundaries of nation-states. Again the increasing consumption of petrol and diesel by the advanced nations is responsible for causing immense harm to the global atmosphere. Cutting of forests and mountains for fuel, timber, lime stone or hydro-electric power projects in any country causes soil erosion. Its cumulative effect results in distortion of weather cycle and consequent danger of global warming.

Then information revolution all over the world has practically eliminated the distance between different countries in the matter of communication. Telephone, internet, e-mail, fax, etc. enable us to send a message or a copy of any document from one corner of the world to another at the speed of light. With the help of satellite, television programmes can be transmitted and watched in all parts of the world simultaneously. Any important event occurring in any part of the world is reported so fast and so vividly in all other parts that nothing remains unknown. The increasing intimacy of the people all over the world has converted it into a global village. Unprecedented advancement of the means of transport and communication has paved the way for globalization of economy. Even criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists are making full use of the advanced means of transport and communication. The situation calls for a global effort to deal with the global problems. In this scenario, nation-state will have to play a new role for which it should concede necessary adjustment in its authority and sovereignty.

**DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE**

Concept of the state comprises the core of political thought. Political thought has been defined as thought about the State, its structure, its nature, and its purpose. There is a long tradition of political thought. Several political thinkers and schools of thought have developed ideas about the nature and purpose of the state according to different points of view. When new ideas appeared, old ideas were criticized or modified. In the realm of political philosophy it is not necessary that old ideas be dead before the new ideas become acceptable. Unlike the principles of natural sciences (such as, physics, chemistry and biology), the old and new principles of political theory exist simultaneously, claiming
their rightful place. None of the current political ideas can claim absolute authority or validity. Their merits and demerits need constant examination before arriving at any consistent conclusions.

An acquaintance with the diverse perspectives on the state would equip us with valuable insights for dealing with public affairs. Of these, the following may be treated as particularly important:

I  
ORGANIC THEORY OF THE STATE

The organic (or organismic) theory of the state represents the earliest thinking about the state although it has received some new interpretations in recent times. In a nutshell, this theory compares the state with an organism or a living body, and the individuals with its organs. This has two obvious implications. In the first place, since the existence and worth of the organs depend on the existence of the organism, so the existence and worth of individuals depend on the existence of the state. Secondly, different organs are fit to perform different functions within the organism some of them are naturally superior to others. Likewise, different groups and classes in society are naturally fit to perform different functions some are destined to enjoy a superior position than others in the interests of the entire society.

The State as a Natural Institution
The organic theory of the state regards the state as a natural institution. According to this view, you cannot imaging the existence of man as man, that is, as a civilized being, without the existence of the state. Thus, ancient Greeks held the view that the state comes into existence for the sake of life, and continues for the sake of good life. In other words, the existence of the state is an essential condition of the existence of man. That is why Aristotle held that man by nature is a political animal. One who lives without the state is, in Aristotle’s view, either a beast or a god. The state is so fundamental to human existence that Aristotle declared in his typical style: State is prior to man. This is not intended to describe a historical fact, but to make a logical point since you cannot think of man as such (that is, one who is neither subhuman nor superhuman) without thinking of the state, as you cannot think of an organ without thinking of its position in an organism. Thus, Aristotle (Politics, Book I) describes the relation between the individual and the state as follows:

The State is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be not better than that... The proof that the State is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god.

The view of the state as a natural institution was challenged by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century which advanced the mechanistic’ theory of the state. However, toward the end of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century men became dissatisfied with the mechanistic theory which looked upon individuals as so many related atoms. This led to a renewed interest in the organic theory of the state for a meaningful explanation of the relation between individual and the state. Edmund Burke (1729-97), the chief exponent of conservatism, argued that the state was the product of a process of historical growth which he often likened to the growth of a living organism. Like an organism, Burke argued, the state could not survive its dissection; it was also
greater and more complex than any of the parts which made it up. Then with the development of ‘nationalism’, the state was portrayed as the embodiment of the nation and an object of worship. This served as a basis of the idealist school.

Hegel (1770–1831), a German philosopher, was the most eloquent champion of this view who declared: **State is march of God on earth.**

The modern theory of evolution gave a new impetus to likening the state with biological phenomena. Thus the organic theory of the state received a new fillip from the contributions of the biological school of political theory, which flourished in the nineteenth century. The pioneers of this school likened the development of political institutions with the growth of living beings towards higher forms of life as characterized by the increasing differentiation of parts. The metaphor was stretched to such a degree that they sometimes drew strange parallels between the state and natural man. They spoke of the tissues of the State, of its systems of nutrition and circulation, of organs within it fulfilling specifically the functions of brain, nerve, fibres, heart, muscles, even stomach and nose. Bluntschli went to the extent of saying that the state was the masculine sex while the Church was feminine.

The State as an Ethical Institution

The second implication of the saying that ‘the State comes into existence for the sake of life and continues for the sake of good life’ is that the state is an instrument of good life. In other words, living in a state helps man not only survive but also secure an excellent life. Accordingly, the state has a moralizing effect on the life of man so that, by performing his duties and enjoying his rights as a citizen of the state, man is able to achieve moral excellence. Thus, the organic theory views the state as an ethical institution.

The ethical foundations of the state, as envisaged by the organic theory, rest on the differentiation of functions. Aristotle, like any other champion of the organic theory, believes in the natural differences between the capabilities of different individuals. He declares in clear terms: ‘From the hour of birth some men are marked out for subjection and others for rule.’ Thus, some are destined to be masters and others to be slaves. In this way Aristotle treats slavery as a natural institution, and defends it on the grounds that the masters are endowed with a high degree of virtue which can be preserved by enjoying the leisure while the slaves can benefit from that virtue by serving their masters. Thus, the institution of slavery is supposed to secure the good life both for the masters and the slaves.

An important contribution to the theory of the state as an ethical institution was made by the modern biological school of political theory. Drawing a clear distinction between the organic view and the mechanistic view of the state, the exponents of the biological school identified three essential characteristics of an organism:

A. In the first place, there is an intrinsic relationship between the parts and the whole. Thus, unlike the part of a machine, the part of an organism has no existence apart from its position within that organism. For instance, a wheel retains its essential character as a wheel whether it is fitted in a machine or is separated from it, while a hand loses its character as a hand as soon as it is separated from the body;

B. Secondly, an organism shows organic unity of its parts and it tends to grow from within. In a machine, old parts can be replaced by the new, but an organism cannot be altered by
substituting new parts for old, but it can transform itself gradually through natural growth; and finally,

C. An organism exists as an end-in-itself while a machine is, at best, a means to an end which exists outside itself.

The exponents of the biological school maintained that the state possesses all the three characteristics of an organism and, therefore, it should be regarded as organic in nature. Thus, they recognized an intrinsic relation between man and the state. As an organism is the real source of life and energy for its parts, so the state is the spring of good life for its citizens. Some writers even claimed that the state makes an appeal to the rational nature of man, and therefore eulogized the state as a Moral Organism, Super-organism’, and an Organism of Organisms’. Some of them attributed personality to the state and glorified it as a ‘Real Person’ or a ‘Super Person’. As individual organs of an organism, such as, hands, teeth or feet, can have no real interests of their own apart from the interest of the organism itself, so the interests of individuals could not be distinguished from the interest of the state. Thus, the champions of the organic theory claimed that individuals could have any rights within the state but they could never have any rights against the state. True freedom of the individual lies in obedience to the laws of the state.

II LIBERAL-INDIVIDUALIST PERSPECTIVE

Liberal-individualist perspective on the state is based on mechanistic view of the state. It arose in a particular historical setting when several factors contributed to its development. The growth of the physical sciences in seventeenth century Europe tended to transform men’s ideas about society and the state. It was now argued that since nature itself was a machine, governed by universal laws to be discovered by observation and reason, so society and the state should also be understood as mechanisms. Thus, ‘the social order came to be understood as a part of the natural order’ and any interference with the social system was thought to be detrimental to its smooth functioning. This idea of ‘non-interference’ highly suited the interests and aptitudes of the new middle class the merchants and the industrialists who flourished in the climate of a ‘free market’ society. The liberal theory represented the social and economic philosophy of this class.

This perspective on the state was particularly strengthened from two sides: (a) the exponents of ‘social contract’ sought to trace the origin of the state in a way that fitted into liberal mode of thought; and (b) the exponents of modem economics made a strong case for laissez-faire individualism which confirmed liberal-individualist view of the state.

THEORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

The theory of the social contract presents a typical version of origin of the state from the liberal point of view. This theory treats the state as a product of the mutual agreement of men, created with a definite purpose, to serve certain social needs.

The liberal theory originated from the mechanistic concept of the state although some later thinkers, like T.H. Green (1836-82) and H.J. Laski (1893 1950) joined the liberal stream without subscribing to the mechanistic concept. In short, the mechanistic theory treats the state as an artificial contrivance. It postulates deliberate efforts behind the formation of the state. This implies the possibility of two life-patterns; one before the origin of the state, the other after the creation of the state. According to this theory, the state is not a natural institution, but an artificial device or instrument invented by men for
their mutual benefit; it is intended to serve the interests of all individuals or all sections of society. It regards the state as the product of the will of society; hence, it is an expression of ‘common will.

The idea of the creation of the state through a contract is found in a rudimentary form in ancient thought both of the East and the West. Kautilya’s Arthashastra makes a pointed reference to it while some ancient Greek sophists described the state as an outcome of the contract between men. Some traces of the theory are also found in ancient Roman law. But all these references should not be taken to mean that the theory of the social contract has been prevalent from the ancient times. On the contrary, this theory was systematically formulated at a particular point of European history, in order to drop a curtain on the values of the feudal system and to introduce the new values of the capitalist system.

**Exponents of the Theory**

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) are regarded as the main exponents of the theory of the social contract. Of these, Hobbes and Locke are from England while Rousseau belongs to France. This theory held the field in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some later thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), John Rawls (1921-2002) and Robert Nozick (1938-2002) made use of this theory to elaborate their own systems of thought.

Hobbes saw sovereignty of the state as an essential condition of social solidarity.

Hobbes was a tutor to Charles II of England. He sought to justify the absolute power of the sovereign in his famous work Leviathan (1651). He condemned the Civil War of 1642 as he saw in it the forces of disintegration. He sought to establish the absolute sovereignty of the state as an essential condition of social solidarity.

Locke, on the other hand, sought to justify the Glorious Revolution of 1688. He was an ardent advocate of constitutional monarchy. In his Two Treatises of Civil Government (1690), Locke argued that if the monarch ever behaved in a despotic manner, the people had the right to remove him from
authority. Brought up in the tradition of British conservatism, Locke was not the sworn enemy of
monarchy, but he sought to establish it in the consent of the people.

Rousseau had no such particular purpose to serve. Yet he was a brilliant writer whose ideas not only
inspired poets and men of letters but induced the revolutionary upsurge that shook the French polity to
its foundations. He is regarded as he source of inspiration of the great French Revolution (1789).

Outline of the Theory
The social contract theory of the origin of the state implies that there was a time when men lived or
would have lived without any recognized civil law, without the state. This stage of life-pattern of men
is described as the state of nature’. Then the state was created through the voluntary agreement of all
individuals who constitute the state. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have drawn different pictures of the
‘state of nature’, ‘terms of the contract’ and the character of sovereignty which came into existence
as a consequence of the birth of the state. It is important to note here that the whole theory of the
social contract is based on speculation. It seeks to trace the origin of the state through logic, not
through historical or scientific evidence. Locke refers to a historical fact to illustrate the point, but
illustration is no evidence.

The State of Nature
The state of nature denotes how men live or would have lived without the authority of civil law, state
or political control. At this stage, there is no industry, no systematic production. Men live not only
close to nature, they have to depend on the bounty of nature for their survival. Their behaviour is
largely governed by their inner impulses, unrestrained by civil law, although a natural law is supposed
to have existed. Men have no recognized rights, although they enjoy some natural rights’. As all these
conditions are determined by logic or particular lines of argument, not on the basis of any scientific
evidence, they do not lead to any uniform conclusions. Different authors have, therefore, given
different versions of the state of nature, etc.

Hobbes
Hobbes draws a gloomy picture of the state of nature. This is a natural corollary of his concept of
human nature. Hobbes postulates that man is selfish by. Nature; self-interest is the mainspring of
human action. Men are moved to action not by intellect or reason, but by their appetites, desires and
passions. In the absence of law and justice, the state of nature is characterized by a perpetual struggle,
ceaseless conflict and constant warfare. In Hobbes’s own forceful words, the life of man at this stage
is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’; ‘every man is enemy to every man’. In pursuance of his
own pleasure, man wants power over others; but as the physical and mental powers of natural men are
nearly alike, nobody is able to overpower the other. Hence, men stand in natural fear of each other. It
is a state of total insecurity.

In such a state there is no room for industry. ‘Might is right’ is the order of the day. Men are free to
take what they can, and to rob whomever they can. There is no law to prevent oppression or to contain
the Taw of the jungle’. It is a state of perfect anarchy. Hobbes is quite clear that he is not describing a
historical fact, but only trying to demonstrate what would happen if there were no settled government
for any length of time.

Hobbes argues that there can be no morality or consciousness of duty or obligation in the state of
nature, because these are possible only after the establishment of law and government. Natural rights
are, therefore, nothing more than the natural powers of men, used to oppress others. At best, natural liberty is nothing but ‘the liberty each man hath to preserve his own life’. This urge for ‘self-preservation’ is embodied in the law of nature or natural law. This conforms to the rules of prudence and expediency. It is natural law which prompts men to abandon the state of nature and to establish law and government. It consists in the rules of self-preservation, particularly as follows: (a) Everybody should aim at securing peace; (b) Men should be willing, in concert with others, to give up their natural rights; (c) Men should keep their contracts; and finally, (d) Men should show gratitude or return beneficence for beneficence. Thus, the requirements of self-preservation itself created a sense of duty in the minds of men which prompts them to form the state.

**Rousseau**

Rousseau, in his Discourse on Inequality (1755), presents a fascinating picture of the state of nature. He describes natural man as a ‘noble savage’, living a life of idyllic blissfulness and primitive simplicity. He states that men in the state of nature are equal, self-sufficient and contented. But with the rise of civilization inequalities raise their head. With the development of arts and science, private property comes into existence, with the consequent division of labour. This necessitates establishment of a civil society. The state is thus an evil; its formation becomes necessary due to inequalities among men. Here Rousseau seems to anticipate Marx as regards the origin of the state.

However, in his later work The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau takes a modified view of the civil state. He seeks to justify its existence, not as a manifestation of the inequalities in society but as an instrument for the protection of liberty. In his opening sentence of The Social Contract, Rousseau strikes a different note: ‘Man is born free; however he is everywhere in chains.’ He seems to make the point that the civil state has deprived man of his natural liberty. But he immediately proceeds to ‘ignore this question’ and attempt a justification of this change. He seeks justification of authority in the natural agreement among men. Thus, he observes: Since no man has a natural authority over other men, and since might never makes right, it follows that agreements are the basis for all legitimate authority among men. When men abandon the state of nature to enter into civil society through the social contract, their loss is handsomely compensated. As Rousseau asserts, what man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and unlimited right to all which attracts him and which he can obtain; what he gains is civil liberty and the property of what he possesses.

**Terms of the Contract**

Corresponding to their notions of the state of nature, natural law and natural rights, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have given different interpretations of the terms of the social contract.

**Hobbes**

Hobbes postulates a single contract by which men abandon the state of nature and establish society and state together. Through this historical fiction he tries to convey a philosophical truth that the government does not rest on sheer force; it rests on the will of the people.

The social contract, according to Hobbes, is concluded among the people themselves who emerge from the state of nature. The sovereign is not a party to the contract. According to Hobbes’s logic, the sovereign did not exist before the conclusion of the contract he comes into existence as a result of this contract, hence he cannot be a party to the contract. It is a contract of each with all and of all with each, to set up a sovereign authority. By this contract every man gave up his natural rights and powers to a ‘common power’ who would ‘keep them is awe’ and give them security. Men entered into a social contract to set up a ruler, as if
every man should say to every man: authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up the right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.

Thus, the social contract brings a sovereign into existence who enjoys supreme and absolute authority. All men in society, apart from the sovereign himself, become his subjects. All natural rights of men are surrendered to the sovereign once and for all. The powers conferred on him cannot be withdrawn, because if men chose to revive their natural rights, they would revert into the state of nature, characterized by anarchy and total insecurity. Hobbes, therefore, does not admit people’s right to revolt or revolution. On this basis, he condemned the civil war of 1642.

Since, according to Hobbes, the state and society come into existence together through a single contract, repudiation of the contract would result not only in an overthrow of the government but a disintegration of society itself. That is why Hobbes treats sovereignty as absolute, indivisible and inalienable. He creates unlimited political obligation.

Hobbes’s theory of the social contract would appear flawless only if a perfect and infallible person or assembly could be found and established as sovereign. But how can imperfect mortals justify the exercise of such universal and absolute authority in the real world? Hobbes cleverly evades this fundamental question.

**Rousseau**

Rousseau, like Hobbes, postulates a single contract, and thereby creates absolute, indivisible and inalienable sovereignty. But Rousseau distinguishes himself as an exponent of popular sovereignty. Sovereignty, according to Rousseau, is not vested in a ruler apart from society itself as Hobbes had assumed; instead, it is vested in the people themselves. When people enter into a social contract, they relinquish their natural rights in their individual capacity; they surrender these rights to their collective whole. Thus, what they lose in their individual capacity, they get back in their corporate capacity, in improved form. No one is a loser in the bargain. Everybody is a gainer, because when any one is attacked, society as a whole comes to his rescue. Sovereignty is indivisible, yet it is shared by each member of the civil society. In Rousseau’s own words: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and in our corporate capacity we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.

The creation of popular sovereignty by vesting it in the general will is a unique contribution of Rousseau which laid the foundations of modern democracy. As Robert M. Maclver (The Modern State; 1926) has noted:

The secret of Rousseau’s doctrine is found in the substitution for a sovereign of the sovereign. His sovereign is the,‘general will’, and he is perfectly ready to apply to it all the sweeping attributes which Hobbes delivers to his ‘one man or assembly of men.’ It too is one and indivisible, inerrant, indestructible, omnipotent.

Rousseau, of course, maintains that liberty in the state of nature is a great boon. But in due course of time, when population increases and the treasures of nature start depleting, it is no longer possible for men to enjoy natural liberty as before. In other words, natural liberty is now threatened because of changed circumstances. When the forces of nature no longer sustain men, they have to consolidate their own force to save themselves. They, therefore, create a civil society to maintain their freedom.
As Maclver has elucidated: The precarious liberty of the state of nature is well lost for the assured and enlarged liberty of the social order. The idea that law was not merely consistent with liberty, not merely a possible guardian of it, but the very form of its realization, was of profound importance for the true interpretation of the state. It gave a new and most significant setting to the problem of political obligation. For Rousseau that problem solves itself when government is vested in the true sovereign, the general will. When that is attained, then ‘each, coalescing with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before’.

In other words, when man acts in the state against his own will under the direction of the general will, he is not losing his freedom. In fact, the constraint of the general will is instrumental for securing his larger and ultimate freedom, which reconciles freedom of each with freedom of all. Thus Rousseau, in his typical style, postulates a condition when ‘man can be forced to be free.’

The concept of the general will is the heart of Rousseau’s doctrine, which must be distinguished from other types of human will. As Patrick Riley has elucidated: Rousseau himself insists that ‘the general will is always right’, that it is ‘the will that one has as a citizen’ when one thinks of the common good and not of one’s own particular will as a private person. Subsequent writers have used the distinction between actual will and real will in order to explicate Rousseau’s distinction between particular will and general will. The existence of these two types of will is a source of conflict within the mind of man. Actual will is motivated by his immediate, selfish interest. Real will is motivated by his ultimate, collective interest. Actual will is reflected in his ordinary ‘self’; real will is reflected in his ‘better self. Actual will prompts him towards gratification of his desires; real will induces him to acts of reason. Actual will is transient, unstable and inconsistent; it changes from moment to moment. Real will is stable, constant, consistent and determinate. Man’s freedom consists in overcoming his actual will and following the direction of the real will. Real will expresses his true freedom. It subordinates man’s self-interest to the interests of the community common interest or common good which is shared by each and all.

But individual by himself is imperfect. At times he may not be able to discriminate between his actual and real will. This dilemma is resolved by the transition from the ‘particular’ to the ‘general’ will. The general will harmonizes the interests of each with those of all. It is not a ‘compromise’ or the lowest common factor, but an expression of the highest in every man. It is the spirit of citizenship in its concrete shape. Man’s particular will may create confusion; but the general will always shows him the right way.

In this line of argument, Rousseau travels much ahead of his original position. He starts with describing civil society as an expression of superior will ‘but ends with treating it as an expression of superior reason’. He starts with the mechanistic view of the state but ends with the organic view of the state. He starts as an ardent liberal but ends as an ardent idealist. Rousseau was the most brilliant writer of his time but he is also the most confusing. Liberals and idealists adore him alike; they also condemn him alike.

THEORY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE INDIVIDUALISM

Theory of laissez-faire individualism was developed by classical liberalism which started taking shape in the eighteenth century and was systematically formulated in the nineteenth century. It placed individual at the centre of its philosophy. It sought to argue that individual is endowed with the faculty of ‘reason’ which enables him to find what is most conducive to his interests. Classical
liberalism, therefore, advocated individual’s right to freedom of trade, freedom of contract, freedom to bargain and freedom of enterprise. It postulated private property as the condition of progress, because property was viewed as a product of individual’s labour, ingenuity and enterprise. Since all freedoms of the individual ensued from the element of reason’, they were regarded valuable for society. The profit motive of the individuals and their open competition were, therefore, regarded as functional’ and, hence, conducive to social progress. The function of the government was to protect individual’s freedom or liberty, to enforce contracts, to guarantee peaceful employment of property and to provide the external conditions of law and order.

With its emphasis on individual as the centre of importance, classical liberalism' advocated the policy of laissez-faire, a French term which means ‘leave alone’. It signified non-intervention by the state in the economic activities of individuals. This phrase was in common usage in mercantile and industrial circles in nineteenth century England, and in other parts of the world, to express a belief in the freedom of industry and economic activity from state interference. Laissez-faire individualism denotes an aspect of liberal political theory which regards property rights of the individual as a necessary condition of liberty, and seeks to set definite and circumscribed limits on the regulatory powers vested in the government over social and economic processes. This theory dubs the state a ‘necessary evil’: it is evil because it imposes regulations and restricts the freedom of the individual, yet it is necessary because, without its regulation, the freedom of the individual cannot be safeguarded.

Exponents of the Theory
The exponents of laissez-faire individualism include Adam Smith (1723-90), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), James Mill (1773-1836) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), British economists and political thinkers. Besides, John Stuart Mill (1806-73), the famous English economist and political thinker, made an important contribution to the theory of laissez-faire individualism, but he sought to transform it from negative liberalism into positive liberalism, and thereby made a unique contribution to liberal theory.

Adam Smith
Adam Smith was a Scotsman. He is regarded as the father of the science of economics. His famous work Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), became the great source of the ideas and policies concerning laissez-faire individualism.

Concept of Economic Man
Smith asserted that everyone has a natural propensity to trade. If given a tree rein, this tendency would stimulate economic activity, resulting in an increase in the production of goods. The profit motive is a natural instinct which inspires every trader in his activity. The selfish motive of the enterpriser is, nevertheless, conducive to promotion of the general good. It harmonizes with national prosperity, thereby benefiting all government, business and labour.

Nineteenth century critics of orthodox economic theory have used the term economic man to deprecate this view of human nature. They have accused Adam Smith and other classical economists of having grossly distorted the true nature of man by assuming that, in a capitalist system, virtually all economic activity must be motivated by purely selfish considerations, and thus giving prominence to baser motives at the expense of the higher values of life.
Adam Smith wrote that man is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.

The classical economists, including Adam Smith, no doubt stressed on the importance of self-interest in the field of economic behaviour. But Adam Smith never gave a blanket endorsement to the idea of beneficence of self-interest. Yet he was convinced that self interest frequently played an essentially beneficent role in economic affairs, for in the pursuit of his own interests, man on occasion was led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. In other words, working within the framework of competition, the selfish individual would unwittingly promote the welfare of society despite his exclusive concern with furthering his own interests. It is significant that Smith’s formulation in this respect came to occupy a central place in orthodox economic theory, and was soon refined through the instrumentality of hedonistic psychology which regarded considerations of pleasure and pain as the prime movers of human behaviour. Many prominent economists of the nineteenth century, including the Utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and his followers accepted this view of man. They regarded man as a highly rational creature who persistently endeavoured by means of the hedonistic calculus, to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.

Concept of Natural Liberty
In accordance with his concept of man, Adam Smith postulated a system of natural liberty implying perfect freedom of commerce and industry in order to promote national prosperity. He emphasized the key role of the businessman in the economic life of a nation. He argued that the businessman knows his own interests far better than any government can tell him. In order to enable the businessman to pursue his interests most effectively, which would automatically contribute to national prosperity, the only wise policy for a government to follow is laissez-faire. Thus, in his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith defined the system of natural liberty as follows:
Everyman, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from... the duty of superintending the industry of the private people, and of directing it toward the employments most suitable to the interest of the society.

**Functions of Government**

According to this system of natural liberty, the role of government is confined to three duties of great importance: (a) the defence of the nation against foreign aggression; (b) the protection of every member of society, as far as possible, from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, i.e. establishing an exact administration of justice; and (c) the erection and maintenance of public works and running certain public institutions which could not be undertaken by an individual or a small number of individuals because the profit accruing from their maintenance would never repay the expenditure involved.

Adam Smith, therefore, advocated the abolition of restrictions imposed on commerce and industry by the government in pursuance of the policy of mercantilism. Likewise, he urged that all producers should be free to compete in a free market: to sell their goods, their services and their labour at prices determined by competition. In this ‘obvious and simple system of natural liberty’ there would exist the freedom of enterprise, the freedom of trade between nations, the freedom of contract between buyer and seller as well as between employer and worker.

**Jeremy Bentham**

Bentham made an important contribution to the theory of laissez-faire individualism as the great exponent of Utilitarianism. This has been described as the revival of the classical hedonism of Epicurus the theory that man’s behaviour should be governed by the advancement of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. This theory was adapted by Bentham to prove its relevance to the conditions of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe.

**Concept of Utility**

Bentham and his followers argued that the concepts of absolute rights, absolute sovereignty and absolute justice had no relevance to the realities of social life. There was only one absolute standard of regulation of human affairs, viz. that of absolute expediency. Political institutions and public policies should, therefore, not be rated as good or bad in relation to some visionary and arbitrary concepts of human rights and obligations; they should be judged by their fruits. These thinkers held that the satisfaction of individual should furnish the yardstick of utility, and when a decision is to be taken for the whole society, the controlling principle should be the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Bentham interpreted happiness by the crude word pleasure. Thus he postulated: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. Taking it to be an incontrovertible fact of human psychology, Bentham and his illustrious follower, James Mill, held that men always desire only pleasure and are averse only to pain. If they desire any other thing, it is only because they have learnt by experience that these things bring pleasure and avert pain. They defined the utility of an action as its tendency to cause pleasure and to avert pain. Accordingly, they defined right action as the one most likely to give the greatest balance of pleasure over pain to the persons liable to be affected by it. Thus, Bentham postulated that pleasure and pain were susceptible
to measurement. He repudiated any qualitative difference between different kinds of pleasure, and emphasized their quantitative differences. This quantitative bias is reflected in the famous saying: Quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry. Bentham even laid down certain criteria for measuring pleasure and pain, known as the ‘hedonistic calculus’ or ‘felicific calculus’. These criteria included:

1. intensity (how strong is its feeling?);
2. duration (how long it lasts?);
3. certainty (how certain we feel to have it?);
4. proximity or propinquity (how near it is to us, i.e. how early we can have it?);
5. fecundity (does it also produce other types of pleasure?);
6. purity (no pain is mixed with it); and
7. extent (how far it extends to others?).

Of these the first six criteria are meant to judge the utility of a thing or action for the individual while the seventh criterion (extent) is relevant to judging public policy as expressed in the principle of ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number.’

Principles of Legislation
Bentham rejected the ideology of natural rights and the social contract, yet he subscribed to the sovereignty of ‘reason’ and proceeded to find a formula for the application of reason to human affairs which should be free from the pitfalls of metaphysical abstraction. He repudiated the theory of the general will as something transcending the will of the individual, and defined the interest of the community as the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. Thus, he accorded a central place to the individual on questions relating to public policy or legislation. He defined the interest of the individual as something which tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures, or to diminish the sum total of his pains. The interest of the community could likewise be discovered by adding the interests of all individuals who composed it. Pleasure or happiness should not be taken as a shadowy attribute of some super-person called a social organism, but must find actual expression in the lives and in the experience of definite individuals. With this principle as the guiding star, the legislator is required but to calculate the pleasurable or painful consequences of an action, actual or proposed, and he would know whether it was right or wrong, sound or unsound. Bentham postulated this principle as the sole criterion of determining the greatest happiness of the greatest number as a guide to all public policy and legislation.

Accordingly, Bentham argued that the business of government is to promote the happiness of society by a system of punishments and rewards. It had no other justification for existence. A good government is the one that promotes the happiness of its subjects. A government which employs ineffectual means in this sphere, loses its title to authority.

Bentham insisted that in calculating pleasure and pain for the purpose of determining public policy, each individual should be treated as one unit and that none should be given special consideration: each to count as one, and no one for more than one’. Thus he asserted the necessity of treating all men as equals. He did not base his doctrine of equality on ‘natural law’. Instead, he proceeded on his original assumption: men were born to be happy that is the plain dictate of experience. Since freedom is essential to happiness, men are entitled to freedom. But equal freedom of each individual postulates ‘equality’; therefore, man’s liberty must be limited and conditioned by the ultimate test of general welfare. Bentham showed that ‘equality’ was a political good, because it was the only practical way
of dealing with large numbers of people. By placing equal importance on the happiness of all individuals, Bentham sought to curb the legislator’s tendency of ignoring the happiness of the people in pursuance of their own moral standards or in promoting the happiness of their choice.

Functions of Government

Bentham, of course, treated the state as an instrument devised by man for the promotion of the happiness of the community, yet he did not contemplate any wide scope of state activity. Believing that men are moved to act solely by the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and that each individual is the best judge of his own interests, Bentham and his followers came to the conclusion that the main function of the state is legislation, and that the chief objective of legislation is to remove all institutional restrictions on the free actions of individuals. Individual himself is capable of exercising moral judgment; the state cannot promote character among the people. The state should restrict its sphere of activity to restraining individuals from indulging in activities which affect the general happiness adversely. Punishment of offenders is another main function of the state. The state should not interfere in the activities of law-abiding citizens who are the best judges of right and wrong, moral and immoral. In this way, Bentham also upheld the doctrine of laissez-faire individualism.

III WELFARE STATE PERSPECTIVE

Liberal theory which stood for negative liberalism in its early phase, was transformed into positive liberalism in its later phase. Positive liberalism promoted the idea of welfare state, as it pleaded for positive role of the state in securing welfare of its citizens, particularly of their vulnerable sections.

Negative liberalism had sought to establish free-market society which promoted capitalism. The success of capitalism in the nineteenth century demonstrated that the free-market society created large inequalities among human beings and promoted oppression of the vulnerable sections workers, peasants, consumers, etc. With the enormous growth of the labour force in industrial cities, freedom of contract in practice meant freedom for factory-owners to hire and fire their workers to maximize their profits with the consequent insecurity and suffering of the workers. Freedom of trade was not restricted to commodities labour was also treated as a commodity. The result was inhumane conditions for the workers, child labour, slum housing, and free sale of poisoned meat, bad gin and other things injurious to health. When freedom of enterprise was interpreted as the total absence of regulation on business and industry, it brought disastrous consequences for the bulk of society, not the greatest happiness of the greatest number held so dear by the classical economists.

Classical liberals had sought to justify a free-market society on the basis of the equality of individuals. Bentham had argued that in aggregating individual utilities, each individual was to count as one. He had sought to justify the liberal state as the state most calculated to maximize utilities security of life, freedom of individual movement, security of property, etc. He had also postulated that a free-market society enabled each individual to maximize his own utility, and therefore brought everyone into productive relations which would thus maximize the aggregate utility of society. But in this process he was caught in a dilemma to reconcile theoretical equality with practical inequality. Bentham tried to escape from this dilemma by introducing another element the criterion of productivity and decided the case in favour of inequality.

However, subsequent liberal thinkers could not escape from this dilemma so easily. The working class was not only increasing in size, its condition was also deteriorating. Its voice could not be suppressed.
any longer. The socialists were incessantly pressing for a solution of the problems of the working class. The liberals were also forced to realize that their insistence on freedom and human rights had created conditions of oppression in society. They must resolve the contradictions of the liberal theory as evidenced by the oppressive character of the capitalist system otherwise the whole edifice would tumble down. As a result, the tenets of the liberal theory were revised toward the last quarter of the nineteenth century and this process of revision went on during the twentieth century.

John Stuart Mill
J.S. Mill is the most brilliant of nineteenth-century liberal thinkers. He played an important role in drawing a distinction between the political and economic spheres, and in working out the implications of liberal theory in these spheres. Thus, while in the political sphere he proved himself to be a strong supporter of constitutional and representative government, in the economic sphere he showed socialist leanings and laid the foundations of the welfare state. In this way, Mill gave a positive direction to liberal theory.

Revision of Utilitarianism
Mill was brought up in the Utilitarian tradition of Bentham, and was the most ardent champion of individualism. As C.E.M. Joad, in his Introduction to Modern Political Theory (1924), has elucidated:

Mill, in common with other Utilitarian thinkers... insists on regarding every political question in terms of the happiness or unhappiness of human beings, and not... in terms of an abstraction such as the General Will or the personality of the State. While conceding, therefore, the contention of the Absolutists that since the State is a natural growth or organism, it is only in the State that the individual can enjoy the fullest happiness of which his nature is capable, he goes on to point out that this admission does not mean that the State does not exist for the happiness of individuals. He then proceeds to draw the conclusion that it is the business of Government actively to promote the happiness of individuals, and that, if it fails in this respect, it must give way to some other form of social organization that succeeds.

Mill agreed with Bentham in identifying happiness with pleasure and unhappiness with pain. But he disagreed with Bentham’s view that happiness could be measured by quantitative differences of pleasures, not by qualitative differences. Mill maintained that some pleasures were qualitatively superior to others.

Robert M. Maclver
R.M. Maclver is another twentieth century exponent of positive liberalism. With a strong sociological background, Maclver traces the evolution of the state from primitive social structures to its fuller development as a modern democratic state.

As regards the origin and nature of the state, Maclver rejects the social contract theory formulated by the early exponents of the liberal theory. He tends to agree with T.H. Green who made a careful distinction between the sphere of law and that of morality, although Maclver differs from Green in making all rights, ethical as well as political, depend on social recognition. However, he approves of Green’s distinction between the state and society. Thus, in his The Modern State (1926), Maclver observes: Green made a careful distinction between the sphere of law and that of morality... Political obligations can and should be enforced, whereas moral duties cannot: unless the latter express the free will of a moral being they lose their character. Political law therefore exists simply for the removal of obstacles in the way of free moral activity within society. It creates the order within
which that freedom can exist. Hence the state has a limited sphere and cannot be identified with the whole activity of society.

It is society which meets all the needs of human personality. Men seek to serve their varied interests through several associations. The state is only one of such associations.

A number of associations have existed in society even before the formation of the state. Many activities of the present-day associations do not fall within the sphere of state-regulation. The state is not superior to all other associations in the moral sense, although it may claim superior authority as an instrument of law. Law itself exists above the state, but it is declared and enforced by the state. In Maclver’s own words: The government has power as the guardian of the constitution, as the executor of law, not in its own right. The state does not create law of its own will; law exists prior to the state; the state grasps it and gives it a definite shape. But since law is bound to act through external sanction, the state should refrain from touching those activities of the associations which are not to be judged by the external conduct of men, but by the spirit behind their conduct. Thus, according to Maclver, “the whole creative side of human thought and endeavour, including religion and morality in its proper sense, are outside the sphere of the state. Its place is determined by the fact that law is an instrument of limited range. The state should only, if it is true to its own nature, enforce those acts the doing of which, from whatever motive, is necessary for the good life within society.

Maclver, therefore, holds that the state does not regulate the internal affairs of other human associations. It cannot determine their purpose, nor their methods for the most part. The state comes into the picture only when the interests of one group encroach upon another. The state acts only in order to resolve the conflicting claims of different social groups. The state is not entitled to impose its own will on any human association for the protection of a common interest. It can only harmonize different social interests originally expressed through human associations. In his Web of Government (1965) Maclver argues that the state should not undertake regulation of those organizations which are formed to serve the emotional and cultural interests of men, but those serving economic interests of different groups cannot be left to make mutual adjustment, even if there is no visible conflict between them. Thus, the relations between employer and employee, trader and consumer, etc. essentially come within the purview of state regulation, whereas religious, artistic and cultural activities must remain beyond the jurisdiction of the state.

Maclver has sought to base the authority of the state on the functions it performs. The state is subservient to society; it derives its authority from society for which it fulfils certain conditions. The state neither serves all interests of men in society, nor does it command their undivided loyalty. The sphere of the state is not coextensive with that of society. Society is an all-comprehensive institution which serves all the interests of individuals material, intellectual, emotional, moral, spiritual, etc. through its network of associations. The state is only one of such associations, meant to serve definite interests its authority is limited like its obligations. The powers and prerogatives of the state are dependent on the services rendered by it. Maclver has, therefore, advanced the theory of the ‘service state’. He tends to keep its authority within definite limits. As he observes in The Modern State (1926):

The state... commands only because it serves; it owns only because it owes. It creates rights not as the lordly dispenser of gifts, but as the agent of society for the creation of rights. The servant is not greater than his master. As other rights are relative to function and are recognized as limited by it, so too the rights of the state should be. It has the function of guaranteeing rights.
The society or community thrives on the unity or solidarity of men. This unity is derived from the feeling and experience of the common interest. It is upheld by the common ways which serve them all. When the ‘community of interests’ is stronger than the ‘division’ or clash of interests, social solidarity and social organizations are highly developed. Perfection of the social organization is reflected in the perfection of the state. Accordingly, the state plays a crucial role in the social life of men. As Maclver himself points out:

All the business of life is rendered possible by its aid, and all who live along it must contribute to its upkeep. It is the basis of all social communications. Therefore, whatever else a man may be, he must be a member, or at least a subject, of the state.

The state is a symbol of the great achievement of civilization. It can prove to be an effective organ of attaining social unity and solidarity, and this particular function distinguishes it from all other human associations. In the words of Maclver, although the state is but one among the great associations, but its own peculiar function is no other than this, of giving a form of unity to the whole system of social relationships. It can achieve this end, as successfully as other associations achieve their ends, without arrogating to itself again that omnicompetence which it has vainly sought to establish.

Maclver is convinced that only a democratic state can perform the unifying function most effectively. He argues that the modern democratic state has distinguished itself from its earlier forms. Thus he observes:

The state can act... as a unifying agent, but only in so far as it has itself undergone evolution towards democracy. For this reason we regard democracy as the form of the state proper, for only under democratic conditions can it achieve this proper function, this function, in other words, which it and it alone is capable of performing.

IV CLASS PERSPECTIVE

Class perspective on the state is associated with Marxism. It is different from the mechanistic theory as well as from the organic theory. It treats the state neither as a natural institution nor as an ethical institution as the organic theory has held. It, of course, treats the state as an artificial device. But unlike the mechanistic theory, it treats the state neither as a manifestation of the will of the people, nor as an instrument of reconciliation of conflicting interests.

According to the class theory, the state comes into existence when society is divided into two antagonistic classes, one owning the means of social production and the other being constrained to live on its labour. In other words, it is the emergence of private property’ that divides society into two conflicting classes. Those owning the means of production acquire the power to dominate the other class not only in the economic sphere but in all spheres of life.

The State as an Instrument of the Dominant Class

With the emergence of ‘private property’, society is divided into ‘dominant’ and ‘dependent’ classes. The dominant class, in order to maintain its stronghold on economic power, invents a new form of power political power. The state is the embodiment of political power. It is, therefore, essentially subservient to economic power. Thus, according to the class theory, the state neither originates in the will of the people, nor does it stand for the benefit of all society, but is an instrument devised by a
dominant class for its own benefit. It is imposed on society from above to serve the interests of a particular class. The state has not existed from eternity. It came into existence at a particular stage of historical development. It is a product of the conscious effort of the dominant class which first acquires the means of production and thereafter political power. The state is, therefore, by no means a natural institution as the organic theory has maintained.

The State as an Instrument of Class Exploitation
The dominant class uses the machinery of the state to serve its own interests which involve the exploitation of the dependent class. The state is, therefore, an instrument of oppression and exploitation, an embodiment of injustice. It does not rest on moral foundations as the organic theory believes. It is not even an instrument of harmonizing the interests of various individuals or groups as the mechanistic theory claims. Instead of being a means of conflict-resolution, the state, according to the class theory, is a device for the suppression of class conflict. It maintains order in society not because it is able to secure the willing obedience of its subjects, but because it uses its coercive power to secure compliance from the dependent class. The state also uses its ‘ideological power’ to create an illusion of ‘consent’ of the governed as also to offer moral justification for its existence.

V COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
Communitarian perspective on the state indicates a recent mode of thought. It marks a departure from the philosophy of liberalism because it places the relation between individual and society in a new perspective. It is based on the philosophy of communitarianism which repudiates the picture of the ‘self implied in the liberal theory. Liberal theory implied an ‘unencumbered self detached from pre-existing social forms, as exemplified by the concept of ‘possessive individualism. The term possessive individualism’ was coined by C.B. Macpherson in his notable work The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (1962) to describe the main assumption underlying modern liberal theory. According to this view, individual is the sole proprietor of his own person or capacities for which he owes nothing to society’. Such a view denies his commitment to other individuals, traditions, practices and conceptions of the good. It holds that self is prior to its ends. It is fully competent to choose its ends as well as its roles and dispositions.

In contrast to this ‘atomistic’ view of individual, communitarianism advances the concept of situated self, as constituted by his social roles, practices and situations. In other words, communitarianism holds that an agent’s identity is constituted by specific commitments to his social situation. While liberalism insists on ‘liberty’ of individual, his interests and rights, communitarianism focuses on his social identity and upholds acceptance of authority’ because it expresses our common will or reflects our common identity, our shared values and beliefs. It is significant to note that liberalism had won liberty of the individual, but atomistic view of society field by liberalism led to the erosion of the sense of responsibility and the moral standards attached thereto. Communitarianism seeks to restore that sense of responsibility and reconstruct moral standards on that basis.

VI POST-COLONIAL PERSPECTIVE
Post-colonial perspective on the state does not embody any new theory of the state. Nevertheless it enables us to understand some new aspects of state-system which are not covered by the conventional theories. In short, post-colonial perspective denotes an attempt to analyse the problems of the newly independent nations, particularly against the background of their relations with colonial and neo-colonial powers.
Post-colonial perspective on the state must be based on the experience of post-colonial societies themselves, i.e. the societies who gained their independence from colonial domination recently (from the mid of the twentieth century onwards) and who aspire to develop themselves into strong nations. Why they remained underdeveloped? Why they were subjugated by Western nations? Why they are still unable to develop themselves? How can they solve their problems?

An analysis of the history of colonialism, the impact of colonial domination, the forces which promoted national movements and the consequences of the process of decolonization would throw light on the general pattern of domination which is crucial to an understanding of state-system. It shows, at the outset, that West European countries who had achieved national consolidation by the seventeenth century set out to achieve their modernization through industrialization and urbanization as they already had the benefit of scientific discoveries and inventions. They needed cheap raw materials, cheap labour and vast areas of operation. They found countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America as their easy prey. These countries were rich in natural resources and labour force but they had little advantage of modern education or national solidarity. Some of these countries had great civilizations in ancient times which had been shattered during the medieval age. For instance, India and Egypt were known for their magnificent past, but they hardly had the potential of national consolidation or their modernization in the mid of the eighteenth century. Thus a large part of Africa, Asia and Latin America fell prey to colonial domination.

VII GANDHIAN PERSPECTIVE

Gandhian perspective on the state is based on the social thought of Mahatma Gandhi (M.K. Gandhi) (1869-1948). Gandhi was an Indian moral philosopher whose thought is scattered in a large number of notes and pamphlets as well as his Autobiography {My Experiments With Truth; 1929). He did not produce any treatise containing a systematic exposition of his thought. His perspective on the state will have to be gleaned from his relevant observations on this subject.

Nature of the State

Gandhi was a champion of non-violence or ahimsa which deprecates all types of coercion. He believed that state was a manifestation of power and law which were based on coercion. State is inclined to impose its own will on individuals with the help of an elaborate machinery of police force, law-courts, prisons and military power. It suppresses an individual’s individuality as it tries to cast all individuals into a uniform mould. It destroys his sense of self-reliance and stunts his personality. It deprives him of his freedom and obstructs the progress of human society.

Gandhi observed that modern state was more powerful than ancient and medieval states as it was more organized and more centralized. Power of the state was concentrated in the hands of the few who did not hesitate to misuse it. In Gandhi’s view, individual is endowed with soul, but state is a soulless machine. State’s acts are devoid of human sensitivity. State goes by rules and regulations. Those who enforce these rules do not feel any moral responsibility.

Indeed Gandhi condemned political power on moral ground, and not on historical or economic grounds. He was convinced that if non-violence or ahimsa could be adopted as a universal principle of human behaviour, political power as well as state would become redundant. The result would be an enlightened anarchy’. So Gandhi wrote in Young India (1931):

To me political power is not an end but one of the means of enabling people to better their condition in every department of life through national representatives. If national life becomes so perfect as to
become self-regulated, no representation becomes necessary. There is then a state of enlightened anarchy. In such a State everyone is his own ruler. He rules himself in such a manner that he is never a hindrance to his neighbour. In the ideal State, therefore, there is no political power because there is no State. But the ideal is never fully realized in life. Hence the classical statement of Thoreau that that government is best which governs the least.

In this respect Gandhi was a follower of Leo Tolstoy (1828-1920) who was a philosophical anarchist or pacific anarchist. Tolstoy was inspired by his faith in Christianity; Gandhi found the basis of this philosophy through his faith in Hinduism (Sanatana Dharma), although he taught equal respect for all religions. Both Tolstoy and Gandhi accorded precedence to spiritual bliss over material satisfaction. Both attacked private property as it enabled the few to lead a luxurious life by exploiting the labour of large numbers. Gandhi did not agree with other anarchists, like P.J. Proudhon (1809-65), Mikhail Bakunin (1814-76) and Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921) who regarded religion as a hindrance to human development.

**Concept of Swaraj**


Gandhi argued that Swaraj did not simply mean political independence from the foreign rule; it also implied the idea of cultural and moral independence. If a country is politically independent but culturally dependent on others for choosing its course of action, it would be devoid of Swaraj. Swaraj does not close the doors of learning from others, but it requires confidence in one’s own potential and decisions. Gandhi thought of Swaraj as a system in which all people will have a natural affinity with their country and they will readily collaborate in the task of nation-building. Swaraj or self-government rules out people’s dependence on government. This applies even to their own government. Thus Gandhi wrote in *Young India* (1925): Self-government means, continuous effort to be independent of government control, whether it is foreign government or whether it is national. Swaraj government will be a sorry affair if people look up to it for the regulation of every detail of life.

Gandhi’s concept of Swaraj also exemplifies his vision of a true democracy. Under this system, people will not merely have the right to elect their representatives, but they will become capable of checking any abuse of authority. As Gandhi wrote in *Young India* (1925): Real Swaraj will come not by the acquisition of authority by a few but by the acquisition of the capacity by all to resist authority when it is abused. In other words, Swaraj is to be obtained by educating the masses to a sense of their capacity to regulate and control authority.

For Gandhi, the idea of Swaraj was not confined to the political goal of securing independence from foreign yoke. It also implied moral regeneration of the individual himself the process of self-control’, self-discipline’ and ‘self-purification’ which must continue even after the independence. As Gandhi himself observed: I am not interested in freeing India merely from the English yoke. I am bent upon freeing India from any yoke whatsoever. I have no desire to exchange ‘king log for king stork’. Hence for me the movement of Swaraj is a movement of self-purification.
CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP

The term ‘citizenship’ is derived from the Latin word ‘civis’ and its Greek equivalent ‘polites’, which means member of the polis or city. Historically, the idea of citizenship was linked with the rise of democracy and modern nation-states in Europe, particularly in the Western European societies.

The manner in which citizenship is understood today as system of equal rights, as opposed to privileges ascribed by conditions of birth, took roots in the French Revolution (1789). With the development of capitalism and liberalism, the idea of the citizen as an individual bearing rights irrespective of his or her class, race, gender, ethnicity, etc., became further entrenched.

More often than not, citizenship is seen in terms of a legal/formal status – having a specific nationality and deriving from this status, entitlements and claims, right guaranteed by the constitution, as well as specific duties and responsibilities which the constitution may lay down. The idea of citizenship, however, goes beyond the legal-formal framework to denote substantive membership in the political community.

The commonly accepted definition of citizenship by T.H. Marshall in *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950) as ‘full and equal membership in a political community’ holds the promise of equality and integration within the political community. While citizenship may be defined with an ideal condition of equality, it may actually remain elusive and fettered, as societies are always marked by hierarchies of class, caste, sex, race, and religion rather than equality of status and belonging.
T.H. Marshall, in his influential account of the growth of citizenship in England, states that the concept developed in a peculiar relationship of conflict and collusion with capitalism. Marshall’s widely accepted definition of citizens as ‘free and equal members of a political community’ comes primarily from the study of citizenship as a process of expanding equality against the inequality of social class, the latter being an integral element of capitalist society.

In *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950), Marshall distinguishes three strands or bundles of rights constituting citizenship, viz., civil, political and social. Civil rights, defined by Marshall as ‘rights necessary for individual freedom’, include freedoms of speech, movement, conscience, the rights to equality before law, and the right to own property. These were ‘negative’ rights in the sense that they limited or checked the exercise of government power. Political rights, viz., the right to vote, the right to contest elections and the right to hold public office, provided the individual with the opportunity to participate in political life. The provision of political rights required the development of universal suffrage, political equality, and democratic government. Social rights, argued Marshall, guaranteed the individual a minimum social status and provided the basis for the exercise of both civil and political rights. These were ‘positive’ rights ‘to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society’. These standards of life and the social heritage of society are realized through active intervention by the state in the form of social services (the welfare state) and the educational system. Each of these three stands has, he suggests, a distinct history confined to a particular century—civil to the 18th, political to the 19th, and social to the 20th—and corresponds with the development of specific state structures—the judiciary, parliamentary institutions of governance, and the educational system and the welfare state, respectively.

Marshall was of the view that there was a permanent tension or contradiction between the principles of citizenship and the operation of the capitalist market. Capitalism inevitably involves inequalities between social classes, while citizenship involves some redistribution of resources, because of rights, which are shared equally by all. Eminent sociologist Talcott Parsons argues that the growth of citizenship is a measure of the modernization of society because it is based on the values of egalitarianism and universalism.

**Marxist Critique of Bourgeois Citizenship**

For Marx, the claims of liberal citizenship to equality and freedom were incompatible with capitalism. The explanation for this incompatibility has been sought in Marx’s interpretation of the modern state as a bourgeois state, as a manifestation and guardian of bourgeois interests, incapable of delivering the promises of equal citizenship. ‘Equal right’ in a capitalist society is a bourgeois right consisting only in the application of an equal/uniform standard. This works out in effect as ‘a right of inequality in its content’, since with the application of an equal standard, people’s (unequal) location in a hierarchized society, their needs, social contexts, relationships, etc., are ignored. In other words, equality before law and universal adult suffrage are aspects of formal equality. Marxist scholars argued that unless there is substantive equality in the form of socio-economic equality, legal equality and political equality would remain illusory (not real).

**Feminism and Citizenship**

The idea of ‘general’ and ‘uniform’ citizenship has been criticized by Marxists for overlooking the inequalities that exist in real life. Feminists have shown how the idea of citizenship
has been especially inimical to women. Feminists of all strands have criticized the dominant conceptions of citizenship on two counts. They argue that citizenship is gender-blind. By focusing on uniform and equal application, it fails to take cognizance of the fact that modern societies are steeped in patriarchal traditions, which make for male domination and privileges. Equality in such conditions remains a facade and the inequality of women is sustained by policies that work within the framework of formal equality.

Feminists have taken different routes to overcome their exclusion from the political community. One strand of feminists has focused on political participation, viewing citizenship as an aspect of public/political activity and as embodying the transformative potential of democracy. They have argued for women’s inclusion in the public sphere as equals, laying emphasis on revitalizing/democratizing the public sphere through communication, speech, and action (which are seen as empowering), and through alliances for a shared common objective. Thus, it is the exercise of rights in the political sphere which is seen as crucial to the full development of women’s citizenship as part of what Rian Voet calls ‘an active and sex-equal citizenship’.

Globalization, World Citizenship and Human Rights

An influential strand of citizenship theorists argues that in an increasingly globalized, interdependent and interconnected world, marked by transnational movement of populations and multicultural national populations, one can no longer talk of citizenship in terms of membership in a territorially limited nation-state, the hitherto uncontested unit of membership. They propose the delinking of the relationship between citizenship and the nation-state, replacing it with global or world citizenship with its basis in human rights. Yasemin Soysal (1994), for example, argues that globalization has brought in a ‘new and more universal’ concept of citizenship that has ‘universal personhood’ rather than ‘national belonging’ as its core principle. Universal personhood delinks legal rights from citizenship status and national belonging and is reflected in the status of guest workers in Europe, who have lived in Europe for years without ever acquiring citizenship, primarily because the countries of residence assured their legal and social rights. These assurances, feels Soysal, are further augmented by the global system of human rights law, the United Nations network, regional governance, etc., that have ushered in the idea of a global civil society. The assurances guaranteed by membership of this global civil society make the securities of nation-state membership redundant. Much of this assurance, it is argued, has emanated from the high degree of agreement on the need for human rights, and the recognition that violations of human rights have global ramifications, and their protection must, therefore involve transnational efforts.
CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

THE TERM DEMOCRACY has been in use in the tradition of Western political thought since ancient times. It is derived from the Greek root ‘demos’ which means ‘the people’ and ‘cracy’ which stands for ‘rule’ or ‘government. Thus, literally, democracy signifies ‘the rule of the people’. Democracy as a form of government implies that the ultimate authority of government is vested in the common people so that public policy is made to conform to the will of the people and to serve the interests of the people.

Abraham Lincoln’s classic definition of democracy still holds true

I CLASSICAL NOTION OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy has a long tradition. But the notions regarding its essence and grounds of its justification have been revised from time to time. Plato and Aristotle saw democracy at work in some of ancient Greek city-states, especially at Athens. Its salient features were: (a) equal participation by all freemen in the common affairs of the polis (city-state) which was regarded as an essential instrument of good life; (b) arriving at public decisions in an atmosphere of free discussion; and (c) general respect for law and for the established procedures of the community. The Greeks took pride in their customary law and admiringly distinguished it from the ‘arbitrary rule’ prevalent among the ‘barbarians’.

However, the form of democracy prevalent in ancient Greek city-states was by no means regarded as an ideal rule. Plato decried democracy because the people were not properly equipped with education ‘to select the best rulers and the wisest courses’. Democracy enabled the men with the gift of eloquence and oratory to get votes of the people and secure public office, but such men were thoroughly selfish and incompetent who ruined the state. Then, Aristotle identified democracy as the rule of the many, that is, of the more numerous members of the community, particularly, the poor ones. In his classification of governments into normal and perverted forms, Aristotle placed democracy among perverted forms since it signified the rule of the mediocres seeking their selfish interests, not the interest of the state. Aristotle observed that no form of government prevalent during his times was stable and this led to frequent upheavals. In his search for a stable form of government, Aristotle in his Politics tried to analyse the merits and demerits of various forms of government. In the process, he made very interesting observations about the merits and demerits of democracy: This rule by the poor has some advantages. The people, though individually they may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge, are collectively as good. Moreover, there are some artists whose works are best judged not by themselves alone but by those who do not possess the art; for example, the user or master of a house will be a better judge of it than the builder... and the guest will be a better judge of a feast than the cook. But the demerits of democracy, in this sense, were no less striking. According to Aristotle, again, democracy is based on a false assumption of equality. It arises out of the notion that those who are equal in one respect (such as, in respect of the law) are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. The upshot is that ability is
sacrificed to numbers, while numbers are manipulated by trickery. Because the people are so easily misled, and so fickle in their views, the ballot should be limited to the intelligent. With this line of argument, Aristotle came to commend a mixed constitution, that is, a combination of aristocracy and democracy, as the best possible from of government. The classical concept of democracy was articulated by some of the modern thinkers, particularly of England, such as, James Bryce and A.V. Dicey.

Dicey’s Account of Democracy
Dicey, in his famous work Law and Opinion in England (1905), treated democracy as a form of government under which majority opinion determines legislation. According to him, it would be unwise in a democracy to enforce laws not approved by the people. He tried to demonstrate elaborately the relation of legislation to the prevailing public opinion. However, he also pointed out that particular laws are the product of a particular historical setting. Since public opinion under democracy is not a uniform phenomenon, it has not produced uniform laws.

II CONCEPT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Democracy is an old concept; liberalism is a recent one. Today, liberalism is generally thought to be inseparable from democracy so much so that the term democracy is applied to denote ‘liberal democracy’ unless otherwise specified. But as C.B. Macpherson in his Democratic Theory Essays in Retrieval (1973) has observed: Until the nineteenth century liberal theory, like the liberal state, was not at all democratic, much of it was specifically antidemocratic. Classical liberal theory was committed to the individual’s right to unlimited acquisition of property and to the capitalist market economy which implies inequality not only in the economic sphere but in the political sphere also. Thus, classical liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries insisted on property qualification for the right-to-vote. This was contrary to the democratic principle which implies equal entitlement of each individual not only in the matter of choosing a government but also to the other advantages accruing from organized social life.

But a combination of the two antithetical principles liberalism and democracy became inevitable in a later phase because of historical reasons. Classical liberalism fostered capitalism and a free-market economy which were responsible for large-scale industrialization and urbanization. This gave rise to a large working class centred in large industrial cities and forced to live under sub-human conditions created by a cruel, competitive economy. In due course this class became conscious of its strength and insisted on a voice at the decision-making level. Thus the liberal state was forced to accommodate democratic principles in order to save its own existence. The outcome of this combination emerged in the form of liberal democracy. It represents a combination of free-market economy with universal adult franchise. It is an attempt to resolve the conflicting claims of the capitalists and the masses by making gradual concessions under the garb of a ‘welfare state’.

Liberal democracy today, is distinguished from other forms of political system by certain principles and characteristics, that is, its procedure and institutional arrangements. Institutions are necessary for the realization of principles; without principles, the institutions might be reduced to a mere formality. The two must go together.

PRINCIPLES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Liberal democracy works on certain principles and certain mechanisms. Broadly speaking, principles of liberal democracy include: (a) Government by consent; (b) Public accountability; (c) Majority rule; (d) Recognition of minority rights; and (e) Constitutional Government.
Political leadership has to listen to the people in a democracy

Government by Consent
Democracy is government by consent of the people. Rational consent can be obtained by persuasion for which an atmosphere of free discussion is essential. Any regime where the consent of the people is sought to be obtained without freedom of expression of divergent opinions, does not qualify for being called a democracy even if it maintains certain democratic institutions.

In view of the highly technical nature, the large volume and urgency of governmental decisions, it is impractical to consult the people on every detail of every policy. However, discussion of the broad issues is indispensable. Discussion is usually held at two levels: (a) among the representatives of the people in the legislative assemblies where members of the opposition have their full say; and (b) at the public level where there is direct communication between the leadership and the people. Mass media (newspapers, radio, television, etc.) also serve as effective channels of communication between the leadership and the people. Democratic leadership is expected not to lose touch with popular sentiment on the major outlines of policy as the ruling parties are bound to seek a fresh mandate of the people at regular intervals.

Public Accountability
Liberal democracy, based on the consent of the people, must constantly remain answerable to the people who created it. John Locke (1632-1704) who thought of government as a ‘trustee’ of the power vested in it by the people for the protection of their natural right to life, liberty and property, nevertheless, felt that it could not be fully trusted. He wanted the people to remain constantly vigilant. He thought of the people as a householder who appoints a watchman for protecting his house, and then, he himself keeps awake to keep a watch on the watchman! Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) envisaged liberal democracy as a political apparatus that would erasure the accountability of the governors to the governed. For Bentham, both governors and the governed, as human beings, want to maximize their happiness. Then governors, who are endowed with power, may tend to abuse it in their
self-interest. Hence, in order to prevent the abuse of their power, governors should be directly accountable to an electorate who will frequently check whether their objectives have been reasonably met.

**Majority Rule**

In modern representative democracies, decisions are taken in several bodies legislatures, committees, cabinets and executive or regulative bodies. Majority rule means that in all these decision-making bodies, from the electorate to the last committee, the issues are to be resolved by voting. Political equality is secured by the principle of ‘one man, one vote’, which implies that there will be no privileged sections claiming special weightage, nor any underprivileged sections whose voice is ignored. No discrimination is allowed on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, ownership of property, and even educational qualifications. Any restriction of suffrage should be based on sound reason, that is, where the ballot cannot be used in a rational and responsible manner, such as, in the case of convicted criminals, mental patients, and persons below a legally fixed age.

The principle of majority rule relies on the wisdom of the majority. Minority opinion has the option to enlist the support of larger numbers by persuasion in an atmosphere of free discussion.

**Recognition of Minority Rights**

The principle of majority rule by no means implies the suppression of minorities. In modern nation-states, there may be several racial, religious, linguistic or cultural minorities who fear discrimination or the tyranny of the majority. Minority grievances may take many forms ranging from psychological insults over discrimination in housing, education and employment to physical persecution and genocide. Legal safeguards are, therefore, considered essential for the realization of the democratic principle because their presence helps to raise the level of awareness of both majority and minority and thus promote a favourable climate for democratic politics.

**Constitutional Government**

Constitutional government means a government by laws rather than by men. Democracy requires an infinitely complex machinery of processes, procedures and institutions to translate the majority will into action. It makes enormous demands on the time, goodwill and integrity of its citizens and public servants. Once the prescribed procedure is set aside, even for a legitimate purpose, it can set a precedent that may be followed for pursuing illegitimate purposes, and the flood-gates of corruption might be thrown wide open. It is, therefore, essential to have a well-established tradition of law and constitution for the stability of a democratic government.

**Mechanism of Liberal Democracy**

Once certain principles of liberal democracy are accepted, the next step is to identify the mechanism that puts these principles into practice. This would enable us to distinguish a liberal-democratic system from other political systems, viz. totalitarian and autocratic systems. The champions of liberal democracy recognize certain institutions and procedures as essential characteristics of democracy. The presence or absence of these characteristics will determine whether a system is democratic or not. They firmly believe that a government can be conducted according to will of the people only by adherence to these institutions and procedures. Any other system may have many qualities but it will not qualify as a democracy without these characteristics. The main characteristics of liberal democracy may be enumerated as follows:
• More than One Political Party Freely Competing for Political Power
• Political Offices Not Confined to any Privileged Class
• Periodic Elections Based on Universal Adult Franchise
• Protection of Civil Liberties
• Independence of the Judiciary

CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL WORKING OF DEMOCRACY
Democracy as a form of government cannot function properly unless it is supported by suitable socio-economic and cultural factors. It is interesting to recall that Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-59), a famous French writer, in his notable work Democracy in America (1835-40) tried to enumerate the principal causes which tended to maintain the democratic structure in the United States. His list included not only the constitutional structure but also: (a) the absence of a large military establishment; (b) equality in social and economic conditions; (c) a prosperous agricultural economy; and (d) the mores, customs and religious beliefs of Americans. For our purpose, this list should be treated only as illustrative and by no means comprehensive or authoritative. Conditions in America have thoroughly changed since de Tocqueville wrote about America. His list may now be modified as follows so as to reflect the contemporary conditions: (a) primacy of civil authority over military power; (b) larger equality in social and economic conditions; (c) a prosperous agricultural and industrial economy; and (d) a democratic culture or mode of thought.

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY
TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF democracy were chiefly concerned with democracy as a form of government and they focused on an ethical justification of democracy. Contemporary theories of democracy largely seek to reformulate the notion of democracy in the light of recent sociological findings.

1 ELITIST THEORY
Elitist theories were originally developed in the field of sociology to explain the behaviour of men in a social setting. Their implications in the field of politics posed a challenge to democratic theory, which was in turn revised by several thinkers. Broadly speaking, the elitist theories hold that every society consists of two categories of men: (a) the elite or the minority within a social collectivity (such as, a society, a state, a religious institution, a political party) which exercises a preponderant influence within that collectivity; and (b) the masses or the majority which is governed by the elite.

Michel propounded his famous ‘iron law of oligarchy’ which implied that every organization whatever its original aims is eventually reduced to an ‘oligrachy’, that is, the rule of the chosen few. Majority of human beings are apathetic, indolent and slavish and they are permanently incapable of self-government. Pareto came to the conclusion that the ‘elite’ show highest ability in their field of activity whatever its nature might be, while masses are characterized by the lack of qualities of leadership and fear from responsibility. They feel safe in following the direction of the elite.

REVISION OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
The elite theory had empirically demonstrated that democracy as the government of the people is incapable of realization. The champions of democracy found it difficult to repudiate the arguments advanced by the elitist theories. They, therefore, sought to accommodate the elite theory in the
framework of democratic theory which led to its revision. The elitist democratic theory or democratic elitism was developed by several writers.

**Views of Mannheim**

Karl Mannheim, who had initially related elite theories with Fascism and with anti-intellectualist doctrines, later championed a reconciliation between the elite theory and the democratic theory. In his *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (1929), Mannheim argued that society did not cease to be democratic by entrusting the actual shaping of policy to the elites. The people cannot directly participate in government, but they can make their aspirations felt at certain intervals, and this is sufficient for democracy; ‘In a democracy the governed can always act to remove their leaders or force them to take decisions in the interests of the many. Mannheim insists on selection by merit and shortening of distance between the elite and the masses in order to ensure compatibility between elite rule and democratic government.

### III    PLURALIST THEORY

Pluralist theories of democracy fall into two categories: (a) the elitist-democratic theories which regard the plurality of elites as the foundation of modern liberal democracy, such as those advocated by Karl Mannheim and Raymond Aron; and (b) the group theories which interpret democracy as a process of bargaining among relatively autonomous groups; the existence and functioning of these groups in a democracy lends a pluralistic character to the polity.

In the USA, A.F. Bentley (*The Process of Government; 1908*) and David Truman (*The Governmental Process; 1951*) interpreted democracy as a political game played by a great variety of groups. According to this interpretation, the government is the focal point for public pressure and its task is to make policies which reflect the highest common group demand. Thus, democratic society is seen as a pluralist, differentiated society where the management of public affairs is shared by a number of groups having different values, sources and methods of influence.

Robert Dahl, in his *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956) developed a model of the democratic process which he described as polyarchy. This corresponds to the models developed by Bentley, Truman and E. Latham (*The Group Basis of Politics; 1952*), variously known as pluralism or the group theory. The term pluralism is used here in the sociological sense, that is, to describe the pluralistic nature of democratic society, not in the philosophical sense as a political ideal, associated with the pluralistic theory of sovereignty. The pluralist theory of democracy, on the other hand, introduces pluralism for a scientific explanation of the political process.

The gist of pluralistic democracy may be given as follows: The policy-making process, however centralized it may appear in form, is, in reality, a highly decentralized process of bargaining among relatively autonomous groups. In other words, public policy is not a product of the will of the elite or the chosen few, as the elitist theories of democracy hold. On the contrary, it is an outcome of the interaction of all groups who make claims upon or express interest in that particular issue. The extent to which different groups will get their way, is a function of the strength of the groups and the intensity of their participation.

**A Critical Appraisal**

The elitist and pluralist theories of democracy have added an empirical dimension to democratic theory by incorporating the results of sociological theory and research. In a nutshell: (a) the elitist theories concede that policy-making in a democracy is the function of the elite while the people’s role
is confined to approval and rejection of particular policies made or advocated by the competing elites; and (b) the pluralist theories view policy-making in a democracy as a decentralized process characterized by bargaining between competing autonomous groups. The pluralist theories are more optimistic than elitist theories because they repudiate the authoritarian basis of policy-making in a democracy as suggested by the elitist theories. In any case, both theories arrive at conclusions which are far removed from the essence of democratic theory.

Men no doubt differ in their physical and intellectual capacities and other natural gifts. But social inequalities in the present-day society do not always correspond to natural inequalities. In most cases the phenomenon of domination in society is closely related to economic disparities. The elitist-pluralist theory of democracy tries to justify the phenomenon of domination on grounds of certain outstanding inborn qualities of persons, or on grounds of better organization of certain interests. In effect, it tends to maintain the status quo. However, if the economic structure of the society is transformed so that rewards are directly related to the quality and amount of work done, instead of the privileged position and manipulative power of certain persons, the existing system of domination will disappear and the principle of equality based on reason will reign supreme which is the essence of democracy.

IV      MARXIST THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Liberal theory largely identifies democracy by its procedure and institutions. Marxist theory, on the other hand, evaluates any political system with reference to its class character. Marxists criticize the prevalent form of liberal democracy because it harbours the capitalist system in which the majority of people comprising workers is deprived of power.

Marxist Critique of Liberal Democracy

Liberal democracy, by fostering the capitalist economic system, exclusively serves the interests of the bourgeoisie, i.e. the capitalist class. Marxists, therefore, dubbed liberal democracy the ‘bourgeois democracy’. In spite of its vast paraphernalia of representative institutions, liberal democracy hardly serves the interests of the people on whose behalf power is exercised. According to Marx and Engels, the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. (Communist Manifesto; 1848). Here the term modern state refers to the prevalent model of liberal democracy.

John Plamenatz, in his Democracy and Illusion An Examination of Certain Aspects of Modern Democratic Theory (1978), has enumerated four outstanding reasons advanced by Marxists, anarchists and other like-minded thinkers for calling bourgeois democracy a sham:

1. Where there are great inequalities of wealth, then, whatever the form of government, power and influence always belong mostly to the wealthy, if only because they alone can afford to provide their children with the expensive schooling needed to fit them for positions carrying power and influence;

2. Where the political system, to work effectively, calls for large organizations, power and influence belong to their leaders rather than to the rank and file;
3. Where there are great social inequalities, leaders, no matter how modest their social origins, soon acquire the attitudes and ambitions of the privileged and lose touch with their followers;

4. Power and influence depend greatly on information, and the wealthy are better placed than the poor both to get information and to control the distribution of it.

These are, no doubt, most familiar points of criticism against liberal democracy involving large economic inequalities. But if we confine our attention to these reasons, it can be argued that if large economic inequalities are removed within the capitalist system, the liberal model can be made to serve as true democracy. But this position would not be acceptable to Marxist exponents of democracy who are convinced that democracy and capitalism cannot go together. In fact, Marxists focus on the defects of the capitalist system itself with regard to its capability of serving as democracy.

**Liberal Democracy Exclusively serves Bourgeois interests**

According to the Marxian standpoint, since the capitalist system of production is designed to serve the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, its political superstructure cannot be made to serve the people. In the economic sphere, society is divided into dominant and dependent ‘classes’, the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, the ‘bourgeoisie’ and the ‘proletariat’; their interests are diametrically opposed to each other. Political power is only a handmaid of economic power. It is, therefore, quite natural that the political institutions of such a system whatever their outer form are bound to serve the interests of the bourgeoisie. Liberal democracy, which represents the political institutions of the capitalist economic system, pays lip-service to ‘sovereignty of the people’ in order to derive its legitimacy. It operates in a situation where all sections of society the bourgeoisie as well as the proletariat accept the legitimacy of the bourgeois relations of production and the roles which these impose. In this situation, the state operates as an instrument of preserving the conditions suitable for a market mechanism which continues to serve the interests of the capitalist class.
V DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

According to Marxism, any form of state power implies dictatorship. The character of the state is determined by the character of its ruling class. Thus bourgeois democracy and ‘bourgeois dictatorship’ are coterminous; they denote a state characterized by the domination of the bourgeoisie. Similarly, ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, ‘proletarian democracy’ or socialist democracy denotes a state characterized by domination of the proletariat. It is established by the proletariat after overthrowing the capitalist order by a violent revolution. This is not the final stage of evolution but only an interim arrangement preparing the ground for the abolition of the division of society into dominant and dependent classes, and the consequent ‘withering away’ of the state itself. It is termed ‘dictatorship’ because it retains the ‘state apparatus’ as such, with its implements of force and oppression, not because its organization is fundamentally different from the so-called ‘democracy’.

Dictatorship of the proletariat is different from the popular notion of ‘dictatorship’ which is despised as the selfish, immoral, irresponsible and unconstitutional political rule of one man or a small political clique characterized by the oppression of the masses. On the other hand, dictatorship of the proletariat implies a stage where there is complete ‘socialization of the major means of production’, de novo planning of material production so as to serve social needs, provide for an effective right to work, education, health and housing for the masses, and fuller development of science and technology so as to multiply material production to achieve greater social satisfaction.

Dictatorship of the Proletariat is Concrete Democracy

In popular parlance, ‘dictatorship’ denotes an antithesis of ‘democracy’. In Marxian terminology, so long as the state is in existence, with its vast coercive apparatus, there is no difference whether you call it a democracy or a dictatorship. If democracy means the rule of the majority over the minority, then the proletarian state is surely more democratic than the bourgeois state. As Henri Lefebvre, in his Sociology of Marx (1968), has elucidated: The dictatorship of the proletariat means concrete democracy, i.e. the coercive power of a majority over a minority. The capitalist system of production maintained by the liberal democracy involves domination of the minority the capitalists over the majority the workers in the economic, social as well as political sphere which is inimical to human freedom. On the contrary, the socialist system of production maintained by socialist democracy ensures domination of the majority the workers over the minority the former capitalists and this process continues as long as the state continues to exist. Domination and coercion during this period are necessary to contain the forces of counterrevolution and to destroy the vestiges of capitalist order. The dictatorship of the proletariat is more akin to democracy not because of its form, but because of the purpose for which the state continues to exist during this period.

Lenin advanced the concept of ‘democratic centralism’ as a principle of organization of the socialist state as well as the communist party. This was designed to lend a democratic character to the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat.

DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

The principle of organization of the socialist state as well as the communist party, as enunciated by V.I. Lenin. It implies: (a) that the membership of each body in the political hierarchy (whether of party or state) was to be decided by the vote of the lower body; and (b) that although free discussion on policy matters was to be allowed at the initial stage, any decision reached by the highest body was to be imposed rigidly at all lower levels in the hierarchy.
Dictatorship of the Proletariat is a Transitional Period

The dictatorship of the proletariat is not intended to last forever. In fact, Marx associated the term ‘dictatorship’ principally with the Roman office of dictatura where all power was legally concentrated in the hands of a single man during a limited period in a time of crisis. Hence dictatorship of the proletariat was meant to accomplish a specified function. As Lefebvre in his Sociology of Marx (1968) observes:

The working class must destroy the machinery of the existing state, but its own state is to last only for a transitional period during which state functions of organization and management are taken over by new social forces... and the state will begin to wither away when a truly rational organization of production becomes possible.

VI CONCEPT OF PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACY

It is important to note that most of the theories of democracy are concerned with ‘liberal democracy’, but the concept of ‘people’s democracy’ is associated with Marxist thought. Marx did not reject democracy as such. He attacked ‘bourgeois democracy’ as a distorted form of democracy, and tried to give an alternative version of true democracy. He was inspired by Rousseau’s critique of representative democracy and saw true democracy as an expression of homogeneous interests. But his adherence to class perspective convinced him that a class-divided society cannot have homogeneous interests. Accordingly the idea of true democracy could only be realized in a classless society, or at best, in a socialist state which represented the uniform interest of the working class.

Marx had anticipated that after the socialist revolution, bourgeois democracy would be replaced by a ‘commune system’. Commune denoted an association whose members own everything in common, including the product of their labour. In the present context, communes were envisaged to be small communities who would manage their own affairs, and would elect their delegates for the larger administrative units, like districts and towns. These larger units would in turn elect their delegates for the still larger administrative areas, like national administration. This system is described as ‘pyramidal structure of direct democracy’. Under this arrangement, all delegates would be bound by the instructions of their electorates, and would take their respective place within the pyramidal structure of directly elected committees. In case of violation of instructions of their electors, they could be removed from office. It may be recalled that this scheme was sought to be implemented in the former Soviet Union after the Russian Revolution (1917), and in China after the Chinese Revolution (1949), but it failed in both countries, primarily due to abolition of incentives for better work.

Socialist systems on the lines of the Soviet Union were also established in several countries of East Europe after the Second World War (1939-45), under the direct supervision of the Soviet Union.
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MARXIST AND ELITIST THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Issue</th>
<th>Marxist Theory</th>
<th>Elitist Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Domination</td>
<td>The ruling class holds economic power and political power concurrently</td>
<td>Elites dominate in various spheres of life and cleverly manage to use political power also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Dominant Class</td>
<td>A cohesive group which maintains its stronghold on power until it is overthrown</td>
<td>Plurality of elites; constant competition between elite groups leading to the circulation of elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Social Division</td>
<td>Society divided into dominant and dependent classes on the basis of ownership and non-ownership of means of production; their conflicting interests can never be reconciled</td>
<td>Division of society into elites and masses is almost instinctive and voluntary; not based on fundamental clash of their interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Justice and Rationality</td>
<td>Social division is the source of exploitation and oppression of the masses; it involves injustice</td>
<td>Social division is natural, rational and functional; it does not involve injustice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Social Change</td>
<td>Working class can organize its strength and overthrow capitalism; this will eventually usher in a classless society</td>
<td>Social change confined to the 'circulation of elites'; no scope of changing the division of society into elites and masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Democracy</td>
<td>True democracy possible only in a classless society which is characterized by the rule of the masses</td>
<td>Democracy can be partly realized through an open elite system and giving ordinary people an opportunity to choose the ruling elites at regular intervals; masses themselves will never rule</td>
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VIII RADICAL THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Radical theory of democracy contemplates to expand the scope of democracy by recognizing and possibly combining the essential features of procedural and substantive democracy. It is best represented by Macpherson’s concept of democracy.
Macpherson's Concept of Democracy
C.B. Macpherson (1911-87) has sought to broaden the scope of democracy and to redefine its essential conditions in view of our recent experiences. In The Real World of Democracy (1966), Macpherson argued that the liberal societies which grant universal suffrage, a choice between political parties, and civil liberties, have no exclusive claim to the title of democracy.

Democracy is a wider phenomenon. Macpherson identifies three variants of democracy which are equally valid if they fulfill certain conditions. The first variant is, of course, liberal democracy which needs a more humane touch. Secondly, Communist countries might qualify as democracies if they granted full intra-party democracy and opened up their closed bureaucratic systems. Finally, Third World countries, which have no experience of Western individualism, could also conform to the ideals of some historical theories of democracy as far as their governments are legitimized by mass enthusiasm. Thus in Macpherson’s view different types of systems which undertake to fulfill the aspirations of the masses, enjoy support of the masses and provide for an opportunity for the amelioration of the condition of the masses, qualify as democracies irrespective of the structures and procedures adopted by them for serving these purposes.

Merits or Advantages of Democracy
1. Democracy gives importance to human liberty and equality. It protects the fundamental rights of the people and safeguards their life. Democracy treats all the citizens as equal before the law.

2. Democratic government is a responsible government. The party which is in power has the fear of the opposition parties and hence is very careful in its functioning.

3. Here, due weightage is given to the opinions and valuable suggestions of intellectuals, statesmen, scholars, etc.

4. The Democratic government gives political education to the people through the political parties. The political parties hence play a vital role in democracy.

5. Democracy provides for peaceful change. Elections are held periodically and people can vote to power the party which they like. Government can be changed through the constitutional methods in a peaceful manner. It averts bloodshed, wars and revolutions.

6. Democracy is a government by consent and criticism, debates and discussions. Hence policies and programmes are undertaken only after obtaining the consent and cooperation of the people or their representatives.

7. Democracy is not based on force or violence, it believes in peaceful methods, in non-violence, co-operation and persuasion.

8. In democracy, people are supreme and the rulers are only their elected representatives. Hence the rulers are responsible and answerable to the governed.

9. Democracy requires the active participation of the people. Hence, people will be alert regarding the political actions of their rulers.

10. Democracy strengthens nationalism and fosters patriotism.
POLITICAL PARTY

The political party is the major organizing principle of modern politics. A political party, in a broader sense, is a group of people that is organised for the purpose of winning government power, by electoral or other means.

**Joseph A. Schumpeter** defines party as ‘a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power.’

Emergence of political parties is an aspect of political modernization. In modern politics, the relationship of an individual with the state has been redefined from that of a subject to a citizen. Democratic theory considers citizens as rational, independent and interested political persons capable of expressing their opinion regarding the persons aspiring for holding offices and also competent in electing some person who deals with the policies of the government in a way conducive to the interest of the masses.

Political sociology is primarily concerned with the study of political parties as social institutions and their transformative character in the ever dynamic social system. It also attempts to understand the relations between party members, party leaders and the masses.

**Marx** and **Engels**, in the ‘Manifesto of the Communist Party’ (1848) furnished the proletariat with the programme which would take humanity to a classless society, i.e. a communist society. This is the programme and path that all must necessarily cross under the leadership of the proletariat materialized in its party. Marx and Engels realized their thesis on the necessity of building the working class party as an indispensable instrument to fight for its class interests. As they wrote, ‘In its struggle against united power of the owning classes, the proletariat cannot act as a class unless it constitutes itself into a political party, distinct and opposed to all the old political parties created by the owning classes’, and that ‘This constitution of the proletariat into a political party is indispensable to ensure the triumph of the social resolution and its ultimate goal: the abolition of the classes.’

**Lenin** reasserted the necessity of party to transform society. His great point was ‘Give us an organization of revolutionaries and we’ll shake Russia to its foundations.’ He reasoned that a party was necessary to change the world. And its programme ‘consists of the organization of the proletariat’s class struggle and the leadership of this struggle whose final objective is the conquest of political power for the proletariat and the organization of socialist society.’ Lenin was much concerned with the principle of party organization. He advocated the construction of a tightly knit revolutionary party, organised on the basis of democratic centralism, to serve as the ‘vanguard of the working class’. He argued that without democracy it was impossible for party members to express their opinions, and without centralism, it was impossible to achieve unity of action and to carry out party decisions.

**Max Weber** defines ‘parties’ as groups which are specifically concerned with influencing policies and making decisions in the interests of their membership. In Weber’s words, parties are concerned with the acquisition of social power. Weber further argues that at times parties may represent class interests or status interests. In most cases, they are partly class parties and partly status parties. Weber’s view of parties suggests that the relationship between political groups
and class and status groups is far from clear cut. For instance, sometimes parties may cut-across both, class as well as status groups.

Max Weber said, parties ‘live in a house of power’ and ‘are always structures struggling for domination’. However, political parties are not the only political groups that operate within the house of power. In most democratic countries there are many private and voluntary associations which influence political process. These include human rights groups, women’s organizations, labour unions, environmental groups, chambers of commerce, manufacturer’s associations, senior citizen’s associations and any other organized interest group in society. These are known as ‘para-political groups’.

In a nutshell, there are two divergent views with regard to the role of political parties in the political process viz. (i) Liberal view and (ii) Marxist view.

The liberal view is that political parties along with pressure groups and others interest groups, engage in competition for power as the representatives of different socio-economic groups in society. As a result of open competition, power in pluralist political systems is non-cumulative and shared. However, this view of the role of political parties in liberal democracies has been criticized severely. It has been argued that certain groups dominate the political decision-making process, especially those who dominate in the political realm. The view was most famously articulated by Robert Michels in the form of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’.

While liberals emphasize the important role of political parties in representative democracies, neo-Marxists (like Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, etc.) play down their significance. In their view, in capitalist societies, since the dominant economic class is also the ruling class, parliamentary politics is illusory, and simply an ideological strategy which diverts attention away from the real sources of socio-economic and political inequalities. Many have argued that both liberal and the Marxist views are unsophisticated. It is true that power may be concentrated, but it is also possible for the ordinary people to influence political outcomes as we have seen in Delhi Assembly elections held in 2013 and also in 2015, in which Aam Aadmi Party, which raised common man’s issues, delivered a spectacular electoral performance.

**Functions of political parties**

Political parties are a vital link between the state and civil society. In other words, political parties link the state to political forces in society, giving organized expression to interests and making them effective politically.

A political party performs a wide range of functions. According to Gabriel Almond, some of the important functions of political parties are as follows:

**1. Articulation of interests:** As stated earlier, political parties perform the vital role of articulation of interests of different sections of society. Thereby give organized expression to interests and make them effective politically.
2. **Aggregation of interests**: One of the most important functions of political party is ‘interest aggregation’. A political party is a multi-interest group that represents diverse interests of the society. It tries to harmonise these interests with each other and thereby seeks to produce consensus among as many groups as possible. Political party thus acts as a very effective mediator in settling disagreements in society in a peaceful and institutionalized manner.

3. **Political communication**: Political party provides a link between rulers and ruled. It ensures a two way communication process between the government and people. It is a channel of expression, upward and downward. It is mainly through the parties that the government is constantly kept informed about the general demands of the society. The upward flow of communication from the ruled to the rulers is relatively strong in competitive party systems, whereas in a single ruling party, the flow of communication is mainly downward.

4. **Direction to government and society**: Political parties give direction to government and society. When in government, party leaders are centrally involved in implementing collective goals for society. The radical transformations of Russian and Chinese society were brought about by vanguard communist parties. In Asia and Africa, nationalist parties played a crucial role in winning independence. In Western Europe, political parties contributed to the creation of welfare states.

5. **Political recruitment and socialization**: Further, political parties also work as agents of elite recruitment and socialization. In a democracy, political elite are recruited mainly through political parties. Leaders of governments are normally the leaders of political parties. The political party also plays an important role in the political socialization of the masses. The political socialization performed by political parties may however assume two distinct forms. The party may either reinforce the existing political culture or it may try to alter the established political cultural pattern by generating new attitudes and beliefs. However, sometimes, this process of political socialization may also result in the dysfunctional consequences. Thus, when parties represent strong traditional and ethnic subcultures and seek to reinforce the same, they in effect, tend to produce divisive forces, which may seriously affect the stability of the political system. Such tendencies can be witnessed in the contemporary India with the growth of numerous regional and religious parties, and coalition governments.

**POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**

Political participation is a necessary ingredient of every political system. All political systems encourage political participation in varying degrees. By involving the people in the matters of the state and governance, political participation fosters stability and order by reinforcing the legitimacy of political authority. There are many forms of participation and democracy is the form of government which encourages maximum participation in governmental process. Participation does not mean the mere exercise of their franchise by the people; rather it means their active involvement which in a real manner influences the decision making of the government.

Political participation can either be active or passive. People may participate actively in the political process either by exercising their franchise (right to vote) or by joining any political party, or contesting elections independently to an office. However, people may also participate in the political process by other ways such as reading, listening or watching the daily news about the various policies and programmes of the government and other political developments. People may
also participate by taking part in political discussions and sharing their views on matters of national interest through newspaper columns. Such passive participation is equally important for a democracy to be a truly representative and participatory democracy as it not only reviews the actions of the government but also indicates a high level of political awareness among the masses.

However, Seymour M. Lipset has pointed out that high level participation cannot always be treated as good for democracy. It may indicate the decline of social cohesion and breakdown of democratic process. While some other scholars are of the opinion that when majority of the people in a society are contented, the political participation is low. This should be taken as a favourable rather than unfavourable sign because it indicates stability and consensus within society and also the absence of broad cleavages.

As stated earlier, individuals can participate in government and politics in numerous ways. They can choose to take an active part in their government by the easiest form of political participation – voting. They can also participate in the political process in their individual capacity by contesting elections to an office. They can also form an interest group or join a political party to articulate their interests and opinions in the given political system.

**INTEREST / PRESSURE GROUPS**

Decision-making is the essence of political dynamics. Decisions involve compromises among conflicting interests of social groups and political parties. Interest groups or pressure groups play an important role in decision-making. Such groups allow an orderly expression of public opinion and increase political participation.

**Interest groups** are the groups based upon common attitudes, concerns or interests. These are voluntary associations of individuals and their primary objective is to promote or protect the shared concerns or interests of the respective members.

Interest groups, according to Blondel, may be classified into two types: promotional and protective. **Promotional groups** tend to defend specific points of view (such as environmentalism, human rights, prevention of cruelty to animals, nuclear disarmament, etc.) and their membership remains open to all citizens. **Protective groups**, on the other hand, defend certain specific interests of some particular social groups (such as trade unions, professional associations, peasants, businessmen, etc.) and their membership is limited.

Some scholars are of the opinion that if interest groups, in their pursuit of common interests, try to influence the public policy or government’s decision-making process, without formally becoming a part of the government (i.e. without sharing any responsibility) then they become pressure groups.

Definitions:

- Well known political scientists Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan remarked, ‘a group is an organized aggregate and an interest group is an interest aggregate.’
- According to Schaefer and Lamm, ‘an interest group is a voluntary association of citizens who attempt to influence public policy.’
• According to The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, ‘an interest (or pressure) group is an organization whose purpose is to influence the distribution and use of political power in a society.’

• According to Andrew Heywood, ‘an interest group or pressure group (the terms are often but not always used interchangeably) is an organised association which aims to influence the policies or actions of government.’

Thus, it may be argued that interest groups or pressure groups are voluntary associations of people having mutual concern about a wide array of economic, social, cultural, political, religious or any other issues. These are formally constituted organizations which are designed at least partly to put pressure on government, civil service and other political institutions to achieve ends that they favour.

Broadly speaking, pressure groups may be any group attempting to bring about any change in the working of any formal organization – state, government or any other social or economic organization. They are private associations to influence mass public policy. These groups are vital part of the political process. The political process is seen to result from a large number of competing interest or pressure groups.

Pressure groups, lobby groups and interest groups are distinct from clubs or social groups, in that their explicit purpose is to mobilize public opinion in support of their aims and to put pressure on decision-making bodies to agree to and support their demands – be they are for continuation of the existing state of affairs or for some change or innovation.

Pressure groups are found only in liberal-democratic political systems, in which the rights of political association and freedom of expression are respected. Pressure groups, however, differ from political parties in that they seek to exert influence from outside, rather than to win or exercise government power. Further, pressure groups typically have a narrow issue focus, in that they are usually concerned with a specific cause or the interests of a particular group, and seldom have the border programmic or ideological features that are generally associated with political parties.

The most positive perspective on group politics is offered by pluralist theories. These theories not only see organized groups as the fundamental building blocks of the political process, but also portray them as a vital guarantee of liberty and democracy. Arguments in favour of pressure groups include the idea that they strengthen representation by articulating interests and advancing views ignored by political parties; that they promote debate and discussion and thus create a more informed electorate; that they broaden the scope of political participation; that they check government power and maintain a vigorous and healthy civil society; and that they promote political stability by providing a channel of communication between government and the people.

However, a more critical view of pressure groups is advanced by the Marxist scholars. Marxist scholars argue that group politics systematically advantages business and financial interests that control the crucial employment and investment decisions in a capitalist society, and that the state is biased in favour of such interests through its role in upholding the capitalist system which they dominate. Thus, from the conflict perspective, the limitation of interest groups or pressure groups is that they tend to represent mainly the wealthier or better-educated sections of the public, leaving the poor and minorities largely unrepresented.
Almond and Powell, in their work *Comparative Politics*, have classified interest groups into four types:

- **Institutional Interest Groups**: These interest or pressure groups are found within formal institutions such as political parties, legislatures, armies, bureaucracies, etc. Examples of such institutional interest groups are the representatives of weaker sections of society in the legislature (such as MLAs or MPs representing the interests of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, religious and linguistic minorities, women, etc.), civil servants’ association of a particular department, conservative business interests within mass political parties, labour leaders in social democratic parties, etc.

- **Associational Interest Groups**: Associational interest groups have both organized structures with full-time professional staff, and well-established procedures for the formulation of demands. The organizational base of these pressure groups places them in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other groups, and they often tend to regulate the development of other interest groups. For example, Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), trade unions, organizations of businessmen (Oilseeds Dealers’ Association) or of manufacturers (Jute Manufacturers’ Association), organizations of religious denominations (the Vishwa Hindu Parishad), various civic groups (such as Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties), etc. The effectiveness of associational interest groups, however, depends on, as Almond and Powell have pointed out, the degree of autonomy they enjoy vis-à-vis political parties. This is particularly true of worker’s, peasant’s and student’s organizations. These associational groups, when subordinated by political parties, instead of articulating the needs perceived by their members, serve only as instruments to mobilize support for the party.

- **Non-associational Interest Groups**: These are groups that lack both an organized structure as well as an organized, well-established procedure of articulation. Articulation of interests may take the form of a petition of an informal delegation from a linguistic group regarding language instruction in schools, appeals by relatives to a cabinet minister for some preferred treatment, etc. Kinship groups, ethnic, regional, and status groups are examples of non-associational interest groups.

- **Anomic Interest Groups**: When individuals or organized groups fail to obtain adequate representation in the political system, the resultant discontent leads to the spontaneous emergence of anomic groups. Riots or demonstrations may be sparked by an incident or by the emergence of an enthusiastic leader. Such spontaneous groups have limited organization.

**COLLECTIVE ACTION**

Collective action refers to the action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests. It seems logical to expect that people who have an interest in common will act on it – for example that pensioners will act for higher pensions or miners for greater underground safety. Similarly, auto-rickshaw or taxi drivers for increase in fare, and ad-hoc teachers for regularization of their services, etc.

However, experience shows that this is not always the case and that many people who stand to benefit from a given collective action will refuse to join in. This seems to run against the
assumption of rationality in human behaviour, and presents a particular problem for students of politics and social movements.

In this book, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Mancur Olson, offered an explanation. Olson argued that rational self-interest often leads to inaction, in so far as individuals will benefit from concessions made to the whole group, whether they themselves have been active or not. For example, if pensions are raised after a campaign by senior citizens, all pensioners will gain, including those who did nothing. Olson called this the free-rider problem, and it is important because it undermines the ability of interest group and social movements to mobilize large numbers of citizens. If those citizens are poor, the costs of participation are relatively higher for them, and they are even more likely to remain passive. The only answer to the free-rider problem is for the movement to offer extra incentives to participate, beyond the goals themselves. These incentives may take the form of recognition, prestige, or the psychological rewards of participation itself.

The term “collection action” is hopeless broad. Taken at face value, it could plausibly refer to all forms of human social action involving two or more people. However, in sociological terms, the term is used in a restricted sense. According to Doug McAdam, “collective action refers to emergent and minimally coordinated action by two or more people that is motivated by a desire to change some aspect of social life or to resist changes proposed by others.” By “emergent” is meant innovative lines of action that depart from taken-for-granted normative routines. “Coordinated” simply means that the various parties to the emerging conflict are attuned to one another and acting in awareness of this fact. Finally, the emphasis on change or resistance to change is designed to capture the adversarial or potentially conflictual nature of “collective action.”

All sociologists talk about collective behaviour but few attempt to define it. When they do, the definitions are not very useful. The study of collective behaviour includes the study of crowds, protests, agitations, social movements and revolutions, etc. There are a number of theoretical formulations of collective behaviour, none of them entirely adequate.

Turner and Killian note that there are at least three different theoretical approaches. The earliest were the contagion theories [LeBon, 1896], which described crowd behaviour as an irrational and uncritical response to the psychological temptation of the crowd situation. Social contagion is defined by Blumer as “the relatively rapid, unwitting, non rational dissemination of a mood, impulse, or form of conduct.” Contagion theory thus emphasizes, and perhaps over emphasizes, the non rational aspects of collective behaviour. This theory reflects the elitist view of common people as childish, impulsive, and irresponsible.

Later came the convergence theories, which focus upon the shared cultural and personality characteristics of the members of a collectivity and note how these similarities encourage a collective response to a situation [Freud, 1922; Allport, 1924; Miller and Dollard, 1941]. The convergence theories view collective as more than foolish impulse and admit that collective behaviour can be rational and goal-directed.

Finally, the emergent norm theories claim that in a behaviour situation which invites collective behaviour, a norm arises which governs the behaviour. It seems that, starting with the perceptions and grievances of the members, and fed by the contagion process, a norm eventually emerges which justifies and sets limits to the crowd behaviour. Crowds are never entirely like-
minded and contagion theory does not explain why the crowd takes one action rather than another. Emergent norm theorists charge that contagion theory exaggerates the irrational and purposeless components of crowd behaviour.

An integrated synthesis of these theories is attempted by Smelser; however, it comes out as mainly an emergent norm theory. His determinants of collective behaviour are:

1. **Structural conduciveness**: The structure of the society may encourage or discourage collective behaviour. Simple, traditional societies are less prone to collective behaviour than are modern societies.

2. **Structural strain**: Deprivation and fears of deprivation lie at the base of much collective behaviour. Feelings of injustice prompt many to extreme action. Impoverished class, oppressed minorities, groups whose hard-won gain are threatened, even privileged groups who fear the loss of their privileges - all these are candidates for collective behaviour.

3. **Growth and spread of a generalized belief**: Before any collective action, there must be a belief among the actors which identifies the source of the threat, the route of escape, or the avenue of fulfillment.

4. **Precipitating factors**: Some dramatic event or rumor sets the stage for action. A cry of “police brutality” in a racially tense neighborhood may touch off a riot. One person starting to run may precipitate a panic.

5. **Mobilization for action**: Leadership emerges and begins or proposes action and directs activity.

6. **Operation of social control**: At any of the above points, the cycle can be interrupted by leadership, police power, propaganda, legislative and government policy changes, and other social controls.

Smelser’s formulation has stimulated a good deal of criticism, and experimentation, yet it remains perhaps the most widely used theoretical approach in the study of collective behaviour today.

**PROTESTS**

Collective acts of disruption and violence are sometimes viewed as expressions of social protests, and sometimes as crime or rebellion, leading to different community reactions. The verdicts of several politically sensitive commissions in the 1960s and 70s marked a dramatic turning point in American reactions to racial disorder. These verdicts identified mass violence by Blacks primarily as acts of social protest and stated that such disorders must be understood as acts of social protest, and not merely as crime, anti-social violence, or revolutionary threats to law and order.
Ralph H. Turner, in his paper, *The Public Perception of Protest* attempts to investigate several theoretical vantage points from which to predict when a public will and will not view a major disturbance as an act of social protest.

Protest has been defined as “an expression or declaration of objection, disapproval, or dissent, often in opposition to something a person is powerless to prevent or avoid.”

An act of protest includes the following elements: the action expresses a grievance, a conviction of wrong or injustice; the protestors are unable to correct the condition directly by their own efforts; the action is intended to draw attention to the grievances; the action is further meant to provoke ameliorative steps by some target group; and the protestors depend upon some combination of sympathy and fear to move the target group in their behalf. Protest ranges from relatively persuasive to relatively coercive combinations, but always includes both. Many forms of protest may involve no violence or disruption at all.

The term protest is sometimes applied to trivial and chronic challenges that are more indicative of a reaction style than of deep grievance. For instance, we speak of a child who protests every command from parent or teacher in the hope of gaining occasional small concessions. It is in this sense that the protestations by some groups in society are popularly discounted because “they just protest everything.” But the subject of this analysis is social protest, by which we mean protest that is serious in the feeling of grievance that moves it and in the intent to provoke ameliorative action.

When violence and disorder are identified as social protest, they constitute a mode of communication more than a form of direct action. Looting is not primarily a means of acquiring property, as it is normally viewed in disaster situations; breaking store windows and burning buildings is not merely a perverted form of amusement or immoral vengeance like the usual vandalism and arson; threats of violence and injury to persons are not simply criminal actions. All are expressions of outrage against injustice of sufficient magnitude and duration to render the resort to such exceptional means of communication understandable to the observer.
According to Marvin Olsen, the principal indicators of a protest definition are concerned with identifying the grievances as the most adequate way of accounting for the disturbance and the belief that the main treatment indicated is to ameliorate the unjust conditions.

AGITATION

J.W. Bowers and D.J. Ochs in their book *The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control* argue that ‘agitation’ exists when:

1. people outside the normal decision-making establishment
2. advocate significant (structural) social change and
3. encounter a degree of resistance within the establishment such as to require more than the normal discursive means of persuasion.”

Agitation-Control Model:

The rhetoric of agitation can be viewed as a continuum of behaviours which range from persuasive speaking (normal argumentation) to outright revolution (instrumental action). According to Bowers and Ochs, agitation movements typically progress step by step through the continuum from the persuasive toward the confrontational. Their model is based on and describes protest movements including the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and Vietnam War Protest Movements.

Control, on the other hand, refers to the response of the decision-making establishment to the agitation.

Under this definition, those within the establishment cannot be agitators. For example, if a mother takes a vote from her kids on what they want for dinner and the daughter protests the choice, she is not considered an agitator because she participated in the decision-making process. Another key point of the definition is that agitation only occurs when steps are taken beyond “normal” persuasive rhetoric. For instance, distributing pamphlets that urge student to vote against an increase in fees is considered within ordinary persuasive means. However, if the students have a sit-in (dharna) or take out a march to oppose unfavorable measures taken by the administration, they are participating in a form of agitation.

Steps in the rhetoric of agitation:

1. **Petition:** Although they are not technically considered agitation, normal persuasive measures often precede agitation. This stage is referred to by Bowers and Ochs as petition. This stage is crucial to an agitation movement because it establishes credibility and gives the establishment an early opportunity to comply with their demands. This strategy includes normal discursive means of persuasion (speeches presenting “the case”, reasoned discussion, petitioning, etc.).

2. **Promulgation:** Once step 1 has met with suppression or avoidance, step 2 is likely to occur. It involves tactics used to win social support for the movement and expand the base (informational picketing, handbills, protest meeting, exploitation of the media, etc.).
3. **Solidification**: The strategy of solidification occurs primarily within the agitation group. Its purpose is to unite the group and increase motivation. Solidification tactics produce or reinforce cohesiveness of members, thereby increasing responsiveness.

4. **Polarization**: If the movement is still being resisted substantially after solidification, tactics which polarize (that is, force people to clearly choose sides—“us or them”) the relevant publics usually are adopted. Tactics include flag issues, derogatory jargon, non-violent resistance.

5. **Non-violent resistance**: The strategy of non-violent resistance is often referred to by the names of famous agitators who were known for this strategy—Martin Luther King, Jr. and Gandhi. Non-violent resistance places agitators in a position in which they are violating laws or customs they consider to be unjust or destructive of human dignity. This includes sit-ins and school boycotts. The agitators participate in activities that would be legal or accepted if the establishment conceded. An example of this is when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus to a white man. She was non-violently protesting laws and customs that the civil rights movement wanted to see changed. When the protested laws are perceived to be very unjust, this stage often turns violent when the establishment continues to resist. The theory behind non-violent protest, according to Martin Luther King, Jr. is that all of the resister’s energy is directed to the policy he is violating, and not in the destruction of the perpetrators. A second aspect is that the resistance does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, rather to win its friendship and understanding.

6. **Escalation**: Another strategy used is called escalation/confrontation and it is designed to make the establishment overreact to threats of disruption, and then looks foolish to the public. The agitators then hope this will lead to reforms instituted by the larger society witnessing the disproportionate action taken by the establishment.

**Control responses from the establishment:**

According to Bowers and Ochs, typical responses to agitation from the establishment include the below mentioned (in roughly this order). The four strategies for control are:

- **Avoidance** (counter-persuasion, evasion, secret rationale, denial of means);
- **Suppression** (leader harassment, denial of demands, banishment, murder);
- **Adjustment** (name change, sacrificial lambs, accepting means, co-opting);
- **Capitulation** (not a control response but surrender)

One of the most widely used avoidance tactics is counter-persuasion. This occurs when the establishment tries to convince the agitators that they are wrong. If they are successful, the threat is minimized. If they are unsuccessful, the establishment has still gained time without changing their ideology or structure.

The second strategy is suppression, which institutions usually do not resort to until all avoidance tactics have failed. This tactic focuses on weakening or removing the agitators’ spokespersons. This is often done by harassment, denial of the agitators’ demands, or banishment. Banishment can terminate a movement by removing its leaders and spokespersons.
A third control strategy is **adjustment**. Establishments may do this by adapting, modifying, or altering their structures, goals or personnel. One tactic is to accept some of the means of agitation. In essence this tactic serves to take away the attention received when the establishment instead reacts to the agitation. A movement may likely gain momentum if the establishment reacts to its agitation strategies by calling attention to its ideology.

The last strategy in the rhetoric of control is **capitulation**. This can be seen as the last resort of an establishment and has been known to be used when total destruction by the agitators is imminent.

In conclusion, the rhetoric of agitation and control as proposed by Bowers and Ochs analyzes the process of social change, specifically the messages generated by the participants in social change movements, the agitators and the targeted establishment. Many different strategies and tactics may be used on either side, which has proven to make each instance of social change unique. Bowers and Ochs identified agitation strategies to include the categories of petition, promulgation, solidification, non-violent resistance, and escalation/confrontation. The control strategies they identified fall into the categories of avoidance, suppression, adjustment, and capitulation.

**SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

Social movements are collective ways of promoting or resisting change. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, “Social movements are an organized effort by a significant number of people to change (or resist change in) some major aspect or aspects of society.” The term was first used by Saint-Simon in France at the turn of the eighteenth century, to characterize the movements of social protest that emerged there and later elsewhere, and was applied to new political forces opposed to the status quo. Nowadays, it is used most commonly with reference to groups and organizations outside the mainstream of the political system. Sociologists have usually been concerned to study the origins of such movements, their sources of recruitment, organizational dynamics, and their impact upon society. Social movements must be distinguished from collective behaviour.

The social movement is one of the major forms of collective behaviour. Social movements are purposeful and organized; collective behaviour is random and chaotic. Examples of social movements would include those supporting civil rights, gay rights, trade unionism, environmentalism, and feminism. Examples of collective behaviour would include riots, fads and crazes, panics, cultic religions, rumours, and mass delusions. Social movements are one of the basic elements of living democracy, and may be catalysts of democracy and change in authoritarian societies. Social movements have specific goals, formal organization, and a degree of continuity. They operate outside the regular political channels of society, but may penetrate quite deeply into political power circles as interest groups. Their goals may be as narrow as legalizing marijuana, or as broad as destroying the hegemony of the capitalist world system; they may be revolutionary or reformist; but they have in common the active organization of a group of citizens to change the status quo in some way.

A social movement is formally defined as “a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist change in society or group of which it is a part” (Turner and Killian). In other words, social movements refer to the collective action by people, in a coordinated
Social movements like the Occupy movement (2011) express collective discontent in a manner, driven by certain ideology, which is sustained over a period of time with its orientation (or resistance) towards change. Stated less formally, a social movement is a collective effort to promote or resist change.

An early typology of social movements, developed by David F. Aberle classifies social movements along two dimensions: the locus of change sought (society or individuals) and the amount of change sought (partial or total). The four categories derived from this classification are transformative, reformative, redemptive, and alternative. These are (respectively) movements which aim at the complete restructuring of society (for example millenarian movements); those which attempt to reform some limited aspects of the existing order (such as nuclear disarmament group); movements which seek to lead members away from a corrupt way of life (as in the case of many religious sectarian groups); and, finally, those which aim to change only particular traits of the individual member (for example drug or alcohol de-addiction). The first two of these are therefore aimed at changing (all or part of) society, the latter pair at changing the behaviour only of individual members.

A Millenarian movement is a social movement based on the expectation of a sudden transformation of society through the intervention of the supernatural. For example, in New Guinea and surrounding islands, a religious movement developed which was popularly known as ‘cargo cult’, resulting in a great variety of similar cults. Cargo cults are based on the expectation that a great cargo ship (or in later cults, airplane) will be brought by the spirits of deceased ancestors, loaded with modern machines, tools, and other goods for the native population. With the aid of this cargo and the help of the spirits, the Europeans will be killed or driven out, and the native population will have the products and standards of living currently enjoyed by the Europeans.
Cargo cults are classified as millenarian movements because they are directed toward a millennium, a day when a sudden supernatural event will occur that will radically change the members’ lives. The cargo cults began to appear in the late nineteenth century, but became more widespread after World War I, particularly in the 1930’s.

Various other scholars have also tried to understand the nature of social movements through different typologies. One of the criteria for classifying movements is their objectives or the quality of change they try to attain. Ghanshyam Shah classifies movements as reform, rebellion, revolt, and revolution to bring about changes in the political system. Reform does not challenge the political system per se. It attempts to bring about certain desired changes within the existing socio-political structure in order to make it more efficient, responsive and workable. That is why the state shows a lenient attitude towards such movements. A rebellion is an attack on existing authority without any intention to seize state power. A revolt is a challenge to political authority, aimed at overthrowing the government. In a revolution, a section or sections of society launch an organised struggle to overthrow not only the established government and regime but also the socio-economic structure which sustains it, and replace the structure by an alternative social order.

Various scholars have proposed different theories of social movements. These include both psychological as well as sociological theories. The psychological theories find the roots of social movements in the personalities of the followers. The two important psychological theories are discontent theory and personal maladjustment theory.

Discontent theory holds that movements are rooted in discontent. People who are comfortable and contented have little interest in social movements. Discontent can be of many kinds, ranging from the searing anger of those who feel victimized by outrageous injustice to the mild annoyance of those who do not approve of some social change. It is probably true that, without discontent, there would be no social movements. But discontent is an inadequate explanation. There is no convincing evidence of any close association between the level of grievance and discontent in a society and its level of social movement activity. People may endure great discontent without joining a social movement. Many societies have endured great poverty, inequality, brutality, and corruption for centuries without serious social protest. And all modern societies always have enough discontent to fuel many social movements. Thus, discontent may be a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for social movement. [Muller, 1972; Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Turner and Killian, 1972]

Personal maladjustment theory sees the social movement as a refuge from personal failure. Many scholars believe that movements find their supporters among the unhappy, frustrated persons whose lives lack meaning and fulfillment. A widely read book written by a self-educated manual labourer, The True Believer [ Eric Hoffer, 1951], describes the kinds of people drawn to social movements: the bored, the misfits, the would-be creative who cannot create, the minorities, the guilty sinners, the downwardly mobile, and others who for any reason are seriously dissatisfied with their lives. They add meaning and purpose to their empty lives through movement activity.

It is plausible that people who feel frustrated and unfulfilled should be more attracted to social movements than those who are complacent and contented. Those who find their present lives absorbing and fulfilling are less in need of something to give them feelings of personal worth and accomplishment, for they already have these. Thus, the movement supporters - and especially the
early supporters - are seen as mainly the frustrated misfits of society. While plausible, the misfit theory is not well substantiated. It is difficult to measure a person’s sense of nonfulfillment. It is yet another theory which sounds reasonable but which cannot easily be proved or disproved.

The sociological theories study the society, rather than the personality of individuals. The three important sociological theories are relative deprivation theory, strain theory, resource mobilization theory and revitalization theory.

The concept of relative deprivation was introduced by Samuel A. Stouffer et al. in their classic social psychological study ‘The American soldier’, 1949, but was later formalized by R. K. Merton in Social Theory and Social Structure, 1961, and extended to a theory of reference group behaviour. Individuals see themselves as deprived (or privileged, hence ‘relative gratification’) by comparing their own situation with that of other groups and categories of persons. The extent to which they will see themselves as deprived will vary according to the category or group selected as the basis of comparison. In other words, the concept of relative deprivation holds that one feels deprived according to the gap between expectations and realizations. The person who wants little and has little feels less deprived than the one who has much but expects still more.

Merton’s understanding of relative deprivation is closely tied to his treatment of reference group behaviour. Essentially, Merton speaks of relative deprivation while examining the findings of ‘The American Soldier’, a work published in 1949. It was found that the privileged members of army were relatively more unhappy and dissatisfied as compared to the relatively unprivileged members who were found to be happier and with high morale. Thus it was discovered in this study that the state of negative emotions and objective conditions are not symmetrically linked. Hence the sense of deprivation is relative, not absolute.

“Comparing himself with his unmarried associates in the army, the married man could feel that induction demanded greater sacrifice from him than from them; and comparing himself with the married civilian friends, he could feel that he had been called on for sacrifices which they were escaping altogether”.

It is important to note that happiness or deprivation are not absolutes, they depend on the scale of measure as well as on the frame of reference. For example, his unmarried associates in the army are relatively free. They don’t have wives and children, so they are free from the responsibility from which married soldiers cannot escape. In other words, married soldiers are deprived of the kind of freedom that their unmarried associates are enjoying. Likewise, the married soldier feels deprived when he compares himself with his civilian married friend because the civilian friends can live with his wife and children and fulfill his responsibility. The married soldier therefore, feels deprived that by virtue of being a soldier he cannot afford to enjoy the normal, day to day family life of a civilian. It is precisely because of the kind of reference group with which the married soldier compares his lot that he feels deprived.

Relative deprivation is increasing throughout most of the underdeveloped world. The recently established independent governments of Third World countries have little hope of keeping up with their peoples’ expectations. The clouds of mass movements and revolutions seem to be widespread in these countries. According to Brinton, revolutions seem most likely to occur not
when people are most miserable but after things have begun to improve, setting off a round of rising expectations.

Relative deprivation theory is plausible but unproved. Feelings of deprivation are easy to infer but difficult to measure, and still more difficult to plot over a period of time. And relative deprivation, even when unmistakably severe, is only one of many factors in social movements.

The ‘strain theory’ of social movement has been propounded by Neil J. Smelser. This theory considers structural strain as the underlying factor contributing to collective behaviour. Structural strains may develop when the equilibrium of society is disturbed due to uneven changes between its various sub-systems. Strain may occur at different levels such as norms, values, mobility, situational facilities, etc. Because of these structural strains some generalised belief that seeks to provide an explanation for the strain, may emerge. Both strain and generalised belief require precipitating factors to trigger off a movement. Smelser’s analysis of the genesis of social movements is very much within the structural-functional framework. Smelser considers strain as something that endangers the relationship among the parts of a system leading to its malfunctioning.

The ‘resource mobilization theory’ stresses techniques rather than causes of movements. It attributes importance to the effective use of resources in promoting social movements, since a successful movement demands effective organization and tactics. Resource mobilization theorists (Zald and McCarthy) see leadership, organization, and tactics as major determinants of the success or failure of social movements. Resource mobilization theorists concede that without grievances and discontent, there would be few movements but add that mobilization is needed to direct this discontent into an effective mass movement.

The resources to be mobilized include: supporting beliefs and traditions among the population, laws that can provide leverage, organizations and officials that can be helpful, potential benefits to be promoted, target groups whom these benefits might attract, any other possible aids. These are weighed against personal costs of movement activity, opposition to be anticipated, other difficulties to be overcome, and tactics of operation to be developed.

Resource mobilization theory does not fit expressive or migratory movements, which can succeed without organization or tactics. Evidence for resource mobilization theory is largely descriptive and is challenged by some scholars. It is likely that societal confusion, personal maladjustment, relative deprivation, discontent, and resource mobilization are all involved in social movements, but in undetermined proportions. As usual, we have several theories, each plausible, each supported by some evidence, but none clearly proved. Social movements are of so many kinds, with so many variables involved, that possibly no one theory will ever be conclusively established.

The ‘revitalization theory’ was initially put forward by A.F.C. Wallace. Wallace postulated that social movements develop out of a deliberate, organised and conscious effort on the part of members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture for themselves. This explanation of genesis of social movement substantially departs from the above explanations. Both the relative deprivation and the strain theories are based on negative conditions. They argue that movements emerge because people experience deprivation and discrimination. The revitalization approach, however, suggests that social movements offer a positive programme of action to revitalise the
system. Thus, according to this theory, social movements not only express dissatisfaction and dissent against the existing condition but also provide alternatives for resurgence of the system.

Herbert Blumer and other scholars have posed a life cycle which many movements follow. The stages include: (1) the *unrest* stage of growing confusion and discontent; (2) the *excitement* stage, when discontent is focused, causes of discontent are identified, and proposals for action are debated; (3) the *formalization* stage, when leaders emerge, programs are developed, alliances are forged, and organizations and tactics are developed; (4) an *institutionalization* stage, as organizations take over from the early leaders, bureaucracy is entrenched, and ideology and program become crystallized, often ending the active life of the movement; (5) the *dissolution* stage, when the movement either becomes an enduring organization (like the YMCA) or fades away, possibly to be revived at some later date.
THEORIES OF RELIGION

FUNCTIONAL THEORIES OF RELIGION

MALINOWSKI
Malinowski uses data from small-scale non-literate societies to develop his thesis on religion. Many of his examples are drawn from his field work in the Trobriand Islands off the coast of New Guinea. Like Durkheim, Malinowski sees religion as reinforcing social norms and values and promoting social solidarity. Unlike Durkheim, however, he does not see religion reflecting society as a whole, nor does he see religious ritual as the worship of society itself. Malinowski identifies specific areas of social life with which religion is concerned, to which it is addressed. These are situations of emotional stress which threaten social solidarity.

Anxiety and tension tend to disrupt social life. Situations which produce these emotions include crises of life such as birth, puberty, marriage and death. Malinowski notes that in all societies these life crises are surrounded with religious ritual. He sees death as the most disruptive of these events and argues that, the existence of strong personal attachments and the fact of death, which of all human events is the most upsetting and disorganizing to man’s calculations, are perhaps the main sources of religious beliefs. Religion deals with the problem of death in the following manner. A funeral ceremony expresses the belief in immortality, which denies the fact of death, and so comforts the bereaved. Other mourners support the bereaved by their presence at the ceremony. This comfort and support checks the emotions which death produces, and controls the stress and anxiety which might disrupt society. Death is ‘socially destructive’ since Millenarian movements do not inevitably occur in response to the above conditions; they are only one possible response to them. The history of the Teton Sioux shows a number of alternative responses: armed aggression; a new way of life farming; a religion based on passive acceptance and resignation - the Ghost Dance was followed by the Peyote Way, an inward-looking religion based on an Indian version of Christianity and mystical experiences produced by the drug peyote; political agitation - the rise of Red Power in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The Marxian view of religion as a response to exploitation and oppression helps to explain many millenarian movements. Engels argues that millenarian movements are an awakening of proletarian self-consciousness. He sees them as an attempt by oppressed groups to change the world and remove their oppression here and now, rather than in the afterlife. Peter Worsley takes a similar view in his study of cargo cults. He sees them as a forerunner of political awareness and organization. Some millenarian movements, particularly in Africa and Melanesia, do develop into political movements. However, this is generally not the case in Medieval Europe and North America.

EMILE DURKHEIM

In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, first published in 1912, Emile Durkheim presented what is probably the most influential interpretation of religion from a functionalist perspective. Durkheim argues that all societies divide the world into two categories, the sacred and the profane, or more simply, the sacred and the non sacred. Religion is based upon this division. It is ‘a unified system of beliefs and practices related to sacred things, that is to say things set apart and forbidden’. It is important to realize that, ‘By sacred things one must not understand simply those personal things which are called gods or spirits; a rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a piece of wood, a house, in a word...
anything can be sacred’. There is nothing about the particular qualities of a pebble or a tree which makes them sacred. Therefore sacred things must be symbols, they must represent something. To understand the role of religion in society, the relationship between sacred symbols and that which they represent must be established.

Durkheim uses the religion of various groups of Australian aborigines to develop his argument. He sees their religion, which he calls totemism, as the simplest and most basic form of religion. Aborigine society is divided into several clans. A clan is like a large extended family with its members sharing certain duties and obligations. For example, clans have a rule of exogamy - members may not marry within the clan. Clan members have a duty to aid and assist each other; they join together to mourn the death of one of their number and to revenge a member who has been wronged by someone from another clan. Each clan has a totem, usually an animal or a plant. The totem is a symbol. It is the emblem of the clan, ‘It is its flag; it is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from all others’.

However, the totem is more than this, it is a sacred symbol. It is carved on the bullroarer, the most sacred object in aborigine ritual. The totem is The outward and visible form of the totemic principle or god. Durkheim argues that if the totem, Is at once the symbol of god and of the society, is that not because the god and the society are only one? Thus he suggests that in worshipping god, men are in fact worshipping society. Society is the real object of religious veneration.

How does man come to worship society? Sacred things are considered superior in dignity and power to profane things and particularly to man’. In relation to the sacred, man’s position is inferior and dependent. This relationship between man and sacred things is exactly the relationship between man and society. Society is more important and powerful than the individual. Durkheim argues that, ‘Primitive man comes to view society as something sacred because he is utterly dependent on it’. But why does man not simply worship society itself? Why does he invent a sacred symbol like a totem? Because, Durkheim argues, ‘it is easier for him to visualize and direct his feelings of awe toward a symbol than towards so complex a thing as a clan’.

Durkheim argues that social life is impossible without the shared values and moral beliefs which form the ‘collective conscience’. In their absence, there would be no social order, social control, social solidarity or cooperation. In short, there would be no society. Religion reinforces the collective conscience. The worship of society strengthens the values and moral beliefs which form the basis of social life. By defining them as sacred, religion provides them with greater power to direct human action. The attitude of respect towards the sacred is the same attitude applied to social duties and obligations. In worshipping society, men are, in effect, recognizing the importance of the social group and their dependence upon it. In this way religion strengthens the unity of the group, it promotes social solidarity. Durkheim emphasizes the importance of collective worship. The social group comes together in religious rituals infused with drama and reverence. Together, its members express their faith in common values and beliefs. In this highly charged atmosphere of collective worship, the integration of society is strengthened. Members of society express, communicate and comprehend the moral bonds which unite them.

Durkheim’s ideas remain influential, though they are not without criticism. Some anthropologists have argued that he is not justified in seeing totemism as a religion. Most sociologists believe that Durkheim has overstated his case. Whilst agreeing that religion is important for promoting social solidarity and reinforcing social values, they would not support the view that religion is the worship of
society. Durkheim’s views on religion are more relevant to small, non-literate societies, where there is a close integration of culture and social institutions, where work, leisure, education and family life tend to merge, and where members share a common belief and value system. They are less relevant to modern societies, which have many subcultures, social and ethnic groups, specialized organisations and a range of religious beliefs, practices and institutions.

THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE

The concepts of sacred and profane are central to Durkheim’s theory of religion. According to him, all aspects of human experience can be divided into two radically and diametrically opposed categories: the sacred and the profane.

What is the nature of the Sacred?
Durkheim says that the sacred is ideal and transcends everyday existence; it is extra-ordinary, potentially dangerous, awe-inspiring, fear-inducing. The sacred, for Durkheim, refers to things set apart by man, including religious beliefs, rites, duties, or anything socially defined as requiring special religious treatment. The sacred has extra-ordinary, supernatural, and often dangerous qualities and can usually be approached only through some form of ritual, such as prayer, incantation, or ceremonial cleansing. Almost anything can be sacred: a god, a rock; a cross, the moon, the earth, a king, a tree, an animal or bird, or a symbol, such as swastik. These are sacred only because some community has marked them as sacred. Once established as ‘sacred’, however, they become symbols of religious beliefs, sentiments and practices.

What is the Profane?
The profane is mundane, that is, anything ordinary. It is a part of the ordinary realm rather than the supernatural world. The profane or ordinary or unholy embraces those ideas, persons, practices, and things that are regarded with an everyday attitude of commonness, utility and familiarity. It is that which is not supposed to come into contact with or take precedence over the sacred. The unholy or the ‘profane is also believed to contaminate the ‘holy’ or ‘sacred’. It is the denial or sub-ordination of the holy in some way. The attitudes and behaviour toward it are charged with negative emotions and hedged about by strong taboos. A rock, the moon, a king, a tree or a symbol may also be considered profane. It means something becomes sacred or profane only when it is basically defined as such by a community of believers.

The sacred and the profane are closely related because of the highly emotional attitude towards them. The distinction between the two is not very much clear, but ambiguous. As Durkheim has pointed out, the circle of sacred objects cannot be determined, then, once and for all. Its extent varies indefinitely according to different religions. The significance of the sacred lies in the fact of its distinction from the profane: The sacred thing is par excellence that which profane should not touch and cannot touch with impurity. Man always draws this distinction of the two orders in different times and places. Participation in the sacred order, for example, in rituals and ceremonies, gives a special social prestige, which actually reveals one of the social functions of religion. Mechanisms are established by all religions for keeping these two worlds (sacred and profane) from communication with one another. One result of this segregation is that the sacred cannot be questioned or challenged by the profane. The sacred can remain fixed or stable to the degree that it succeeds in insulating itself from the secular or profane. Breaches of this segregation are treated as sacriligious or heretical and may be dealt with by a wide range of sanctions. -Bernard S. Philips writes in his book, ‘Sociology Social Structure and Change’.
Nature and Qualities of the Sacred
Metta Spencer and Alex Inkeles have enlisted seven qualities of the sacred as described by Durkheim. They are:
(i) The sacred is recognised as a power or force,
(ii) It is characterised by ambiguity in that, it is both physical and moral, human and cosmic, positive and negative, attractive and repugnant, helpful and dangerous to men,
(iii) It is non-utilitarian,
(iv) It is non-empirical
(v) It does not involve knowledge of any rational or scientific character,
(vi) It strengthens and supports worshippers, and
(vii) It makes moral demand on the believer and worhipper.

The sacred quality is not intrinsic to objects but is conferred on them by religious thought and feeling. The sacred does not help one to manipulate natural forces and is useless in practical sense. It is not even an experience based on knowledge and the senses, but involves a definite break with the everyday world.

God as Sacred. The sacred may be a supernatural being, that is, god. Those who believe in one god are monotheists. More than 985 million Christians, 14.5 million Jews and 471 million Muslims are monotheists. Those who worship more than one god are polytheists, say, the Hindus, whose number exceeds 472 millions.

Ghost as Sacred. Gods are not alone among the sacred. Many worship the sacred ghost or ancestor spirit. Such spirits are also believed to possess superhuman qualities. But they are of human origin rather than of divine. Shintoism, for example, with its more than 60 million followers (mostly found in Japan) is based on reverence towards family ancestors.

Moral or Philosophical Principle as Sacred. A moral or philosophical principle can also be sacred. For example, the Asian religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism—all stress the importance of certain ethical and spiritual ideals. Buddhism is more concerned with Buddha’s message of four noble truths than with him as the god. Similarly, more importance is laid on the Eight-fold path ‘to attain nirvana a state of spiritual detachment.

Totem as the Sacred : Totems are another example of Durkheim’s sacred things. The totemic object—an animal or plant—is worshipped by primitive people all over the world. The totem is a symbol, a treasury of deep group-based sentiments and feelings. It is worshipped as a god or as an ancestor, or both, and it generally possesses some special quality or significance for the religious community.

Supernatural Force as Sacred. A supernatural force is still another example of a sacred thing although it has no shape of its own. Example : On certain islands of Oceania, a warrior successful in battle while using a particular spear will attribute his victory to mana—a supernatural force that entered his spear. The supernatural force, on the whole, may be good or bad. Thus, whether be it a force, or a god, a ghost, a moral principle, or a totemic object—all are elements of Durkheim’s definition of religion. All are forms of the sacred and all bear witness to the existence of religious behaviour.

"To what do the sacred symbols of religious belief and practice refer? — Durkheim asks. Durkheim is of the opinion that they cannot refer to the external environment or to individual human nature but
only to the moral reality of society. The source and object of religion are the collective life; the sacred is at bottom society personified.

Thus, according to Durkheim, man’s attitudes towards God and society are more or less similar. Both “inspire the sensation of divinity, both possess moral authority and stimulate devotion, self-sacrifice and exceptional individual behaviour. The individual who feels dependent on some external moral power is not, therefore, a victim of hallucination but a member of and responding to society itself. Durkheim concludes that the substantial function of religion is the creation, reinforcement and maintenance of social solidarity. So long as society persists so will religion.

FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION

The universal existence of religion shows that religion has a great survival value. The universality of religion is not based upon the forms of belief and practice, but upon the social functions which religion universally fulfills. These functions are of great individual as well as social significance.

1. **Religion Provides Religious Experience.** This is the basic function of religion. Prayer, worship and meditation are the summary of religious experience. Through these means man expresses awe, reverence, gratitude and allegiance to the Almighty or the God, or the Supernatural Force. When an individual comes into contact with the supernatural he undergoes some sort of peculiar, inexplicable experience. He converses with the divine through prayers. He forgets the worldly life and its problems. This religious experience ennobles the human desires, ideals and values. It facilitates the development of personality, sociability and creativeness.
2. Religion Provides Peace of Mind. Religion provides for the individual the most desired peace of mind. At every crisis, personal or collective, religion is called in for consolation and peace of mind. It promotes goodness and helps the development of character. In a world full of uncertainties, indefiniteness, dangers, insecurities and unhappiness, the need for safety and security is really great. Religion here acts as the healer of the ills of life. It reduces one’s grievances to some extent. It gives the individuals emotional support in the face of uncertainty. It consoles them when they are disappointed. It reconciles them when they are estranged from the goals and norms of society. In doing this it supports established values and goals and reinforces the morale. It offers man inspiration, hope, faith, optimism and courage.

3. Religion Promotes Social Solidarity, Unity and Identity. Religion upholds and validates the traditional ways of the life. More than that it unites people. It is known that a common faith, common value-judgements, common sentiments, common worship are significant factors in unifying people. By their participation in religious rituals and worship, people try to identify themselves as having something in common. Religion affects an individual’s understanding of who they are (people) and what they are. As Davis points out, “Religion gives the individual a sense of identity with the distant past and the limitless future. As Thomas F. O'Dea says, in periods of rapid social change and large-scale social mobility, the contribution of religion to identity may become greatly enhanced. As A.W. Green has pointed out religion is “the supremely integrating and unifying force in human society”.

4. Religion Conserves the Value of Life. Religion is an effective means of preserving the values of life. Religion defines and redefines the values. Moral, spiritual and social values are greatly supported by religion. It exercises a tremendous influence over the younger ones and their behaviour. Through such agencies like the family and the Church, religion inculcates the values of life in the minds of the growing children. Further, as Thomas F.0’Dea says, religion sacralises the norms and values of established society. It maintains the dominance of group goals over individual impulses.

5. Religion is an Agent of Social Control. Religion is one of the forms of informal means of social control. It regulates the activities of people in its own way. It prescribes rules of conduct for people to follow. The conceptions of spirits, ghosts, taboos, souls, commandments, sermons, decontrol human action and enforce discipline. Ideas of hell and heaven have strong effect on the behaviour of people. Thus, religion has a great disciplinary value. Religion has its own methods to deal with those individuals who violate its norms. It has its own ways to reintegrate the disobedient into the social group. Further religious sanctions are widely made use of to support the ethical codes and moral practices among many peoples.

6. Priestly Function of Religion. By performing its priestly function religion contributes to the stability and order of the society. Religion offers a kind of relationship with the beyond through different kinds of worship and beliefs. By this it provides the emotional ground for a new security. Through its authoritative teaching of beliefs and values, it provides similar points of opinion and avoids conflicts. It contributes to the maintenance of the status quo.

7. Religion Promotes Welfare. Religion renders service to the people and promotes their welfare. It appeals to the people to be sympathetic, merciful and co-operative. It rouses in them the spirit of mutual help and co-operation. It awakens the philanthropic attitude of the people. It reinforces the sense of belonging to the group. It promotes art, culture and provides means for the
development of character on the right lines. Various religious organisations like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Hindu Seva Pratishthana, Ramakrishna Mission, Arya Samaj, Brahma Samaj, The Society of Jesus, etc. are engaged in various social, educational, aesthetic, cultural, civic, medical, and other activities.

8. Religion Provides Recreation. Religion promotes recreation through religious lectures, Kirtanas, dramas, dance, music, bhajanas, puranas, harikathas, fairs, festivals, musical concerts, art exhibitions and so on. It tries to make men sorrowless and fearless. Various religious festivals and rituals can provide relief to the disturbed mind.

9. Religion Explains Individual Suffering and Helps to Integrate Personality. Man has never lived by knowledge alone. Man is a rational as well as an emotional creature. The things for which men strive in this world are in some measure denied to them. If the aim is to Propagate a faith, persecution may bring failure. If the aim is to achieve fame, a mediocre career may bring disillusionment. If the aim is to become rich in business, heavy loss in it may bring disheartenment. With a multiplicity of goals no individual can escape frustration. But the culture provides him with goals that anybody can reach. These are goals that transcend the world of actual experience, with the consequence that no evidence of failure to attain them can be conclusive. If the individual believes that he has gained them, that is sufficient. All he needs is sufficient faith. The greater his disappointment in this life, the greater his faith in the next. Religion tries to give release from the very thing it instills, guilt. Ritual means are freely provided for wiping away guilt, so that one can count on divine grace.

10. Religion Enhances Self-Importance. Religion expands the self to infinite proportions. Religious belief relates the self to the infinite or Cosmic Design. Through unity with the infinite the self is ennobled, made majestic. Man considers himself the noblest work of God with whom he shall be united. His self thus becomes grand and elevated.

Conclusion. It is true, that the rapid developments in the field of civilisation, in physical and biological sciences, have affected the functions, of religion to a great extent. Some of the age old religious beliefs have been exploded by the scientific investigations. Science has often shaken the religious faith. The growing secular and the rationalist attitude has posed a challenge, a serious question Can the society rely on the acceptance of certain ethical and moral principles without believing in the existence of a spiritual or superempirical world Still, it is understandable that the institution of religion is so deep-rooted and long-lasting that it will continue to function in the near future withstand ing the dangers of changes and the ravages of time.

TOTEMISM

Durkheim used the religion of various groups of Australian Aborigines to develop his argument. He saw their religion, which he called totemism, as the simplest and most basic form of religion.

Aborigine society is divided into several clans. A clan is like a large extended family, with its members sharing certain duties and obligations. For example, clans have a rule of exogamy - that is, members are not allowed to marry within the clan. Clan members have a duty to aid and assist each other: they join together to mourn the death of one of their number and to revenge a member who has been wronged by someone from another clan.
Each clan has a totem, usually an animal or a plant. This totem is then represented by drawings made on wood or stone. These drawings are called churingas. Usually churingas are at least as sacred as the species which they represent and sometimes more so. The totem is a symbol. It is the emblem of the clan. It is its flag; it is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from all others. However, the totem is more than the churinga which represents it—it is the most sacred object in Aborigine ritual. The totem is ‘the outward and visible form of the totemic principle or god’.

Durkheim argued that if the totem is at once the symbol of god and of the society, is that not because the god and the society are only one? ‘Thus, he suggested, In worshipping god, people are in fact worshipping society. Society is the real object of religious veneration.

How does humanity come to worship society? Sacred things are considered superior in dignity and power to profane things and particularly to man’. In relation to the sacred, humans are inferior and dependent. This relationship between humanity and sacred things is exactly the relationship between humanity and society. Society is more important and powerful than the individual. Durkheim argued: ‘Primitive man comes to view society as something sacred because he is utterly dependent on it.’

But why does humanity not simply worship society itself? Why does it invent a sacred symbol like a totem? Because, Durkheim argued, it is easier for a person to visualize and direct his feelings of awe toward a symbol than towards so complex a thing as a clan.

**Religion and the collective conscience**

Durkheim believed that social life was impossible without the shared values and moral beliefs that form the collective conscience. In their absence, there would be no social order, social control, social solidarity or cooperation. In short, there would be no society. Religion reinforces the collective
conscience. The worship of society strengthens the values and moral beliefs that form the basis of social life. By defining them as sacred, religion provides them with greater power to direct human action.

This attitude of respect towards the sacred is the same attitude applied to social duties and obligations. In worshipping society, people, in effect, recognizing the importance of the social group and their dependence upon it. In this way, religion strengthens the unity of the group: it promotes social solidarity.

Durkheim emphasized the importance of collective worship. The social group comes together in religious rituals full of drama and reverence. Together, its members express their faith in common values and beliefs. In this highly charged atmosphere of collective worship, the integration of society is strengthened. Members of society express, communicate and understand the moral bonds which unite them.

According to Durkheim, the belief in gods or spirits, which usually provide the focus for religious ceremonies, originated from belief in the ancestral spirits of dead relatives. The worship of gods is really the worship of ancestors’ souls. Since Durkheim also believed that soul represent the presence of social values, the collective conscience is present in individuals. It is through individual souls that the collective conscience is realised. Since religious worship involves the worship of souls, Durkheim again concludes that religious worship is really the worship of the social group or society.

Evaluation of Durkheim
Durkheim’s ideas are still influential today, although they have been criticised:

1. Critics have argued that Durkheim studied only a small number of Aboriginal groups, which were somewhat untypical of other Aboriginal tribes. It may therefore be misleading to generalise about Aboriginal beliefs from this sample, never mind generalising about religion as a whole. Andrew Dawson (2011) points out that some of the fieldwork data which Durkheim relied upon was of doubtful validity.

2. Most sociologists believe that Durkheim overstated his case. While agreeing that religion can be important for promoting social solidarity and reinforcing social values, they would not support his view that religion is the worship of society. Durkheim’s views on religion are more relevant to small, non-literate societies, where there is a close integration of culture and social institutions, where work, leisure, education and family life tend to merge, and where members share a common belief and value system. His views are less relevant to modern societies, which have many subcultures, social and ethnic groups, specialized organizations, and a range of religious beliefs, practices and institutions.

3. Durkheim may also overstate the degree to which the collective conscience permeates and shapes the behaviour of individuals. Hamilton (1995) argues that sometimes religious beliefs can be at odds with societal values.

Despite the extensive criticism of Durkheim, many sociologists recognize that he has made an important contribution to understanding religion. For example, William E. Paden (2009) argues that Durkheim’s observations about the importance of religion for social solidarity remain valid in many circumstances today. The symbolic importance of the Western (or Wailing) Wall in Jerusalem for Jews is an example of the continuing symbolic importance of sacred objects. Another example is how...
the different ways in which Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims hold their arms when praying demonstrates the importance of markers of identity in collective worship in holding communities together and producing social solidarity. Dawson concludes that Durkheim's theoretical approach is criticised for both attributing society an overly autonomous status from its human occupants and over-emphasising social order and continuity to the detriment of societal dynamism and transformation. Despite its limitations, however, Durkheim's work continues as an important reference point for contemporary sociological reflection.

TALCOTT PARSONS
Religion and value consensus
Talcott Parsons argued that human action is directed and controlled by norms provided by the social system. The cultural system provides more general guidelines for action in the form of beliefs, values and systems of meaning. The norms which direct action are not merely isolated standards for behaviour: they are integrated and patterned by the cultural system's values and beliefs. For example, many norms in Western society are expressions of the value of materialism. Religion is part of the cultural system, and religious beliefs provide guidelines for human action and standards against which people's conduct can be evaluated.

In a Christian society the Ten Commandments operate in this way. They demonstrate how many of the norms of the social system can be integrated by religious beliefs. For example, the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' integrates such diverse norms as the way to drive a car, how to settle an argument and how to deal with the suffering of the aged. The norms that direct these areas of behaviour prohibit manslaughter, murder and euthanasia, but they are all based on the same religious commandment.

In this way, religion provides general guidelines for conduct, which are expressed in a variety of norms. By establishing general principles and moral beliefs, religion helps to provide the consensus that Parsons believes is necessary for order and stability in society.

Religion and social order
Parsons, like Malinowski, sees religion as being addressed to particular problems that occur in all societies and disrupt social life. These problems fall into two categories. The first consists in the fact that individuals are hit by events which they cannot foresee and prepare for, or control, or both. One such event is death, particularly premature death. Like Malinowski, and for similar reasons. Parsons sees religion as a mechanism for adjustment to such events and as a means of restoring the normal pattern of life.

The second problem area is that of 'uncertainty'. This refers to endeavours in which a great deal of effort and skill has been invested, but where unknown or uncontrollable factors can threaten a successful outcome. One example is humanity’s inability to predict or control the effect of weather upon agriculture. Again, following Malinowski, Parsons argues that religion provides a means of adjusting and coming to terms with such situations through rituals which act as ‘a tonic to self-confidence’.

In this way, religion maintains social stability by relieving the tension and frustration that could disrupt social order.
Religion and meaning
As a part of the cultural system, religious beliefs give meaning to life; they answer, in Parsons's rather sexist words, man's questions about himself and the world he lives in. Social life is full of contradictions that threaten the meanings people place on life. Parsons argues that one of the major functions of religion is to make sense of all experiences, no matter how meaningless or contradictory they appear.

A good example of this is the question of suffering: 'Why must men endure deprivation and pain and so unequally and haphazardly, if indeed at all?' Religion provides a range of answers: suffering is imposed by God to test a person's faith; it is a punishment for sins; and suffering with fortitude will bring its reward in heaven. Suffering thus becomes meaningful. Similarly, the problem of evil is common to all societies. It is particularly disconcerting when people profit through evil actions. Religion solves this contradiction by stating that evil will receive its just deserts in the afterlife.

Parsons therefore sees a major function of religion as the provision of meaning to events that people do not expect, or feel ought not to happen. This allows intellectual and emotional adjustment. On a more general level, this adjustment promotes order and stability in society.

CRITICISMS OF THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH
The functionalist perspective emphasises the positive contributions of religion to society and tends to ignore its dysfunctional aspects. With its preoccupation with harmony, integration and solidarity, functionalism neglects the many instances where religion can be seen as a divisive and disruptive force. It bypasses the frequent examples of internal divisions within a community over questions of religious dogma and worship - divisions that can lead to open conflict. It gives little consideration to hostility between different religious groups within the same society such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq, or Hindus and Muslims in India. In such cases religion can be seen as a direct threat to social order. As Charles Glock and Rodney Stark (1965) state in their criticism of functionalist views on religion: We find it difficult to reconcile the general theory with considerable evidence of religious conflict. On every side it would seem that religion threatens social integration as readily as it contributes to it. The history of Christianity, with its many schisms, manifests the great power of religion not merely to bind but to divide.

DYSFUNCTIONS OF RELIGION
Religion as a basic social institution of human society has been fulfilling certain positive functions no doubt. Its role in promoting social solidarity, as Durkheim has pointed out, and its need in providing inner individual peace and solace as Edward Sapir has pointed out cannot be undermined. By looking at these manifest positive functions of religion one should not jump to the conclusion that religion brings man only advantages. Religion, on the contrary, has its own dysfunctional aspect also. It does certain disservices also. Sumner and Keller, Benjamin Kidd, Gillin, Karl Marx, Thomas F. O'dea and others have pin pointed the negative side of the functions or the dysfunctions of religion also. According to Thomas F. O'Dea, one of the functionalists, the main dysfunctions of religion are as follows.

1. Religion inhibits protests and impedes social changes. Religion provides man emotional consolation and helps him to reconcile himself with situations. In doing so, T.F.O' Dea remarks, religion inhibits protests and impedes social changes which may even prove to be beneficial to the
welfare of the society. All protests and conflicts are not always negative. Protests and conflicts often become necessary for bringing out changes. Some changes would certainly lead to positive reforms. By inhibiting protests and preventing changes religion may postpone reforms. This effect of religion can contribute to the build up of explosive resentments which eventually result in revolution and in most costly and destructive changes. In fact, In Europe and America the vigorous conflict of classes and other groups led to a better distribution of the national product, a more harmonious relationship of classes, a better control of the society over its environment, and a more stable and orderly society. Religion often played a role in that history, to some extent inhibiting such conflict.

2. **Hampers the adaptation of society to changed condition.** A religion can make norms of behaviour and can also sacralise the norms and values of society. Some of the norms which lose their appropriateness under changed conditions may also be imposed by religion. This can impede a more functionally appropriate adaptation of society to changing conditions. Example: During the Medieval Period in Europe, the “Church refused to grant the ethical legitimacy of money-lending at interest, despite the great functional need of this activity in a situation of developing capitalism”. Even today, traditional Muslims face religio-ethical problems concerning interest-taking. Similar social conflict is evident in the case of birth control measures including abortion, in the Catholic world.

3. **Religion increases conflict and makes the evolution of realistic solutions more difficult.** By performing its prophetic function religion may “provide standards of value in terms of which institutionalised norms may be critically examined and found seriously wanting. But this function can also have its dysfunctional consequences. Religious criticism of the existing norms and values may become so unrealistic that it beclouds genuine issues. The religious “demands for reform may become so utopian that they constitute an obstacle in the working out of more practical action”. Religion may also set up standards that are untimely. Religion always seeks to see its demands as the will of God, and in that, it may impart an extremism to the conflict that renders compromise impossible. Example: Because of religious convictions, the left-wing Protestant sects of the Reformation period became the victims of intolerance. Due to this intolerance some of these Protestants took some extreme positions that any compromise between them and the general society was actually impossible.

4. **Impedes the development of new identities.** “In fulfilling its identity function religion may foster certain loyalties which may actually impede the development of new identities which are more appropriate to new situations.” Religious identification may prove to be divisive to societies. Religion builds deeply into the personality structures of people a strong animosity that makes them to oppose their opponents tooth and nail. In the religious wars that followed Reformation this animosity (which was the result of religious identifications) was very much evident. Like the ideology of communism and nationalism, religion too provides for an element of identity which promotes inter-group conflicts by dividing people along religious lines.

5. **Religion may foster dependence and irresponsibility.** Religion often makes its followers to become dependents on religious institutions and leaders instead of developing in them an ability to assume individual responsibility and self-direction. It is quite common to observe in India that a good number of people prefer to take the advices of priests and religious leaders before starting some great ventures instead of taking the suggestion of those who are competent in the field. However. It is difficult to assess the exact role of religion in hampering the sense of responsibility and self dependence of an individual, without an appeal to his own values. Still it could be said that religion's role with respect to individual development and maturation, is highly problematic.
Many wars have been fought in the name of religion. (Above) Crusades (1095 – 1291) were religious wars sanctioned by the Church aimed at recovering the Holy Land from Muslims.

Other Dysfunctions of Religion

1. Conservative and Retards Progress. Religion is said to be conservative. It is regarded as retrogressive and not progressive. Religion upholds traditionalism and supports the status quo. It is not readily amenable to change.

2. Promotes Evil Practices. Religion in its course of development, has at times, supported evil practices such as cannibalism, suicide, slavery, incest, killing of the aged, untouchability, human and animal sacrifice, etc. There is hardly a vice which religion has not at one time or another actively supported.

3. Creates Confusions, Contradictions and Conflicts. Religion consists of some inconsistencies. It has supported war and peace, wealth and poverty, hard work and idleness, virginity and prostitution. Religion has not offered any absolute standard of morality.

4. Contributes to Inequalities and Exploitation. Religion perpetuates the distance between rich and the poor, the propertied class and propertyless class. More than that, as Marx said, religion has often been used as an instrument of exploiting the poor and the depressed class. Hence Marx calls religion as the opium of the masses.

5. Promotes Superstitious Beliefs. Superstition is closely related to religion. Religion has promoted superstitious beliefs which have caused man more harm than good. Ex: the belief that evil spirits and ghosts cause diseases, the belief that God is responsible for the birth of children.

6. Religion Causes Wastes. Sumner and Keller are of the opinion that religion often causes economic wastes. Ex. : Investing huge sums of money on building temples, churches, mosques, etc., speeding much on religious fairs, festivals and ceremonies, spoiling huge quantity of food articles, material things, etc., in the name of offerings. It leads to waste of human labour, energy and time.

7. Religion Wrecks Unity. Religion creates vast diversities among people. Religion not only brings people together but also keeps them at a distance. Wars and battles have been fought in the name of religion. Loot, plundering, mass killing, rape, arson and other cruel treatments have been meted out to some people in the name of God and religion.
8. Religion Undermines Human Potentiality. Religion by placing high premium on divine power and divine grace has made people to become fatalistic. By tracing the cause of all the phenomenon to some divine power, religion has undermined human power, potentiality. This adversely affected the creativity of man.

9. Religion Retards Scientific Achievements. Science is often regarded as a challenge to religion. Religion has time and again tried to prevent the attempts of scientist from revealing newly discovered facts. It made Galileo to renounce his painstakingly established doctrines. Similarly, it tried to suppress the doctrines of Darwin, Huxley and others. Thus religion has interfered with the free inquiry of scholars. Further, it has suppressed the democratic aspirations of the people.

10. Religion Promotes Fanaticism. Faith without reasoning is blind. Religion has often made people to become blind, dumb and deaf to the reality. On the contrary, it has often made people to become bigots and fanatics. Bigotry and fanaticism have led to persecution, inhuman treatment and misery in the past.

It is clear from the above description that religion has its bright as well as the dark side on positive and negative functions. Religion as a social mechanism or phenomenon has been subject to human use and abuse in the past. Religion has been used to serve humanity and also abused to

MARXIST VIEWS OF RELIGION

From Marx’s point of view, religion is a form of mystification - a distortion of the real relationships between people and inanimate objects. Through religion, humans project personal characteristics onto the impersonal forces of nature- they create gods whom they believe to have control over nature. This renders nature potentially open to manipulation by humans, for example through prayer or sacrifice.

However, to Marx this is a form of alienation. People create imaginary beings or forces which stand above them and control their behaviour. Marx says, in religion people make their empirical world into an entity that is only conceived, imagined, that confronts them as something foreign.

However, Marx did not believe that religion would last forever. Rather, religion was rooted in societies that alienated and exploited their members, and when such societies were superseded, religion would no longer be necessary. Ultimately, the proletariat would remove the need for religion by replacing capitalist society. Marx argued that the social principles of Christianity are sneaking and hypocritical, and the proletariat is revolutionary.

In Marx’s vision of the ideal, communist society, exploitation and alienation are things of the past. The means of production are communally owned, which results in the disappearance of social classes. Members of society are fulfilled as human beings: they control their own destinies and work together for the common good. Religion does not exist in this communist utopia because the social condition that produce it have disappeared.

To Marx, religion is therefore an illusion that eases the pain produced by exploitation and oppression. It is a series of myths that justify and legitimate the subordination of the subject class and the domination and privilege of the ruling class. It is a distortion of reality which provides many of the deceptions that form the basis of ruling-class ideology and false class consciousness.
Religion as 'the opium of the people'

In Marx’s words ‘Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people’. Religion acts as an opiate to dull the pain produced by oppression. It is both an expression of real suffering and a protest against suffering, but it does little to solve the problem because it helps to make life more bearable and therefore dilutes demands for change. As such, religion merely stupefies its adherents rather than bringing them true happiness and fulfillment. Similarly, Lenin argued that ‘religion is a kind of spiritual gin in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claims to any decent life’.

From a Marxist perspective, religion can dull the pain of oppression in the following ways:

1. It promises a paradise of eternal bliss in life after death. Engels argued that the appeal of Christianity to oppressed classes lies in its promise of salvation from bondage and misery ’in the afterlife. The Christian vision of heaven can make life on earth more bearable by giving people something to look forward to.

2. Some religions either make a virtue of the suffering produced by oppression or see it as justified punishment. As Marx put it, The social principles of Christianity declare all the vile acts of the oppressors against the oppressed to be either a just punishment for original sins, or trials which the Lord, in his infinite wisdom, ordains for the redeemed’. When suffering is seen as a trial, it promises reward for those who bear the deprivations of poverty with dignity and humility. As the well-known biblical quotation says.’ It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.’ Religion thus makes poverty more tolerable by offering a reward for suffering and promising compensation for injustice in the afterlife.
3. Religion can offer the hope of supernatural intervention to solve problems on earth. Members of religious groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses live in anticipation of the day when the supernatural powers will descend from on high and create heaven on earth. Anticipation of this future can make the present more acceptable.

4. Religion often justifies the social order and a person’s position within it. God can be seen as creating and ordaining the social structure, as in the following verse from the Victorian hymn ‘All things bright and beautiful’:

   The rich man in his castle,
   The poor man at his gate,
   God made them high and lowly,
   And ordered their estate.

In this way, social arrangements appear inevitable. This can help those at the bottom of the stratification system to accept and come to terms with their situation. It can make life more bearable by encouraging people to accept their situation philosophically.

Religion and social control
From a Marxist viewpoint, religion does not simply cushion the effects of oppression: it is also an instrument of that oppression. It acts as a mechanism of social control, maintaining the existing system of exploitation and reinforcing class relationships. Marx says that Christianity preaches cowardice, self-contempt, submissiveness and humbleness’ to the proletariat. In doing so, it keeps them in their place. Furthermore, by making unsatisfactory lives bearable, religion tends to discourage people from attempting to change their situation. By offering an illusion of hope in a hopeless situation, it prevents thoughts of overthrowing the system.

Religion is not, however, solely the province of oppressed groups. In the Marxist view, ruling classes adopt religious beliefs to justify their position both to themselves and to others. The lines God made them high and lowly / And ordered their estate show how religion can be used to justify social inequality to the rich as well as the poor.

The ruling classes often directly support religion to further their interests. In the words of Marx and Engels,’ the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord’. In feudal England the lord of the manor’s power was frequently legitimated by pronouncements from the pulpit. In return for this support, landlords would often richly endow the established church.

Because religion was an instrument of oppression, it followed that if oppression came to an end then religio would no longer be necessary. Marx stated:’ Religion is only the illusory sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself (Marx and Engels, 1957). In a truly socialist society, individuals revolve around themselves, and religion- along with all other illusions and distortions of reality- disappears.
Evidence to support Marxism

There is considerable evidence to support the Marxist view of the role of religion in society. The caste system of traditional India was justified by Hindu religious beliefs. In medieval Europe, kings and queens ruled by divine right. The Egyptian Pharaohs combined both god and king in the same person. Slave-owners in the southern states of America often approved of the conversion of slaves to Christianity, believing it to be a controlling and gentling influence. It has been argued that in the early days of the industrial revolution in England, employers used religion as a means of controlling the masses and encouraging them to remain sober and to work hard.

Steve Bruce (1988) discusses another example that can be used to support Marxism. He points out that, in the USA, conservative Protestants- the 'New Christian Right'- consistently support right-wing political candidates in the Republican Party, and attack more liberal candidates in the Democratic Party. The New Christian Right supported Ronald Reagan in his successful campaign for the presidency in 1984. In the 1988 presidential campaign, however, a member of the New Christian Right, Pat Robertson, unsuccessfully challenged Reagan for the Republican nomination for president. Robertson was one of a number of television evangelists who tried to gain new converts to their brand of Christianity and who spread their political and moral messages through preaching on television.

Another president who drew support from the New Christian Right was George W. Bush. When he was reelected in 2004, an exit poll found that two-thirds of voter who attended church more than once a week voted for him (Schifferes, 2004). Bush consistently supported morally conservative views during his presidency.

According to Bruce, the New Christian Right support a more aggressive anti-communist foreign policy, more military spending, less central government interference, less welfare spending, and fewer restraints on free enterprise. Although Bruce emphasises that they have had a limited influence on American politics, it is clear that they have tended to defend the interests of the rich and powerful at the expense of other groups in the population.

Evaluation of Marxism

Conflicting evidence suggests that religion does not always legitimate power; it is not simply a justification of alienation or a justification of privilege, and it can sometimes provide an impetus for change. Although this is not reflected in Marx’s own writing, nor in much of Engels’s earlier work, it is reflected in Engels’s later work and in the perspectives on religion advanced by more recent neo-Marxists. We will examine these views in the next section.

Marxism does not explain the existence of religion where it does not appear to contribute to the oppression of a particular class. Nor does it explain why religion might continue to exist when, in theory at least, oppression has come to an end.

In the USSR under communism after the 1917 revolution the state actively discouraged religion and many places of worship were closed. The communist state placed limits on religious activity, and the religious instruction of children was banned. Steve Bruce (2011) comments that, ‘In all communist states churches found it difficult to reproduce and socialize younger generations.’ Nevertheless, religion did not die out under communism as Marx predicted.

Drawing on a variety of statistical sources, including the European Values Study and the World Values Survey, Olaf Muller (2008) found that in the early 1990s, shortly after the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, religious beliefs remained widespread. For example, in 1990, 97% of people in Poland claimed to believe in God. In Russia, the figure was much lower, at 35%, but by 1999, when religious organisations had had time to reassert their influence, this had risen to 61%. Church attendance in Russia was very low in the early 1990s, at just 6%, but had increased substantially, to 10%, by 1999/2000. Thus, although communism had some success in suppressing religion in certain countries, it did not eradicate it or prevent religious belief, and activity increased again once communism had ended.

This evidence suggests that Marx was wrong to believe that religion would disappear under communism, and that there must be other reasons for the existence of religion apart from those put forward by Marx.
TYPES OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

ANIMISM

Animism means the belief in anima or spirits. It holds that the world is driven by spirits. Animism refers to a given form of religion, in which, man finds the presence of spirit in objects or notions that surrounds him. Animism is considered as one of the most primitive ideas that gave birth to religion in society and as a religious concept, it is associated with primitive people. Even today, many tribals, cults and sects across the world, believe in this idea as a religious practice. Spirits are seen as benign as well as malevolent. Teton Sioux of America practice an animistic religion, in which, spirits play negative roles in their lives and they perform Ghost Dance ceremony to appease them. Evans Pritchard in his study of the Nuer of South Sudan found out that they have an elaborate theological idea of religion centred on Sky Spirit or High God. Even in modern times, many sects in India treat illness through witchcraft, sorcery, etc.

In a hunting gathering society, man faced enormous challenges. He came to believe that his happiness depends on the happiness of his dead relatives and ancestors. If some of their ancestors don’t rest in peace, their lives will be miserable. In India also the concepts of Pitra and Shraadh among Hindus are associated with similar beliefs. Hindus make rituals and prayers to placate the souls of their ancestors and demand peace and happiness in their lives from their ancestors. This is also the reason that Animism Theory is also called as ancestor worship theory. Religions which have an idea of transmigration of soul as one of the central tenets also have an idea of anima inherent in that.

Edward B Tylor was the first sociologist who elaborated the concept in his famous book Primitive Culture, 1871 and subsequently, he developed the distinction between magic, religion and science. Tylor associates animism to the primitive societies and it transforms into modern religion as society evolves. According to him, any type of spiritual phenomenon, that is souls, divinities, etc. which are animated and interpreted by man, explain the stage of animism. Man’s ideas of spirits primarily originated from his dreams. In his dreams, man, for the first time, encountered with his double. He realised that his double or duplicate is more dynamic and elastic than his own self. He further considered that his double, though resembled his body, is far more superior in terms of quality from his body. He generalised further that the presence of soul in human body is responsible for the elasticity of images in dreams. Taking this fact into consideration, primitive mind considered that when man sleeps the soul moves out of the body temporarily and when he is dead, it leaves out of the body permanently.

Thereafter, man generalised that every embodiment, which is subjected to birth, growth and decay, is obviously associated with spirit. Hence, trees, rivers, mountains, which are greatly subjected to decay and expansion, were considered as the embodiments in which soul is present. Realising this, man started worshipping these embodiments and animism, as a specific form of religion, came into being. According to Tylor, the most ancient form of animistic practice is manifested in terms of ancestor worship’. Tylor argues that religion, in the form of animism, originated to satisfy mans intellectual nature to meet his need of making sense of death, dreams and vision. Spencer also, like Tylor, associated the idea of soul with the dreams.

Graham Harvey, in his Animism: Respecting the Living World,2005, also mentions a form of new animism which is an offshoot of an ethnographic study done by Irving Hallowell in Canada. Post-modernist scholars argue that contrary to Tylor’s idea that only primitives animate their surrounding world, all societies animate their social world. According to them, all of us animate our surroundings in one way or the other be that our pets, toys or even abstract ideas by creating personal relationships
with elements of the objective world. Thus, the post-modernist sociologists reject the dichotomy between natural or physical world and humans and Nurit Bird-David even claims that classical sociologists have projected their own mental state on the primitives.

**MONISM AND PLURALISM**

Monism is a belief in single attribute, God or religious idea. It is centred on the belief of oneness of all existences or in a single god, ideology. The term was popular in all cultures, including Hinduism as Advaita, in western literature, it was coined by Christian Wolff, but was used in a narrow sense. Philosophers like Thales, Plotinus and Adi Shankara preached monism in one form or the other. Among modern religions, Islam is a monistic religion as its believers deny existence of any other power than Allah. Similarly, Advait philosophy of Hinduism also contends that there is no distinction between the disciple and God and they are one and there is ultimately a single being. Sufi saints also stressed upon this concept of a single all powerful entity. Some also believe that the monistic beliefs are symbol of a nascent religion. As different cults and sects emerge from original religion, it transforms into a pluralistic religion. E B Tylor, on the other hand, gave an evolutionary theory of religion, in which, he contended that monotheistic religions are hallmark of modern societies and pluralistic religions are hallmark of primitive societies.

**PANTEISM** is one popular western religious ideology which rests upon the belief that all of reality is identical with divinity and everything composes an all-encompassing god. Pantheists do not believe in a distinct personal or anthropomorphic god. Baruch Spinoza, a 17th Century philosopher, was a key influence in spreading the idea through his book Ethics, 1677, in which he opposed Descartes mindbody dualism. Though the name Pantheism was popularised in the 17th Century, the idea was present in many religions of the east, including Hinduism, Buddhism, etc. and of Europe as well. Established religions of Europe, primarily Church, regarded this ideology as heretic. The ideology gained a great momentum in the 19th Century and had noted followers like William Wordsworth, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau and later in the 20th Century, even Einstein.

**PLURALIST RELIGIOUS PRACTICES**, on the other hand, are those which accommodate different viewpoints, beliefs etc. Pluralism in the simplest terms can be defined as respecting others as other and is a counter ideology to exclusivism. The ideology is different from syncretism which calls for mixing of the different beliefs etc. into one single output. The existence of religious pluralism depends on the existence of freedom of religion, fertility of ideas and mutual tolerance. Freedom of religion is when different religions of a particular region possess the same rights of worship and public expression.

Hinduism, as a religion, is one such examples. In Hinduism, multiple philosophies and ideologies like Vaishnava, Shaiv, Advait, Dwait and even atheism thrive in parallel. Similarly, in Christianity also Calvinists, Methodists, Protestants, Catholics thrive in parallel. Religious pluralism is the belief that one can overcome religious differences between different religions and denominational conflicts within the same framework.

According to Steve Bruce- Religious pluralism results from a variety of sources and it has undermined the communal basis of religious orthodoxy as well. Modernisation and industrialisation are two key factors which are said to be causes of growth of social fragmentation and diverse cultural and religious groups come into contact of each other in such a society. In a diverse society, state also cannot support any single religion without causing conflict. Plurality of religions is also, in a way,
functional to the society as well. It reminds individuals that religion is a matter of choice, and hence, a private matter. Bruce also views pluralism as a sign of growing secularisation in the society. But many of Bruce hypothesis about the religious pluralism are also contestable. Recent conflicts in religious pluralistic places like Syria and even Europe are an example that pluralism may prove dysfunctional as well. Peter Berger has linked the growth of the pluralistic beliefs to the growing trend of modernization and secularisation as pluralistic beliefs undermine the one absolute truth. Similarly, Bryan Wilson also argues that with pluralisation of society, religious values become personal values and no longer remain community values.

Religious pluralism has existed in the Indian subcontinent since the rise of Buddhism around 500 BCE and has widened in the course of several Muslim settlements (Delhi Sultanate 1276-1526 CE and the Mughal Empire 1526-1857 CE). In the 8th Century, Zoroastrianism was established in India as Zoroastrians fled from Persia to India in large numbers, where they were given refuge. Christianity was in India long before the colonial rulers arrived.

**SOCIOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS**

Various sociological classifications of religious movements have been proposed by scholars. In the sociology of religion, the most widely used classification is the church-sect typology. The typology states that churches, ecclesia, denominations and sects form a continuum with decreasing influence on society. Sects are break-away groups from more mainstream religions and tend to be in tension with society.

Cults and new religious movements fall outside this continuum and in contrast to aforementioned groups often have a novel teaching. They have been classified on their attitude towards society and the level of involvement of their adherents.

**Church-sect typology**

This church-sect typology has its origins in the work of Max Weber. The basic premise is that there is a continuum along which religions fall, ranging from the protest-like orientation of sects to the equilibrium maintaining churches. Along this continuum are several additional types, each of which will be discussed in turn.

Differing religions are often classified by sociologists as ideal types. Because there is significant variation in each religion, how closely an individual religion actually holds as their ideal type categorisation will vary. Nevertheless, the categorisation scheme is useful as it also outlines a sort of developmental process for religions.
CHURCH

Johnstone provides the following seven characteristics of churches:

- Claim universality, include all members of the society within their ranks, and have a strong tendency to equate "citizenship" with "membership"
- Exercise religious monopoly and try to eliminate religious competition
- Are very closely allied with the state and secular powers; frequently there is overlapping of responsibilities and much mutual reinforcement
- Are extensively organized as a hierarchical bureaucratic institution with a complex division of labor
- Employ professional, full-time clergy who possess the appropriate credentials of education and formal ordination
- Primarily gain new members through natural reproduction and the socialization of children into the ranks
- Allow for diversity by creating different groups within the church (e.g., orders of nuns or monks) rather than through the formation of new religions

The classical example of a church by this definition is the Catholic Church, especially in the past, such as the State church of the Roman Empire. Today, the Catholic Church has been forced into the denomination category because of religious pluralism, or competition among religions. This is especially true of Catholicism in the United States. The change from a church to a denomination is still under way in many Latin American countries where the majority of citizens remain Catholics.

Islam is a church in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, where there is no separation of church and state. The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia states: "God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet ". These nations are ruled under an official interpretation of religious law, and the religious law predominates the legal system. Saudi Arabia, however, lacks Johnstone's criteria for an ordained clergy and a strictly hierarchical structure, although it has the ulema. In the Shia denominations, there is a professional clergy led by a Grand Ayatollah.

A slight modification of the church type is that of ecclesia. Ecclesia include the above characteristics of churches with the exception that they are generally less successful at garnering absolute adherence among all of the members of the society and are not the sole religious body. The state churches of some European nations would fit this type.

DENOMINATIONS

The denomination lies between the church and the sect on the continuum. Denominations come into existence when churches lose their religious monopoly in a society. A denomination is one religion among many. When churches or sects become denominations, there are also some changes in their characteristics. Johnstone provides the following eight characteristics of denominations:

1. similar to churches, but unlike sects, in being on relatively good terms with the state and secular powers and may even attempt to influence government at times
2. maintain at least tolerant and usually fairly friendly relationships with other denominations in a context roeffligious pluralism
3. rely primarily on birth for membership increase, though it will also accept converts; some actively pursue evangelization
4. accept the principle of at least modestly changing doctrine and practice and tolerate some theological diversity and dispute
5. follow a fairly routinized ritual and worship service that explicitly discourages spontaneous emotional expression
6. train and employ professional clergy who must meet formal requirements for certification
7. accept less extensive involvement from members than do sects, but more involvement than churches
8. often draw disproportionately from the middle and upper classes of society

Most of the major Christian bodies formed post-reformation are denominations by this definition (e.g., Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, Seventh-day Adventists).

Sects

Sociologically, a "sect" is defined as a newly formed religious group that formed to protest elements of its parent religion. Their motivation tends to be situated in accusations of apostasy or heresy in the parent denomination; they often decry liberal trends in denominational development and advocate a return to so-called "true" religion.

Leaders of sectarian movements (i.e., the formation of a new sect) tend to come from a lower socio-economic class than the members of the parent denomination, a component of sect development that is not yet entirely understood. Most scholars believe that when se f ormation involves social class distinctions, they reflect an attempt to compensate for deficiencies in lower social status. An often seen result of such factors is the incorporation into the theology of the new sect a distaste for the adornments of the wealthy (e.g., jewelry or other signs of wealth).

After their formation, sects can take only three paths - dissolution, institutionalization, or eventual development into a denomination. If the sect withers in membership, it will dissolve. If the membership increases, the sect is forced to adopt the characteristics of denominations in order to maintain order (e.g., bureaucracy, explicit doctrine, etc.). And even if the membership does not grow or grows slowly, norms will develop to govern group activities and behavior. The development of norms results in a decrease in spontaneity, which is often one of the primary attractions of sects. The adoption of denomination-like characteristics can either turn the sect into a full-blown denomination or, if a conscious effort is made to maintain some of the spontaneity and protest components of sects, an institutionalized sect can result. Institutionalized sects are halfway between sects and denominations on the continuum of religious development. They have a mixture of sect-like and denomination-like characteristics. Examples include: Hutterites, Iglesia ni Cristo, and the Amish.

Most of the well-known denominations of the U.S. existing today originated as sects breaking away from denominations (or Churches, in the case of Lutheranism and Angli canism). Examples include: Methodists, Baptists, and Seventh-day Adventists. An example of an institutionalized sect that did not become a denomination are the Mennonites.
CULTS or new religious movements

Boxing legend Muhammad Ali rejected Christianity as ‘slave religion’, embraced Islam and became one of the most prominent members of the Nation of Islam

By sociological typology, cults are, like sects, new religious groups. But, unlike sects, they can form without breaking off from another religious group, though this is by no means always the case. The characteristic that most distinguishes cults from sects is that they are not advocating a return to pure religion but rather the embracing of something new or something that has been completely lost or forgotten (e.g., lost scriptures or new prophecy). Cults are also much more likely to be led by charismatic leaders than are other religious groups and the charismatic leaders tend to be the individuals who bring forth the new or lost component that is the focal element of the cult.

Cults, like sects, often integrate elements of existing religious theologies, but cults tend to create more esoteric theologies synthesized from many sources. Cults tend to emphasize the individual and individual peace.

Cults, like sects, can develop into denominations. As cults grow, they bureaucratize and develop many of the characteristics of denominations. Some scholars are hesitant to grant cults denominational status because many cults maintain their more esoteric characteristics. But given their closer semblance to denominations than to the cult type, it is more accurate to describe them as denominations. Some denominations in the US that began as cults include Christian Science and the Nation of Islam.

Finally, there is a push in the social scientific study of religion to begin referring to cults as New Religious Movements (NRMs). This is the result of the often pejorative and derogatory meanings attached to the word cult in popular language.

Cults typology

The concept of "cult" has lagged behind in the refinement of the terms that are used in analyzing the other forms of religious origination. Bruce Campbell discusses Troeltsch's concept in defining cults as
non-traditional religious groups that are based on belief in a divine element within the individual. He gives three ideal types of cults:

1. a mystically-oriented illumination type
2. an instrumental type, in which inner experience is sought solely for its effects
3. a service-oriented type that is focused on aiding others.

He also gives six groups in the applications of analysis: Theosophy, Wisdom of the Soul, Spiritualism, New Thought, Scientology, and Transcendental Meditation.

In the late nineteenth century, there have been a number of works that help in clarifying what is involved in cults. There are several scholars of this subject, such as Joseph Campbell and Bruce Campbell, who have noted that cults are associated with beliefs in a divine element in the individual. It is either Soul, Self, or True Self. Cults are inherently ephemeral and loosely organized. There is a major theme in many of the recent works that show the relationship between cults and mysticism. Campbell brings two major types of cults to attention. One is mystical and the other is instrumental. This can divide the cults into being either occults or metaphysical assemblies.

Sociologists Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge distinguish three types of cults, classified on the basis of the levels of organizational and client (or adherent) involvement:

- Audience cults which have hardly any organization because participants/consumers lack significant involvement.
- Client cults, in which the service-providers exhibit a degree of organization in contrast to their clients. Client cults link into moderate-commitment social networks through which people exchange goods and services. The relationship between clients and the leaders of client cults
resembles that of patients and therapists.

- Cult movements, which seek to provide services that meet all of their adherents' spiritual needs, although they differ significantly in the degree to which they use mobilize adherents' time and commitment.

The sociologist Paul Schnabel has argued that the Church of Scientology originated from an audience cult (the readership of Hubbard's book Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health and the Astounding Science Fiction article which had preceded it) into a client cult (Dianetics) then into a cult movement (the Church of Scientology).

Roy Wallis introduced a classification system of new religious movements based on movements' views on and relationships with the world at large.

- World-rejecting movements view the prevailing social order as deviant and a perversion of the divine plan. Such movements see the world as evil or at least as materialistic. They may adhere to millenarian beliefs. The International Society of Krishna Consciousness (a.k.a. "Hare Krishnas"), the Unification Church, the Brahma Kumaris and the Children of God exemplify world-rejecting movements.

- World-accommodating movements draw clear distinctions between the spiritual and worldly spheres. They have few or no consequences for the lives of adherents. These movements adapt to the world but they do not reject or affirm it.

- World-affirming movements might not have any rituals or any formal ideology. They may lack most of the characteristics of religious movements. They affirm the world and merely claim to have the means to enable people to unlock their "hidden potential". As examples of world-affirming movements, Wallis mentions Transcendental Meditation.

### Distinction between cults and sects

The sociologist Roy Wallis introduced differing definitions of sects and cults. He argued that a cult is characterized by "epistemological individualism" by which he means that "the cult has no clear locus of final authority beyond the individual member." According to Wallis, cults are generally described as "oriented towards the problems of individuals, loosely structured, tolerant, non-exclusive", making "few demands on members", without possessing a "clear distinction between members and non-members", having "a rapid turnover of membership", and are transient collectives with vague boundaries and fluctuating belief systems. Wallis asserts that cults emerge from the "sectic milieu." Wallis contrasts a cult with a sect in that he asserts that sects are characterized by "epistemological authoritarianism": sects possess some authoritative locus for the legitimate attribution of heresy. According to Wallis, "sects lay a claim to possess unique and privileged access to the truth or salvation, such as collective salvation, and their committed adherents typically regard all those outside the confines of the collectivity as in error."
RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY

RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Both science and religion are complex social and cultural endeavors that vary across cultures and have changed over time. Most scientific and technical innovations prior to the scientific revolution were achieved by societies organized by religious traditions. Elements of the scientific method were pioneered by ancient pagan, Islamic, and Christian scholars. Roger Bacon, who is often credited with formalizing the scientific method, was a Franciscan friar. Hinduism has historically embraced reason and empiricism, holding that science brings legitimate, but incomplete knowledge of the world and universe. Confucian thought has held different views of science over time. Most Buddhists today view science as complementary to their beliefs. While the classification of the material world by the ancient Indians and Greeks into air, earth, fire and water was more philosophical, medieval Middle Easterns used practical and experimental observation to classify material.

Events in Europe such as the Galileo affair, associated with the scientific revolution and the Age of Enlightenment, led scholars such as John William Draper to postulate a conflict thesis, holding that religion and science have been in conflict methodologically, factually and politically throughout history. This thesis is held by some contemporary scientists such as Richard Dawkins, Lawrence Krauss, Peter Atkins, and Donald Prothero. The conflict thesis has lost favor among most contemporary historians of science.

Perspectives

The kinds of interactions that might arise between science and religion have been categorized by theologian, Anglican priest, and physicist John Polkinghorne as: (1) conflict between the disciplines, (2) independence of the disciplines, (3) dialogue between the disciplines where they overlap and (4) integration of both into one field.

This typology is similar to ones used by theologians Ian Barbour and John Haught.

Incompatibility

According to Guillermo Paz-y-Miño-C and Avelina Espinosa, the historical conflict between evolution and religion is intrinsic to the incompatibility between scientific rationalism/empiricism and the belief in supernatural causation. According to evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne, views on evolution and levels of religiosity in some countries, along with the existence of books explaining reconciliation between evolution and religion, indicate that people have trouble in believing both at the same time, thus implying incompatibility. According to physical chemist Peter Atkins, "whereas religion scorns the power of human comprehension, science respects it." Planetary scientist Carolyn Porco describes a hope that "the confrontation between science and formal religion will come to an end when the role played by science in the lives of all people is the same played by religion today." Geologist and paleontologist Donald Prothero has stated that religion is the reason "questions about evolution, the age of the earth, cosmology, and human evolution nearly always cause Americans to flunk science literacy tests compared to other nations."
Daniel Dennett holds that incompatibility exists because religion is not problematic to a certain point before it collapses into a number of excuses for keeping certain beliefs, in light of evolutionary implications.

According to Neil deGrasse Tyson, the central difference between the nature of science and religion is that the claims of science rely on experimental verification, while the claims of religions rely on faith, and these are irreconcilable approaches to knowing. Because of this both are incompatible as currently practiced and the debate of compatibility or incompatibility will be eternal. Philosopher and physicist Victor J. Stenger's view is that science and religion are incompatible due to conflicts between approaches of knowing and the availability of alternative plausible natural explanations for phenomena that is usually explained in religious contexts.

According to Sean M. Carroll, since religion makes claims that are not compatible with science, such as supernatural events, therefore both are incompatible.

Richard Dawkins is openly hostile to fundamentalist religion because it actively debauches the scientific enterprise and education involving science. According to Dawkins, religion "subverts science and saps the intellect". He believes that when science teachers attempt to expound on evolution, there is hostility aimed towards them by parents who are skeptical because they believe it conflicts with their own religious beliefs, and that even in some textbooks have had the word 'evolution' systematically removed. He has worked to argue the negative effects that he believes religion has on education of science.

**Conflict thesis**

The conflict thesis, which holds that religion and science have been in conflict continuously throughout history, was popularized in the 19th century by John William Draper's and Andrew Dickson White's accounts.

An often cited example of conflict, that has been clarified by historical research in the 20th century, was the Galileo affair, whereby interpretations of the Bible were used to attack ideas by Copernicus on heliocentrism. By 1616 Galileo went to Rome to try to persuade Catholic Church authorities not to ban Copernicus' ideas. In the end, a decree of the Congregation of the Index was issued, declaring that the ideas that the Sun stood still and that the Earth moved were "false" and "altogether contrary to Holy Scripture", and suspending Copernicus' De Revolutionibus until it could be corrected. Galileo was found "vehemently suspect of heresy", namely of having held the opinions that the Sun
Conflict: Scientists endorse Darwin’s theory of evolution. Devout Christians swear by the Biblical message that God created man in His own image.

lies motionless at the center of the universe, that the Earth is not at its centre and moves. He was required to "abjure, curse and detest" those opinions. However, before all this, Pope Urban VIII had personally asked Galileo to give arguments for and against heliocentrism in a book, and to be careful not to advocate heliocentrism as physically proven since the scientific consensus at the time was that the evidence for heliocentrism was very weak. The Church had merely sided with the scientific consensus of the time. Pope Urban VIII asked that his own views on the matter be included in Galileo's book. Only the latter was fulfilled by Galileo.

Whether unknowingly or deliberately, Simplicio, the defender of the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic geocentric view in Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, was often portrayed as an unlearned fool who lacked mathematical training. Although the preface of his book claims that the character is named after a famous Aristotelian philosopher, the name "Simplicio" in Italian also has the connotation of "simpleton". Unfortunately for his relationship with the Pope, Galileo put the words of Urban VIII into the mouth of Simplicio. Most historians agree Galileo did not act out of malice and felt blindsided by the reaction to his book. However, the Pope did not take the suspected public ridicule lightly, nor the physical Copernican advocacy. Galileo had alienated one of his biggest and most powerful supporters, the Pope, and was called to Rome to defend his writings.

The actual evidences that finally proved heliocentrism came centuries after Galileo: the stellar aberration of light by James Bradley in the 18th century, the orbital motions of binary stars by William Herschel in the 19th century, the accurate measurement of the stellar parallax in the 19th century, and Newtonian mechanics in the 17th century.

British philosopher A. C. Grayling, still believes there is competition between science and religions and point to the origin of the universe, the nature of human beings and the possibility of miracle.

Independence A modern view, described by Stephen Jay Gould as "non-overlapping magisteria" (NOMA), is that science and religion deal with fundamentally separate aspects of human
experience and so, when each stays within its own domain, they co-exist peacefully. W.T. Stace felt that science and religion, when each is viewed in its own domain, are both consistent and complete.

The USA's National Academy of Science supports the view that science and religion are independent: Science and religion are based on different aspects of human experience. In science, explanations must be based on evidence drawn from examining the natural world. Scientifically based observations or experiments that conflict with an explanation eventually must lead to modification or even abandonment of that explanation. Religious faith, in contrast, does not depend on empirical evidence, is not necessarily modified in the face of conflicting evidence, and typically involves supernatural forces or entities. Because they are not a part of nature, supernatural entities cannot be investigated by science. In this sense, science and religion are separate and address aspects of human understanding in different ways. Attempts to put science and religion against each other create controversy where none needs to exist.

According to Archbishop John Habgood, both science and religion represent distinct ways of approaching experience and these differences are sources of debate. He views science as descriptive and religion as prescriptive. He stated that if science and mathematics concentrate on what the world ought to be, in the way that religion does, it may lead to improperly ascribing properties to the natural world as happened among the followers of Pythagoras in the sixth century B.C. In contrast, proponents of a normative moral science take issue with the idea that science has no way of guiding "oughts". Habgood also stated that he believed that the reverse situation, where religion attempts to be descriptive, can also lead to inappropriately assigning properties to the natural world. A notable example is the now defunct belief in the Ptolemaic (geocentric) planetary model that held sway until changes in scientific and religious thinking were brought about by Galileo and proponents of his views.

**Parallels in method**

According to Ian Barbour, Thomas S. Kuhn asserted that science is made up of paradigms that arise from cultural traditions, which is similar to the secular perspective on religion.

Michael Polanyi asserted that it is merely a commitment to universality that protects against subjectivity and has nothing at all to do with personal detachment as found in many conceptions of the scientific method. Polanyi further asserted that all knowledge is personal and therefore the scientist must be performing a very personal if not necessarily subjective role when doing science. Polanyi added that the scientist often merely follows intuitions of "intellectual beauty, symmetry, and 'empirical agreement'". Polanyi held that science requires moral commitments similar to those found in religion.

Two physicists, Charles A. Coulson and Harold K. Schilling, both claimed that "the methods of science and religion have much in common." Schilling asserted that both fields—science and religion—have "a threefold structure—of experience, theoretical interpretation, and practical application." Coulson asserted that science, like religion, "advances by creative imagination" and not by "mere collecting of facts," while stating that religion should and does "involve critical reflection on experience not unlike that which goes on in science." Religious language and scientific language also show parallels.

**Dialogue**

The religion and science community consists of those scholars who involve themselves with what has been called the "religion-and-science dialogue" or the "religion-and-science field." The community belongs to neither the scientific nor the religious community, but is said to be a third overlapping community of
interested and involved scientists, priests, clergymen, theologians and engaged non-professionals. Institutions interested in the intersection between science and religion include the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, the Ian Ramsey Centre, and the Faraday Institute. Journals addressing the relationship between science and religion include Theology and Science and Zygon. Eugenie Scott has written that the "science and religion" movement is, overall, composed mainly of theists who have a healthy respect for science and may be beneficial to the public understanding of science. She contends that the "Christian scholarship" movement is not problem for science, but that the "Theistic science" movement, which proposes abandoning methodological materialism, does cause problems in understanding of the nature of science. The Gifford Lectures were established in 1885 to further the discussion between "natural theology" and the scientific community. This annual series continues and has included William James, John Dewey, Carl Sagan, and many other professors from various fields.

The modern dialogue between religion and science is rooted in Ian Barbour's 1966 book Issues in Science and Religion. Since that time it has grown into a serious academic field, with academic chairs in the subject area, and two dedicated academic journals, Zygon and Theology and Science. Articles are also sometimes found in mainstream science journals such as American Journal of Physics and Science.

Philosopher Alvin Plantinga has argued that there is superficial conflict but deep concord between science and religion, and that there is deep conflict between science and naturalism. Plantinga, in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism, heavily contests the linkage of naturalism with science, as conceived by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and like-minded thinkers; while Daniel Dennett thinks that Plantinga stretches science to an unacceptable extent. Philosopher Maarten Boudry, in reviewing the book, has commented that he resorts to creationism and fails to "stave off the conflict between theism and evolution." Cognitive scientist Justin L. Barrett, by contrast, reviews the same book and writes that "those most needing to hear Plantinga's message may fail to give it a fair hearing for rhetorical rather than analytical reasons.

Integration

As a general view, this holds that while interactions are complex between influences of science, theology, politics, social, and economic concerns, the productive engagements between science and religion throughout history should be duly stressed as the norm.

Scientific and theological perspectives often coexist peacefully. Christians and some non-Christian religions have historically integrated well with scientific ideas, as in the ancient Egyptian technological mastery applied to monotheistic ends, the flourishing of logic and mathematics under Hinduism and Buddhism, and the scientific advances made by Muslim scholars during the Ottoman empire. Even many 19th-century Christian communities welcomed scientists who claimed that science was not at all concerned with discovering the ultimate nature of reality. According to Lawrence M. Principe, the Johns Hopkins University Drew Professor of the Humanities, from a historical perspective this points out that much of the current-day clashes occur between limited extremists— both religious and scientistic fundamentalists—over a very few topics, and that the movement of ideas back and forth between scientific and theological thought has been more usual. To Principe, this perspective would point to the fundamentally common respect for written learning in religious traditions of rabbinical literature, Christian theology, and the Islamic Golden Age, including a Transmission of the Classics from Greek to Islamic to Christian traditions which helped spark the Renaissance. Religions have also given key participation in
development of modern universities and libraries; centers of learning & scholarship were coincident with religious institutions – whether pagan, Muslim, or Christian

**Buddhism**

Buddhism and science have been regarded as compatible by numerous authors. Some philosophic and psychological teachings found in Buddhism share points in common with modern Western scientific and philosophic thought. For example, Buddhism encourages the impartial investigation of nature (an activity referred to as Dhamma-Vicaya in the Pali Canon)—the principal object of study being oneself. Buddhism and science both show a strong emphasis on causality. However, Buddhism doesn't focus on materialism.

Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, maintains that empirical scientific evidence supersedes the traditional teachings of Buddhism when the two are in conflict. In his book The Universe in a Single Atom he wrote, "My confidence in venturing into science lies in my basic belief that as in science, so in Buddhism, understanding the nature of reality is pursued by means of critical investigation." and "If scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false," he says, "then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims.

**Christianity**

Christian philosophers Augustine of Hippo (354–30) and Thomas Aquinas held that scriptures can have multiple interpretations on certain areas where the matters were far beyond their reach, therefore one should leave room for future findings to shed light on the meanings. The "Handmaiden" tradition, which saw secular studies of the universe as a very important and helpful part of arriving at a better understanding of scripture, was adopted throughout Christian history from early on. Also the sense that God created the world as a self operating system is what motivated many Christians throughout the Middle Ages to investigate nature.

Modern historians of science such as J.L. Heilbron, Alistair Cameron Crombie, David Lindberg, Edward Grant, Thomas Goldstein, and Ted Davis have reviewed the popular notion that medieval Christianity was a negative influence in the development of civilization and science. In their views, not only did the monks save and cultivate the remnants of ancient civilization during the barbarian invasions, but the medieval church promoted learning and science through its sponsorship of many universities which, under its leadership, grew rapidly in Europe in the 11th and 12th centuries, St. Thomas Aquinas, the Church's "model theologian", not only argued that reason is in harmony with faith, he even recognized that reason can contribute to understanding revelation, and so encouraged intellectual development. He was not unlike other medieval theologians who sought out reason in the effort to defend his faith. Some of today's scholars, such as Stanley Jaki, have claimed that Christianity with its particular worldview, was a crucial factor for the emergence of modern science.

David C. Lindberg states that the widespread popular belief that the Middle Ages was a time of ignorance and superstition due to the Christian church is a "caricature". According to Lindberg, while there are some portions of the classical tradition which suggest this view, these were exceptional cases. It was common to tolerate and encourage critical thinking about the nature of the world. The relation between Christianity and science is complex and cannot be simplified to either harmony or conflict, according to Lindberg. Lindberg reports that "the late medieval scholar rarely experienced the coercive power of the church and would have regarded himself as free (particularly in the natural sciences) to follow reason and observation.
wherever they led. There was no warfare between science and the church." Ted Peters in Encyclopedia of Religion writes that although there is some truth in the "Galileo's condemnation" story but through exaggerations, it has now become "a modern myth perpetuated by those wishing to see warfare between science and religion who were allegedly persecuted by an atavistic and dogma-bound ecclesiastical authority". In 1992, the Catholic Church's vindication of Galileo attracted much comment in the media.

A degree of concord between science and religion can be seen in religious belief and empirical science. The belief that God created the world and therefore humans, can lead to the view that he arranged for humans to know the world. In the words of Thomas Aquinas, "Since human beings are said to be in the image of God in virtue of their having a nature that includes an intellect, such a nature is most in the image of God in virtue of being most able to imitate God.

During the Enlightenment, a period "characterized by dramatic revolutions in science" and the rise of Protestant challenges to the authority of the Catholic Church via individual liberty, the authority of Christian scriptures became strongly challenged. As science advanced, acceptance of a literal version of the Bible became "increasingly untenable" and some in that period presented ways of interpreting scripture according to its spirit on its authority and truth.

**Perspectives on evolution**

In recent history, the theory of evolution has been at the center of some controversy between Christianity and science. Christians who accept a literal interpretation of the biblical account of creation find incompatibility between Darwinian evolution and their interpretation of the Christian faith. Creation science or scientific creationism is a branch of creationism that attempts to provide scientific support for the Genesis creation narrative in the Book of Genesis and attempts to disprove generally accepted scientific facts, theories and scientific paradigms about the geological history of the Earth, cosmology of the early universe, the chemical origins of life and biological evolution. It began in the 1960s as a fundamentalist Christian effort in the United States to prove Biblical inerrancy and falsify the scientific evidence for evolution. It has since developed a sizable religious following in the United States, with creation science ministries branching worldwide. In 1925, The State of Tennessee passed the Butler Act, which prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in all schools in the state. Later that year, a similar law was passed in Mississippi, and likewise, Arkansas in 1927. In 1968, these "anti-monkey" laws were struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States as unconstitutional, "because they established a religious doctrine violating both the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution.

Most scientists have rejected creation science for several reasons, including that its claims do not refer to natural causes and cannot be tested. In 1987, the United States Supreme Court ruled that creationism is religion, not science, and cannot be advocated in public school classrooms. In 2018, the Orlando Sentinel reported that "Some private schools in Florida that rely on public funding teach students" Creationism.

Theistic evolution attempts to reconcile Christian beliefs and science by accepting the scientific understanding of the age of the Earth and the process of evolution. It includes a range of beliefs, including views described as evolutionary creationism, which accepts some findings of modern science but also upholds classical religious teachings about God and creation in Christianity.
Hinduism

In Hinduism, the dividing line between objective sciences and spiritual knowledge (adhyatma vidya) is a linguistic paradox. Hindu scholastic activities and ancient Indian scientific advancements were so interconnected that many Hindu scriptures are also ancient scientific manuals and vice versa. In 1835, English was made the primary language for teaching in higher education in India, exposing Hindu scholars to Western secular ideas; this started a renaissance regarding religious and philosophical thought. Hindu sages maintained that logical argument and rational proof using Nyaya is the way to obtain correct knowledge. The scientific level of understanding focuses on how things work and from where they originate, while Hinduism strives to understand the ultimate purposes for the existence of living things. To obtain and broaden the knowledge of the world for spiritual perfection, many refer to the Bhāgavata for guidance because it draws upon a scientific and theological dialogue. Hinduism offers methods to correct and transform itself in course of time. For instance, Hindu views on the development of life include a range of viewpoints in regards to evolution, creationism, and the origin of life within the traditions of Hinduism. For instance, it has been suggested that Wallace-Darwinian evolutionary thought was a part of Hindu thought centuries before modern times. The Shankara and the Sāmkhya did not have a problem with the theory of evolution, but instead, argued about the existence of God and what happened after death. These two distinct groups argued among each other's philosophies because of their sacred texts, not the idea of evolution. With the publication of Darwin's On the Origin of Species, many Hindus were eager to connect their scriptures to Darwinism, finding similarities between Brahma's creation, Vishnu's incarnations, and evolution theories.

Samkhya, the oldest school of Hindu philosophy prescribes a particular method to analyze knowledge. According to Samkhya, all knowledge is possible through three means of valid knowledge –

1. Pratyakṣa or Drṣṭam – direct sense perception,
2. Anumāna – logical inference and
3. Śabda or Āptavacana – verbal testimony.

Nyaya, the Hindu school of logic, accepts all these 3 means and in addition accepts one more Upamāna (comparison).

The accounts of the emergence of life within the universe vary in description, but classically the deity called Brahma, from a Trimurti of three deities also including Vishnu and Shiva, is described as performing the act of 'creation', or more specifically of 'propagating life within the universe' with the other two deities being responsible for 'preservation' and 'destruction' (of the universe) respectively. In this respect some Hindu schools do not treat the scriptural creation myth literally and often the creation stories themselves do not go into specific detail, thus leaving open the possibility of incorporating at least some theories in support of evolution. Some Hindus find support for, or foreshadowing of evolutionary ideas in the Vedas.

The incarnations of Vishnu (Dashavatara) is almost identical to the scientific explanation of the sequence of biological evolution of man and animals. The sequence of avatars starts from an aquatic organism (Matsya), to an amphibian (Kurma), to a land-animal (Varaha), to a humanoid (Narasimha), to a dwarf human (Vamana), to 5 forms of well developed human beings (Parashurama, Rama, Balarama/Buddha, Krishna, Kalki) who showcase an increasing form of complexity (Axe-man, King, Plougher/Sage, wise Statesman, mighty Warrior). In fact, many Hindu gods are represented with features of animals as well as...
those of humans, leading many Hindus to easily accept evolutionary links between animals and humans. In India, the home country of Hindus, educated Hindus widely accept the theory of biological evolution. In a survey of 909 people, 77% of respondents in India agreed with Charles Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, and 85% of God-believing people said they believe in evolution as well.

As per Vedas, another explanation for the creation is based on the five elements: earth, water, fire, air and ether. The Hindu religion traces its beginnings to the sacred Vedas. Everything that is established in the Hindu faith such as the gods and goddesses, doctrines, chants, spiritual insights, etc. flow from the poetry of Vedic hymns. The Vedas offer an honor to the sun and moon, water and wind, and to the order in Nature that is universal. This naturalism is the beginning of what further becomes the connection between Hinduism and science.

Islam

From an Islamic standpoint, science, the study of nature, is considered to be linked to the concept of Tawhid (the Oneness of God), as are all other branches of knowledge. In Islam, nature is not seen as a separate entity, but rather as an integral part of Islam’s holistic outlook on God, humanity, and the world. The Islamic view of science and nature is continuous with that of religion and God.

This link implies a sacred aspect to the pursuit of scientific knowledge by Muslims, as nature itself is viewed in the Qur’an as a compilation of signs pointing to the Divine. It was with this understanding that science was studied and understood in Islamic civilizations, specifically during the eighth to sixteenth centuries, prior to the colonization of the Muslim world. Robert Briffault, in The Making of Humanity, asserts that the very existence of science, as it is understood in the modern sense, is rooted in the scientific thought and knowledge that emerged in Islamic civilizations during this time. Ibn al-Haytham, an Arab Muslim, was an early proponent of the concept that a hypothesis must be proved by experiments based on confirmable procedures or mathematical evidence—hence understanding the scientific method 200 years before Renaissance scientists.

With the decline of Islamic Civilizations in the late Middle Ages and the rise of Europe, the Islamic scientific tradition shifted into a new period. Institutions that had existed for centuries in the Muslim world looked to the new scientific institutions of European powers. This changed the practice of science in the Muslim world, as Islamic scientists had to confront the western approach to scientific learning, which was based on a different philosophy of nature. From the time of this initial upheaval of the Islamic scientific tradition to the present day, Muslim scientists and scholars have developed a spectrum of viewpoints on the place of scientific learning within the context of Islam, none of which are universally accepted or practiced. However, most maintain the view that the acquisition of knowledge and scientific pursuit in general is not in disaccord with Islamic thought and religious belief.

Jainism

Jainism does not support belief in a creator deity. According to Jain doctrine, the universe and its constituents – soul, matter, space, time, and principles of motion have always existed (a static universe similar to that of Epicureanism and steady state cosmological model). All the constituents and actions are governed by universal natural laws. It is not possible to create matter out of nothing and hence the sum total of matter in the universe remains the same (similar to law of conservation of mass). Similarly, the soul of each living being is unique and uncreated and has existed since beginningless time.

211
The Jain theory of causation holds that a cause and its effect are always identical in nature and hence a conscious and immaterial entity like God cannot create a material entity like the universe. Furthermore, according to the Jain concept of divinity, any soul who destroys its karmas and desires, achieves liberation. A soul who destroys all its passions and desires has no desire to interfere in the working of the universe. Moral rewards and sufferings are not the work of a divine being, but a result of an innate moral order in the cosmos; a self-regulating mechanism whereby the individual reaps the fruits of his own actions through the workings of the karmas.

Through the ages, Jain philosophers have adamantly rejected and opposed the concept of creator and omnipotent God and this has resulted in Jainism being labeled as nastika darsana or atheist philosophy by the rival religious philosophies. The theme of non-creationism and absence of omnipotent God and divine grace runs strongly in all the philosophical dimensions of Jainism, including its cosmology, karma, moksa and its moral code of conduct. Jainism asserts a religious and virtuous life is possible without the idea of a creator god.

Studies on scientists' beliefs

A survey conducted between 2005 and 2007 by Elaine Howard Ecklund of University at Buffalo, The State University of New York of 1,646 natural and social science professors at 21 US research universities found that, in terms of belief in God or a higher power, more than 60% expressed either disbelief or agnosticism and more than 30% expressed belief. More specifically, nearly 34% answered "I do not believe in God" and about 30% answered "I do not know if there is a God and there is no way to find out." In the same study, 28% said they believed in God and 8% believed in a higher power that was not God. Ecklund stated that scientists were often able to consider themselves spiritual without religion or belief in god. Ecklund and Scheitle concluded, from their study, that the individuals from non-religious backgrounds disproportionately had self-selected into scientific professions and that the assumption that becoming a scientist necessarily leads to loss of religion is untenable since the study did not strongly support the idea that scientists had dropped religious identities due to their scientific training. Instead, factors such as upbringing, age, and family size were significant influences on religious identification since those who had religious upbringing were more likely to be religious and those who had a non-religious upbringing were more likely to not be religious. The authors also found little difference in religiosity between social and natural scientists.

Between 1901 and 2000, 654 Laureates belonged to 28 different religions. Most (65%) have identified Christianity in its various forms as their religious preference. Specifically on the science related prizes, Christians have won a total of 73% of all the Chemistry, 65% in Physics, 62% in Medicine, and 54% in all Economics awards. Jews have won 17% of the prizes in Chemistry, 26% in Medicine, and 23% in Physics. Atheists, Agnostics, and Freethinkers have won 7% of the prizes in Chemistry, 9% in Medicine, and 5% in Physics. Muslims have won 13 prizes (three were in scientific categories).

Many studies have been conducted in the United States and have generally found that scientists are less likely to believe in God than are the rest of the population. Precise definitions and statistics vary, with some studies concluding that about 1/3 of scientists in the U.S. are atheists, 1/3 agnostic, and 1/3 have some belief in God (although some might be deistic, for example). This is in contrast to the more than roughly 3/4 of the general population that believe in some God in the United States. Other studies on scientific organizations like the AAAS show that 51% of their scientists believe in either God or a higher power and
48% having no religion. Belief also varies slightly by field. Two surveys on physicists, geoscientists, biologists, mathematicians, and chemists have noted that, from those specializing in these fields, physicists had lowest %age of belief in God (29%) while chemists had highest (41%). Other studies show that among members of the National Academy of Sciences, concerning the existence of a personal god who answers prayer, 7% expressed belief, 72% expressed disbelief, and 21% were agnostic however Eugenie Scott argued that there are methodological issues in the study, including ambiguity in the questions. A study with simplified wording to include impersonal or non-interventionist ideas of God concluded that 40% of leading scientists in the US scientists believe in a god.

In terms of perceptions, most social and natural scientists from 21 American universities did not perceive conflict between science and religion, while 37% did. However, in the study, scientists who had experienced limited exposure to religion tended to perceive conflict. In the same study they found that nearly one in five atheist scientists who are parents (17%) are part of religious congregations and have attended a religious service more than once in the past year. Some of the reasons for doing so are their scientific identity (wishing to expose their children to all sources of knowledge so they can make up their own minds), spousal influence, and desire for community.

A 2009 report by the Pew Research Center found that members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) were "much less religious than the general public," with 51% believing in some form of deity or higher power. Specifically, 33% of those polled believe in God, 18% believe in a universal spirit or higher power, and 41% did not believe in either God or a higher power. 48% say they have a religious affiliation, equal to the number who say they are not affiliated with any religious tradition. 17% were atheists, 11% were agnostics, 20% were nothing in particular, 8% were Jewish, 10% were Catholic, 16% were Protestant, 4% were Evangelical, 10% were other religion. The survey also found younger scientists to be "substantially more likely than their older counterparts to say they believe in God". Among the surveyed fields, chemists were the most likely to say they believe in God.

Elaine Ecklund conducted a study from 2011 to 2014 involving the general US population, including rank and file scientists, in collaboration with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). The study noted that 76% of the scientists identified with a religious tradition. 85% of evangelical scientists had no doubts about the existence of God, compared to 35% of the whole scientific population. In terms of religion and science, 85% of evangelical scientists saw no conflict (73% collaboration, 12% independence), while 75% of the whole scientific population saw no conflict (40% collaboration, 35% independence).

According to the Study of Secularism in Society and Culture's report on 1,100 scientists in India: 66% are Hindu, 14% did not report a religion, 10% are atheist/no religion, 3% are Muslim, 3% are Christian, 4% are Buddhist, Sikh or other. 39% have a belief in a god, 6% have belief in a god sometimes, 30% do not believe in a god but believe in a higher power, 13% do not know if there is a god, and 12% do not believe in a god. 49% believe in the efficacy of prayer, 90% strongly agree or somewhat agree with approving degrees in Ayurvedic medicine. Furthermore, the term "secularism" is understood to have diverse and simultaneous meanings among Indian scientists: 93% believe it to be tolerance of religions and philosophies, 83% see it as involving separation of church and state, 53% see it as not identifying with religious traditions, 40% see it as absence of religious beliefs, and 20% see it as atheism. Accordingly, 75% of Indian scientists had a "secular" outlook in terms of being tolerant of other religion.
According to the Religion Among Scientists in International Context (RASIC) study on 1,581 scientists from the United Kingdom and 1,763 scientists from India, along with 200 interviews: 65% of U.K. scientists identified as nonreligious and only 6% of Indian scientists identify as nonreligious, 12% of scientists in the U.K. attend religious services on a regular basis and 32% of scientists in India do. In terms of the Indian scientists, 73% of scientists responded that there are basic truths in many religions, 27% said they believe in God and 38% expressed belief in a higher power of some kind. In terms of perceptions of conflict between science and religion, less than half of both U.K. scientists (38%) and Indian scientists (18%) perceived conflict between religion and science.

According to Renny Thomas' study on Indian scientists, atheistic scientists in India called themselves atheists even while accepting that their lifestyle is very much a part of tradition and religion. Thus, they differ from Western atheists in that for them following the lifestyle of a religion is not antithetical to atheism.

Public perceptions of science

Global studies which have pooled data on religion and science from 1981–2001, have noted that countries with high religiosity also have stronger faith in science, while less religious countries have more skepticism of the impact of science and technology. The United States is noted there as distinctive because of greater faith in both God and scientific progress. Other research cites the National Science Foundation's finding that America has more favorable public attitudes towards science than Europe, Russia, and Japan despite differences in levels of religiosity in these cultures.

According to a 2015 Pew Research Center Study on the public perceptions on science, people's perceptions on conflict with science have more to do with their perceptions of other people's beliefs than their own personal beliefs. For instance, the majority of people with a religious affiliation (68%) saw no conflict between their own personal religious beliefs and science while the majority of those without a religious affiliation (76%) perceived science and religion to be in conflict. The study noted that people who are not affiliated with any religion, also known as "religiously unaffiliated", often have supernatural beliefs and spiritual practices despite them not being affiliated with any religion and also that "just one-in-six religiously unaffiliated adults (16%) say their own religious beliefs conflict with science." Furthermore, the study observed, "The share of all adults who perceive a conflict between science and their own religious beliefs has declined somewhat in recent years, from 36% in 2009 to 30% in 2014. Among those who are affiliated with a religion, the share of people who say there is a conflict between science and their personal religious beliefs dropped from 41% to 34% during this period.

The 2013 MIT Survey on Science, Religion and Origins examined the views of religious people in America on origins science topics like evolution, the Big Bang, and perceptions of conflicts between science and religion. It found that a large majority of religious people see no conflict between science and religion and only 11% of religious people belong to religions openly rejecting evolution. The fact that the gap between personal and official beliefs of their religions is so large suggests that part of the problem, might be defused by people learning more about their own religious doctrine and the science it endorses, thereby bridging this belief gap. The study concluded that "mainstream religion and mainstream science are neither attacking one another nor perceiving a conflict." Furthermore, they note that this conciliatory view is shared by most leading science organizations such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS).
A study collecting data from 2011 to 2014 on the general public, with focus on evangelicals and evangelical scientists was done in collaboration with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Even though evangelicals only make up 26% of the US population, the found that nearly 70% of all evangelical Christians do not view science and religion as being in conflict with each other (48% saw them as complementary and 21% saw them as independent) while 73% of the general US population saw no conflict as well.

**SECULARIZATION**

In Family and Neighbourhood, a study conducted in Oxford in the early 1950s, J. M. Mogey found the prevailing attitude to religion in general, and churchgoing in particular, to be one of indifference. Most people regarded the church as a place for the young and the old, but not for themselves. Many would argue that such findings indicate a decline in the influence of religion in society.

Many sociologists maintain that Western societies are undergoing a process of secularization. This means that the influence of religion in all areas of social life is steadily diminishing. Bryan Wilson, who supports this view, defines secularization as 'the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance'. Like all key concepts in sociology, the concept of secularization has been used in a variety of ways. From his review of studies on secularization, Larry Shiner states that, ‘the lack of agreement on what secularization is and how to measure it stands out above everything else’. Any research on secularization must begin with a definition of religion.

Immediately problems arise because of the absence of a generally accepted definition. Differing views of religion will result in differing views of secularization. Glock and Stark argue that, Perhaps the most important attribute of those who perceive secularization to be going on is their commitment to a particular view of what religion means. Thus one researcher might see the essential characteristic of religion as worship in a religious institution. As a result he may see a decline in church attendance as evidence of secularization. Another might emphasize religious belief which he might see as having nothing necessarily to do with attending a religious institution. In an attempt to clarify the issue, studies of secularization will be classified in terms of some of the many ways in which the process has been conceptualized and measured.

**Institutional religion - participation**

Some researchers have seen religious institutions and activity associated with them as the key element in religious behaviour. From this viewpoint they have measured the importance of religion in society in terms of factors such as church attendance and marriages performed in church. From such measures they argue that secularization is occurring in most Western societies. Statistics on church attendance in England and Wales indicate a steady decline over the past century. The 1851 Census of Religion showed that just under 40% of the adult population attended church each week. By the turn of the century, this figure had dropped to 35%, by 1950 to 20% and by 1970 only 10 to 12% of the population of England and Wales attended church on an average Sunday. There has also been a steady, though less sharp, decrease in the number of baptisms, confirmations, church marriages and Sunday school attendances. For example, in 1929, 56% of all marriages in England and Wales were conducted in the Church of England compared with only 37% in 1973. During these years the %age of registry office marriages rose from 25.7 to 47%.

The decline in church oriented religious activity has been paralleled by a decrease in the numbers of clergy. Bryan Wilson gives the following figures. In 1861, there was one Anglican clergyman for
every 960 people in England and Wales, a century later there was less than one for every 4000 people. Certainly, on the basis of counting heads, there has been a marked decline in institutional religion in England and Wales. This trend applies not only to the Church of England but to all the important denominations. Evidence from most West European countries provides a similar picture.

Bryan Wilson argues that the decline in organized religious participation indicates a way in which the Churches are losing direct influence over the ideas and activities of man’. Researchers who see a decline in institutional religion as an indication of a more general decline of religion in society are influenced by the traditional view that a religious person goes to church. Peter Glasner argues that these studies have in common the identification of religion with church-oriented religion and the utilization of conventional definitions of religious institutions’.

The decline in participation in institutional religion can be interpreted in a number of ways. From a phenomenological perspective, it is essential to discover the meanings associated with participation. David Martin argues that in Victorian times, church attendance was more strongly motivated by non-religious factors such as middle-class respectability. Today, church attendance is no longer an indication of respectability for many members of the middle class. Thus, their absence from church may have nothing to do with a change in their religious beliefs. National opinion polls over the past twenty years reveal that a high proportion of those who regard themselves as Christians, do not see regular church attendance as a necessary part of being a Christian. Robert N. Bellah argues that the decline in institutional religion cannot be taken as an indication of a decline in religious belief and commitment. Religion today may simply be expressed in a different way. Bellah argues that there has been a move from collective worship to privatized worship and from clerical to individual interpretation of doctrine. He claims that, ‘The assumption in most of the major Protestant denominations is that the Church member can be considered responsible for himself’.

While there is little dispute that participation in institutional religion has declined over the past century in most European countries, there is considerable disagreement over the interpretation of this process.
Institutional religion- disengagement and differentiation

Some researchers, as noted above, have seen the truly religious society in terms of full churches. They have therefore seen empty churches as evidence of secularization. Others have seen the truly religious society as one in which the church as an institution, is directly involved in every important area of social life. In terms of this emphasis, a disengagement of the church from the wider society is seen as secularization. David Martin states that this view is concerned with the ecclesiastical institution, and specifically with any decline in its power, wealth, influence, range of control and prestige.

Compared to its role in Medieval Europe, the church in contemporary Western society has undergone a process of disengagement. In the Middle Ages, there was a union of church and state. Today, apart from the right of bishops to sit in the British House of Lords, the church is hardly represented in government. Ecclesiastical control of education and social welfare has been superseded by secular organizations under state control. Church patronage of the arts was reflected by the fact that most art in the Middle Ages was based on religious themes. Today secular themes predominate. Bryan Wilson argues that the Church of England today provides little more than traditional ritual to dramatize important turning points in the life cycle, namely, birth, marriage and death. He sees its disengagement from the wider society as evidence of secularization. However, the power of the church in the Middle Ages need not necessarily be seen as a golden age of religion. As David Martin suggests, ‘the height of ecclesiastical power can be seen either as the triumph of the religious or its more blasphemous secularization. Thus today, the church’s specialization in specifically religious matters may indicate a purer form of religion, untainted by involvement with secular concerns such as politics.

An alternative to the view that disengagement equals secularization is provided by Talcott Parsons. Parsons agrees that the church as an institution has lost many of its former functions. He argues that the evolution of society involves a process of structural differentiation. Various parts of the social system become more specialized and so perform fewer functions. (This idea forms part of Parsons’s theory of social evolution). However, the differentiation of the units of the social system does not necessarily lessen their importance. As outlined in a previous section, Parsons argues that religious beliefs still give meaning and significance to life. Churches are still the fount of religious ethics and values. As religious institutions become increasingly specialized, Parsons maintains that their ethics and values become increasingly generalized. In American society they have become the basis for more general social values. Thus many of the values of American society are at once Christian and American. This has resulted in the endowment of secular life with a new order of religious legitimation. From this perspective disengagement, or in Parsons’s terminology, structural differentiation, does not equal secularization. To some degree this interpretation rests on Parsons’s belief that Christian values direct behaviour in American society. Many critics of the American way of life would disagree with this view.

Institutional religion- religious pluralism

Some researchers imply that the truly religious society has one faith and one church. This picture is influenced by the situation in some small-scale, non-literate societies, such as the Australian aborigines, where the community is a religious community. Members share a common faith and at certain times of the year, the entire community gathers to express this faith in religious rituals. In terms of Durkheim’s view of religion, the community is the church. Medieval European societies provide a similar picture. There the established church ministered to the whole society. In contemporary Western societies, one church has been replaced by many. A multiplicity of
denominations and sects have replaced the common faith and the established church. In terms of the model of a truly religious society provided by small-scale societies and Medieval Christendom, today’s religious pluralism has been interpreted as evidence of secularization. In particular, it has been argued that a range of competing religious institutions has reduced the power of religion in society. Only when a single religion has a monopoly on the Truth can it effectively reinforce social norms and values and integrate society.

Bryan Wilson argues that if there are a number of denominations in society, each with its own version of the Truth, they can at best only reflect and legitimate the beliefs of a section of the population. In this way, religious values cease now to be community values. Religion no longer expresses and reinforces the values of society whole and so ceases to perform its traditional function of promoting social solidarity. Berger and Luckmann make a similar point. Instead of one religious institution with a single, unchallenged view of the supernatural, there are now many with divergent views. Berger and Luckmann argue that the emergence of denominations weakens the influence of religion. No longer is a single universe of meaning provided for all members of society.

During the past thirty years, there has been a movement towards the unity of Christian churches and denominations known as the ecumenical movement. This may reverse the trend towards religious pluralism. Wilson however, interprets the ecumenical movement as further evidence of secularization. He argues that ‘Organizations amalgamate when they are weak rather than when they are strong. since alliance means compromise and amendments of commitment He believes that ecumenism represents a declining Christianity grasping at straws. Though it has caught the imagination of some churchmen, Wilson argues that the ecumenical movement has aroused little general interest and produced few positive results.

The continuing proliferation of sects has been interpreted by some researchers in much the same way as the spread of denominations. It has been seen as a further fragmentation of institutional religion and therefore as evidence of the weakening hold of religion over society. Accurate measurements of the numbers of sects and the size of their memberships are not available. However, impressionistic assessments, particularly of the USA, indicate a steady growth of new religious movements. These include the Christian World Liberation Front, the Happy-Healthy-Holy Organization usually called 3HO, the Krishna Consciousness movement more commonly known as Hare Krishna, and quasi-religious Movements such as Transcendental Meditation. Although it is difficult to classify such movements —they often fall outside the accepted definition of a sect—they have certain characteristics in common with sects.

They are small religious groups and their beliefs and practices are regarded as unconventional by mainstream society and contain an implicit and more often an explicit criticism of mainstream culture. Apart from the possible growth of new religious movements, there is some evidence that longer established sects are increasing their membership. For example, in Britain from 1970 to 1975, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormons) claims to have increased its membership from 88 000 to 100 000; the Jehovah’s Witnesses claim an increase from 62 000 to 79 000 members. Peter Berger sees the continuing vitality of sects as evidence of a secular society. He argues that belief in the supernatural can only survive in a sectarian form in a secular society. In order to maintain a strong religious belief and commitment, individuals must cut themselves off from the secularizing influences of the wider society, and seek out the support of others of like mind. The sect, with its close-knit community organization, provides a context where this is possible. From this viewpoint, the sect is the last refuge of the supernatural in a secular society. Sects are therefore evidence of
secularization. Bryan Wilson takes a similar view maintaining that sects are a feature of societies experiencing secularization, and they may be seen as a response to a situation in which religious values have lost social pre-eminence. Sects are therefore the last outpost of religion in societies where religious beliefs and values have little consequence.

Bryan Wilson is particularly scathing in his dismissal of the religious movements of the young in the West, such as Krishna Consciousness, which emerged during the 1960s in the USA. He regards them as almost irrelevant to society as a whole claiming that, ‘They add nothing to any prospective reintegration of society, and contribute nothing towards the culture by which a society might live’. By comparison, Methodism, in its early days as a sect, provided standards and values for the new urban working class, which helped to integrate its members within the wider society. In addition, its beliefs ‘steadily diffused through a much wider body of the population’. The new religious movements show no such promise. Their members live in their own enclosed, encapsulated little worlds. There they emphasize ‘hedonism, the validity of present pleasure, the abandonment of restraint and the ethic of do your own thing’. Wilson is scornful of their ‘exotic novelty’ which he believes offers little more than self-indulgence, titillation and shortlived thrills. He believes that movements which seek for truth in Asian religions and emphasize the exploration of the inner self, for example Krishna Consciousness, can give little to Western society. They simply ‘offer another way of life for the self-selected few rather than an alternative culture for mankind. Rather than contributing to a new moral reintegration of society, they simply provide a religious setting for dropouts. They do not halt the continuing process of secularization and are likely to be no more than transient and volatile gestures of defiance’ in the face of a secular society.

Wilson judges the significance of new religious movements in terms of their potential contribution to the wider society. Since he believes that in the West, they have little or nothing to offer, he regards them as insignificant. However, from another perspective, such movements can be seen as the least secularized of religious institutions and therefore as the most religious. Their members have not compromised their religious beliefs to fit in with the wider society like members of denominations. Their lives often revolve around their religion which has a vitality and commitment not often found in denominations. In this sense true religion lives on in the sects and the new religious movements. It has not been tainted or diluted by the secular influences of the wider society. From this perspective, Pfautz has defined secularization as ‘the tendency of sectaria religious movements to become both part of and like the world’. Something of this viewpoint is found in the work of Will Herberg which is examined in the following section.

Institutional religion—the secularization of religious institutions
To return to a quotation from Charles Glock and Rodney Stark noted earlier, ‘Perhaps the most important attribute of those who perceive secularization to be going on is their commitment to a particular view of what religion means’. The relevance of this remark will already be apparent. It is particularly true of Will Herberg, a longtime observer of religion in the USA. To Herberg, ‘authentic religion’ means an emphasis on the supernatural, a deep inner conviction of the reality of supernatural power, a serious commitment to religious teachings, a strong element of theological doctrine and a refusal to compromise religious beliefs and values with those of the wider society. This is just what Herberg does not find in the established denominations in America. He claims that, ‘Denominational pluralism, on the American plan means thorough-going secularization’. The major denominations have increasingly emphasized this world as opposed to the other world, they have moved away from traditional doctrine and concern with the supernatural, they have compromised their religious beliefs
to fit in with the wider society. Because of this, they have become more like the secular society in which they are set.

Compared to Western Europe, membership and attendance of religious institutions in the USA is high. The Yearbook of American Churches states that from 1940 to 1957, their membership rose from 49% of the population to 61%, while average weekly attendance rose from 37% to 40%. Though there was a slight decline in attendance during the 1960s and early 1970s, average weekly attendance still involves around 40% of the population. Despite this relatively high level of participation in religious institutions, Herberg argues that it is directed by secular rather than religious concerns. In Protestant - Catholic - Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology, he presents the following arguments.

Firstly, Herberg sees a need for Americans to identify with a social group. This is particularly apparent with the third generation of the major wave of immigrants to America. Rather than identifying with their ethnic groups, members of this generation now identify and locate themselves socially in terms of one of the three great sub-communities - Protestant, Catholic, Jewish - defined in religious terms. This generation regards itself as American first and foremost (rather than Irish, Polish, German, Swedish etc.) and church membership and attendance is a symbol and expression of this identification. It is a way of announcing that a person is a complete American. In Herberg's words, Not to be that is not to identify oneself and be identified as- either a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew is somehow not to be an American.

Secondly, Herberg believes that American society is becoming increasingly ‘other-directed’. The ‘other-directed’ man is concerned with ‘fitting in’, conforming, being popular and sociable, whereas the ‘inner-directed’ man is concerned with achievement and is less influenced and directed by the opinions that others may have of him. The ‘other-directed’ man wants, above all, to be accepted by, and feel he belongs to, a social group. Herberg sees church membership as a means to this sense of belonging. He writes, ‘Being religious and joining a church is, under contemporary American conditions, a fundamental way of adjusting and belonging’. The church provides the sociable, secure and conforming environment that ‘other-directedness’ requires. Religion has become ‘a way of sociability or belonging rather than a way of reorienting life to God. It is thus frequently a religiousness without serious commitment, without real inner conviction.

Thirdly, Herberg argues that religion in America is subordinated to the American Way of Life, to the central values and beliefs of American culture. The American Way of Life embraces such seemingly incongruous elements as sanitary plumbing and freedom of opportunity, Coca Cola and an intense faith in education. It includes a commitment to democracy and free-enterprise. Christianity and Judaism have been shaped by the American Way of Life, they have become ‘Americanized’. The late President Eisenhower once said ‘Our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply held religious faith - and don’t care what it is’. The particular denomination is not important because they all support and sanctify the American Way of Life. There is relatively little emphasis on theology and doctrine, rather ‘ethical behaviour and a good life’ are stressed. The ‘good life’ is based on the central values of American society rather than the word of God. Sermons in American churches often echo the vast American literature on success and motivation, which reflects the high value placed on achievement in American society. Thus the Rev. Irving E. Howard writes in the magazine Christian Economics, ‘Jesus recommends faith as a technique for getting results’.

Herberg claims that the major denominations in America have undergone a process of secularization. They increasingly reflect the American Way of Life rather than the word of God. For the typical
churchgoer, religion is ‘something that reassures him about the essential rightness of everything American, his nature, his culture and himself. But from Herberg’s viewpoint, this has little to do with the real meaning of religion.

Berger and Luckmann are in general agreement with Herberg’s thesis. Luckmann argues that denominations were forced to undergo a ‘process of internal secularization’ in order to survive and prosper in a secular society. If they retained their traditional teachings, their beliefs would no longer have a ‘plausibility structure’ in a changed society. They would appear irrational, irrelevant or contradictory in a new social setting. Denominations have adapted to society and their teachings have, therefore, remained ‘plausible’. However, this has required a sacrifice of considerable religious content. Peter Berger likens American religious institutions to commodities sold in the marketplace. A successful sales campaign means that the supernatural elements are pushed into the background, while the institution is sold under the label of values congenial to secularized consciousness. Denominations have succeeded in attracting full houses ‘by modifying their product in accordance with consumer demands, that is the demands of a secular society. This accounts for the differences in participation in organized religion between Europe and America. In Europe, religious institutions have remained largely unchanged in the context of changing societies. The result is empty churches. In the USA, religious institutions have adapted to a changing society and the result is full churches.

Herberg’s views on American religion have been criticized by Seymour M. Lipset. Lipset argues that there is some evidence to suggest that evangelical Christianity is growing at a faster rate than the traditional denominations. Evangelical movements are much closer to Herberg’s view of ‘real religion. They are more closely based on biblical teachings. There is a strong supernatural element and a direct and emotional commitment from their members. In addition, Lipset suggests that, ‘the secularized religion which observers see as distinctly modern may have been characteristic of American believers in the past’. In support of this argument, he refers to the observations of foreign visitors to the USA in the nineteenth century. They often commented on the lack of depth and specifically religious content in American religion. The debate on the secularization of religious institutions rests ultimately on the observer’s judgment of ‘authentic religion’. Herberg’s view may reveal as much if not more about his own beliefs and values than it does about the nature of religion in the USA.

Religion and society - generalization
The previous sections have examined approaches to secularization largely in terms of institutional religion. The focus now changes to a more general view of the role of religion in Western society. It is concerned with the influence of religious beliefs and values on social norms and values, social action and consciousness. As in previous sections, assessments of the importance of religion depend largely on the observer’s interpretation of what constitutes a ‘religious society’ and religiously motivated action. Four main views of the changing role of religion in Western industrial society will be examined. They can be classified under the headings of generalization, individuation, transformation and desacrilization.

As noted in a previous section, Talcott Parsons argues that as religious institutions become more specialized, religious values become increasingly generalized. He begins from the judgment that American society is a highly moral society and this morality is based ultimately on Christian values. Although social values are no longer recognized as distinctly religious values, they are grounded on Christian principles. Religious beliefs no longer specifically direct particular actions. However, since they are incorporated within society’s value system, they provide general guidelines for conduct. In
this sense, they have become generalized. The practice of medicine provides an example. The curing of illness is no longer surrounded by religious ritual. In many small-scale, non-literate societies religion and medicine went hand in hand in the person of the shaman. As both a religious leader and a curer, the shaman combined practical medicine with religious ritual to cure the sick. Today, hospitals are secular institutions. Yet the practice of medicine is based on the Christian value that the community has a duty to care for and cure the sick. This general directive has replaced the specific religious rituals which surrounded the cure of illness. In this way Parsons argues that religious beliefs and values have become generalized. They form the basis of social values and so provide general guidelines for action.

David Martin applies a similar argument to British society. He maintains that Christian values are an integral part of social values. For example, they provide a check in terms of divine limits set to any form of power whatsoever; they are absolutely fundamental in British society in a manner scarcely paralleled elsewhere’. Unfortunately, Martin does not develop this statement and his analysis remains at a rather vague and abstract level.

As with Martin’s statement, the main problem with the generalization thesis is its vagueness. Neither Parsons nor Martin provide much evidence to support their views. Beginning with the assumption that the USA and Britain are basically Christian societies, it is possible to see Christian values directing many aspects of social life. However, it is just as possible to argue that social values have a secular foundation.

Religion and society - individuation
Robert N. Bellah states that, The analysis of modern man as secular, materialistic, dehumanized and in the deepest sense are ligious seems to me fundamentally misguided. Bellah argues that sociologists who judge the significance of religion in terms of religious institutions are mistaken. He maintains that, Now less than ever can man’s search for meaning be confined to the church’. Religion is increasingly an individual quest for meaning rather than a collective act of worship. In this way religion has undergone a process of individuation whereby the individual works out his own salvation and follows his own path to ultimate meaning. The importance of religion has not declined, rather its form of expression has changed. Bellah claims that in contemporary Western society, there is an ‘increasing acceptance of the notion that the individual must work out his own ultimate solutions and that the most the church can do is provide him with a favourable environment for doing so, without imposing on him a prefabricated set of answers’. No longer is religious doctrine imposed. Modern man has a greater freedom than ever before to search for and construct his own ultimate meaning.

Bellah’s arguments are based in part on his view of religion which he defines as ‘a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence. This definition contains no mention of the supernatural. It simply suggests that any search for ultimate meaning, for answers to questions concerning the meaning and purpose of life, is basically a religious quest. Many researchers would argue that Bellah has stretched the concept of religion too far. In addition, Bellah fails to provide detailed evidence to show that the search for ultimate meaning is widespread in contemporary Western society.

Religion and society - transformation
Rather than seeing religious beliefs as either generalized or individuated, a number of sociologists argue that they have become transformed into secular guides to action in Western society. Though many of society’s values have religious origins, their connection with religion has been severed. The
most famous statement of this position is made by Max Weber. He sees the origin of the spirit of capitalism in ascetic Protestantism. However, even by the eighteenth century, particularly in the USA, the pursuit of wealth has been stripped of its religious and ethical meaning.

Weber believed that ascetic Protestantism contained the seeds of its own destruction. It encouraged involvement and success in this world. Its strict disciplines provided a rational outlook on life. Once its teachings were incorporated into a rational capitalist system, religious direction and validation were rapidly eroded. Two factors were instrumental in transforming ascetic Protestantism into secular guides to action. The first is the ‘secularizing influence of wealth. Wealth provides its own rewards and satisfactions. Gradually they alone provided sufficient motivation for the continued accumulation of wealth. As a result, Weber believed that ‘material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period of history’. The second factor involves the mechanization of production in industrial society. Religious motivation provided the initial drive to work hard and accumulate wealth. Mechanized production technology rather than man provides the basic driving force of industrial society and technology does not require religious motivation. The ‘spirit of religious asceticism’ is no longer necessary because ‘victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer’. Industrial society has developed its own driving force, its own impetus.

There is considerable controversy over Weber’s interpretation of the relationship between ascetic Protestantism and capitalism. It is debatable whether or not the guides to action in modern society had their origin in religious beliefs. Even if Weber’s interpretation is accepted, it is still not clear whether the beliefs of ascetic Protestantism have been transformed or generalized. It could be argued that the Protestant ethic which sees hard work as a virtue and a moral duty still survives as a general guide to action.

**Religion and society - desacrilization**

A number of sociologists have argued that the sacred has little or no place in contemporary Western society, that society has undergone a process of desacrilization. This means that supernatural forces are no longer seen as controlling the world. Action is no longer directed by religious belief. Man’s consciousness has become secularized.

Max Weber’s interpretation of industrial society provides one of the earliest statements of the desacrilization thesis. He claimed that industrial society is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world ‘. The world is no longer charged with mystery and magic; the supernatural has been banished from society. The meanings and motives which direct action are now rational.

Briefly, rational action involves a deliberate and precise calculation of the importance of alternative goals and the effectiveness of the various means for attaining chosen goals. For example, if an individual’s goal is to make money, he will coldly and carefully calculate the necessary initial investment and the costs involved in producing and marketing a commodity in the most economical way possible. His measurements will be objective, they will be based on factors which can be quantified and accurately measured. He will reject means to reach his goal which cannot be proven to be effective. Rational action rejects the guidelines provided by emotion, by tradition or by religion. It is based on the cold, deliberate reason of the intellect which demands that the rationale for action can only be based on the proven results.
A number of sociologists have accepted Weber’s interpretation of the basis for action in industrial society. In Religion in a Secular Society, Bryan Wilson states that, Religious thinking is perhaps the area which evidences most conspicuous change. Men act less and less in response to religious motivation: they assess the world in empirical and rational terms’. Wilson argues that the following factors encouraged the development of rational thinking and a rational world view. Firstly, ascetic Protestantism, which ‘created an ethic which was pragmatic, rational, controlled and anti-emotional’. Secondly, the rational organization of society which results in men’s ‘sustained involvement in rational organizations- firms, public service, educational institutions, government, the state- which impose rational behaviour upon them’. Thirdly, a greater knowledge of the social and physical world which results from the development of the physical, biological and social sciences. Wilson maintains that this knowledge is based on reason rather than faith. He claims that, Science not only explains many facets of life and the material environment in a way more satisfactory (than religion), but it also provided confirmation of in explanation in practical results. Fourthly, the development of rational ideologies and organizations to solve social problems. Ideologies such as communism and organizations such as trade unions offer practical solutions to problems. By comparison, religious solutions such as the promise of justice and reward in the after life, do not produce practical and observable results.

Wilson argues that a rational world view is the enemy of religion. It is based on the testing of arguments and beliefs by rational procedures, on assessing truth by means of factors which can be quantified and objectively measured. Religion is based on faith and as such is non-rational. Its claim to truth cannot be tested by rational procedures.

Peter Berger develops some of Weber’s and Wilson’s ideas within the framework of the sociology of knowledge. He maintains that people in Western society increasingly look upon the world and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations’. As a result there is a ‘secularization of consciousness’. Berger argues that the ‘decisive variable for secularization’ is ‘the process of rationalization that is the prerequisite for any industrial society of the modern type’. A rational world view rejects faith which is the basis of religion. It removes the ‘mystery, magic and authority’ of religion.

In The Homeless Mind, Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner present a novel interpretation of the reasons for the secularization of consciousness. Compared to industrial society, they argue that pre-industrial societies were more closely knit, more integrated. As a result people had a single ‘life world’, a single set of meanings, a single reality. Family life, work, education and politics were closely integrated. They formed part of the same pattern. This pattern could be comprehended and made sense of in terms of a single universe of meaning. Typically religious beliefs formed the foundation of this universe of meaning. Modern industrial society is highly differentiated and segmented, and, as a result, members have a ‘plurality of life worlds’, several sets of meanings, several realities. There is the world of private life, the world of technological production, the world of bureaucracy, the world of education, the many worlds presented by the mass media. The individual participates in all these worlds, each of which has, to some extent, different meanings and values, a different reality. The individual has a plurality of life worlds. Pluralization of life worlds has a secularizing effect for the following reasons. Firstly, since the various life worlds have different and even contradictory meanings, for example the worlds of business and family life, it is difficult for religion to integrate this plurality of social life in one overarching and comprehensive universe of meaning. Second, plurality of life worlds produces a ‘general uncertainty’. With different sets of meanings, the individual is not certain about anything, including religion and the meanings it
provides. Thus, ‘the plausibility of religious definitions of reality is threatened from within, that is within the subjective consciousness of the individual’. Religion provides a single, comprehensive universe of meaning. In a fragmented world this universe tends to shatter.

This section has examined the desacrilization thesis, that is the view that religion and the sacred have largely been removed from the meanings which guide action and interpret the world and from the consciousness of man. This view is difficult to evaluate since it is largely based on the impressions of particular researchers rather than ‘hard’ data. In addition, it compares industrial society with often unspecified pre-industrial societies in which, presumably, religion provided a guide to action and a basis for meaning. The problems involved with this approach will be dealt with in the following section.

Secularization – conclusion

Many of the arguments in support of secularization are based on the assumption of the existence of truly religious societies in pre-industrial times. As Larry Shiner notes, those who argue that the social significance of religion has declined have the problem of determining when and where we are to find the supposedly religious age from which decline has commenced. The anthropologist Mary Douglas argues that the use of supposedly ‘religious’, small scale non-literate societies as a basis for comparison with modern ‘secular’ societies is unjustified. She states that, ‘The contrast of secular with religious has nothing whatever to do with the contrast of modern with traditional or primitive... The truth is that all varieties of scepticism, materialism and spiritual fervour are to be found in the range of tribal societies’. It is simply an illusion concocted by Western man that ‘all primitives are pious, credulous and subject to the teaching of priests or magicians’. In the same way, the search for the golden age of religion in the European past may provide an equally shaky standard for comparison. From his study of religion in sixteenth and seventeenth-century England, K. V. Thomas states, ‘We do not know enough about the religious beliefs and practices of our remote ancestors to be certain of the extent to which religious faith and practice have actually declined. W. M. William’s study of Gosforth, a village in Cumbria, indicates one of the traps into which some sociologists may have fallen. The parish records indicated a low level of church attendance for some 400 years, but each new Anglican vicar believed this to be a recent trend.

The problem of measurement has dogged the secularization debate. Bryan Wilson, although he is convinced that secularization in its various forms is occurring in Western society, admits that there is no adequate way of testing the strength of religious commitment’. Public opinion polls over the last twenty years indicate that from 80 to 90% of the British population and between 90 and 95% of the population of the USA believe in God. However, such data give no indication of the strength of religious belief, the extent to which it guides and directs action, or the importance of a belief in God is to those who claim one.

Charles Clock argues that researchers have been unable to measure the significance of religion because ‘they have not given adequate attention to conceptualizing religion or religiousness in a comprehensive way’. Until they have clearly thought out and stated exactly what they mean by religion and religiousness, Glock maintains that the secularization thesis cannot be adequately tested. In an attempt to solve this problem, dock and Stark define five core dimensions of religiousness. First, the belief dimension the degree to which people hold religious beliefs. Second, religious practice the degree to which people engage in acts of worship and devotion. Third, the experience dimension - the degree to which people feel and experience contact and communication with the supernatural. Fourth,
the knowledge dimension - the amount of knowledge people have of their religion. Fifth, the consequences dimension - the degree to which the previous dimensions affect people’s day-to-day lives, Dock and Stark argue that a clearly defined system in which to classify people in religious terms is necessary before any scientifically valid statement about religiousness can be made. Only with such a system can the extent of religiousness be measured. Only when different researchers use the same conceptualization of religion can their results be compared with any degree of validity.

Even though Dock and Stark’s scheme may represent an improvement on previous research designs, it does not solve a basic problem of research methodology. It is unlikely that any research technique will be developed to accurately measure subjective factors such as the strength of religious commitment or to uncover, with any degree of certainty, the meanings and motives which lie behind social action.

FUNDAMENTALISM AND RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD

The nature and definition of fundamentalism

The theory of secularisation suggests a progressive decline in religion, but, as the previous section indicates, there are many parts of the world where religion appears to be thriving or reviving. In a number of contexts the term fundamentalism has been used to describe the nature of religion, particularly where it is undergoing an enthusiastic revival in strongly held beliefs.

In a major comparative study of Strong Religion (or fundamentalism), Gabriel Almond, R. Scott Appleby and Emmanuel Sivan (2003) identify fundamentalist movements among Jews in Israel, Muslims in Pakistan, Palestine, Egypt, and the Russian regions of Dagestan and Chechnya, Sikhs and Hindus in India, Christians in the USA and Ireland, and Buddhists in Sri Lanka.

Almond et al. note that in five countries fundamentalist groups have taken control of the state. In 1979 the pro-Western Shah of Iran was toppled in an Islamic revolution. In the Sudan in 1993, and in Turkey and Afghanistan in 1996, Islamic regimes also gained control. In India in 1998 and 1999 a Hindu fundamentalist party won the national elections. Since Almond et al. were writing, Hamas, a Palestinian fundamentalist group, have also come to power (in 2006).

Elsewhere- for example, in Pakistan and the USA fundamentalist groups may not have gained outright power, but there have been political leaders (such as George Bush) who have had some sympathy with fundamentalist views.

Islamic fundamentalism has perhaps been subject to more attention than other forms, particularly after the Islamic fundamentalist group al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks in the USA in 2001, the train bombings in Madrid in 2004, and the suicide bombings in London in July 2005. However, fundamentalism is by no means confined to Islam. Furthermore, most Islamic people (like most Christians, Hindus and the followers of other religions) are not usually regarded as fundamentalists. Fundamentalism is sometimes linked to violence, particularly terrorism, though this is not always the case.

According to Steve Bruce (2000), the term fundamentalism was first used in the 1920s when conservative evangelical Protestants published a series of pamphlets in which they called for a return to The Fundamentals of the Faith'. Bruce says they reasserted what they saw as the core of Protestant truth against the liberal and progressive spirit of the age. These Protestants were therefore anti-modernist in that they objected to the way in which, as they saw it, their religion was becoming diluted in the modern world.
Islamic fundamentalists attacked the offices of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in 2015 objecting to the publication of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad

Bruce notes that all religions will have some elements within them that are conservative and traditional, but he sees fundamentalism as involving more than this. In his view, fundamentalism describes 'movements that respond to problems created by modernisation by advocating society-wide obedience to some authentic and inerrant text or tradition and by seeking the political power to impose the revitalized tradition.'

Almond et al. (2003) reached a definition of fundamentalism after an extensive comparative research project. They defined it as ‘a discernible pattern of religious militancy by which self-styled’ true believers attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors'.

These two definitions are similar in that both see fundamentalism as a response to a perceived threat to a religion. However, Bruce's definition is perhaps a little narrower. He only defines a movement as fundamentalist if it claims authority for a sacred text and if it seeks society-wide obedience.

Although fundamentalists claim to be reasserting the true meaning of a religion, it should be borne in mind that religions are usually open to many different interpretations. Those claiming to be returning to the original teachings of a religion may well disagree with one another. Thus, Fred Halliday (1994), commenting on Islamic fundamentalism, says no such essential Islam exists: as one Iranian thinker...
puts it, Islam is a sea in which it is possible to catch almost any fish one wants'. In other words, each particular fundamentalist interpretation of a religion is only one among many.

There is often much room for dispute over what the fundamentals of a religion actually are, although the adherents to a particular version of fundamentalism tend to believe that theirs is the one, true version of the faith.

**Steve Bruce - fundamentalism and secularisation**

**Secularisation and modernisation**

The British sociologist Steve Bruce (2000) is a strong advocate of the theory of secularisation or religious decline. The theory of secularisation strongly influences his explanation of fundamentalism. Bruce sees fundamentalism as a reaction to modernisation.

Modernisation involves societisation (in which social life becomes increasingly fragmented) and differentiation (in which religious life is separated from other aspects of social life such as the economy. Modernisation also involves rationalisation, in which social life is planned to achieve certain goals, not based upon faith or prayer.

A further feature of modernity is a tendency towards egalitarianism, in which all members of society share certain rights. For example, it involves increasingly egalitarian gender roles as women gain full citizenship rights.

According to Bruce, all of these processes challenge the authority of religion, and in some circumstances groups with strongly held religious beliefs will try to defend their religion against the perceived threat to it. In 'first world' countries, such as the USA, modernisation has provided a local and immediate challenge to religious belief as such countries have modernised. Elsewhere, a process of modernisation has been imposed upon society from outside by regimes friendly to the West. Examples include the regimes of the Shah of Iran and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey.

In either set of circumstances, Bruce (2000) believes that 'the main cause of religious fundamentalism is the belief of religious traditionalists that the world around them has changed so as to threaten their ability to reproduce themselves and their tradition'.

**The causes of fundamentalism**

However, Bruce believes that the existence of a group who feel threatened by secularisation and modernisation is not sufficient in itself to create a fundamentalist reaction. A number of other factors are also important.

I. Some religions have more potential for developing fundamentalist groups than others. Religions that do not have a single sacred text (such as the Bible or Qur'an) struggle to develop fundamentalist movements. For example, unlike Islam or Christianity, Hinduism is a diverse religion with many Gods and no central sacred text. This makes it more difficult to create a movement claiming to express the true nature of the religion. What Bruce calls ideological cohesion makes it much easier to mobilise people and claim their allegiance. Thus, although there has been some Hindu fundamentalism, it has not been as prominent as Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, Bruce sees both Hindu fundamentalism in India and Sinhalese Buddhist fundamentalism in Sri Lanka as being more an expression of nationalism than of religious orthodoxy.
Christian fundamentalists expect complete obedience to the message of Jesus

2. Fundamentalist beliefs tend to be stronger where a group believes it has a common external enemy. Ideological cohesion is not just a property of religious belief; it can develop where a group is united through hostility to a common enemy. Thus Hinduism started to develop some degree of unity when Hindus began to unite in hostility to rule by the British Raj. Similarly, many Islamic fundamentalist groups are united in hostility to the USA and its allies.

3. A third factor is the way in which belief systems are controlled within a religion. Roman Catholicism has not given rise to fundamentalism. According to Bruce this is because religious authority is centralised with the Pope and the Vatican. Such is their authority that dissenters are unlikely to be able to claim that their version of the religion is truer. On the other hand, both Protestantism and Islam are less centralised, and ‘authoritative knowledge is democratically available. Any rightspirited person can determine God’s will by reading the scriptures or studying the Qur an (Bruce, 2000).

4. Religious fundamentalism does not just require religious beliefs and organisation; it also needs a supply of potential recruits. To Bruce this means that it needs ‘members of particular social strata that feel especially threatened, dispossessed or relatively deprived by modernization’. In the USA, some Christians, particularly from the South, who felt threatened by the liberal secularism of Washington politicians fell into this category. In Palestine, Hamas has found a supportive constituency among young, often unemployed or poor Muslims, who feel anger at their treatment by Israel.

5. The path that fundamentalism takes is also affected by its relation to politics. In the USA, New Right Christian fundamentalists have had ample opportunity to promote their cause through conventional democratic politics. Where this avenue is not open, fundamentalism is more likely to
take a violent turn. American Christian fundamentalists have on occasion used violence - for example, against abortion clinics - but violent action is much more common among Islamic fundamentalists.

Furthermore, Christianity started out as a deviant religion that was persecuted under Roman rule. Christians were forced to accept a distinction between church and state so that they would 'Render unto Caesar the things that were Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s' (Matthew 22:21). In contrast, Islam quickly came to dominate states that were led by Islamic leaders. The Prophet himself was a political leader. According to Bruce this has led to followers of Islam seeking political control and, unlike followers of Christianity, not being satisfied with maintaining religious belief without political power.

Christianity emphasises being religious through holding the correct beliefs (orthodoxy), whereas Islam places more emphasis on being religious through one's actions (ortho-praxis). Bruce believes that the emphasis on action and on gaining political power, combined with the lack of opportunity for democratic progress in some Muslim countries, makes it more likely that Islamic fundamentalists will turn to violence than Christian Fundamentalists.

Bruce's analysis emphasises that many of the causes of fundamentalism (such as modernisation and the existence of groups who are relatively deprived) lie outside religions themselves. However, he does think that religion is important in its own right and is more than a justification for political movements which would have existed anyway. He says: It would be bizarre if something which took up so much of people's wealth and time, and that so dominated so many cultures, did not matter: that it merely served as a cafeteria of convenient legitimations for any sort of behaviour.

To Bruce, therefore, it is necessary to look at both wider sociological causes of fundamentalism, and factors which lie within the religions themselves. He sees fundamentalism as a 'rational response of traditionally religious peoples to social, political and economic changes that downgrade and constrain the role of religion in the public world'. The response is rational, because Bruce believes that the threat to traditional religion from secularisation is real and very strong. He believes that the social changes that threaten religion are so strong that 'Fundamentalism in the West has no chance of winning.

Outside the West its prospects are better, and Islamic fundamentalism, in particular, has centuries-old roots, which mean that it is unlikely to disappear any time soon. However, Bruce still believes it faces an uphill struggle. He quotes a study of Jordanians (Antoun, 1994) who had worked or studied in the West before returning to their village. Although the Jordanians valued Islam and valued many of the traditional aspects of village life, they accepted the need to become more Western by accepting science, technology and rational bureaucracy. Ultimately, Bruce believes, these kinds of secular Western influence will undermine traditional religions throughout the world.

**Evaluation**

Bruce provides many useful insights into the nature and causes of fundamentalism. His views are broadly supported by Anson Shupe (2009). Shupe sees fundamentalism as being caused by secularisation as an aspect of globalization, in which religion becomes separated from other spheres (what Bruce calls differentiation). Shupe sees fundamentalism as resulting from resentment at the increased marginalisation of religion, leading to an attempt to de-differentiate by making religion central once again to some societies.
Not everyone supports Bruce’s views though. His ideas are strongly influenced by his support for the theory of secularisation. His view that Islamic fundamentalism is more likely to become violent than other forms is controversial. Linked to this, he places more emphasis than some other sociologists on the nature of religious beliefs in explaining fundamentalism. Karen Armstrong (2001) places much more emphasis than Bruce on the specific political and economic circumstances that might have encouraged the development of militant Islam, and less emphasis on the nature of the religion itself.

**Gabriel Almond, R. Scott Appleby and Emmanuel Sivan- Strong Religion**

**Levels of explanation**

In Strong Religion, Gabriel Almond, R. Scott Appleby and Emmanuel Sivan (2003) discuss the findings of a major comparative study of fundamentalist religions throughout the world. Researchers carried out a total of 75 case studies over a 20-year period, and interviews were conducted in the Middle East, North Africa and the United States.

Like Bruce, Almond et al. regard some Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist movements as fundamentalist, alongside Muslim and Christian ones. They also follow Bruce in seeing fundamentalism as a reaction to the social changes associated with modernisation and secularisation. However, they take a somewhat broader range of factors into account than Bruce does in explaining the rise of fundamentalism. Almond et al. argue that fundamentalism can be understood at three levels:

1. The structural level is concerned with long-term contextual conditions such as structural unemployment, the existence of persecuted ethnic groups or dislocated people, social changes such as secularisation, the theology of a religion or the economic situation.

2. However, contingency and chance are also important. Structural factors might create the general situation in which fundamentalism is likely to develop, but specific historical events help to determine whether this is translated into actual movements.

3. The third set of factors concern human choice and leadership. Even when other factors create the right conditions for fundamentalism, it will not develop without religious leaders who can mobilise large numbers in support of their beliefs.

**Structural causes of fundamentalism**

The first and central structural cause of fundamentalism is secularisation. Without secularisation there would be no need for a fundamentalist movement. Like Bruce, though, Almond et al. think that the nature of religious organisations is also important. They argue that religions where individual congregations have some independence are more likely to develop breakaway groups, including fundamentalist ones. If the beliefs of the religion are ‘explicit and coherent, codified in texts’, then it is easier to claim to have discovered the true interpretation of the religion.

So far, Almond et al. identify very similar factors to Bruce, but they also think that education and communication are important. For example, the growth of higher education in the USA tended to undermine traditional religious beliefs and increased the influence of rationalism. This in turn encouraged some Christians to feel beleaguered and to turn to fundamentalism.

The development of communications has led to globalisation, and with it the influence of Western secular rationalism has spread to non-Western countries. However, it has also provided opportunities
for fundamentalists to organise and spread their message. Thus the New Christian Right in the USA have made extensive use of the media, including starting their own TV stations. The internet has been important in spreading Islamic fundamentalism worldwide. It also allows the demonstration effect or copy-cat behaviours such as some suicide bombings.

A strong civil society - for example, with trade unions or political parties - can help to defuse the anger and resentment that can feed fundamentalism. However, inequality and deprivation tend to encourage strong religious beliefs. Almond et al. quote a study in the USA by Nancy Ammerman (1990) which found that Christian fundamentalism among Southern Baptists thrived among those from working-class backgrounds.

Major migration movements also encourage the development of fundamentalism. Where large numbers of people are displaced - for example, Palestinians after the creation of the Israeli state in 1948- this can breed the resentment on which fundamentalism feeds. Recent migrants who form a minority in a country can also become fundamentalist if they feel their religion and traditions are under threat.

Economic problems can be a major stimulus to fundamentalism. Almond et al. (2003) say that "recessions, depressions, inflation, strikes, unemployment and famine may produce grievances among groups in the population inclining them favourably to fundamentalist arguments. However, economic problems can make fundamentalist movements unpopular where they have gained political power, as has occurred at various times in Sudan, Turkey and Iran.

The final structural cause mentioned by Almond et al. is Western imperialism. Fundamentalism is often tied up with nationalist movements against Western control and influence in colonies, former colonies and countries with pro-Western regimes. A prime example is the 1979 Iranian revolution against the Shah, who was supported by the USA and other Western powers. Another example is the growth of fundamentalism among Palestinians after Israel seized land from them during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Contingency and chance
All of the above structural factors make the development of fundamentalism more likely, but it also usually takes a specific shock or trigger to mobilise populations into active participation in fundamentalist movements. Some chance events, such as a particularly poor harvest in a country which is already struggling to feed its population, are made more likely by structural conditions. Others, however, are completely unpredictable. For example, part of the reason for the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979 was the illness of the Shah, who was suffering from terminal cancer, which made it very difficult for him to respond effectively to the threat from fundamentalism.

Human choice and leadership
Even with the right structural conditions and chance factors encouraging fundamentalism, leaders are still needed to persuade people to follow a fundamentalist path. Leaders may be of different types. Ideological catalysts are often charismatic individuals able to gain loyal following due to the force of their personality. The can also have an impact by articulating an ideology which expresses the grievances of a particular group of people and gives them direction. Ayatollah Khomeini, who became leader of Iran in 1979, is an example. In contrast, organisers and coalition makers rely more on their bureaucratic and political skills to lead a movement. Almond et al. use Bob Jones, a fundamentalist Baptist in the USA, as an example of this type of leader.
Conclusion and evaluation

Almond et al. conclude that fundamentalism will only thrive when the right combination of structural factors, chance factors and leadership comes together at a specific place and time. If the structural conditions have created a 'mobilizable mass of potential followers' and a cataclysmic, transformative event occurs, then the 'trigger creates a new set of circumstances that provides an opening for a fundamentalist movement to expand and assert itself under the guidance of a charismatic and authoritarian leader'.

Almond provide a sophisticated and thoroughly researched analysis of the factors leading to the growth of fundamentalism. They examine a wider range of factors and place less emphasis than Steve Bruce does on the characteristics of particular religions. Nevertheless, their explanations have much in common, since both see fundamentalism as a response to Western secularisation among poor or relatively deprived groups, or groups which feel particularly threatened by social change.
FAMILY, MARRIAGE & KINSHIP
FAMILY

Family is one of the most important social institutions. It is the very basic unit of the social structure in any society. It is a universal social institution and has existed throughout the history of human society in some form or the other. This is as true among simple societies as within the complex modern societies. However, it varies in its internal organisation, in its degree of autonomy and in the sanctions and taboos by which it is protected and perpetuated.

Horton and Hunt argue that sociologically family may be defined as ‘a kinship grouping which provides for the rearing of children and for certain other human needs.’ According to MacIver and Page, family is by far the most important primary group in society. They describe family as ‘a group defined by a sex relationship sufficiently precise and enduring to provide for the production and upbringing of children.’ According to Kingsley Davis, family is ‘a group of persons whose relations to one another are based upon consanguinity and who are, therefore, kin to another.’ Elliott and Merrill define family as ‘the biological social unit composed of husband wife and children.’ According to Green, ‘family is the institutionalized social group charged with duty of population replacement.’

In a study entitled Social Structure, George Peter Murdock examined the institution of the family in a wide range of societies. Murdock took a sample of 250 societies ranging from small hunting and gathering bands to large-scale industrial societies. He claimed that some form of family existed in
every society and concluded, on the evidence of his sample, that the family is universal. Murdock defines the family as follows, ‘The family is a social group characterized by common residence, economic co-operation and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually co-habiting adults’. The parent-child relationship is not necessarily a biological one. Its importance is primarily social, children being recognized as members of a particular family whether or not the adult spouses have biologically produced them.

Either on its own or as the basic unit within an extended family, Murdock found that the nuclear family was present in every society in his sample. This led him to conclude that, ‘The nuclear family is a universal human social grouping. Either as the sole prevailing form of the family or as the basic unit from which more complex forms are compounded, it exists as a distinct and strongly functional group in every known society.’

Another scholar R. H. Lowie in his work Primitive Society argues that, ‘It does not matter whether marital relations are permanent or temporary; whether there is polygyny or polyandry or sexual license; whether conditions are complicated by the addition of members not included in our family circle; the one fact stands out beyond all others that everywhere the husband, wife, and immature children constitute a unit apart from the remainder of the community.’

Much anthropological research and speculation has gone into examining the historical origins of the family. Some authors have put forward the theory that the ‘original state of mankind’ was one of sexual promiscuity. It is also popularly known as the theory of early sex communism or primitive promiscuism. The theory of primate promiscuity appears, for example, in L.H. Morgan’s Ancient Society and R. Briffault’s The Mothers. But this doctrine has been weakened by the weight of anthropological evidence. In fact, among the primates and other non-human species, family life is often found to be highly developed.

Morgan in his evolutionary theory concludes that in the earlier form of groupings of people, sex was absolutely un-regulated and the institution of family was not known. His picture of primitive society was one of atomistic existence, the only form of groupings existent being sibs. He further held that due to free sex relations and ignorance of the role of paternity, fathers were unimportant, and mothersibs were the earliest groupings. His conclusions, however, were more logical and academic than actual and historical. He postulated a sequential growth of the institution of the family. Morgan listed five different and successive forms of family, each being associated with a corresponding and distinctive type of marriage. They were, in succession, as follows:

1. The consanguine family, consisted of a group which was founded upon the intermarriage, in a group, of siblings, own and collateral, i.e. of brothers and sisters and of cousins.
2. The punaluan family was founded upon the intermarriage of several sisters, own and collateral, with each other’s husbands in a group. The joint husbands were not necessarily related to each other. Such a family was also founded upon the intermarriage of several brothers, own and collateral, with each other’s wives, in a group, these wives not being necessarily related to each other. However, in actual practice, the husbands as a group, and the wives as a group, must have been kin of each other. In each case, one group was conjointly married to another such group of members of the opposite sex over another. Consequently such a marriage continued during the pleasure of the parties.
4. The patriarchal family was founded upon the marriage of one man with several wives, each wife being secluded from every other.
5. The monogamous family was founded upon marriage between single pairs, with the married couple having exclusive cohabitation with one another.

The first significant denial of Morgan’s scheme, and its basis particularly, came from Westermarck. On the basis of a detailed study of the institution of marriage, Westermarck, in his famous work *History of Human Marriage*, concluded that the family was the outcome of male possessiveness and jealousy, and a growth in property and of the sense of property. So man, and not woman, becomes the central figure in the scheme of development here. He traced monogamy back to mammals and birds, and opined the man had inherited it from the earlier stages of the ladder of evolution. Any further evolution which had taken place was essentially in moral ideas evolved by man with regard to marriage and not in the institution itself. However, it is also true that Morgan also dated the origin of the family only after man’s role in begetting children became known, and the right of passing property to his own, rather than to his sister’s or mother’s children, had been recognized and accepted.

Briffault in his famous work *The Mothers* has challenged Westermarck’s position. Briffault argues that man originally lived in a state of social promiscuity and that the earliest human family consisted of a mother and her child. It was only after the mother began realizing the economic advantages of having a man attached to her that she tried to turn the casual attachment of the male into a more permanent relationship. He roots the institution of the family in yet another institution, viz., the mother-right, that is, the supreme authority of the mothers. Consequently he argues that the earliest form of the family was matriarchal and that only with the development of higher agriculture and the economic dominance of men could the patriarchal type emerge. Thus, the patriarchal and monogamous families are regarded by him as later in point of time and development.

Scholars have classified forms of families based on different criteria. Firstly, on the basis of marriage, family may be classified into monogamous and polygamous family. In monogamous family, at any given time a man can have only one wife and a woman can have only one husband. The married couple has the exclusive right of cohabitation with one another. Monogamy is prevalent in all societies and is almost the universal form in all modern industrial societies. Polygamy is that arrangement of marriage in which either a man or woman can have more than one spouse. A polygamous family could be of two types, polygynous and polyandrous. When a man marries more than one wife, the family organization which is formed is of polygynous type. On the other hand, a polyandrous family is one in which a woman has more than one husbands.

Secondly, on the basis of descent or ancestry, family can be classified into two types, viz., patrilineal and matrilineal family. In patrilineal family the descent (and sometimes inheritance) is traced unilaterally through the father and the male line, while in matrilineal family, it is traced unilaterally through the mother and the female line. In India, Khasi and Garo tribes of north-east and the Nayars of Kerala are the matrilineal groups. The Khasi follow the rule of ultimogeniture and thus being a matrilineal society the youngest daughter inherits the property. Please note that Ultimogeniture refers to the rule of inheritance or succession which favours the ‘last born’ or the youngest child (son in patrilineal societies and daughter in matrilineal societies). Primogeniture, on the other hand, is the rule of inheritance or succession which favours the ‘first born’ or the eldest child. The principle of primogeniture was widely prevalent among the Nambudri brahmans. Please also note that among the Sema Naga tribe there is a practice of inheritance of widows. Among the Sema Naga, one is often obliged to marry one’s father’s widows, other than one’s own mother. The reason for this lies in the fact than on a person’s death his property goes to his widow(s) and if his son(s) want/wants that...
property he (they) can get it only if he (they) marries/marry the widow(s), other than his (their) own mother.

Thirdly, on the basis of nature of authority, a family may be either patriarchal or matriarchal. Under the patriarchal family the male head of the family is possessed of inclusive powers. He is the owner and administrator of the family property and rights. He presides over the religious rites of the family. In short, the family father or the eldest male descendant is the protector and ruler of the family enjoying full authority over the family members. In matriarchal family, the authority vests in the woman head of the family with the males being subordinate. She is the owner of the family property and rules over the family.

Fourthly, on the basis of rules of residence, family can be classified into various forms. The term ‘Virilocal’ is used to denote a residence pattern or rule in which after marriage a couple resides with or near the man’s family or kin group. In Latin it means ‘in the man’s place’. The term Virilocal is usually preferred in modern anthropology to Patrilocal or Patrivirilocal. In sociological and anthropological literature these terms have been used interchangeably. In this residence pattern, it is worth making a reference to Avunculocal and Amitalocal. In Avunculocal residence, the custom prescribes that a married couple reside with or in the locality of the husband’s maternal uncle, while in Amitalocal residence, the custom prescribes that a married couple reside with or in the locality of the husband’s paternal aunt (husband’s father’s sister). The term ‘amitate’ however refers to a pattern of special relationships between a child and his or her paternal aunt (the child’s father’s sister) found in certain societies. Another related term is Matri-patrilocal residence. It is a type of patrilocal residence distinguished by George P. Murdock, in which the bride and groom first live with the bride’s family, with the groom contributing his services to her family for specified period of time. Later, the couple moves and stays permanently at the groom’s parental home or community.

On the other hand, the term ‘Uxorilocal’ is used to denote a residence pattern or rule whereby on marriage the couple goes to live with or near the woman’s family or kin group. In Latin it means ‘in the woman’s place’. It is generally preferred in modern anthropology to the term Matrilocal. Both these terms are often used interchangeably in sociological and anthropological literature. Other related terms are Unilocal, Ambilocal or Bilocal residence. Unilocal residence refers to a custom prescribing that married couple reside in or near the household of one of the spouse’s relatives. Tradition dictates whether within a particular culture the pair live with the husband’s or the wife’s family. Ambilocal or Bilocal residence implies a residence pattern which allows a choice of Virilocal or Uxorilocal residence. In other words, it refers to a custom that allows married couples to have the choice to living with or in the locality of either the husband’s or the wife’s family. While on the other hand, in Neolocal residence, the married couple are normally expected not to live with either of the family of origin, but to establish a new residence for themselves. In other words, the married couple neither stays at groom’s house nor in bride’s house, but settles a new house for themselves. In some societies Duolocal residence has also been reported. Duolocal residence implies that the husband and the wife reside separately. In this context it means that the husband visits his wife’s home at night. Duolocal residence has been reported among the matrilineal Muslim community of Lakshadweep.

Fifthly, on the basis of nature of relations (kinship ties) among the family members, the family can be classified into two main types, viz., conjugal family and consanguine family. Conjugal family is a type of family organization in which primary emphasis is placed upon the husband-wife relationship (marital bond), rather than upon the blood relationships. The conjugal family centres about a husband and wife and their unmarried children. The conjugal family usually does not form an extended family.
Consanguine family, on the other hand, refers to a type of family organization in which the primary emphasis is upon the blood relationship of parents and children or brother and sister’s, rather than upon the marital relationship of husband and wife. Thus the position of blood relatives is central while the position of spouses tends to be peripheral. The consanguine family normally forms an extended family, usually with two or three generations living together.

Sixthly, on the basis of membership, family can be classified in terms of family of orientation and family of procreation. Family of orientation is the family into which an individual is born and in which he is socialized. It includes his father, mother, brothers and sisters. Family of procreation, on the other hand, is one which an individual establishes by his marriage and which includes his or her spouse and children.

Further, Carle C. Zimmerman in his work Family and Civilization has described three types of family viz., atomistic family, domestic family and trusteeship family. Atomistic family is a type of family which is characterized by a higher degree of individuation than either the domestic family or trusteeship family. Individual family members have more freedom from family control, and the welfare of the individual is considered more important than the welfare of the family as a whole. The atomistic family typically is small in size, and centre about a husband, wife, and unmarried children. Usually parents do not live with their married children. Domestic family is intermediate between the atomistic family and the trusteeship family. The domestic family has more group unity and less individuation than the atomistic family. Considerable emphasis is placed on the relationship between parents and children even after the children are married, and close contact is maintained between parents and married children and among families of married brothers and sisters. Trusteeship family, on the other hand, is a type of family characterized by a higher degree of group unity than either the atomistic family or domestic family. In the trusteeship family the individual’s self-interests are subordinated to the welfare of the family as whole. Living members are regarded as trustees of the family’s “blood, rights, property, name and position for their lifetimes”. The trusteeship family is usually an extended family (including several living generation) and is typically found in rural cultures where the family forms an economic unit.

Burgess and Locke have classified family on the basis of the behaviour of the individual members in terms of institutional and companionship families. In the former family, the behaviour of the members is controlled by mores and public opinion, while in the latter family, behaviour arises from mutual affection and consensus. K.P. Chattopadhyay has identified three types of family: simple (man, wife, and unmarried children), compound (two simple families, say, ego, his wife and unmarried children, and ego’s parents and unmarried brothers and sisters), and composite (i.e. lineal and collateral joint families).

Talcott Parsons argues that the ‘isolated nuclear family’ is the typical family form in modern industrial society. It is ‘structurally isolated’ because it does not form an integral part of a wider system of kinship relationships. Parsons concludes that given the universalistic, achievement oriented values of industrial society, the isolated nuclear family is the most suitable family structure.

Units larger than the nuclear family are usually known as extended families. Such families can be seen as extension of the basic nuclear unit, either vertical or horizontal. Vertically extended family is based on the extension of the parent-child relationship. Thus, the patrilineally extended family is based on an extension of the father-son relationship, while the matrilineally extended family is based on the mother-daughter relationship. The extended family may also be extended horizontally to
include a group consisting of two or more brothers, their wives and children. This horizontally extended family is called as the fraternal or collateral family. Bell and Vogel define the extended family as ‘any grouping broader than the nuclear family which is related by descent, marriage or adoption’. These extended families across the globe are known by different-different names. For example, in Europe, the Yugoslav form of the extended family is known as zadruga. In India, the patrilineal extended families among Coorgs of south India is popularly known as okka, while among Nambudiri Brahmans it is known as illom. Further, the matrilineal extended family among the Nayars of Kerala is known as taravad.

In India, the family whether extended vertically and/or horizontally is called the joint family, which is strictly speaking also a property-sharing unit. The term ‘joint family’ was coined by Sir Henry Maine to describe the patrilineal type of extended family in India where all the male members of the family hold joint ownership rights in the family property. It is largely patrilineal, patriarchal and patrivirilocal (residence of the couple after marriage in husband’s father’s home) in nature with a few exceptions. Joint family, which is a typical feature of Indian society is characterised by commensality, common residence, coparcenary (joint ownership of property among the male members of the family in a patrilineal society), co-operation sentiment and ritual bonds. Please note that in case of Hindu joint family the authority to take decision and maintain peace and discipline in the family lies in the hand of the Karta. All the earning members keep their earnings with him and the entire property is kept under his control. Family ceremonies and celebrations are held under his guidance and direction. He also settles the disputes within the household. In a nutshell, the Karta is the trustee of the family and enjoys unquestionable authority.

According to Iravati Karve, the joint family may be defined as “a group of people who generally live under one roof, who eat food cooked at one hearth, who hold property in common, and who participate in common family worship and are related to each other as some particular type of kindred.” Scholars like I.P. Desai emphasise that the number of generations present in a family is important for identifying a joint family. According to him, ‘we call that household a joint family which has greater generation depth than the nuclear family and members of which are related to one another by property, income and mutual right and authority.’ A joint family is commonly defined as a three generational family. For instance a man, his married son and his grand children constitute a joint family. I.P. Desai suggested that there are five types of family life in India which may be summarised as follows:

i) Nuclear Family: The smallest family which consists of wife, husband and their unmarried children.

ii) Functional Joint Family: When two families having blood relationship are living separately but function under one common authority, it is called functional joint family.

iii) Functional and Substantial Joint Family: When a functional joint family is also joint in terms of property it is called functional and substantial joint family.

iv) Marginal Joint Family: When two generations of family members live together functionally and substantially it is called marginal joint family.

v) Traditional Joint Family: It consists of three or more generations of people living together in one household, own property in one commonly and participate in the family rituals.

Researchers, like F.G. Bailey and T.N. Madan, on the other hand have advocated the limitation of the term joint family to a group of relatives who form a property owning group, the coparcenary family.
M.S. Gore, for instance, defines a joint family as a group consisting of adult male coparceners and their dependants. The wives and young children of these male members are the dependants.

Another type of extended family found in India is the matrilineal family among the Nayars of Kerala. The Nayars called this matrilineal extended family as ‘Taravad’. Among the Nayars, the term Taravad was applied for the clan, and the lineage. It also referred to the property group. Taravad was an exogamous unit, i.e., its members marry outside the Taravad. The composition of this matrilineal joint family was entirely different from the patrilineal joint family. All members of this family were consanguinely related men and women only. In relation to the male ego, the members of such a family included his mother and her sisters and brothers, his own brothers and sisters, mother’s sister’s sons and daughters and the children of the ego’s sisters. Thus, there was no relation by marriage in Taravad. The married women with their children lived with their mothers and other siblings. The men in the family were only occasional visitors to their wives in other Taravad at night but permanently resided with their own mother. That is why this system is also popularly known as the ‘visiting husband system’.

Please note that since the Nayars practiced non-fraternal polyandry, a Nayar woman had a number of husbands at a time. The children born of such unions belonged to woman’s Taravad only and were looked after by their mother’s brother. The property is inherited by women and managed by their brothers. Though theoretically woman is the nominal head of the family but it is the eldest male member of the family, known as Karnavan, who looks after the affairs of the family. He is the custodian of property and the manager of family matters. He also played the role of the social father for the children born in the Taravad. In this system the bond between brother and sister was strongly emphasized, and the bond between husband and wife correspondingly de-emphasized, the more so because Nayar women could legitimately have a number of visiting husbands, provided they were of higher status (hypergamy) i.e., higher caste Nayars or Namboodiri Brahmins. Also, Nayar men too could have a number of wives (polygyny). In fact, the marital bond was so minimised among the Nayars that anthropologists have debated endlessly whether Nayar society has the institution of marriage at all. Anthropologists have also cited that the Nayar system disproves the proposition that the elementary or nuclear family is a ‘universal’ human institution. Please note that the emphasis being on the solidarity of the lineage group, marriage was the weakest institution among the Nayars. The strong descent ties and weak affinal links in this case are related to the kind of private ownership of land in Kerala.

When Taravad becomes too large in size it is divided into ‘Tavazhis’, whereby one of the women members of the Taravad is given a share of the property and provided with a house to start a new Taravad. A Tavazhi in relation to a woman is ‘a group of persons consisting of a female, her children, and all her descendants in the female line’. In a Taravad there is always a potential conflict between a mother’s sons and her brother. Mother’s sons suspect their maternal uncle of diverting the Taravad property to his own children. This often leads to conflict and tension. Of late these Taravads have further started breaking down into smaller familial units known as the ‘Veedus’.

Similarly, among the Coorgs of south India, the patrilineal and patrilocal joint family is called as ‘okka’. Eminent sociologist M.N. Srinivas in his study ‘Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India’ found the okka as the basic group among Coorgs. It is impossible to imagine a Coorg apart from the okka of which he is a member. People who do not belong to an okka have no social existence at all, and the elders always bring pressure on the parties concerned to see that children born out of wedlock obtain membership in their father’s or mother’s okka. Member of an okka is acquired
by birth, and the outside world always identifies a man with his okka. His association with his okka does not cease even after death, because he then becomes one of a body of apotheosized ancestors (karanava) who are believed to look after the okka of which they were members when alive. The ancestors are worshipped, and offerings of food and drink (bharani) are occasionally made to them.

Membership of an okka determines to a very large extent the choice of a spouse. First of all, marital relations are forbidden between members of the same okka. Where agnation overflows the okka, the taboo extends to agnatic relatives who are not members of the okka. Again, children of sisters may not intermarry. In recent times the importance of the joint family has gradually declined. As Srinivas points out, the Coorg okka ‘is a very much stronger institution than the joint family of the higher castes of south India. The theory of the impartibility of its traditional property and preference for leviratic unions buttress it strongly against fission. Add to this the fact that a cross cousin is commonly chosen for marriage and it becomes almost impregnable’. Even here, however, the joint family is said to weakening.

In yet another example from south India, there is Nambudari joint family. Nambudiri Brahmins lived in patrilineages or patrilineal families which were called ‘Illom’. The Nambudiris were landowners. Land was considered indivisible, and indivisibility was ensured by the rule of primogeniture. Primogeniture refers to the rule of inheritance according to which only the eldest son is entitled to inherit the ancestral property of the family. Only the eldest son was permitted to marry a Nambudiri girl and the younger sons had “liaison” (sambandham) with girl belonging to the higher Nayar castes. The younger sons visited their life partners at night and the children born of the union become members of their mother’s taravads. Such a Nambudiri Brahmin, who forms sambandham with a Nayar woman, is called her ‘ritual husband’. Since the children from these unions always belonged to the lineage of Nayar women only, thus, in this way the Nambudiri men could check their children by Nayar women from claiming a share in their lineage property. Here we find that both the Nambudiri patrilineal group and the Nayar matrilineal group insist on maintaining their autonomy. Further, kinship relationships within respective lineages remain strong. The result is that affinal relationships arising out of sambandham alliances are quite weak. The strong descent ties and weak affinal links in this case are related to the kind of private ownership of land in Kerala. The Nambudiri Illom consisted of a man, his wife or wives, his children and his younger brothers. Sometimes, the Illom included his old parents or his eldest son’s children. Please note that with the rapid advancement of the forces of modernisation these traditional forms of extended families are rapidly undergoing change.

The family institution in the whole world is undergoing change. In the developed societies of the West, this change is quite fundamental in nature, so that the very existence of family is threatened. Industrialization and development of material culture have mainly led to this change. In India too drastic changes in the family in India are taking place though slowly. Contemporary western society is characterized, among other things, by the declining importance of all primary groups, including the family, and their supersession by secondary groups. Most of those functions which the family used to satisfy are now fulfilled by various commercial and state operated institutions like crèches, kindergartens, schools, trade unions, clubs, hotels, and restaurants. The disintegration of the family has been hastened by freer sex relations made possible by changing notions about morals and by birth control techniques. With the decline of religion, the religious sanctions behind family and marriage have also vanished, making dissolution easier to obtain. The changed notions about the status and role of women have also aided this break up. Individualism is the basis of all
contemporary Western culture. Individual happiness is often possible only at the cost of the family as a whole.

In India, generally the factors leading to changes in the family are discussed in the context of the issue of disintegration of the joint family. A host of interrelated factors, economic, educational, legal, demographic, have affected the family in India. Among the economic factors, industrialization and urbanization have significantly affected the structure and composition of the traditional family system. The family which was a principle unit of production has been transformed into a consumption unit. Industrialisation has also separated the place of work from home. Due to diversification of occupational opportunities members of a family are no more dependent on the traditional family occupation. Further, the processes of industrialization and urbanization, particularly in India, have led to a demographic change in terms of heavy migration of rural people to cities. Residential separation due to mobility of members from one place to another affects the size and composition of the family. A man may take his wife and children along with him to establish a nuclear family in the city. There have been many studies, which show that migration to cities from villages and small towns has contributed to the rapid disintegration of large-size family units. In the city, with problems of finding accommodation and limited space available for living, it becomes difficult for an average urbanite to maintain and support a large family.

Modern system of education has also brought about a significant change in the attitudes, beliefs and values of the young generation. Due to increasing literacy child marriages are lessening in number leading to marriage between mature individuals. Further, educated women tend to be more liberal, autonomous and economically independent. Couples are not interested in having more than two or three children. As a result of which the family size is getting smaller and the number of nuclear families is fast increasing.

Legislations regarding education, marriage, employment, and property, have also affected the family system in many ways. For example, Constitution of India has made ‘right to free and compulsory education to all children in the age group of six to fourteen years’ a fundamental right under Article 21A which was introduced by Eighty Sixth Amendment Act, 2002. Similarly, labour laws passed for the benefit of employees like the Indian Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 and the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, helped to reduce the economic reliance of members on the joint family for economic support. Further, Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930 declared that the property acquired by a Hindu out of his education was his personal property though his education was paid for by the joint family. The distinction between self-acquired property and joint family property was drawn. After Independence, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was passed which gave a daughter and son equal rights to the father’s property. These legislations challenged the inheritance patterns that prevailed in joint families prior to the passing of this Act and the dependent position of women within the family.

Many sociologists have regarded the family as the cornerstone of society. In pre-modern and modern societies alike it has been seen as the most basic unit of social organization and one which carries out vital tasks such as socializing children. It is difficult to imagine how human society could function without it. The composition of the family may vary from society to society. In general, therefore, the family has been seen as a universal social institution, as an inevitable part of human society. On balance, it has been regarded as a good thing, both for the individual and society as whole. This view has tended to divert attention from interesting and important questions. For example, it has discouraged serious and detailed consideration of alternatives to the family.
Until the 1960s few sociologists questioned the importance or the benefits of family life. Most sociologists assumed that family life was evolving as modernity progressed, and the changes involved made the family better-suited to meeting the needs of society and of family members. A particular type of family, the nuclear family (based around a two-generation household of parents and their children), was seen as well-adapted to the demands of modern societies. From the 1960s, an increasing number of critical thinkers began to question the assumption that the family was necessarily a beneficial institution. These new perspectives on the family have questioned many of the assumptions of the more traditional view. These approaches have not assumed that the family is inevitable. Often, they have been openly critical of the institution of the family. During the late 1960s the Women’s Liberation Movement began shaking the foundations of the family by attacking the role of women within it. This attack was developed by some feminist writers into a condemnation of the family as an institution. Feminists, Marxists and critical psychologists began to highlight what they saw as some of the negative effects and the ‘dark side’ of family life.

In the following decades the family was not just under attack from academic writers – social changes also seemed to be undermining traditional families. Rising divorce rates, cohabitation before marriage, increasing numbers of single-parent families and single-person households, and other trends have all suggested that individuals may be basing their lives less and less around conventional families.

Some have seen these changes as a symptom of greater individualism within modern societies. They have welcomed what appears to be an increasing choice for individuals. People no longer have to base their lives around what may be outmoded and, for many, unsuitable, conventional family structures. Others, however, have lamented the changes and worried about their effect on society. Such changes were seen as both a symptom and a cause of instability and insecurity in people’s lives and in society as a whole. This view was advocated by traditionalists who wanted a return to the ideal of the nuclear family. For them, many of society’s problems were a result of the increased family instability.

Some postmodernists have begun to argue that there has been a fundamental break between the modern family and the postmodern family. They deny that any one type of family can be held up as the norm to which other family types can be compared. While modern societies might have had one central, dominant family type, this is no longer the case. As a result, it is no longer possible to produce a theory of ‘the family’. Different explanations are needed for different types of family.

In short, the family has come to be seen as more problematic than it was in the past. The controversies that have come to surround families and households have been discussed subsequently. This chapter begins by examining the assumption of the universality of the family.

**IS THE FAMILY UNIVERSAL?**

**George Peter Murdock: the family is a universal social institution**

In a study entitled Social structure, George Peter Murdock examined the institution of the family in wide range of societies. Murdock took a sample of 250 societies ranging from small hunting and gathering bands to large-scale industrial societies. He claimed that some form of family existed in every society and concluded, on the evidence of his sample, that the family is universal. Murdock defined the family as follows, ‘The family is a social group characterized by common residence, economic co-operation and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom
maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually co-habiting adults’. Thus the family lives together, pools its resources and works together and produces offspring. At least two of the adult members conduct a sexual relationship according to the norms of their particular society. Such norms vary from society to society. For example, among Banaro of New Guinea, the husband does not have sexual relations with his wife until she has borne a child by a friend of his father. The parent-child relationship is not necessarily a biological one. Its importance is primarily social, children being recognized as members of a particular family whether or not the adult spouses have biologically produced them.

The structure of the family varies from society to society. The smallest family unit is known as the nuclear family and consists of a husband and wife and their immature offspring. Units larger than the nuclear family are usually known as extended families. Such families can be seen as extension of the basic nuclear unit, either vertical extensions – for example the addition of members of a third generation such as the spouses’ parents – and/or horizontal extensions – for example the addition of members of the same generation as the spouses such as the husband’s brother or an additional wife. Thus Bell and Vogel define the extended family as ‘any grouping broader than the nuclear family which is related by descent, marriage or adoption’.

Either on its own or as the basic unit within an extended family, Murdock found that the nuclear family was present in every society in his sample. This led him to conclude that, ‘The nuclear family is a universal human social grouping. Either as the sole prevailing form of the family or as the basic unit from which more complex forms are compounded, it exists as a distinct and strongly functional group in every known society’. However, as the following sections will indicate, Murdock’s conclusions might not be well founded.

Kathleen Gough – the Nayar Tarvad

Some societies have sets of relationships between kin which are quite different from those which are common in Britain. One such society was that of the Nayar of Kerala in southern India, prior to British rule being established in 1792. Sociologists disagree about whether this society had a family system or not, and thus whether or not it disproves Murdock’s claim that the family is universal.

Kathleen Gough provided a detailed description of Nayar society. Before puberty all Nayar girls were ritually married to a suitable Nayar man in the tali-rite. After the ritual marriage had taken place, however, the tali husband did not live with wife, and was under no obligation to have any contact with her whatsoever. The wife owed only one duty to her tali husband: she had to attend his funeral to mourn his death.

Once a Nayar girl reached or neared puberty she began to take a number of visiting husbands, or ‘sambandham’ husbands. The Nayar men were usually professional warriors who spent long periods of time away from their villages acting as mercenaries. During their time in the villages they were allowed to visit any number of Nayar women who had undergone the tali-rite and who were members of the same caste as themselves, or a lowers caste. With the agreement of the woman involved, the sambandham husband arrived at the home of one of his wives after supper, had sexual intercourse with her, and left before breakfast the next morning. During his stay he placed his weapons outside the building to show the other sambandham husbands that he was there. If they arrived too late, then they were free to sleep on the veranda, but could not stay the night with their wife. Men could have
unlimited numbers of sambandham wives, although women seem to have been limited to no more than 12 visiting husbands.

**An exception to the family?**

Sambandham relationships were unlike marriages in most societies in a number of ways:

1. They were not a lifelong union: either party could terminate the relationship at any time.
2. Sambandham husband had no duty towards the offspring of their wives.

When a woman became pregnant, it was essential according to Nayar custom that a man of appropriate caste declared himself to be the father of the child by paying a fee of cloth and vegetables to the midwife who attended the birth. However, it mattered little whether he was the biological parent or not, so long as someone claimed to be the father, because he did not help to maintain or socialize the child.

3. Husbands and wives did not form an economic unit. Although husbands might give wives token gifts, they were not expected to maintain them – indeed it was frowned upon if they attempted to. Instead, the economic unit consisted of a number of brothers and sisters, sisters’ children, and their daughters’ children. The eldest male was the leader of each group of kin.

Nayar society, then, was a matrilineal society. Kinship groupings were based on female biological relatives and marriage played no significant part in the formation of households, in the socializing of children, or in the way that the economic needs of the members of society were met.

In terms of Murdock’s definition, no family existed in Nayar society, since those who maintained ‘a sexually approved adult relationship’ did not live together and cooperate economically. Only the women lived with the children. Murdock’s definition of the family included at least one adult of each sex. But the Nayars of Kerala, a matrilineal society, are an exception to this rule. The Nayars called their matrilineal extended family as ‘Taravad’. All members of this family were consanguinely related men and women only. In relation to the male ego, the members of such a family included his mother and her sisters and brothers, his own brothers and sisters, mother’s sister’s sons and daughters and the children of the ego’s sisters. Thus, there was no relation by marriage in Taravad. The married women with their children lived with their mothers and other siblings. The men in the family were only occasional visitors to their wives in other Taravad at night but permanently resided with their own mother. That is why this system is also popularly known as the ‘visiting husband system’.

Therefore, either Murdock’s definition of the family is too narrow, or the family is not universal. Gough claimed that marriage, and by implication the family, existed in Nayar society. In order to make this claim, though, she had to broaden her definition of marriage beyond that implied in Murdock’s definition of the family. She defined marriage as a relationship between a woman and one or more persons in which a child born to the woman ‘is given full birth-status rights’ common to the normal members of the society.

**Matrifocal families – an exception to the rule?**

Murdock’s definition of the family includes at least one adult of each sex. However, both today and in the past, some children have been raised in households that do not contain adults of both sexes. Usually these households have been headed by women.
A significant proportion of black families in the islands of the West Indies, parts of Central America such as Guyana, and the USA do not include adult males. The ‘family unit’ often consists of a woman and her dependent children, sometimes with the addition of her mother. This may indicate that family is not universal as Murdock suggests, or that it is necessary to redefine the family and state that the minimal family unit consists of a woman and her dependent children, own or adopted, and that all other family types are additions to this unit.

Female-headed families are sometimes known as matriarchal families and sometimes as matrifocal families, although both of these terms have been used in a number of senses. We will use the term matrifocal family here to refer to female-headed families. Various scholars support the view that matrifocal family should be recognized as an alternative to the nuclear family.

**The kibbutz – the abolition of the family?**

The family is the Israeli kibbutz presents another possible exception to Murdock’s claim for the universality of the nuclear family. About 4% of Israel’s population live in some 240 kibbutzim settlements. Capital and property are collectively owned by kibbutzim members and the main economy is agriculture plus some light industry. The ‘family’ in the kibbutzim has been shaped by a number of ideological and economic factors. Particularly during the early days, all able-bodied adults were needed to get the settlements off the ground which left little time for intimate relationships between mothers and children. Kibbutzim ideology emphasized sexual equality and rejected the Western pattern of parental roles, specially the mother role. In particular there was a reaction against the traditional ‘Jewish mamma’, the supposedly overprotective Jewish mother, a well-known figure in American folklore and humour.

Although there are differences between kibbutzim, the general pattern of family life can be described as follows. Marriage is monogamous (one spouse of each sex), the married couple sharing a single bedroom cum living room. Common residence does not extend to their children live in communal dormitories where they are raised by child ‘crackers’ or ‘educators’. They eat and sleep in the dormitories spending most of the day and all of the night away from their parents. They usually see their parents for an hour or two each day, often visiting them in their apartment. These visits are viewed as ‘fun time’ rather than occasions for specialization and child training. Bruno Bettelheim, who studied children caring practices in a kibbutz, states that ‘parents have transferred their power to the community. All children are viewed and cared for as “children of the kibbutz”’. The collective method of childrearing represents a rejection of the family, with particular reference to parental roles.

Economic cooperation between the married couple as such hardly exists. Neither works for the family but rather for the kibbutz as a whole. They receive the goods and services they require from the kibbutz as do their children. They eat in the communal dining room, food is cooked in communal kitchen and services such as laundering are provided for an entire kibbutz rather than being the responsibility of the family. Economic cooperation is on a community rather than a family level, each working for the kibbutz as a whole and receiving his or her share of the goods and services produced. In terms of Murdock’s definition, the family does not exist in the kibbutz on two counts. Firstly, family members do not share a common residence. Secondly, their relationship is not characterized by economic operation.
In terms of Murdock’s definition, it can be argued that the family is not universal. The case of ‘Taravad’, among the Nayars of Kerala, does not satisfy Murdock’s criterion of at least one spouse of each sex. The kibbutz case does not satisfy the criteria of common residence and economic cooperation.

**Same sex couples**

Another type of household that may contradict Murdock’s claims about the universality of the family, as defined by him, is gay and lesbian households. By definition, such households will not contain ‘adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship’ (Murdock, 1949). Such households may, however, include children who are cared for by two adult females or two adult males. The children may have been adopted, be the result of a previous heterosexual relationship, or they may have been produced using new reproductive technologies involving sperm donation or surrogate motherhood. A lesbian may have sex with a man in order to conceive a child to be raised by her and her female partner.

Most children of gay couples result from a previous heterosexual relationship. Lesbian mothers are rather more common than gay fathers, due to the difficulties gay men are likely to have in being granted custody or given adopted children. However, Mukti Jain Campion quotes a study which claimed that over 1,000 children were born to gay or lesbian couples in San Francisco between 1985 and 1990, and that there were many more people living with gay partners who had conceived children in heterosexual...
relationships. Thus, while households consisting of gay partners and one or more children may not be very common, they do exist. This raises the question of whether such households should be regarded as families.

Rather like lone-parent families, households with gay parents are seen by some as not being ‘proper’ families. In most Western societies the gay couple will not be able to marry and any children will have a genetic connection with only one of the partners. However, Sidney Callahan (1997) argues that such households should still be seen as families. He argues that, if marriage were available, many gay and lesbian couples would marry. Furthermore, he believes that the relationships involved are no different in any fundamental way from those in heterosexual households. Callahan therefore claims that gay and lesbian households with children should be regarded as a type of family, at least where the gay or lesbian relationship is intended to be permanent. He concludes, ‘I would argue that gay or lesbian households that consist of intimate communities of mutual support and that display permanent shared commitments to intergenerational nurturing share the kinship bonding we observe and name as family’(Callahan, 1997)

The universality of the family – conclusion

Whether the family is regarded as universal ultimately depends on how the family is defined. Clearly, though, a wide variety of domestic arrangements have been devised by human beings which are quite distinctive from the ‘conventional’ families of modern industrial societies. As Diana Gittins puts it ‘Relationships are universal, so is some form of co-residence, of intimacy, sexuality and emotional bonds. But the forms these can take are infinitely variable and can be changed and challenged as well as embraced’.

It may be a somewhat pointless exercise to try to find a single definition that embraces all the types of household and relationship which can reasonably be called families.

THEORIES OF THE FAMILY

THE FAMILY – A FUNCTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE

The analysis of the family from a functionalist perspective involves three main questions. Firstly, ‘What are the functions of the family?’ Answers to this question deal with the contributions made by the family to the maintenance of the social system. It is assumed that society has certain functional prerequisites or basic needs that must be met if it is to survive and operate efficiently. The family is examined in terms of the degree to which it meets these functional prerequisites. A second and related question asks, ‘What are the functional relationships between the family and other parts of the social system?’ It is assumed that there must be a certain degree of fit, integration and harmony between the parts of the social system if society is going to function efficiently. For example, the family must be integrated to some extent with the economic system. This question will be examined in detail in a later section when the relationships between the family and industrialization will be considered. The third question is concerned with the functions performed by an institution or a part of society for the individual. In the case of the family, this question considers the functions of the family for its individual members.
Functionalists view the family as a source of human happiness and social stability

George Peter Murdock – the universal functions of the family

From his analysis of 250 societies, Murdock argues that the family performs four basic functions in all societies. These universal functions he terms the sexual, reproductive, economic and educational. They are essential for social life since without the sexual and reproductive functions there would be no members of society, without the economic function, for example the provision and preparation of food, life would cease; and without education, a term Murdock uses for socialization, there would be no culture. Human society without culture could not function.

In Murdock’s scheme, the family is seen as a multi-functional institution which is indispensable to society. Its ‘many-sided utility’ accounts for its universality and its inevitability. In his enthusiasm for the family, however, Murdock does not seriously consider whether its functions could be performed by other social institutions. He does not examine alternatives to the family. Furthermore, Murdock’s emphasis on harmony and integration is not shared by some researchers.

Talcott Parsons – the ‘basic and irreducible’ functions of the family

Parsons concentrates his analysis on the family in modern American society. However, his ideas have a more general application since he argues that the American family retains two ‘basic and irreducible functions’ which are common to the family in all societies. These are the ‘primary socialization of children’ and the ‘stabilization of the adult personalities of the population of the society’.

Primary socialization refers to socialization during the early years of childhood which takes place mainly within the family. Secondary socialization occurs during the later years when the family is less involved and other agencies such as the peer group and the school exert increasing influence. There
are two basic processes involved in primary socialization: the internalization of society’s culture and the structuring of the personality. Unless culture is internalized, society would cease to exist since without shared norms and values, social life would not be possible. However, culture is not simply learned, it is ‘internalized as part of the personality structure’. The child’s personality is moulded in terms of the central values of the culture to the point where they become a part of him. In the case of American society, his personality is shaped in terms of independence and achievement motivation which are two of the central values of American culture. Parsons argues that families ‘are “factories” which produce human personalities’. He believes they are essential for this purpose since primary socialization requires a context which provides warmth, security and mutual support. He can conceive of no institution other than the family which could provide this context.

Once produced, the personality must be kept stable. This is the second basic function of the family, the ‘stabilization of adult personalities’. The emphasis here is on the marriage relationship and the emotional security the couple provide for each other. This acts as a counterweight to the stresses and strains of everyday life which tend to make the personality unstable. This function is particularly important in Western industrial society since the nuclear family is largely isolated from kin. It does not have the security once provided by the close-knit extended family. Thus the married couple increasingly look to each other for emotional support. Adult personalities are also stabilized by the parents’ role in the socialization process. This allows them to act out “childish” elements of their own personalities which they have retained from childhood but which cannot be indulged in adult society. For example, father is ‘kept on the rails’ by playing with his son’s train set. The family therefore provides a context in which husband and wife can express their childish whims, give and receive emotional support, recharge their batteries and so stabilize their personalities.

As with Murdock, Parsons has been accused of idealizing the family with his picture of well-adjusted children and sympathetic spouses caring for each other’s every need. Secondly, his picture is based largely on the American middle class family which he treats as representative of American families in general. As D.H.J. Morgan states, ‘there are no classes, no regions, no religious, ethnic or status groups, no communities’ in Parsons’s analysis of the family. For example, he fails to explore possible differences between middle and working-class families. Thirdly, like Murdock, Parsons largely fails to explore functional alternatives to the family. He does recognize that some functions are not necessarily tied to the family. For example he notes that the family’s economic function has largely been taken over by other agencies in modern industrial society. However, his belief that its remaining functions are ‘basic and irreducible’ prevents him from examining alternatives to the family. Finally, Parsons’s view of the socialization process may be criticized. He sees it as a one-way process with the child being pumped full of culture and its personality moulded by powerful parents. He tends to ignore the two-way interaction process between parents and children. There is no place in his scheme for the child who twists its parents round its little finger.

Ezra F. Vogel and Norman W. Bell – functions and dysfunctions of the family

In an article entitled, The Emotionally Disturbed Child as the Family Scapegoat, Vogel and Bell present a functional analysis of certain families which avoids the tendency of many functionalists to concentrate solely on the positive aspects of the family. When examining the functional significance of the family, they ask functional ‘for whom?’ and ‘for what?’ Vogel and Bell base their findings on an intensive study of a small number of American families containing an ‘emotionally disturbed child’. They argue that the tension and hostility of unresolved conflicts between the parents are projected on the child. The child is thus used as an emotional scapegoat by the parents to relieve their
Children are the victims of unresolved parental conflict in the family

tension. For example, in one case a son was criticized by his mother for all the characteristics she
disliked in her husband. Clearly, the process of scapegoating is dysfunctional for the child. He
becomes ‘emotionally disturbed’. He is unable to adjust to life at school and in the neighbourhood.
However, what is dysfunctional for the child can be seen as functional for the parents, for the family
unit and for society as a whole. The parents release their tension and so control the conflict between
them. As a result the family as a whole is stabilized and strengthened. Vogel and Bell argue that the
cost to the child is ‘low relative to the functional gains of the whole family’. Scapegoating the child
serves as a ‘personality-stabilizing process’ for the parents which allows them to effectively perform
their roles in the wider society as ‘steady workers and relatively respectable community members’.

Whether the costs to the child are indeed low, compared to the gains of family solidarity and effective
role performance by the adults outside the family, is a matter of opinion. To some extent this
judgment reflects the functionalist view of the vital importance of the family to society. However,
Vogel and Bell’s analysis does have the merit of dealing with dysfunctional aspects of the family
within a functionalist framework.

CRITICAL VIEWS OF THE FAMILY

Increasingly, picture of the family as a cohesive and happy social unit is coming under strong
criticism. Some observers are suggesting that the family may well be dysfunctional for society and its
individual members.

Edmund Leach – A Runaway World?

In a study entitled A Runaway World? Edmund Leach presents a pessimistic view of the family in
industrial society. Leach, an anthropologist, has spent many years studying small-scale pre-industrial
societies. In such societies the family often forms a part of a wider kinship unit. An extensive network
Family is also a seat of complex, negative emotions and unhappiness

of social relationships between a large number of kin provides practical and psychological support for the individual. This support is reinforced by the closely-knit texture of relationships in the small-scale community as a whole. By comparison, in modern industrial society, the nuclear family is largely isolated from kin and the wider community. Leach summarizes this situation and its consequences as follows, ‘In the past kinsfolk and neighbours gave the individual continuous moral support throughout his life. Today the domestic household is isolated. The family looks inward upon itself; there is an intensification of emotional stress between husband and wife and parents and children. The strain is greater than most of us can bear’. Thrown back almost entirely on its own resources, the nuclear family becomes like an overloaded electrical circuit. The demands made upon it are too great and fuses below. In their isolation, family members expect and demand too much from each other. The result is conflict. In Leach’s words, ‘The parents and children huddled together in their loneliness take too much out of each other. The parents fight; the children rebel’.

Problems are not confined to the family. The tension and hostility produced within the family find expression throughout society. Leach argues that the ‘isolation and the close-knit nature of contemporary family life incubates hate which finds expression in conflict in the wider community’. The families in which people huddle together create barriers between them and the wider society. The privatized family breeds suspicion and fear of the outside world. Leach argues that, ‘Privacy is the source of fear and violence. The violence in the world comes about because we human beings are forever creating barriers between men who are like us and men who are not like us’. Only when individuals can break out of the prison of the nuclear family, rejoin their fellows, and give and receive support will the ills of society begin to diminish. Leach’s conclusion is diametrically opposed to the functionalist view of the family. He states, ‘Far from being the basis of the good society, the family, with its narrow privacy and tawdry secrets is the source of all our discontents’.

R.D. Laing – The politics of the family

In The Politics of the Family and a number of other publications, R.D. Laing presents a radial alternative to the functionalist picture of the ‘happy family’. Laing is a phenomenological psychiatrist. He is concerned with interaction within the family and the meanings which develop in that context. His work is largely based on the study of families in which one member is a schizophrenic.
Family dinners are an unpleasant experience for many because of the politics and bitterness

Laing argues that the behavior of so-called schizophrenics can only be understood in terms of relationships within the family. Far from viewing schizophrenia as madness, he argues that it makes sense in terms of the meanings and interactions which develop within the family. As such it can be seen as reasonable behaviour. Laing maintains that the difference between so-called ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ families is small. It therefore follows that a lot can be learned about families in general by studying those labeled as abnormal.

Laing views the family in terms of sets of interactions. Individuals form alliances, adopt various strategies and play one or more individuals off against others in a complex tactical game. Laing is preoccupied with interaction situations which he regards as harmful and destructive. Throughout his work he concentrates on exploitive aspects of family relationships.

Laing refers to the family group as a ‘nexus’. He argues that ‘the highest concern of the nexus is reciprocal concern. Each partner is concerned about what the other thinks, feels, does’. Within the nexus there is a constant, unremitting demand for mutual concern and attention. As a result there is considerable potential for harm; family members are in an extremely vulnerable position. Thus if a father is ashamed of his son, given the nature of the nexus, his son is deeply affected. As he is emotionally locked into the nexus, he is concerned about his father’s opinion and cannot brush it off lightly. In self-defence he may run to his mother who offers protection. In this way Laing argues that, ‘A family can act as gangsters, offering each other mutual protection against each other’s violence.

From interaction within the nexus, ‘reciprocal interiorization’ develops. Family members become a part of each other and the family as a whole. They interiorize or internalize the family. Laing argues that, ‘To be in the same family is to feel the same “family” inside’. Laing regards the process of
interiorization as psychologically damaging since it restricts the development of the self. The individual carries the blueprint of his family with him for the rest of his life. This prevents any real autonomy or freedom of self, it prevents the development of the individual in his own right. Self-awareness is smothered under the blanket of the family.

Like Leach, Ling argues that problems in the family create problems in society. Due to the nature of the nexus and the process of interiorization, a boundary or even a defensive barrier is drawn between the family and the world outside. This can reach the point where, ‘some families live in perpetual anxiety of what, to them, is an external persecuting world. The members of the family live in a family ghetto as it were’. The barrier erected between the family and the world outside may have important consequences. According to Laing it leads family members, particularly children, to see the world in terms of ‘us and them’. From this basic division stem the harmful and dangerous distinctions between Gentile and Jew, Black and White and the separation of others into ‘people like us’ and ‘people like them’.

Within the family children learn to obey their parents. Laing regards this as the primary link in a dangerous chain. Patterns of obedience laid down in early childhood form the basis for obedience to authority in later life. They lead to soldiers and officials blindly and unquestioningly following orders. Laing implies that without family obedience training, people would question orders, follow their own judgment and make their own decisions. If this were so, American soldiers might not have marched off to fight what Laing regards as a senseless war in Vietnam.

David Cooper – The Death of the Family

David Cooper is a phenomenological psychiatrist who has worked closely with Laing. His book, The Death of the Family is an outright condemnation of the family as an institution. Like Laing, he sees the family as a stultifying institution which stunts the self and largely denies people the freedom to develop their own individuality. To develop an autonomous self, the child must be free to be alone, free from the constant demands made upon him in the family, free from the ‘imprisoning and ambiguous love’ which engulfs him. Like Laing, Cooper argues that individuals interiorize the family. Because of this the self can never be free since it is made up of other family members. In the process of interiorization, ‘one glues bits of other people onto oneself’ and for most people, this results in ‘the chronic murder of their selves’.

Cooper develops his ideas along Marxian lines. He argues that the family operates ‘as an ideological conditioning device in an exploitive society – slave society, feudal society, capitalist society. The behaviour patterns and controls laid down within the family produce the ‘well-conditioned, endlessly obedient citizen’ who is easily manipulated by ruling classes. As a result of the social controls implanted into the child by family socialization, ‘The child is in fact primarily taught not how to survive in society but how to submit to it’. Each child has the potential to be an artist, a visionary and a revolutionary but this potential is crushed in the family. Artists, visionaries and revolutionaries tend to think for themselves and to see through ruling class ideologies. However, the opportunity to develop in this way is stifled by the submission of the self to the demands of the family.

Cooper argues that ‘the family specializes in the formation of roles for its members rather than laying down conditions for the free assumption of identity’. Thus children are taught to play the roles of son and daughter, male and female. Such roles are constricting. They confine behaviour within narrow limits and restrict the development of self. They lay the groundwork for ‘indoctrination’ into roles at
school, work and in society generally. The family prepares the individual for his induction into the role he is to play in an exploitive society, the role of ‘the endlessly obedient citizen’. Cooper’s view of the relationship between the family and society is summarized in the following quotation, ‘So the family goes on and is externally reflected in all our relationships’. An exploitive family produces an exploitive society.

Leach, Laing and Cooper have provided a balance to the functionalist view which has dominated sociological thinking on the family for many years. Laing in particular, has given important insights into interaction patterns within the family.

THE FAMILY – A MARXIAN PERSPECTIVE

Marxian sociologists have tended to bypass the family in their preoccupation with social class. Apart from Friedrich Engels, who wrote an important work on the origin and evolution of the family entitled The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, (first published in 1984), until the late 1960s few writers attempted to apply Marxian theory to the family.

Like many nineteenth-century scholars, Engels took an evolutionary view of the family, attempting to trace its origin and evolution through time. He combined an evolutionary approach with Marxian theory arguing that as the mode of production changed, so did the family. During the early stages of human evolution, Engels believed that the forces of production were communally owned and the family as such did not exist. This era of ‘primitive communism’ was characterized by promiscuity. There were no rules limiting sexual relationships and society was, in effect, the family. Although Engels has been criticized for this type of speculation, the anthropologist Kathleen Gough argues that his picture may not be that far from the truth. She notes that man’s nearest relatives, the chimpanzees, live in ‘promiscuous hordes’ and this may have been the pattern for early man.

Engels argued that throughout man’s history, more and more restrictions were placed on sexual relationships and the production of children. He speculated that from the promiscuous horde, marriage and the family evolved through a series of stages which included polygyny to its present stage, the monogamous nuclear family. Each successive stage placed greater restrictions on the number of mates available to the individual. The monogamous nuclear family developed with the emergence of private property, in particular the private ownership of the forces of production, and the advent of the state. The state instituted laws to protect the system of private property and to enforce the rules of monogamous marriage. This form of marriage and the family developed to solve the problems of the inheritance of private property. Property was owned by males and in order for them to pass it on to their heirs, they must be certain of the legitimacy of those heirs. They therefore needed greater control over women so there would be no doubt about the paternity of their offspring. The monogamous family provided the most efficient device for this purpose. In Engels’s words, ‘It is based on the supremacy of the man, the express purpose being to produce children of undisputed paternity; such paternity is demanded because these children are later to come into their father’s property as his natural heirs’.

Engels’s scheme of the evolution of the family is much more elaborate than the brief outline described above. It was largely based on Ancient Society, an erroneous interpretation of the evolution of the family by the nineteenth century American anthropologist, Lewis Henry Morgan. Modern research has suggested that many of its details are incorrect. For example, monogamous marriage and the nuclear family are often found in hunting and gathering bands. Since humanity has lived in hunting
and gathering bands for the vast majority of its existence, the various forms of group marriage postulated by Engels, such as the promiscuous horde, may well be figments of his imagination. However, Kathleen Gough argues that ‘the general trend of Engels’s argument still appears sound’. Although nuclear families and monogamous marriage exist in small-scale societies, they form a part of a larger kinship group. When individuals marry they take on a series of duties and obligations to their spouse’s kin. Communities are united by kinship ties and the result is like a large extended family. Gough argues that, ‘It is true that although it is not a group marriage in Engels’s sense, marriage has a group character in many hunting bands and in most of the more complex tribal societies that have developed with the domestication of plants and animals. With the development of privately owned, heritable property, and especially with the rise of the state, this group character gradually disappears’.

**Eli Zaretsky – personal life and capitalism**

Eli Zaretsky has analysed more recent developments in the family from a Marxist perspective. He argues that the family in modern capitalist society creates the illusion that the ‘private life’ of the family is quite separate from the economy. Before the early nineteenth century the family was the basic unit of production. For example, in the early capitalist textile industry, production of cloth took place in the home and involved all family members. Only with the development of factory-based production were work and family life separated.

In a society in which work was alienating, Zaretsky claims that the family was put on a pedestal because it apparently ‘stood in opposition to the terrible anonymous world of commerce and industry’. The private life of the family provided opportunities for satisfactions that were unavailable outside the walls of the home.

Zaretsky welcomes the increased possibilities for a personal life for the proletariat offered by the reduction in working hours since the nineteenth century. However, he believes that the family is unable to provide for the psychological and personal needs of individuals. He says ‘it simply cannot meet the pressures of being the only refuge in a brutal society’. The family artificially separates and isolates personal life from other aspects of life. It might cushion the effects of capitalism but it perpetuates the system and cannot compensate for the general alienation produced by such a society.

Furthermore, Zaretsky sees the family as major prop to the capitalist economy. The capitalist system is based upon the domestic labour of housewives who reproduce future generations of workers. He also believes that the family has become a vital unit of consumption. The family consumes the products of capitalism and this allows the bourgeoisie to continue producing surplus value. To Zaretsky, only socialism will end the artificial separation of family private life and public life, and produce the possibility of personal fulfillment.

**Feminist Perspectives on the Family**

In recent decades feminism has probably had more influence on the study of the family than any other approach to understanding society. Like Laing, Leach and Marxists, feminists have been highly critical of the family. However, unlike other critics, they have tended to emphasize the harmful effects of family life upon women. In doing so they have developed new perspectives and highlighted new issues.
Feminists have, for example, introduced the study of areas of family life such as housework and domestic violence into sociology. They have challenged some widely-held views about the inevitability of male dominance in families and have questioned the view that family life is becoming more egalitarian. Feminists have also highlighted the economic contribution to society made by women’s domestic labour within the family. Above all, feminist theory has encouraged sociologists to see the family as an institution involving power relationships. It has challenged the image of family life as being based upon cooperation, shared interests and love, and has tried to show that some family members, in particular men, obtain greater benefits from families than others.

Recently, some feminists have questioned the tendency of other feminists to make blanket condemnations of family life and have emphasized the different experiences of women in families. Some have rejected the idea that there is such a thing as ‘the family’ rather than simply different domestic arrangements. They have, however, continued to identify ways in which domestic life can disadvantage women.

**Marxist feminist perspectives on the family**

Marxian analysis of the family in capitalist society developed mainly in the late 1960s and 1970s, when several feminist writers employed Marxian concepts in their criticism of the family. From this perspective, the family is seen as a unit which produces one of the basic commodities of capitalism, labour. It produces it cheaply from the point of view of the capitalists, since they do not have to pay for the production of children or their upkeep. In particular, the wife is not paid for producing and rearing children.

Please note that Marxists such as Engels and Zaretsky have acknowledged that women are exploited in marriage and family life but they have emphasized the relationship between capitalism and the family, rather than the family’s effects on women. Marxists feminists use Marxist concepts but see the exploitation of women as a key feature of family life. The next few sections will examine how these theories have been applied to the family.

**The production of labour power**

Margaret Benston (1972) states that ‘the amount of unpaid labour performed by women is very large and very profitable to those who own the means of production. To pay women for their work, even at minimum wage scales, would involve a massive redistribution of wealth. At present, the support of the family is a hidden tax on the wage earner – his wage buys the labour power of two people’. The fact that the husband must pay for the production and upkeep of future labour acts as a strong discipline on his behaviour at work. He cannot easily withdraw his labour with a wife and children to support. These responsibilities weaken his bargaining power and commit him to wage labour. Benston argues that, ‘As an economic unit, the nuclear family is a valuable stabilizing force in capitalist society. Since the production which is done in the home is paid for by the husband –father’s earnings, his ability to withhold labour from the market is much reduced’.

Not only does the family produce and rear cheap labour, it also maintains it in good order at no cost to the employer. In her role as housewife, the woman attends to her husband’s needs thus keeping him in good running order to perform his role as a wage labourer.
Fran Ansley translates Parsons’ view, that the family functions to stabilize adult personalities, into a Marxian framework. She sees the emotional support provided by the wife as a safety valve for the frustration produced in the husband by working in a capitalist system. Rather than being turned against the system which produced it, this frustration is absorbed by the comforting wife. In this way the system is not threatened. In Ansley’s words, ‘when wives play their traditional role as takers of shit, they often absorb their husband’s legitimate anger and frustration at their own powerlessness and oppression. With every worker provided with a sponge to soak up his possibly revolutionary ire, the bosses rest more secure’. Kathy McAfee and Myrna Wood make a similar point in their discussion of male dominance in the family. They claim that, ‘The petty dictatorship which most men exercise over their wives and families enables them to vent their anger and frustration in a way which poses no challenge to the system’.

**Ideological conditioning**

The social reproduction of labour power does not simply involve producing children and maintaining them in good health. It also involves the reproduction of the attitudes essential for an efficient workforce under the capitalism. Thus David Cooper argues that the family is ‘an ideological conditioning device in an exploitive society’. Within the family children learn to conform, to submit to authority. The foundation is therefore laid for the obedient and submissive workforce required by capitalism.

A similar point is made by Diane Feeley who argues that the structure of family relationships socializes the young to accept their place in a class stratified society. She sees the family as an authoritarian unit dominated by the husband in particular and adults in general. Feeley claims that the family with its ‘authoritarian ideology is designed to teach passivity, not rebellion’. Thus children learn to submit to parental authority and emerge from the family pre-conditioned to accept their place in the hierarchy of power and control in capitalist society. Marxian views on the role of the family in capitalist society mirror Marxian analysis of the role of education.

**Radical feminist perspectives on the family**

There are many varieties of radical feminism. As Valerie Bryson says, ‘the radical feminist label has been applied in recent years to a confusingly diverse range of theories’. She says ‘it is the site for far ranging disagreements at all levels of theory and practice’. However, Bryson does identify some key characteristics which distinguish radical feminists from other feminists:

1. ‘It is essentially a theory of, by and for women’ and therefore ‘sees no need to compromise with existing perspectives and agenda’. Radical feminist ideas tend to be novel rather than adaptations of other theories such as Marxism.

2. ‘It sees the oppression of women as the most fundamental and universal form of domination’. Society is seen as patriarchal, or male-dominated, rather than capitalist, and women are held to have different interests to those of men.

Radical feminists do not agree on the source of male domination, but most do see the family as important in maintaining male power. We will now analyse one major radical feminist theory of the family.
Christine Delphy and Diana Leonard – Familial Exploitation

Delphy and Leonard (1992) are unlike most radical feminists in that they attach considerable importance to material factors in causing women’s oppression. In this respect they have some similarity with Marxist feminist theories. In particular, Delphy and Leonard attach special importance to work and say that their approach ‘uses Marxist methodology’. Nevertheless, they see themselves as radical feminists since they believe that it is men, rather than capitalists or capitalism, who are the primary beneficiaries of the exploitation of women’s labour. To them, the family has a central role in maintaining patriarchy. They say: We see the familial basis of domestic groups as an important element in continuing the patriarchal nature of our society: that is, in the continuance of men’s dominance over women and children.

The family as an economic system

Delphy and Leonard see the family as an economic system. It involves a particular set of ‘labour relations in which men benefit from, and exploit, the work of women’. The key to this explanation is that family members work not for themselves but for the head of the household. Women in particular are oppressed, not because they are socialized into being passive, nor because they are ideologically conditioned into subservience, but because their work is appropriated within the family. Delphy and Leonard argue that ‘it is primarily the work women do, the uses to which our bodies can be put, which constitutes the reason for our oppression’.

Delphy and Leonard argue that every family-based household has a social structure that involves two types of role. These are head of household and their dependents. Family households have members who are connected by kinship or marriage. Female heads of household are uncommon. Where a male adult relative is present it is usually he who takes over as head of household. He holds the ultimate authority and makes the final decisions in the household. Further, the type and amount of work family members have to do are related to sex and marital status. Female relatives have to do unpaid domestic work; wives in addition have to carry out ‘sexual and reproductive work’. Although the precise allocation of tasks varies from household to household, domestic work remains a female responsibility. Moreover, the relations of production within the family often, therefore, involve payment in kind (such as a new coat or a holiday) rather than payment in money.

To conclude Delphy and Leonard believe that the family is a patriarchal and hierarchical institution through which men dominate and exploit women. Men are usually the head of household, and it is the head who benefits from the work that gets done. Women provide ‘57 varieties of unpaid service’ for men, including providing them with a ‘pliant sexual partner and children if he wants them’. Wives do sometimes resist their husband’s dominance – they are not always passive victims – but ‘economic and social constraints’ make it difficult for women to escape from the patriarchal family.

Delphy and Leonard do not think that there are simple solutions to the problems created by the family. Individual men may love their wives, but that does not stop them from exploiting them. Single mothers cannot escape from patriarchy ‘because they are often poor and their situation is always difficult’. Lesbians ‘may be downright ostracized and physically attacked’. In the end, they admit that they do not know what strategy feminists should use to change the family, but they believe that women should continue to struggle to improve their lives, both inside and outside family life.
Laura M. Purdy – ‘Babystrike!’

Feminism and motherhood

Like Delphy and Leonard, Laura M. Purdy (1997) believes that women are disadvantaged and exploited in family relationships. Unlike Delphy and Leonard, she believes that these disadvantages largely result from childcare responsibilities rather than from material inequalities. Purdy argues that in recent years feminists have placed less emphasis on criticisms of families and marriage, while issues such as pornography and sexual harassment have come to be seen as more important. She says, ‘critiques of marriage and family seem almost forgotten as feminists, like society at large, now seem generally to assume that all women – including lesbians – will pair up and have children’. Some recent accounts of the family in the popular media suggest that it is possible for women to ‘have it all’. They can combine a successful career with a rewarding family life and successful and satisfying child-rearing. Purdy question whether it is really possible to ‘have it all’ and whether family life in general, and child-rearing in particular, are really the paths to female self-fulfilment.

Purdy suggest that it is generally assumed that women should want to form couples (whether heterosexual or lesbian) and have children. Couples who choose not to have children are thought of as eccentric and selfish. Young women never ‘hear that some people shouldn’t have children, either because they do not really want them, because they are not able to care for them well, or because they have other projects that are incompatible with good child-rearing’. Purdy believes that feminism should try to counter the assumption that having children is necessarily desirable.

The disadvantages of motherhood

According to Purdy, there are a number of disadvantages for women in having children. Having children is extremely expensive and can increase the burden of poverty on women who are already poor. Having children represents a commitment for women for the rest of their lives, and a particularly onerous commitment during first 18 years. According to an American study quoted by Purdy, men still do only 20% of domestic work, despite big increases in female employment. This makes it very difficult for women to compete on equal terms in the labour market or to try to fight for greater equality. She asks, ‘How can women energetically fight the entrenched sexism in society and pursue positions of power and prestige if their time and energy is mostly taken up with children’s needs, needs that cannot and ought not be ignored?’

Purdy believes that society in general takes it for granted that women will have children and therefore perform the vital function of reproducing the species. The only way to bring home to men the sacrifices of child-rearing is for women to stop having children. In other words, Purdy advocates a babystrike. Only then would men take women’s demands for equality within families seriously. Only then would social arrangements change so that women were able to combine having children with successful careers.

Difference feminism

Neither Marxist nor radical feminism is particularly sensitive to variations between families. Both approaches tend to assume that families in general disadvantage women and benefit men (and, in the case of Marxist approaches, benefit capitalism). Both can be criticized for failing to acknowledge the
variety of domestic arrangements produced by different groups, and the range of effects that family life can have.

Increasingly, however, feminists have begun to highlight the differences between groups of women in different family situations. Thus, they have argued that women in single-parent families are in a different situation to women in two-parent families; women in lesbian families are in a different position to women in heterosexual families; black women are often in a different family position to white women; poor women are in a different position to middle-class women, and so on. Feminists who analyse the family in these terms have sometimes been referred to as ‘difference feminists’. Difference feminists have been influenced by a range of feminist theories including liberal feminism, Marxist feminism and radical feminism. Their work often has affinities with postmodern theories of the family and with ideas relating to family diversity. However, they share a sufficiently distinctive approach to be considered a separate feminist perspective on the family.

Michelle Barrett and Mary McIntosh – The Anti-social Family

One of the earliest examples of a theory of the family put forward by difference feminists is provided by the work of Michelle Barrett and Mary McIntosh (1982). Their work was influenced by Marxist feminism but moves beyond the kinds of Marxist views discussed earlier. Barrett and McIntosh believe that the idea of ‘the family’ is misleading, given the wide variations that exist in life within families and varieties of household types in which people live. If there is no one normal or typical family type, then it may be impossible to claim that the family always performs particular functions either for men or for capitalism.

Barrett and McIntosh do believe that there is a very strong ideology supporting family life. To them ‘the family’ is ‘anti-social’ not just because it exploits women, and benefits capitalists, but also because the ideology of the family destroys life outside the family. They say ‘the family ideal makes everything else seem pale and unsatisfactory’. People outside families suffer as a consequence. Family members are so wrapped up in family life that they neglect social contact with others. ‘Couples mix with other couples, finding it difficult to fit single people in’.

Life in other institutions (such as children’s homes, old people’s homes and students’ residences) comes to be seen as shallow and lacking in meaning. Barrett and McIntosh argue that homes for the handicapped could be far more stimulating for, say, Down’s syndrome sufferers, if it were not for life in institution being devalued by the ideology of the family.

Like other feminists, they point out that the image of the family as involving love and mutual care tends to ignore the amount of violent and sexual crime that takes place within a family context. They note that 25% of reported violent crimes consist of assaults by husbands on their wives, and many rapes take place within marriage. They do not deny that there can be caring relationships within families, but equally they do not think that families are the only places in which such relationships can develop. In their view, the ideology that idealizes family life: has made the outside world cold and friendless, and made it harder to maintain relationships of security and trust except with kin. Caring, sharing and loving would be more widespread if the family did not claim them for its own.
Linda Nicholson – ‘The myth of the traditional family’

Like Barrett and McIntosh, Linda Nicholson (1997) believes that there is a powerful ideology which gives support to a positive image of family life. She argues that this ideology only supports certain types of family while devaluing other types. Nicholson contrasts what she calls the ‘traditional’ family with ‘alternative’ families. She is an American feminist and her comments largely refer to the USA, but they may be applicable more generally to Western societies. The ‘traditional’ family Nicholson defines the traditional family as ‘the unit of parents with children who live together’. The bond between husband and wife is seen as particularly important, and the family feels itself to be separate from other kin. This family group is often referred to as the nuclear family. When conservative social commentators express concern about the decline of the family, it is this sort of family they are concerned about. They tend to be less worried about any decline of wider kinship links involving grandparents, aunts, uncles and so on.

According to Nicholson, the nuclear family is a comparatively recent phenomenon. It first developed among upper classes in the eighteenth century. For middle-class groups this type of family only became popular in the nineteenth century. Working class people often aspired to form nuclear families in the nineteenth century, but their low income usually prevented them from doing so. They frequently had to share accommodation with others from outside the nuclear family. Indeed, it was not really until the 1950s and the post-Second World War boom that nuclear family households became the norm for working class families. Thus Nicholson argues that the conventional family is actually a very recent phenomenon for most people.

However, even in the 1950s, some groups lacked the resources to form nuclear families. This was the case for people with few or outdated skills and for many African Americans who were the victims of racism in the labour market.

ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES

Alternative family forms were already developing even before the traditional family reached its zenith. Nicholson says that: even as certain ideal of family was coming to define ‘the American way of life’, such trends as a rising divorce rate, increased participation of married women in the labour force, and the growth of female-headed households were making this way of life increasingly atypical. In all cases such trends preceded the 1950s.

Some of these changes actually altered what was perceived as a ‘traditional’ family. For example, it came to be seen as ‘normal’ for married women to work, even if they and their partners had small children. Other changes, though, were seen as producing alternative families. Alternatives to traditional families included, ‘Not only gays and lesbians but heterosexuals living alone; marries couples with husbands at home caring for children’, as well as stepfamilies, single parents, heterosexual couples living together outside marriage, and gay or lesbians couples with or without children.

The family, industrialization and modernization

A major theme in sociological studies of the family is the relationship between the structure of the family and the related processes of industrialization and modernization. Industrialization refers to the mass production of goods in a factory system which involves some degree of mechanized production...
technology. Modernization refers to the development of social, cultural, economic and political practices and institutions which are thought to be typical of modern societies. Such developments include the replacement of religious belief systems with scientific and rational ones, the growth of bureaucratic institutions, and the replacement of monarchies with representative democracies.

Some sociologists regard industrialization as the central process involved in changes in Western societies since the eighteenth century; others attach more importance to broader processes of modernization. However, there are a number of problems which arise from relating the family to industrialization or modernization:

1. The processes of industrialization and modernization do not follow the same course in every society.

2. Industrialization and modernization are not fixed states but developing processes. Thus the industrial system in nineteenth-century Britain was different in important respects from that of today. Similarly, British culture, society and politics are very different at the turn of the millennium from how they were two hundred years earlier.

3. Some writers dispute that we still live in modern industrial societies and believe that we have moved into a phase of postmodernity. The issue of the family and postmodernity will be examined later.

Further difficulties arise from the fact that there is not one form of pre-industrial, or pre-modern, family, but many. Much of the research on the family, industrialization and modernization has led to considerable confusion because it is not always clear what the family in industrial society is being compared to. In addition, within modern industrial society there are variations in family structure.

The family in non-literate societies

In many small-scale, non-literate societies, the family and kinship relationships in general are the basic organizing principles of social life. Societies are often divided into a number of kinship groups, such as lineages, which are groups descended from a common ancestor. The family is embedded in a web of kinship relationships. Kinship groups are responsible for the production of important goods and services. For example, a lineage may own agricultural land which is worked, and its produce shared, by members of the lineage.

Members of kinship groups are united by a network of mutual rights and obligations. In some cases, if individuals are insulted or injured by someone from outside the group, they have the right to call on the support of members of the group in seeking reparation or revenge. Many areas of an individual’s behaviour are shaped by his or her status as kin. An uncle, for example, may have binding obligations to be involved with aspects of his nephew’s socialization and may be responsible for the welfare of his nieces and nephews should their father die.

The ‘classic’ extended family

A second form of pre-industrial, pre-modern family, sometimes known as the classic extended family, is found in some traditional peasant societies. This family type has been made famous by C.M. Arensberg and S.T. Kimball’s study of Irish farmers, entitled Family and Community in Ireland (1968).
As in kinship-based societies, kinship ties dominate life, but in this case the basic unit is the extended family rather than the wider kinship grouping. The traditional Irish farming family is a patriarchal extended family, so-called because of the considerable authority of the male head. It is also patrilineal because property is passed down through the male line. Within the family, social and economic roles are welded together, status being ascribed by family membership.

**Talcott Parsons – the ‘isolated nuclear family’**

Talcott Parsons argues that the ‘isolated nuclear family’ is the typical family form in modern industrial society. It is ‘structurally isolated’ because it does not form an integral part of a wider system of kinship relationships. Obviously there are social relationships between members of nuclear families and their kin but these relationships are more a matter of choice than binding obligations. Parsons sees the emergence of the isolated nuclear family in terms of his theory of social evolution. The evolution of society involves a process of ‘structural differentiation’. This means that institutions evolve which specialize in fewer functions. In this sense, no longer do the family and kinship groups perform a wide range of functions. Instead specialist institutions such as business firms, schools, hospitals, police forces and churches take over many of their functions. This process of differentiation and specialization involves the ‘transfer of a variety of functions from the nuclear family to other structures of the society’. Thus in industrial society, with the transfer of the production of goods to factories, specialized economic institutions became differentiated from the family. The family ceases to be an economic unit of production.

Functionalist analysis emphasizes the importance of integration and harmony between the parts of society. An efficient social system requires the parts to fit smoothly rather than abrade. The parts of society are functionally related when they contribute to the integration and harmony of the social system. Parsons argues that there is a functional relationship between the isolated nuclear family and the economic system in industrial society. In particular, the isolated nuclear family is shaped to meet the requirements of the economic system. A modern industrial system with a specialized division of labour demands considerable geographical mobility from its labour force. Individuals with specialized skills are required to move to places where those skills are in demand. The isolated nuclear family is suited to the need for geographical mobility. It is not tied down by binding obligations to a wide range of kin, and compared to the pre-industrial families, it is a small, streamlined unit.

Status in industrial society is achieved rather than ascribed. An individual’s occupational status is not automatically fixed by his ascribed status in the family or kinship group. Parsons argues that the isolated nuclear family is the best form of family structure for a society based on achieved status. In industrial society, based on what Parsons terms ‘universalistic values’, that is values that are universally applied to all members of society. However, within the family, status is ascribed and, as such, based on particularistic values’, that is values that are applied only to particular individuals. Thus a son’s relationship with his father is conducted primarily in terms of their ascribed statuses of father and son. The father’s achieved status as bricklayer, schoolteacher or lawyer has relatively little influence on their relationship since his son does not judge him primarily in terms of universalistic values. Parson argues that in a society based on achieved status conflict would tend to arise in a family unit larger than the isolated nuclear family. In a three generation extended family in which the children remained as part of the family unit, the following situation could produce conflict. If the son became a doctor and the father was a labourer, the particularistic values of family life would give the father a higher status than his son. Yet the universalistic values of society as a whole would award his
son higher social status. Conflict may result from this situation which could undermine the authority of the father and threaten the solidarity of the family. The same conflict of values may occur if the nuclear family were extended horizontally. Relationships between a man and his brother may be problematic if they held jobs of widely differing prestige.

The isolated nuclear family largely prevents these problems from arising. There is one main breadwinner, the husband–father. His wife is mainly responsible for raising the children and the latter have yet to achieve their status in the world of work. No member of the family is in a position to threaten the ascribed authority structure by achieving a status outside the family which is higher than the achieved status of the family head. These problems do not occur in pre-industrial society. There, occupational status is largely ascribed since an individual’s position in the family and kinship group usually determines his job. Parsons concludes that given the universalistic, achievement oriented values of industrial society, the isolated nuclear family is the most suitable family structure. Any extension of this basic unit may well create conflict which would threaten the solidarity of the family.

As a consequence of the structural isolation of the nuclear family, the conjugal bond – the relationship between husband and wife – is strengthened. Without the support of kin beyond the nuclear family, spouses are increasingly depended on each other, particularly for emotional support. As outlined in a previous section, Parsons argues that the stabilization of adult personalities is a major function of the family in industrial society. This is largely accomplished in terms of the husband-wife relationship.

MICHAEL YOUNG AND PETER WILLMOTT – FOUR STAGES OF FAMILY LIFE

Michael Young and Peter Willmott have been conducting studies of family life in London for over twenty years. In their latest book, The Symmetrical family, they attempt to trace the development of the family from pre-industrial England to the present day. Using a combination of historical research and social surveys – large-scale surveys based on random samples within a particular area – they suggest that the family is moving through four main stages.

Stage 1 is represented by the pre-industrial family. The family is a unit of production, the husband, wife and unmarried children working as a team, typically in agriculture or textiles. This type of family was gradually supplanted by the industrial revolution. However, it continued well into the nineteenth century and is still represented in a small minority of families today.

The Stage 2 family began with the industrial revolution, developed throughout the nineteenth century and reached its peak in the early years of the twentieth. The family ceased to be a unit of production since individual members were employed as wage earners. Throughout the nineteenth century working-class poverty was widespread, wages were low and unemployment high. Like Anderson, Young and Willmott argue that the family responded to this situation by extending its network to include relatives beyond the nuclear family. This provided an insurance policy against the insecurity and hardship of poverty. The extension of the nuclear family was largely conducted by women who ‘eventually built up an organization in their own defence and in defence of their children’. The basic tie was between a mother and her married daughter and in comparison, the conjugal bond – the husband-wife relationship – was weak. Women created an ‘informal trade union’ which largely excluded men. Young and Willmott claim that, ‘Husband were often squeezed out of the warmth of the female circle and took to the pub as their defence’. Compared to later stages, the stage 2 family was often headed by a female.
The Stage 2 family began to decline in the early years of the twentieth century but it is still found in many low-income, long established working-class areas. Its survival is documented in Young and Willmott’s famous study entitled Family and Kinship in East London. The study was conducted in the mid 1950s in Bethnal Green, a low-income borough in London’s East End. Bethnal Green is a long settled, traditional working-class area. Children usually remain in the same had parents living within two to three miles of their residence. There was a close tie between female relatives. Over 50% of the married women in the sample had seen their mothers during the previous day, over 80% within the previous week. There was a constant exchange of services such as washing, shopping and babysitting, between female relatives. Young and Willmott argue that in many families, the households of mother and married daughter are ‘to some extent merged’. As such they can be termed extended families which Young and Willmott define as ‘a combination of families who to some degree form one domestic unit’. Although many aspects of the state 2 family were present in Bethnal Green, there were also indications of a transition to Stage 3. For example, fathers were increasingly involved in the rearing of their children.

Young and Willmott argue that the Stage 2 family has largely disappeared.

For all social classes, but particularly the working class, the Stage 3 family predominates. This family is characterized by ‘the separation of the immediate, or nuclear family from the extended family’. The trade union of women is disbanded and the husband returns to the family circle.

Life for the Stage 3 nuclear family is largely home-centred, particularly when the children are young. Free time is spent doing chores and odd jobs around the house and leisure is mainly ‘home-based’, for example watching television. The conjugal bond is strong and relationships between husband and wife are increasingly ‘companionate’. In the home, ‘They shared their work; they shared their time’. The nuclear family has become a largely self-contained, self-reliant unit. The stage 3 family is very similar to the privatized home-centered affluent worker family described by Goldthorpe and Lockwood and the isolated nuclear family which Talcott Parsons sees as typical of modern industrial society.

Young and Willmott use the term ‘symmetrical family’ to describe the nuclear family of Stage 3. Symmetry refers to an arrangement in which the opposite parts are similar in shape and size. With respect to the symmetrical family, conjugal roles, although not the same - wives still have the main responsibility for raising the children, although husbands help – are similar in terms of the contribution made by each spouse to the running of the household. They share many of the chores, they share decisions, they work together, yet there is still men’s work and women’s work. Conjugal roles are not interchangeable but they are symmetrical in important respects.

1. A number of factors have reduced the need for kinship-based mutual aid groups. They include an increase in the real wages of the male breadwinner, a decrease in unemployment and the male mortality rate, and increased employment opportunities for women. Various provisions of the welfare state such as family allowances, sickness and unemployment benefits and old age pensions have reduced the need for dependence on the kinship network.

2. Increasing geographical mobility has tended to sever kinship ties. In their study of Bethnal Green (London), Young and Willmott showed how the extended kinship network largely ceased to operate when young couples with children moved some 20 miles away to a new council housing estate.
3. The reduction in the number of children, from an average of five or six per family in the nineteenth century to just over two in 1970s, provided greater opportunities for wives to work. This in turn leads to greater symmetry within the family since both spouses are more likely to be wage earners and to share financial responsibility for the household.

4. As living standards rose, the husband was drawn more closely into the family circle since the home was a more attractive place. It became more comfortable with better amenities and a greater range of home entertainments.

To the above points can be added Goldthorpe and Lockwood’s conclusions from the affluent worker study. They argue that the privatized nuclear family stems largely from the values placed by the affluent worker on home-centredness and materialism. The major concern of the affluent worker was to raise the living standards of himself and his immediate family, a concern that largely shapes his family structure and domestic life.

Young and Willmott found that the home-centered symmetrical family was more typical of the working class than the middle class. They argue that members of the working class are ‘more fully home-centered because they are less fully work-centered’. Partly as compensation for boring and uninvolving work, and partly because relatively little interest and energy are expended at work, manual workers tend to focus their attention on family life. Young and Willmott therefore see the nature of work at a major influence on family life.

In The Symmetrical Family, Young and Willmott devise a general theory which they term the ‘Principle of Stratified Diffusion’. They claim that this theory explains much of the change in family life in industrial society. Put simply, the theory states that what the top of the stratification system does today, the bottom will do tomorrow. Life styles, patterns of consumption, attitudes and expectations will diffuse from the top of the stratification system downwards. They argue that industrialization is the ‘source of momentum’, it provides the opportunities for higher living standards and so on. However, industrialization alone cannot account for the changes in family life. For example it cannot fully explain why the mass of the population has chosen to adopt the life style of Stage 3 families. To complete the explanation, Young and Willmott maintain that the Principle of Stratified Diffusion is required. Industrialization provides the opportunity for a certain degree of choice for the mass of the population. This choice will be largely determined by the behavior of those at the top of the stratification system. Values, attitudes and expectations permeate down the class system; those at the bottom copy those at the top. There are a number of problems with this theory. In particular, it largely ignores the possibility that working-class subculture can direct behaviour. In the Luton study, Goldthorpe and Lockwood argue that behaviour of the affluent worker can be understood in terms of the adaptation of working-class norms and values to a new situation. They reject the view that the affluent worker simply absorbs the norms and values of higher social strata and acts accordingly.

Applying the Principle of Stratified Diffusion to the future, Young and Willmott postulate a possible Stage 4 family. They examine in detail the family life of managing directors, which in terms of their theory, should diffuse downwards in years to come. Managing directors are work-centred rather than home-centred, ‘my business is my life’ being a typical quote from those in the sample. Their leisure activities are less home-centred and less likely to involve their wives than those of Stage 3 families. Sport was an important area of recreation, particularly swimming and golf. The wife’s role was to look after the children and the home. As such the managing director’s family was more asymmetrical
than the Stage 3 family. Young and Willmott suggest that changes in production technology may provide the opportunity for the Stage 4 family to diffuse throughout the stratification system. As technology reduces routine work, larger numbers of people may have more interesting and involving jobs and become increasingly work-centered. Young and Willmott admit that, ‘We cannot claim that our 190 managing directors were representative of managing directors generally’. However, given the evidence available, they predict that the asymmetrical Stage 4 family represents the next major development.

CONTEMPORARY FAMILY NETWORKS

Peter Willmott – networks in London

Young and Willmott had suggested that changes in production technology may provide the opportunity for the Stage 4 family to diffuse throughout the stratification system. However, in a later research conducted during the 1980s in a north London suburb, Peter Willmott found that contacts with kin remained important in both the middle and working class. In the area he studied, about a third of the couples had moved to the district in the previous five years. Only a third of all the couples had parents or parents-in-law living within ten minutes travelling distance. However, despite the distance between their homes, two thirds of the couples saw relatives at least weekly. Working class couples saw relatives more frequently than middle class couples, but the difference were not great. Maintaining contact was relatively easy for most families because so many had access to cars. Most also had homes that were sufficiently spacious for relatives to come and stay. Some 90% had telephones which enables them to keep in touch with relatives even if they did not meet face-to-face. Peter Willmott also found that ‘relatives continue to be the main source of informal support and care, and that again the class differences are not marked’. For example, nearly 75% had relatives who sometimes helped with babysitting and 80% looked to relatives to help them when they needed to borrow money.

Margaret O’Brien and Deborah Jones – families and kinship in East London

Margaret O’Brien and Deborah Jones conducted research in Barking and Dagenham, East London, in the early 1990s. They collected survey data on 600 young people and their parents in this predominantly working-class area. They compared their findings with a 1950s study of the same area conducted by Peter Willmott. They found that, compared with the 1950s, this area had developed a greater variety of types of family and household. Of the young people surveyed, 14% lived with a step-parent, and 14% lived in lone-parent families. According to census statistics, over one-third of births in the area took place outside marriage. There were many dual-earner families, with 62% of women in their sample working in paid employment, and 79% of men. In Willmott’s 1950s study, family life was much more homogeneous. Then, 78% of people were married, and just 1% were divorced. Most single people were young and lived with their parents.

Despite the move towards a greater plurality of family and household types, O’Brien and Jones did not find that there had been any major erosion in the importance attached to kinship. In both Willmott’s and O’Brien and Jones’s research, over 40% of the sample had grandparents living locally. In the 1990s, 72% of those studied had been visited by a relative in the previous week, and over half the sample saw their maternal grandparent at least weekly. Twenty% had large network of local kin numbering over ten relatives.
O’Brien and Jones conclude that there has been a pluralisation of lifestyles, an increase in marital breakdowns and a big rise in dual-earner households. However, they also found that kin contact and association do not appear to have changed significantly since Willmott’s study of the borough in the 1950s. This suggests a greater continuity in kin relationships, at least among the working class in London, than that implied by some other studies.

All the above studies have been based upon specific geographical areas at a particular point in time. However, in 1980s and 1990s, British Social Attitude Surveys were conducted at national level. The surveys used large representative samples of the British population. The results of these surveys have been analysed by Francis McGlone, Alison Park and Kate Smith (1998).

McGlone et al. conclude that family members remain the most important source of practical help. While people tend to turn first to a spouse or partner, after that they turn to other relatives, with friends of neighbours being less important. McGlone et al. found that ‘the majority of the adult population are very family-centred’. The vast majority thought that parents should continue to help children after they had left home, and around 70% thought that people should keep in touch with close family members. A majority thought that you should try to keep in touch with relatives like aunts, uncles and cousins, even if you did not have much in common with them.

McGlone et al. found that families remain very important to people in contemporary Britain. They argue that their study confirms the results of earlier research showing that families remain an important source of help and support, and that family contacts are still maintained even though family members tend to live further apart. Their research suggests that the ‘core’ of the family does not just include parents and children - in most households grandparents are part of the core as well. They also found that differences between social classes remained significant, with the working class still more likely to have frequent contacts than the middle class. Despite all the social changes affecting families between 1986 and 1995, kinship networks beyond the nuclear family remain important to people.

Similarly Janet Finch too argues that although the circumstances in which family relationships are made have changes enormously since pre-industrial times, there is no evidence that in general there is less sense of obligation to kin than there was in the past.

The ‘modified extended family’

In order to clear up the confusion surrounding the term ‘isolated nuclear family’, Eugene Litwak argues that a new term, the ‘modified extended family’ should be introduced to describe the typical family in modern industrial society. Litwak defines the modified extended family as ‘a coalition of nuclear families in a state of partial dependence. Such partial dependence means that nuclear family members exchange significant services with each other, thus differing from the isolated nuclear family, as well as retain considerable autonomy (that is not bound economically or geographically) therefore differing from the classical extended family’.

The ‘modified elementary family’

Graham Allan accepts Litwak’s view that kin outside the nuclear family continue to be important in industrial society. On the basis of this own research in a commuter village in East Anglia, he argues that in normal circumstances non-nuclear kin do not rely on each other. In many families there may be little exchange of significant services most of the time. However, in most families the members do
feel an obligation to keep in touch. For example, very few married children break off relationships with their parents altogether, and brothers and sisters usually maintain contact. Although significant services are not usually exchanged as a matter of course, kin frequently recognize an obligation to help each other in times of difficulty or crisis.

Unlike Litwak, Allan believes that these kinds of relationships are confined to an inner or ‘elementary’ family, consisting of wives and husbands, their parents, children, brothers and sisters. The obligations do not extend to uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, cousins or more distant kin. Allan therefore prefers the term modified elementary family to ‘modified extended family’, since to him it more accurately describes the range of kin who are important to an individual.

The ‘dispersed extended family’

On the basis of research carried out in London in the 1980s, Peter Willmott reached broadly similar conclusions to Litwak and Allan. He claims that the dispersed extended family is becoming dominant in Britain. It consists of two or more related families who cooperate with each other even though they live some distance apart. Contacts are fairly frequent, taking place on average perhaps once a week, but less frequent than they were amongst extended families who lived close together. Cars, public transport and telephones make it possible for dispersed extended families to keep in touch. Members of dispersed extended families do not rely on each other on a day-to-day basis.

Like Litwak, Willmott sees each nuclear family unit as only partially dependent upon extended kin. Much of the time the nuclear family is fairly self-sufficient but in times of emergency the existence of extended kin might prove invaluable. Thus Willmott argues that, in modern Britain, ‘although kinship is largely chosen, it not only survives but most of the time flourishes’.

The research discussed by McGlone et al. reaches broadly similar conclusions. Kinship networks outside the nuclear family are still important. Indeed they argue that the core families with dependent children include not just the nuclear family but also grandparents. Despite all the social changes that could have weakened kinship, people still value kinship ties and for the most part try to retain them even when they live some distance from their relatives. In this section we have focused on the changes in household composition and kinship networks that have accompanied industrialization in Britain. We will now examine the extent to which the idea of a ‘typical family’ is accurate.

FAMILY DIVERSITY

Although some historians such as Michael Anderson have pointed to a variety of household types in pre-industrial times and during industrialization, it has generally been assumed that a single type of family is dominant in any particular era. Whether the modern family is regarded as nuclear, modified extended, modified elementary or dispersed extended, the assumption has been that this type of family is central to people’s experiences in modern industrial societies. However, recent research has suggested that such societies are characterized by a plurality of household and family types, and that the idea of a typical family is misleading.
The ‘cereal packet image’ of the family

Ann Oakley (1982) has described the image of the typical or ‘conventional’ family. She says, ‘conventional families are nuclear families composed of legally married couples, voluntarily choosing the parenthood of one or more (but not too many) children’.

Leach called this the ‘cereal packet image of the family’. The image of the happily married couple with two children is prominent in advertising, and the ‘family-sized’ packets of cereals and their types of product are aimed at just this type of grouping. It tends also to be taken for granted that this type of family has its material needs met by the male breadwinner, while the wife has a predominantly domestic role.

The monolithic image of the family

The American feminist Barrie Thorne has attacked the image of the ‘monolithic family’. She argues that ‘Feminists have challenged the ideology of “the monolithic family”, which has elevated the nuclear family with a breadwinner husband and a full-time wife and mother as the only legitimate family form’. She argues that the focus on the family unit neglects structures of society that lead to variations in families. She says, ‘Structures of gender, generation, race and class result in widely varying experiences of family life, which are obscured by the glorification of the nuclear family, motherhood, and the family as a loving refuge’. The idea of ‘The Family’ involves ‘falsifying the actual variety of household forms’. In fact, according to Thorne, ‘Households have always varied in composition, even in the 1950s and early 1960s when the ideology of The Family was at its peak’. By the 1990s, such an ideology was more obviously inappropriate since changes in society had resulted in ever more diverse family forms.
Households in Britain

The view that such images equate with reality has been attacked by Robert and Rhona Rapoport (1982). They drew attention to the fact that in 1978, for example, just 20% of families consisted of married couples with children in which there was a single breadwinner. Rapoorts found that there has been a steady decline in the proportion of households in Great Britain consisting of married couples, with dependent children, from 38% in 1961 to just 23% in 1998. There has been a corresponding increase in single-person households in the same period, with the proportion of households of this type rising from 11% in 1961 to 28% in 1998. Furthermore, the proportion of households that were single-parent households with dependent children more than tripled, from 2% in 1961 to 7% in 1998. The total number of lone-parent households rose from 6% to 10% over the same period. Single-parent families are discussed in more detail later.

Types of diversity

The fact that the ‘conventional family’ no longer makes up a majority of households or families is only one aspect of diversity identified by the Rapoorts. In their survey, they found a variety of family forms that are emerging in Britain. The findings of their survey have been summarized below:

• that there has been a steady decline in the proportion of ‘conventional families’ consisting of married heterosexual couples and their dependent children.
• that there is a rising trend towards ‘organizational diversity’. By this, they mean there are variations in family structure, household type, patterns of kinship network, and differences in the division of labour within home. For example, there are the differences between conventional families, one-parent families, and dual-worker families, in which husband and wife both work.
• that there are also increasing numbers of ‘reconstituted families’. These families are formed after divorce and remarriage. This situation can lead to a variety of family forms. The children from the previous marriages of the new spouses may live together in the newly reconstituted family, or they may live with the original spouses of the new couple.
• that the variety of family forms is also influenced by ‘cultural diversity’. There are differences in the lifestyles of families of different ethnic origins. Protestant families may also be an important element of diversity.
• that there are differences between middle- and working-class families in terms of relationships between adults and the way in which children are socialized.
• that the variety of family forms is also influenced by ‘regional diversity’. For example, in what they term ‘the sun belt’ (the affluent southern parts of England) Rapoorts found two-parent upwardly mobile families are typical. On the other hand, in rural regions, the family-based farm tends to produce strong kinship networks.
• that there is an increasing trend towards cohabitation without marriage (live-in relationships).
• that ‘gay and lesbian households’ have become more common. Many sociologists believe that such households, where they incorporate long-term gay or lesbian relationships, should be seen as constituting families.

New reproductive technologies

New reproductive technologies have added an entirely new dimension to family diversity. It was not until 1978 that the first ‘test-tube baby’, Louise Brown, was born. The process is called in vitro fertilization and involves fertilizing an egg with a sperm in a test-tube, before implanting in a women’s womb. The woman may or may not be the woman who produced the egg.
Surrogate motherhood involves one woman carrying a foetus produced by the egg of another woman. This raises question about who the parents of a child are, and questions about what constitutes a family. Calhoun sees this as undermining the centrality of the reproductive couple as the core of the family, and it introduces a greater range of choices into families than was previously available. John Macionis and Ken Plummer show how new reproductive technologies can create previously impossible sets of family relationships. They quote the case of Arlette Schweitzer, who in 1991 gave birth in South Dakota in the USA to her own grandchild. Her daughter was unable to carry a baby and Arlette Schweitzer acted as a surrogate mother. She gave birth to twins, a boy and a girl. Macionis and Plummer ask, ‘is Arlette Schweitzer the mother of the twins she bore? Grandmother? Both?’ Such examples, they say, ‘force us to consider the adequacy of conventional kinship terms’. They note that such technologies have largely been also been used by lesbian, homosexual, and single and older women.

The implication of new reproductive technologies is that biology will no longer restrict the possibilities for forming or enlarging families by having children. They therefore add considerably to the range of potential family types and thus contribute to growing diversity.

A global trend

According to Rhona Rapoport, the decline of conventional family forms and the increasing diversity are part of a global trend. She quotes figures showing movement toward diverse family structure in very different European countries. In Finland, the %age of household consisting of a nuclear family declined from 63.8 % in 1950 to 60 % in 1980. In Sweden, the decline was from 52.4 % in 1960 to 42.6 % in 1980, in East Germany from 56.7% in 1957 to 48.7 % in 1977. She also points to an enormous increase throughout Europe in the proportion of married women who have paid
employment, which suggests that men’s and women’s roles within marriage are changing and consequently new family forms are developing. These conclusions are broadly shared by a study of diversity in Europe.

Diversity and European family life

At the end of the 1980s the European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences organized a cross-cultural study of family life in 14 European nations (Boh, 1989). These were Belgium, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany (the study was carried out before re-unification), Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the then Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The findings of individual national studies were analysed and compared by Katja Boh. She tried to ‘trace the tendencies in changes of family patterns’ and found that although most of the evidence showed that family life was very different in different European countries, some evidence did point to certain trends being widespread. All European countries had experienced rising divorce rates and many had made it easier to get divorced. Cohabitation appeared to have become more common in most countries, and the birth rate had declined everywhere.

Further, Boh argues that the existence of diverse patterns of family life in Europe, but with some common trends, seems at first sight to be contradictory. However, together, they produce a consistent pattern of convergence in diversity. While family life retains considerable variations from country to country, throughout Europe a greater range of family types is being accepted as legitimate and normal. This has been caused by increasing gender symmetry in work patterns, more freedom in conjugal choice and a more hedonistic view of marriage and love, premarital and experimental sexuality, higher marriage instability and alternative forms of ‘living together’, decreasing fertility and change in forms of parenting.

Boh concludes that whatever the existing patterns are, they are characterized by the acceptance of diversity that has given men and women the possibility to choose inside the boundaries of available options the life pattern that is best adapted to their own needs and aspirations (Boh, 1989).

The increase in single parenthood

As mentioned earlier, single-parent families have become increasingly common in Britain. According to government statistics, in 1961, 2 % of the population lived in households consisting of a lone parent with dependent children, but by 1998 this had more than tripled to 7 %. Between 1972 and 1997 the percentage of children living in single-parent families increased from 7 % to 19 %. According to Hantrais and Letablier (1996), Britain has the second highest rate of lone parenthood in Europe. It is exceeded only by Denmark, and rates in countries such as Greece, Portugal and France are much lower than those in Britain. Nevertheless, throughout Europe and in advanced industrial countries such as Japan and the USA, the proportions have generally been increasing since at least the 1980s. Further, as per the General Household Survey (1996) it was found that only 1 % of the family households were headed by lone fathers, compared to 18 % that were headed by lone mothers.
Single parenthood is on the rise, particularly by women

Clearly, then, the rise in lone motherhood is closely related both to increase in the divorce rate and to an increase in births outside marriage. The causes of the rise in divorces are discussed later. The increase in single lone mothers may partly result from a reduction in the number of ‘shotgun weddings’ – that is, getting married to legitimate a pregnancy. Mark Brown suggests that in previous eras it was more common for parents to get married, rather than simply cohabiting, if they discovered that the woman was pregnant. Marriages that resulted from pregnancy were often unstable and could end up producing lone motherhood through an eventual divorce or separation. Now, the partners may choose to cohabit rather than marry and, if their relationship breaks up, they end up appearing in the statistics as a single, never-married, parent.

Some writers see the rise of single parenthood as a symptom of increased tolerance of diverse family forms. For example, the Rapoorts claim that the single-parent family is an important ‘emerging form’ of the family which is becoming accepted as a legitimate alternative to other family structures.

However, there is little evidence that a large number of single-parents see their situation as ideal and actively choose it as an alternative to dual parenthood. Burghes and Brown conducted research into 31 lone mothers and found that only a minority of the pregnancies were planned. None of the mothers had actively set out to become lone mothers and all of them attributed the break-up of their relationship to ‘violence in the relationship or the father’s unwillingness to settle down’. In this small
sample, all aspired to forming a two-parent households, but they had failed to achieve it despite their preference.

David Morgan (1994) suggests that the rise in lone parenthood could partly be due to changing relationships between men and women. He says important factors causing the rise could include ‘the expectations that women and men have of marriage and the growing opportunities for women to develop a life for themselves outside marriage or long-term cohabitations’.

A longer-term trend that helps to account for the increase could be a decline in the stigma attached to single parenthood. This is reflected in the decreasing use of terms such as ‘illegitimate children’ and ‘unmarried mothers’, which seems to imply some deviation from the norms of family life, and their replacement by concepts such as ‘single-parent families’ and ‘lone-parent families’, which do not carry such negative connotations. The reduction in the stigma of single parenthood could relate to ‘the weakening of religious or community controls over women’ (Morgan, 1994).

**Ethnicity and family diversity**

Ethnicity can be seen as one of the most important sources of family diversity in Britain. Ethnic groups with different cultural backgrounds may introduce family forms that differ significantly from those of the ethnic majority. Statistical evidence does suggest that there are some differences in the prevalence of different household types in different ethnic groups.

The general picture, provided by various empirical studies, suggests that immigrants and their descendants have adapted their family life to fit British circumstances, but have not fundamentally altered the relationships on which their traditional family life was based. This would suggest that the existence of a variety of ethnic groups has indeed contributed to the diversity of family types to be found in Britain. These ethnic minorities have succeeded in retaining many of the culturally distinctive features of their family life.

Nevertheless, there is also evidence of changes taking place in the families of ethnic minorities, and British culture may have more effect on future generations. Each ethnic group contains a variety of different family types, which are influenced by factors such as class and stage in the life cycle, which relate to diversity in white families. Thus ethnic minorities families have not just contributed to family diversity through each group having its own distinctive family pattern, they have also contributed to it through developing diverse family patterns within each ethnic group.

**Robert Chester – the British neo-conventional family**

In a strong attack upon the idea that fundamental changes are taking place in British family life, Robert Chester (1985) argued that the changes had been only minor. He claimed that the evidence advanced by writers such as the Rapoports was misleading, and that the basic features of family life had remained largely unchanged for the vast majority of the British population since the Second World War. He argued:

Most adults still marry and have children. Most children are reared by their natural parents. Most people live in a household headed by a married couple. Most marriages continue until parted by death. No great change seems currently in prospect.
The ‘neo-conventional family’

According to Chester, there was little evidence that people were choosing to live on a long-term basis in alternatives to the nuclear family. However, he did accept that some changes were taking place in family life. In particular, many families were no longer ‘conventional’ in the sense that the husband is the sole breadwinner. He accepted that women were increasingly making a contribution to household finances by taking paid employment outside the home.

However, he argued that, although 58% of wives, according to his figures, worked, often they only did so for part of their married lives, and frequently on a part-time basis. Many gave up work for the period when their children were young; a minority of married mothers (49%) were employed, and only 14% of working married mothers had full-time jobs. Because of such figures he argued that ‘The pattern is of married women withdrawing from the labour force to become mothers, and some of them taking (mostly part-time) work as their children mature.’

Although he recognized that this was an important change in family life compared to the past, he did not see it as a fundamental alteration in the family. He called this new family form – in which wives have some involvement in the labour market – the neo-conventional family. It was little different from the conventional family apart from the increasing numbers of wives working for at least part of their married lives.

Conclusion

While Chester makes an important point in stressing that nuclear families remained very common and feature in most people’s lives, he perhaps overstated his case. Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a continuing reduction in the proportion of people living in parents-and-children households, from 59% in 1981 to 49% in 1998. The percentages of people living alone or in lone-parent households have increased. Thus, since Chester was writing, there has been a slow but steady drift away from living in nuclear families in Britain.

In 1990, the position was summed up by Kathleen Kiernan and Malcolm Wicks who said that ‘Although still the most prominent form, the nuclear family is for increasing numbers of individuals only one of several possible family types that they experience during their lives’. Similarly, in 1999, Elizabeth Silva and Carol Smart argue that fairly traditional family forms remain important. They note that: in 1996, 73% of households were composed of heterosexual couples (with just under 90% of these being married), 50% of these households had children, and 40% had dependent children…. only 9% of households with dependent children were headed by lone parents.

Nevertheless, they argue that ‘personal choices appear as increasingly autonomous and fluid’. The idea that family diversity indicates a new era of choice was first advanced by Rapoports in 1982. They argued that it was increasingly acceptable to form alternative households and families to conventional nuclear ones. They said: Families in Britain today are in a transition from coping in a society in which there was a single overriding norm of what family life should be like to a society in which a plurality of norms are recognized as legitimate, indeed, desirable.
The passage of time does not seem to have made their argument less valid. Indeed, a growing number of sociologists have tried to link ideas of choice and diversity with their particular views on modernity and postmodernity.

**THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY**

Many sociologists argue that the family has lost a number of its functions in modern industrial society. Institutions such as businesses, political parties, schools, and welfare organizations now specialize in functions formerly performed by the family. Talcott Parsons argued that the family has become: on the ‘macroscopic’ levels, almost completely functionless. It does not itself, except here and there, engage in much economic production; it is not a significant unit in the political power system; it is not a major direct agency of integration of the larger society. Its individual members participate in all these functions, but they do so as individuals, not in their roles as family members.

However, this does not mean that the family is declining in importance – it has simply become more specialized. Parsons maintained that its role is still vital. By structuring the personalities of the young and stabilizing the personalities of adults, the family provides its members with the psychological training and support necessary to meet the requirements of the social system. Parsons concluded that, ‘the family is more specialized than before, but not in any general sense less important, because society is dependent more exclusively on it for the performance of certain of its vital functions’. Thus the loss of certain functions by the family has made its remaining functions more important.

This view is supported by N. Dennis (1975) who argues that impersonal bureaucratic agencies have taken over many of the family’s functions. As a result, the warmth and close supportive relationships which existed when the family performed a large range of functions have largely disappeared. Dennis argues that in the impersonal setting of modern industrial society, the family provides the only opportunity ‘to participate in a relationship where people are perceived and valued as whole persons’. Outside the family, individuals must often interact with strangers in terms of a number of roles. Adopting roles such as employee, customer, teacher and student, they are unable to express many aspects of themselves or develop deep and supportive relationships. Dennis argues that: ‘marriage has become the only institution in which the individual can expect esteem and love. Adults have no one on whom they have the right to lean for this sort of support at all comparable with their right to lean on their spouse’.

Support provided by family relationships grows in importance as the family loses many of its functions. They claim that the family can provide some sense of wholeness and permanence to set against the more restricted and transitory roles imposed by the specialized institutions which have flourished outside the home. The upshot is that, as the disadvantages of the new industrial and impersonal societies have become more pronounced, so the family has become more prized for its power to counteract them.

**The maintenance and improvement of functions**

Not all sociologists would agree, however, that the family has lost many of its functions in modern industrial society. Ronald Fletcher, a British sociologist and a staunch supporter of the family, maintained that just the opposite has happened. In The Family and Marriage in Britain (1966), Fletcher argued that not only has the family retained its functions but those functions have ‘increased
in detail and importance’. Specialized institutions such as schools and hospitals have added to and improved the family’s functions, rather than superseded them.

1. Fletcher maintained that the family’s responsibility for socializing the young is as important as it ever was. State education has added to, rather than removed, this responsibility since ‘Parents are expected to do their best to guide, encourage and support their children in their educational and occupational choices and careers’.

2. In the same way, the state has not removed the family’s responsibility for the physical welfare of its members. Fletchers argued that, ‘The family is still centrally concerned with maintaining the health of its members, but it is now aided by wider provisions which have been added to the family’s situation since pre-industrial times’.

Rather than removing this function from the family, state provision of health services has served to expand and improve it. Compared to the past, parents are preoccupied with their children’s health. State health and welfare provision has provided additional support for the family and made its members more aware of the importance of health and hygiene in the home. Even though family may not be anymore a unit of production, he argues that it still maintains a vital economic function as a unit of consumption. Particularly in the case of the modern home-centered family, money is spent on, and in the name of, the family rather than the individual. Thus the modern family demands fitted carpets, three-piece suits, washing machines, television sets and ‘family’ cars.

**Feminism and economic functions**

Feminist writers have tended to disagree with the view shared by many sociologists of the family that the family has lost its economic role as a unit of production and has become simply a unit of consumption. They tend to argue that much of the work that takes place in the family is productive but it is not recognized as such because it is unpaid and it is usually done by women. The contribution to economic life made by women is frequently underestimated.

The radical feminists Christine Delphy and Diana Leonard (1992) accept that industrialization created new units of production such as factories, but deny that it removed the productive function from the family. Some productive functions have been lost, but others are performed to a much higher standard than in the past. They cite as examples ‘warm and tidy rooms with attention to décor, and more complex meals with a variety of forms of cooking’. The family has taken on some new productive functions, such as giving pre-school reading tuition to children, and functions such as washing clothes and freezing food have been reintroduced to the household with the advent of new consumer products. They also point out that there are still a fair number of families which continue to act as an economic unit producing goods for the market. French farming families, which have been studied by Christine Delphy, are a case in point.

**Summary and conclusions**

In summary, most sociologists who adopt a functionalist perspective argue that the family has lost several of its functions in modern industrial society but they maintain that the importance of the family has not declined. Rather, the family has adapted and is adapting to a developing industrial society. It remains a vital and basic institution in society.
Others dispute the claim that some of these functions have been lost, or argue that new functions have replaced the old ones. From all these viewpoints the family remains a key institution.

All the writers examined here have a tendency to think in terms of ‘the family’ without differentiating between different types of family. They may not, therefore, appreciate the range of effects family life can have or the range of functions it may perform. Postmodernists and difference feminists certainly reject the view that there is any single type of family which always performs certain functions.

The writers discussed also tend to assume that families reproduce the existing social structure, whether this is seen as a functioning mechanism, an exploitative capitalist system, or as a patriarchal society. Yet families are not necessarily supportive of or instrumental in reproducing existing societies. With increasing family diversity, some individual families and even some types of family may be radical forces in society. For example, gay and lesbian families sometimes see themselves as challenging the inequitable relationships in heterosexual families.

MARRIAGE

Marriage is an important and universal social institution of society. As a social institution, it provides a recognized form for entering into a relatively enduring heterosexual relationship for the bearing and rearing of children. It is thus primarily a way of regulating human reproduction. This reproduction, however, also has a sociological dimension. The right of sexual relationship, that universally accompanies marriage, provides legitimization to the children born in wedlock; this legitimacy is of great importance in the matter of inheritance and succession. Besides, through marriage there comes into existence the family, a relatively stable social group that is responsible for the care and training of children. In all these respects, then, marriage has historically provided the institutional mechanisms necessary for replacement of social members and thereby has been meeting the important prerequisites of human survival and society’s continuance.

According to Horton and Hunt, “Marriage is the approved social pattern whereby two or more persons establish a family.” Edward Westermarck defined marriage as “more or less durable connection between male and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of offspring.” Malinowski defined marriage as “a contract for the production and maintenance of children.” Various anthropologists have attempted to trace the history of this institution of marriage but there is no consensus among them. For example, Lewis Morgan in his evolutionary theory concludes that in the earlier form of groupings of people, sex was absolutely un-regulated and the institution of family was not known. Believing that human societies have evolved from lower to higher types, Morgan set forth certain hypothetical stages in the evolution of marriage. Accordingly, as he thought, from the hypothetical state of promiscuity society must have evolved into group marriage, then polygamy and lastly monogamy. Westermarck on the other hand, is of the opinion that the history of marriage began with its monogamous form. He concludes this on the basis of his assumption that the male has by nature been an acquisitive and possessive creature. Another anthropologist Robert Briffault claims that at the initial stage of marital relationship, mother had the supreme authority. He rejects patriarchy as claimed by Morgan and monogamy as claimed by Westermarck to be the initial forms of marriage and family.

All societies have prescriptions and proscriptions regarding who may or may not marry whom. In some societies these restrictions are subtle, while in some others, individuals who can or cannot be married are more explicitly and specifically defined. Forms of marriage based on rules governing
eligibility/ineligibility of mates is classified as endogamy and exogamy. Endogamy requires an individual to marry within a culturally defined group of which he is already a member, as for example caste, religion or tribe, etc. Caste and religious endogamy are the most pervasive forms of endogamy. Most religious groups do not permit or like their members to marry individuals of other faiths. **Endogamy** is also a very important characteristic of the Indian caste system. Exogamy, on the other hand, requires the individual to marry outside of his own group. **Exogamy** refers to the rules of avoidance in marital relationship. Every community prohibits its members from having marital relationship with certain persons. The exogamy in one form or the other is practised in every community. Under this rule, marriage among close relative especially kins and same clan is prohibited. For example, in China, the individuals who bear the same surname may not inter-marry. In Hindu marriage, Gotra and Sapinda are such exogamous groups. Gotra refers to a group of families which trace their origin from a common mythical ancestor. Sapinda means that persons of seven generations on the father’s side and five on the mother’s side cannot inter-marry.

**Incest taboo** is perhaps the most prominent feature of exogamic rule of mate-selection in almost every society. Marriage of father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister is unknown the world over. Prohibition of sex relationship between such primary kins is called incest taboo. There are sociological, psychological and also scientific reasons for the institution of incest taboo. The exogamic rules are designed to restrict free marriage relationship. The incest taboos, according to Kingsley Davis, confine sexual relations and sentiments to the married pairs alone excluding such relationships as between parent and child, brother and sister etc. In this way the possibility of confusion in the organization of kinship is prevented and the family organization is maintained. Quite often, a scientific justification is also provided for keeping restrictions of incest taboo. Eugenically, there is a fear of a possibility that certain physiological inadequacies present among close kins such as cousins may be perpetuated and transferred to their off-springs in case the former inter-marry.

Generally, there are two forms of marriage prevalent in different parts of world: (i) monogamy and (ii) polygamy. **Monogamy** restricts the individual to one spouse at a time. Under this system, at any given time a man can have only one wife and a woman can have only one husband. Monogamy is prevalent in all societies and is almost the universal form in all modern industrial societies. In many societies, individuals are permitted to marry again often on the death of the first spouse or after divorce; but they cannot have more than one spouse at one and the same time. Such monogamy marriage is termed as serial monogamy. A society may also practice straight monogamy, in which remarriage is not allowed. Most upper caste Hindu females were obliged to follow the norm of straight monogamy prior to the enactment of Widow Remarriage Act of 1856, as until then widows were not allowed to marry again. With further modernisation societies are likely to move towards the conditions of serial monogamy, rather than maintain straight monogamy.

**Polygamy** is that arrangement of marriage in which either a woman has more than one husband or a man has more than one wife. The former arrangement is called polyandry and the latter polygyny. Of the two forms of polygamy, polygyny is much more prevalent than polyandry the world over. Murdock’s research, based on an analysis of 283 societies, revealed that 193 of these were characterised by polygyny, 43 were monogamous and only 2 practiced polyandry.

**Polyandry** is much restricted in distribution in comparison to other forms of marriage. Some argue that it is because polyandry leads to fewer children to every woman, more male children and a high incidence of sterility among women. Polyandry has two forms, fraternal or adelphic polyandry and
non-fraternal polyandry. In fraternal polyandry, the woman is wife to all the brothers and in the non-fraternal one, the wife has several husbands who are not brothers. The paternity in case of polyandrous societies is more legal and social than biological. Ogburn and Nimkoff are of the opinion that the chief factor responsible for polyandry would seem to be the extreme poverty of the people. Fraternal polyandry is reported among the Todas of the Nilgiris of Tamil Nadu and Khasas of Jaunsar Bawar in Dehradun district of Uttar Pradesh while non-fraternal polyandry was practised by Nayars of Kerala. Please note that the Khasas of Jaunsar Bawar have evolved a very practical mode of polyandrous matrimony. Among them, when the eldest brother marries a girl, she automatically becomes the common wife of the rest of the brothers. If a brother is minor, he may, on becoming adult, marry another girl to match his age. Hence this leads to a situation where a number of brothers have more than one wife which is not the classical mode of polyandry. Observing polygyny-polyandry mixed up, Majumdar has coined an interesting phrase, Polygynandry, to describe this situation.

In some polygamous societies certain preferential rules for the choice of wives/husbands are followed. In certain societies males marry the wife’s sisters, and females their husband’s brothers. Such marriages are termed as sororal polygyny and fraternal polyandry, respectively. In other words, while sororal polygyny implies the marriage of one man with several sisters, fraternal polyandry on the other hand implies the marriage of one woman with several brothers. Levirate, sororate, cross-cousin marriage and parallel-cousin marriage are some other forms of preferential marriages. Levirate is a custom in certain societies in which a widow marries one of her husband’s brothers. Sororate, on the other hand, refers to the custom of a widower marrying the sister of his deceased wife. Often it is a younger sister who marries her deceased older sister’s husband.

Cross-cousin marriage refers to the marriage of the children of siblings of the opposite sex, that is, the children of a brother and sister. Cross-cousin marriage in certain societies is often explained to be a device for avoiding payment of a high bride price, and also for maintaining property in the household. The Gonds of Madhya Pradesh call this form of marriage dudhlautawa (‘return of milk’), implying thereby that the bride-price a person pays for his wife will be returned when his daughter marries her mother’s brother’s son. Parallel cousin marriage refers to the marriage of the children of siblings of the same sex, that is, two or more brother’s children, or two or more sisters’ children.

**KINSHIP**

Kinship is one of the main organizing principles of human society. Marriage is a link between the family of orientation and the family of procreation. This fact of individual membership in two nuclear families gives rise to kinship system. According to Theodorson, kinship may be defined as “a social relationship based upon family relatedness”. The relationship which may be consanguineal (based on blood) or affinal (based on marriage), determines the rights and obligations of related persons.

As such, kinship system is referred to as “a structured system of statuses and roles and of relationship in which the kin (primary, secondary, tertiary and distant) are bound to one-another by complex interlocking ties”. G.P. Murdock argues that kinship is merely a structured system or relationship in which individual are bound to one another by complex interlocking and ramifying ties. Radcliffe-Brown (Structure and Function in Primitive Society) looks at kinship system as a part of social structure and insists upon the study of kinship in terms of the rights and obligations of the individuals involved.
Every kinship system distinguishes between blood relatives (biologically related, actually or by social fiction), who are technically called consanguineal relatives, and relatives by marriage, technically called affinal relatives. Married couples may in some systems be related by blood, but they are always regarded as affinal relatives since the marriage bond is socially the most important bond between them. The various types of family therefore always include some affinal relatives. The only exception we know of is the Nayar Taravad, which consists of brothers and sisters, with the children of the sisters and of the women in successive generations. All these consanguineal relatives can live in the same household only because among the Nayars husband and wife do not live together for more than three days.

According to the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, ‘Kinship systems establish relationships between individuals and groups on the model of biological relationships between parents and children, between siblings, and between marital partners.’ Relationships established by marriage, which form alliances between groups of person related by blood (or consanguineous ties), are usually referred to as affinal relationship. Some social scientists make a distinction between the study of kinship and the study of affinity. It should be noted that actual biological relationships are not necessary for status within a kinship system to be established. For instance, it may be more important to establish that a child has a social father, who will take responsibility for its welfare and have a right to the product of its labour, than to find out who the biological father might be.

For example, the Todas of Nilgiri Hills who practiced fraternal polyandry, used to observe an interesting ceremony called bow and arrow ceremony to declare the paternity socially. In this ceremony, all brothers and the common wife used to assemble amidst the rest of the villagers in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy of the wife and as a result of consensus one of the brothers used to present a set of bow and arrow to the wife. This was taken as declaration that this particular brother would be accepted as father of the coming child. In this way, the ‘social fatherhood’ overrides ‘biological fatherhood’.

Kinship structure is a commonly used term in both sociological as well as anthropological literature. Structure means a more or less lasting pattern of social relationship. Thus, structure of kin groups refers to those persisting patterns of relations which form the basis of their organisation. Robin Fox in his major work Kinship and Marriage has identified certain conditions which have to be met by every kinship system in order to survive and sustain itself. He has called these conditions as structural principles of kinship because the manner in which these conditions are fulfilled shape the structure of the kinship system. These structural principles of kinship are: (i) men impregnate women, (ii) women bear the children, (iii) men control economic activity and (iv) incest taboo. According to Robin Fox, these four conditions have to be met by all kinship systems. He further argues that the way these conditions are met will determine the structure or pattern of relations in the kinship system.

Kinship Terms and Usages:

Kinship terms are used to designate and address a kin. A.R. Radcliffe Brown, the famous anthropologist, has observed that kinship terms indicate, among other things, classification of ego’s rights and duties. Prior to him, L.H. Morgan, pointed out that kinship terms provides the context and idiom for our social relationship. Kinship terms are technically classified in different ways, but there are two broad categories of the terms as given by Morgan: (i) Descriptive and (ii) Classificatory.
The **Descriptive System** refers to a kinship system in which a single term refers to a particular relative and a specific kind of relationship of the ego (the person from whom the relationship is calculated) with her or him. For example, mother’s brother is referred to as mama, father’s brother as chacha etc. The **Classificatory System** uses kinship terms that merge or equate relatives who are genealogically distinct from one another. Here the same term is used for different kin. For example, in English, the term ‘grandfather’ includes both father’s father and mother’s father, brother-in-law applies to both wife’s and husband’s brother and also sister’s husband and so on. In Hindi, the term ‘samdhi’ is used for both, daughter’s father –in-law and son’s father –in-law.

The North Indian kinship terminology is comparatively descriptive in the sense that it describes elementary relationships starting from the ego. In order to emphasise the patrilineal descent, the terms in the system make a clear-cut distinction between parallel and cross cousins, e.g., bhatiji - one’s brother’s daughter and bhanji - one’s sister’s daughter. In the South Indian kinship terminology there is relative stress on classificatory terminology. Here the same term mama includes mother’s brother, father’s sister’s husband and wife’s father. However, in most contemporary societies, both terms – descriptive and classificatory – are used.

Within each kin group there are certain reciprocal behavioural patterns. These behaviours, verbal or non-verbal constitute kinship usages. Relationships of avoidance, joking relationships and teknonymy are some of the usages which are almost universally practiced. In relations of avoidance, we find that certain relationships are of restricted nature. Such kins maintain a distance and avoid free interaction between themselves. A man’s relationship with his son’s wife or with his younger brother’s wife is the example of this category of relationship. Certain other relationships are there in which opposite is the case. Interaction between them is intimate and frank and they have joking relationship including use to obscene and vulgar references. Joking relationship between a man and his wife’s sister or between a woman and her husband’s younger brother are very common.

**Teknonymy** is yet another kinship usage. It was used in anthropology for the first time by Tylor. According to this usage, a kin is not referred to directly but he is referred to through another kin. A kin becomes the medium of reference between two kins. Thus, in traditional Hindu family a wife does not utter the name of her husband. She calls him through her son or daughter. For example, he is referred to by her as the father of Bittoo or Gudiya.

Kinship usages accomplish two major tasks. First, they create groups: special groupings of kin. Thus marriage assigns each mother a husband, and makes her children his children, thereby creating a special group of father, mother and children, which we call “family”. The second major function of kinship usage is to govern the role relationships between kin: that is, how one kinsman should behave in a particular kinsman’s presence, or what one kinsman owes to another. Kinship assigns guidelines for interactions between persons. It defines proper, acceptable role relationship between father and daughter, between brother and sister, between son-in-law and mother-in-law and between fellow lineage members and clansmen. Kinship thus acts as a regularizer of social life and maintains the solidarity of social system.

**LINEAGE AND DESCENT**

As stated earlier, kinship is one of the main organizing principles of human society. Kinship includes all forms of social relationships based on consanguineal (related by blood, common descent) and affinal ties (related by marriage).
A lineage may be described as a consanguineous unilineal decent group whose members trace themselves from a known common ancestor. A lineage is based on more precise and specific genealogy than a clan, of which it may be a subgroup. In other words, a lineage consists of persons who can indicate, by stating all the intermediate links, common descent from a shared ancestor. Thus, lineages are generally historically more shallow, and as a consequence small groups than clans.

In this connection, it is necessary to point out that in determining consanguineous kinship it is not the biological fact that is important but social recognition. According to renowned social anthropologist W.H.R. Rivers, ‘kinship is the social recognition of biological ties.’

Social recognition is more important than biological ties. Biological ties, if not socially recognized, then no kinship bond will exist, for example – in the case of illegitimate child. But, if social recognition is given to a relationship where no biological ties exist, even then kinship bond exists, for example – in the case of adopted child.

Among many primitive societies, the role of a father in birth of a child is unknown, as among the Trobriand Islanders of Malanesia. Among them it is the wife’s husband who is conventionally accepted as father. Amongst the polyandrous Todas of Nilgiri, until another brother makes the ceremonial presentation of a bow and arrow to the common wife, all children born to her of several brothers are regarded as the children of that brother who last performed the ceremony, even though he may have been away or dead for a long time. Here is an instance where ignorance of the biological role of fatherhood is not implied; only social recognition is shown to override biological fact. Among some African primitives, in case a husband dies, a woman assumes the role of father to the expected child of the wife of the deceased. A universal example of the overriding nature of social recognition is the practice of adoption. An adopted child is everywhere treated as if it were one’s own biologically produced offspring. So, in kinship social recognition overrides biological facts.

Lineage and descent are the two important concepts that help us to understand the social structure of a given society.

A lineage may be described as a consanguineous unilineal descent group whose members trace themselves from a known common ancestor. A lineage is based on more precise and specific genealogy than a clan, of which it may be a sub-group. In other words, a lineage consists of persons who can indicate, by stating all the intermediate links, common descent from shared ancestor. Thus lineages are generally historically more shallow, and as a consequence, smaller groups than clans.

Descent, in kinship terminology, implies a person’s family origins. Descent concerns the tracing of relationships through succeeding generations, i.e., who has descended from whom. When social recognition is given to the biological descent, it gives rise to descent groups, for example, lineage, clan, etc.

In a given society, lineage can either be traced unilineally or otherwise. **Unilineal descent** implies that descent is determined exclusively by either the father’s line (patrilineal) or by mother’s line (matrilineal).
Non-unilineal descent groups are grouped as cognatic descent, which are of following types:

- **Bilineal (Double Unilineal) descent:**
  - both lines (father’s as well as mother's lines are recognized but not symmetrically
  - some resources are transmitted from the father’s lineage, others through the mother’s lineage
  - the two lineages are kept separate. For example, Yako of Nigeria

- **Bilateral descent**
  - both lines are recognized equally and symmetrically
  - it is a predominant feature of modern industrial societies
  - both parents transmit to their child

- **Ambilineal descent**
  - in this case, the individual has a choice to decide which line he/she wants to identify with.
  - for example, Samoan Islands in Pacific (studied by Margaret Mead)

- **Parallel descent**
  - men transmit to their sons and women to their daughters
  - for example, Saha tribe of Brazil (studied by James Safer)

- **Crossing/ Alternating descent**
  - men transmit to their daughters, women transmit to their sons

Significance of lineage and descent in kinship and family:

1. Reproduction of society (incest taboo, endogamy, exogamy)

All human societies prohibit sexual relation between persons who are classified as closed blood kin, which includes at least the father-child, mother-child and siblings relationships. This does not of course mean that such relations do not occur, but rather that there is a norm prohibiting it. This universal rule is often spoken of as the incest taboo. Please note that the extension of incest taboos differ from society to society and from religion to religion. Some anthropologists have pointed out the social advantages of the rule, including the expansion of the group through the inclusion of new members and the forging of alliances across kin boundaries. While others have pointed out that widespread incest would lead to biological degeneration through the transmission of inheritable disease.

Further all societies have prescriptions and proscriptions regarding who may or may not marry whom. In some societies, these restrictions are subtle while in others individuals who can or cannot be married are more explicitly and specifically defined. Forms of marriage based on rules governing eligibility/eligibility of mates is classified as endogamy and exogamy. Endogamy requires an individual to marry within a culturally defined group of which he is already a member, as for example caste, religion or tribe, etc.

Caste and religious endogamy are the most pervasive forms of endogamy. Most religious groups do not permit or like their members to marry individuals of other faiths. Endogamy is also a very important characteristic of the Indian caste system. Exogamy, on the other hand, requires the
individual to marry outside of his own group. Exogamy refers to the rules of avoidance in marital relationship. Every community prohibits its members from having marital relationship with certain persons. The exogamy in one form or the other is practised in every community. Under this rule, marriage among close relatives especially kins and within the same clan is prohibited. For example, in China, the individuals who bear the same surname may not inter-marry. In Hindu marriage, gotra and sapinda are such exogamous groups.

2. Group membership

Kinship concerns much more than the reproduction of society and the transmission of cultural values and knowledge between the generations, although these aspects are certainly important. Kinship also facilitates group formation. Thus, marriage assigns each mother a husband, and makes her children his children, thereby creating a special group of father, mother and children, which we call “family”.

3. Political function

Kinship can also be important in politics and in the management of everyday affairs. In many societies, a man needs support from both consanguineal kin (blood kin) and from affines (in-laws) in order to follow a successful political career. In societies, specially stateless ones, the kin group usually forms, along with locality, the basis for political stability and for the promotion of political interests.

4. Economic function

In many societies, family members join forces in economic investments. Among the Hindus of Mauritius, for example, it is common for groups of brothers and cousins to set up a join business. Although there may be no formal rule to the effect that one has to be related to run a business together, kinship can give a practical advantage. One can usually trusts ones relatives, since they are tied to one self through webs of strong normative obligations.

5. Social stability and social control

Inside the kin group, norms specify roughly how one is to behave towards different categories of kin. In other words, kinship usages also govern the role relationships between kin: that is, how one kinsman should behave in a particular kinsman’s presence, or what one kinsman owes to another. Kinship assigns guidelines for interaction between persons. It defines proper acceptable role relationship between father and daughter, between brother and sister, between son-in-law and mother-in-law, between fellow lineage members and clansmen. Kinship thus acts as a regularizer of social life and maintains the solidarity of social system. These norms prevent the dissolution of the group and ensure that people carry out their duties. The entire division of labour may thus be organized on kinship principle.

6. Inheritance and succession

Group membership, politics, reproduction and social stability have been mentioned as important aspects of kinship. A further important dimension of the kinship institution is its connection with inheritance and succession. Both institutions are to do with the transmission of the resources from one generation to the next. Inheritance concerns the transmission of property, while succession refers to ‘the transmission of office’, transmission of specified rights and duties as ascribed statuses.
All societies have rules regulating who is to inherit what when someone dies, although these rules are often contested or interpreted in varying ways. There is no universal link between the kinship systems and rules of inheritance in societies. There are patrilineal systems of descent where men and women are equals in terms of inheritance, and there are systems which give priority to one of the genders, usually the male. In some societies the eldest son receives a larger part of the inheritance than his siblings (primogeniture); others follow the opposite principle and give priority to the youngest son (ultimogeniture). Whereas the corporate principle functions in an integrating way, inheritance is a source of potential disruption, since it reveals conflict of interests among the relatives. Rules of succession are often closely linked with the principle of descent. In patrilineal systems, a son (or a younger brother) will frequently take over the commitments of the deceased; in matrilineal systems, a man commonly succeeds his mother’s brother.

Kinship serves two important and related purposes. Firstly, it serves to establish and maintain effective social group and secondly, it provides a way of transmitting status and property from one generation to the next. In most societies where kinship connections are important, the rules of descent affiliate individuals with different sets of kin. Descent concerns the tracing of relationships through succeeding generations, i.e., who has descended from whom. Different societies follow different rules of descent and inheritance. Some of the important ones are mentioned in the following section in brief.

In most societies a child is regarded as the offspring of both parents, and so has relationships of kinship traced through both. Those kin traced through the father are termed paternal or patrilateral; those traced through the mother, maternal or matrilateral. The totality of matrilateral and patrilateral kin recognized by a person within a certain degree is sometimes termed his kindred. It is also usual to distinguish lineal from collateral kin. Lineal kin are the direct ancestors and direct descendants of an individual: his parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc., and his children, grandchildren, etc. Collaterals are the other descendants of one’s lineal kin (parents’ siblings, cousins, etc.). Some writers consider a person’s siblings and their descendant as lineal, others as collateral kin. Yet another distinction is made between primary, secondary and tertiary kin. Primary kin are one’s parents, one’s siblings and one’s own offspring (father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter). Secondary kin are the primary kin of these (father’s father, mother’s brother, brother’s daughter, etc.). Tertiary kin are the primary kin of secondary kin, and so on.

The classic way of defining consanguinity is in terms of common descent from ancestor. All the descendants of a common ancestor may be termed as stock. Thus an individual is a member of as many stocks as he recognizes ultimate lineal ancestors. Through his parents he is a member of two stocks, through his grandparents of four…. etc. A person is said to be a cognate of, or related cognatically to, all those people with whom he shares a common ancestor.

For some purposes, however, the descent criterion may be restricted to males, and only those descendants of a common ancestor in the male line will be recognized as kin. These are known as agnatic or patrilineal kin. If descent is traced through female exclusively for some purposes, then the descendants would be called uterine or matrilineal kin. These two modes of tracing descent are called unilineal: that is, they select one ‘line’ only, either the male or the female. These principles are not necessarily mutually exclusive within a society. It is possible, for example, for an individual to recognize all cognates as kin for some purposes, but to restrict recognition to agnates for some other purposes. Indeed, almost all kinship systems recognize bilateral relationship, i.e relationship to both
maternal and paternal kin. Some societies, such as the Yako of Nigeria, utilize matrilineal descent for some purposes and patrilineal for other, thus achieving a system of double unilineal descent, known usually as double-descent for short.

Rules of inheritance tend to coordinate with the reckoning of descent in most societies, but not necessarily in a one-to-one manner. In fact, it is quite often the case that certain types of property pass from father to son, and other types from mother to daughter. In most parts of India, in the past, immovable property such as land and housing was inherited only by sons. In the absence of sons, except under rare circumstances, by the nearest male relatives on the father’s side. On the other hand, movable property in the form of cash and jewellery was given to the daughter at the time of her marriage, with a certain amount of jewellery also passing from the mother-in-law to the daughter-in-law.

Until the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, two systems of inheritance dominated among patrilineal Hindus. In one system (called the Mitakshara school, adopted in most regions) a son has a vested interest in his father’s ancestral property from the moment of his birth. The father cannot give away any part of this property to the detriment of his son’s interest. Under the other system (the Dayabaga school, adopted in Bengal and Assam) the father is the absolute owner of his share and has a right to alienate his property the way he wants.

However with the passing of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, a uniform system of inheritance has been established. The individual property of a male Hindu, dying intestate (having made no will), passes in equal shares between his son, daughter, widow and mother. Male and female heirs have come to be treated as equal in matters of inheritance and succession. Another important feature of the Act is that any property possessed by a female Hindu is held by her as her absolute property and she has full power to deal with it the way she likes. This Act has also given a woman the right to inherit from the father as well as from the husband. However the benefit conferred on a woman is limited when compared to the right of the male members who still have rights to coparcenary ancestral property by birth. Daughters are not part of the coparcenary and have no birthrights.
SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

In most societies the tasks of women are clearly differentiated. In the West as well as in the middle class sections of Indian society, men have been seen to be the bread winners and women were expected to take care of the house and raise children. This arrangement used to be considered as ‘natural’ and complementary, having roots in the biological makeup of the sexes. The economic dependence of women and sexual division of labour were closely interlinked.

The ideology of ‘naturalness’ of division of labour has been challenged as women started entering the labour force in large numbers in the West. The rise of feminist movement in the west raised questions about division of labour and almost universal subordination of women across societies and cultures. The questions like has employment changed women’s status? Are they facing double burden of performing jobs which are negatively valued. For example housework not being considered as work whereas paid work outside the household as work. Statistics show that women all over the world earn much less than men for the same work. Occupations are also segregated along gender lines. Other questions relate to women’s active participation in work force, its consistent devaluation and women’s exclusion from decision making. In understanding these issues we look for answers in the stratification theories.

Division of Labour

This cultural valuation is the foundation for gender stratification that is then reinforced by gender ideologies of male superiority and a high degree of sexual antagonism between men and women. Meigs (1990) describes a “chauvinistic” ideology that is rooted in men’s role as warriors. The division of work among Mundurucu, an Amazonian horticultural society, where men hunt, fish and fell the forest area for gardens while women plant, harvest and process manioc. Men work at Mudurucu has more assigned value. As Murphy and Murphy (1985) state “Male ascendancy does not wholly derive from masculine activities but is to a considerable degree prior to them”. Male domination is traditionally symbolic. According to Martin and Voortries (1975) the decline in female participation in agriculture is that the female domestic workload tends to increase when root crops are replaced by cereal crop and when animal labour replaces manual labour.

Feminist scholars resist to treat the problem of women essentially an artifact of the contemporary system of economic exploitation. They have argued that the oppression of women is not to be seen as ‘secondary’ to class oppression as a whole. Women are oppressed as a class by men and patriarchal structures are geographically and historically almost universal. The major axis of differentiation in prevailing society is not class but gender and it is women who wait for the ‘longest revolution’. Gender in class stratification theories attempts to uncover the sources of structured inequality and social change. Both Marxists and Weberians have been engaged in empirical research which both document and attempt to explain the forms and structures of inequality. It has been widely criticized that the class situation of family members is ‘derived’ from that of the main breadwinner who is usually a man. The question of gender raises serious problem for both theoretical and empirical work in social stratification. The active participation of women in all walks of life, the decrease in the number of households that have only male bread winners, passage of new laws created an
environment for women’s location in social stratification. According to Newby (1982) the issue of gender inequality arose from women’s movement.

**Weber, Marx and Stratification**

Weber observed that societies can be stratified according to their degree for class or status formation, providing the most important and basic fact of social stratification theory. The first form of inquiry concerns with the extent to which class or status systems are the predominant modes of social action at the societal level. Theories of social stratification then presuppose as their explanatory object the inter and intra-societal variability of class or status formations. At this time the question of sexual inequality treated in terms of division of labour (Marxist approach) which considers women as ‘reserve army’ i.e. The labour of women could be called upon to facilitate expansionary ‘deskilling’ clerical work as well as in periods of acute labour shortage such as in wartime. According to Max Weber economic and technological changes favour class stratification and pushes status stratification in the background.

Since the determination and explanation of the variability of class and status formation have been the central concerns of the study of social stratification, the documentation of the inequality of opportunities and outcome occupied a subordinate place. It was justified on several grounds. First, because of interest in the distribution of unequal rewards, life-chances and how different social arrangements could procure ‘better’ outcomes and opportunities. The second season was the importance given to the explanation of ‘outcomes’ of class or status differentiation, which were considered as by-product of stratification analysis. These approaches never gave serious thought to issues of gender inequality, because the emphasis was on class polarisation and status-group consolidation. Earlier it was always presumed that gender relations are usually heterosexual and therefore crosscut by class and status relations. It gave bearing on the view that gender relations are somehow similar to ethnic relations.

Patriarchy constitutes a type of social formation that has been improperly ignored by conventional stratification analysis. According to Mann (1986) the omission of gender as a basis of social stratification created a crisis in stratification theory. The five main areas of stratification theory, which have been influenced by Gender, are individual, the family and household, the division of labour between the sexes, social class and nation-states.

**Gender and Social Stratification in Cross- Cultural Perspective**

The unequal accesses to resources, opportunities and rewards and to rights between men and women are legitimised by patriarchy across societies and cultures. Status inequality between men and women is not a new phenomena which is reinforced through patriarchy and its institutions, gendered division of labour and social institutions like marriage, dowry, property and inheritance and subordination. Sylvia Walby observes that patriarchy is not only differential distribution of power but also it is built into the very mechanism of production.

Feminist sociologists working on the concept of class have challenged its basis solely derived from man’s occupations. A major concern of feminist critique has been to consider what modification of class boundaries would be necessary if women in paid work are to be considered as well. Secondly they have sought to reevaluate the contribution of women’s work to the family.
Cross cultural research on sexual division of labour attempted to describe wide range of women’s productive activities in societies with different mode of subsistence but also the status implications of these on status of women.

For feminist anthropologists right from the very beginning the chief concern has been to explore the causes of universal gender inequality. They sought to explain its origin and perpetuation in terms of sociological, cultural and material terms. Each of these explanations rested upon a major dichotomy which was taken to be universal: public/domestic, nature/culture and production/reproduction.

In feminist anthropology, the relationship of gender with social stratification has been conceptualised primarily in the way gender informs social structures as a symbolic construct and as a metaphor for social action. Gender is conceptualised as symbolic representations and the behaviour of women and men and their relations. Anthropologists like Rosaldo, Lamphere and Ortner identified gender and kinship as the basis of social inequality whereby recognising how women’s access to property and decision making etc. are subsumed within larger ideological, material and political contexts of kinship structures.

Ortner and Whitehead proposed a model of prestige structures which is defined as the set of prestige positions or level that result from a particular line of social evaluation, the mechanisms by which individuals arrive at a given level or positions, and the overall conditions of reproduction of the system of statuses.

Gender, they argued, is one such prestige structure, and in every human society, man and woman compose two differentially valued terms of a value set, men being men, higher. They suggested that male prestige is linked to ‘public roles’, such as chief or a Brahman, while female prestige is defined in relation to men, in such roles as wife, sister and mother, in other words female structures are encompassed within the male structures. Conceptualising gender as one of the prestige structures pushed the gendered analysis of social stratification across societies.

Anthropological literature suggests that women’s work outside of household and in subsistence economy indicates as well reinforce generally egalitarian relations between women and men. Women’s in Vanatinai have access to power both through their control of the economic capital of land.
and through their accumulation of symbolic capital in exchange and mortuary ritual. But among horticulturists in highland New Guinea, women raise staple crops but men raise prestige crops that are the focus of social exchange.

Marx and Patriarchy

Marxist school of thought has led to the conceptualisation of sexual division in terms that have less to do with actual social relationship or patterns of social interaction, than with the determination of the ‘place’ of female labour within the class structure and of its ‘functions for capital’. A major question arose from this perspective is whether or not female domesticity has always had difficulties in formulating a stable and coherent theory of action which could relate the analysis of objective class position and of system contradictions to class formation. There was a fundamental difference from the kind of analysis that has accreted around the concept of ‘patriarchy’ which refers to patterns of behaviour or forms of social interaction. Both Marxists and patriarchy approaches also differ on whether women constitute a class or not, while patriarchy is seen as a structure of social relations in men are privileged systematically and women disprivileged in such a variety of social contexts that it makes sense to think of gender relations as a form of ‘stratification’.

Women’s value is defined by their reproductive abilities rather than by their productive activities. Bride wealth is considered as compensation to the bride’s parents or her kin for the productive and reproductive rights of the bride; dowry as a form of inheritance provides a bride with land and other wealth and helps her to attract a husband.

In traditional patriarchal Irish family (studied by Arensberg & Kimball) work was divided by gender and age. The division of labour considered “natural” and power in the hands of men. Pastoral societies are also generally characterised by patriarchy and a dichotomisation of the sexes, both symbolically and socially segregation of the sexes and gender stratification are fundamental attributes of many pastoral societies. Campbell who studied “Sarakatsani of Greece” says that the life of pastoral ‘Sarakatsani’ revolves around three things: sheep, children and honour gender ideology is embedded in these three valued items. The ultimate authority lies with the male despite the fact that female contributes equally in all aspects of life.

Status of Women

Generalisations are often made about the status of women according to different modes of adaptation but these studies show that great amount diversity persists. To understand gender stratification, the interlinkage of both ideology and participation in production must be understood. As Atkinson (1982) states, “It is too facile to deny the significance of sexual stereotypes or to presume that women’s influence in one context cancels out their degradation in another, just as we know that women’s status is not a unitary phenomenon across cultures, we need to be reminded that the intra cultural picture is equally complex.” Socialist feminist scholars, however, maintain that patriarchy precedes class inequality. They clearly show that new forms of subordination and gender asymmetry have superseded the old, leaving patriarchal control undisturbed. Industrial work privileged men who took control over the earnings and social power while leaving women as dependents.
Leela Dube, Eleanor Leacock and Shirley Ardener provide a cross-cultural perspective; focusing upon the insignificance and passivity of women and the primacy of men in various societies. Leela Dube observes that making women invisible despite their obvious preference and effective visibility is the root cause of their low status in society.

Inequalities of gender can be explained by “gender regimes” which is a cluster of practices ideological and material, which in a given social context, acts to construct various images of masculinity and feminity and thereby to consolidate forms of gender inequality (Connell, 1994: 29-40). According to Kabeer (1995) ‘biology is gendered as well as sexed’. Male and female are translated as man and woman based on mutually exclusive traits of masculinity and feminity.

Women are attached to a two-fold stratification i.e. in relation to men and in relation to other women. Gender structures different spheres of male-female inequality.

Many near-egalitarian societies in the contemporary world are characterised by a division of labour whereby men hunt and women gather. Friedl (1975) outlines four reasons for this division i.e. the variability in the supply of game, the different skills required for hunting and gathering the incompatibility between carrying burdens and hunting and the small size of semi nomadic foraging population. Despite the common assumption that men hunt and women gather, there is no sharp division of labour. The Tiwi, Australian aborigines who live on Melville Island off the coast of Northern Australia both men and women hunt and gather. Women are considered economic assets and a source of wealth and prestige for men. Women acquire social status and can be politically influential. Goodale suggests that Tiwi culture emphasises the equality of men and women in society. Among the Agta Negritos of North Eastern Luson, the Philippines women enjoy greater social and economic equality with their men compared to Tiwi of Australia. They make significant contribution to the daily food supply and also control the distribution of the food they acquire, sharing them with their families and trading them in the broader community. This challenges the widely held notion that in foraging societies pregnancy and child care are incompatible with hunting. They have developed methods of contraception and abortion to aid them in spacing their children.

In horticultural societies, in which cultivation and farming is required by the use of hand-tool technology women play important roles in production. Lepowsky points to gender egalitarianism among the horticultural and matrilineal people of the pacific island of Vanatani. He says that the prominent position of women in Vanatinai exchange and other activities.

The Indian Context

According to Kalpana Bardhan “Although the family is the salient unit of analysis for stratification studies, whether based on class or caste analysis, it is not quite sufficient situated within the broader framework, the division by sex and the status of women affect its properties of stability and dynamics”.

In Indian society, besides family as a basic unit of stratification the role of kinship, family and everyday relations, the role of male head of the family, status equality between men and women are some of the questions, which needs examination. Michael Mann discusses patriarchy, economy and class structure. According to Mann compartmentalisation of women persists despite involvement of women in politics, development programmes and processes and feminism. Indian society has been divided into purushjati and stree jati. To conceptualise women and write about them, Nita Kumar suggests four ways to deal i.e. by making women the object of human ‘gaze’ by seeing women as actors and subjects by giving them the prerogative of males, by focussing on the patriarchal,
ideological discursive within which women exist and which seemingly control them without a chance to get out of them, by looking at the hidden, subversive ways in which women exercise their agency. She raises some questions like desirability of having women as subjects and to replacing of the masculine, rational, free subject into a feminine one.

According to Monisha Behal’s (1984) work in Mainpuri district in west Uttar Pradesh, women’s lives in the village are full of gloom and sadness because of work overload, bad health, drudgery and poverty. Madhu Kishwar and Ruth Vanita (1984) pose the women’s question by highlighting the incompatibility of Indian constitutional Law, violence, aggression and crimes against women. Mahatma Gandhi viewed that women has infinite capacity for sufferings because she is the mother of man has also been critically examined. Joanna Liddle and Rama Joshi (1986) studied the Indian women in the context of interconnections between gender, caste and class. They explained that the patriarchal upper castes tightened both caste and gender division as they consolidated their economic supremacy and defended challenges to that supremacy.

Women’s movements in India have mainly focused on those issues which seem to cut across boundaries such as violence against women, work related inequalities, access to education and employment, health, social recognition of work of housewives and remuneration for their work, political repression and under representation, price rise etc.

Raising issues of exploitation and oppression in different spheres of life i.e. family, marriage, economy, religion and politics, feminists seem to cover a large vista of gender concerns in diverse Indian contexts.

In all kinds of writings it has been admitted that patriarchy, stratification system and status of women are closely inter-related and any kind of positive change in the status of women would be an attack on patriarchy and stratification system. Through a symbolic analysis unequal practices have been seen express deep seated cultural valuations of what it is to be a masculine and feminine. Leela Dube discusses the relationship between man and women by using metaphoric concepts of ‘seed’ and the earth in various patrilineal cultures as justification of gender asymmetry.

Women in literary writings have been projected in a conservative form. In the last three decades large spate of writings on various aspects of gender inequality challenge the invisibility of women in economy, denial of unemployment, decision making and violence and crime against women as male privileges.

The abolition of landlordism and the breakdown of its socio–cultural milieus have affected women in a positive manner. Mencher and Saradamoni find that female income is essential for below poverty line houses. Most of the women are engaged in three types of work: (a) participation in the traditionally defined labour force (b) domestic work plus activities like alone. Even these women are victimized because of their sex and poor economic back-ground.

Karuna Ahmad finds (1979) five trends in women’s employment: (a) clustering of women in a few occupations (b) clustering either in low status occupation or in the lower rungs of the prestigious profession, (c) women receive lower salaries than men, (d) high proportion of highly educated and professionally trained unemployed women.
Studies suggest that women’s professional locations reflect their position in society in terms of caste and class backgrounds and educational achievements. Perceptions regarding status among women are shaped by modern education than the traditional values regarding marriage and family.

Agnihotri (1996) and Agarwal (1984) gave preference for Marxist approach in analysing women. Agarwal proposes that a number of questions which would have a bearing on gender relations will get obfuscated in the organisation of production and relations of production. But despite the metaphor of reforms and individualisation of women, emphasis on chastity, patriarchy, division of Labour, sacredness of Marriage seclusion with the household has persisted.

**PATRIARCHY**

Subordination of women to men is prevalent in large parts of the world. We come across experiences where women are not only treated as subordinate to men but are also subject to discriminations, humiliations, exploitations, oppressions, control, and violence. Women experience discrimination and unequal treatment in terms of basic right to food, health care, education, employment, control over productive resources, decision-making, and livelihood not because of their biological differences or sex, which is natural but because of their gender differences which is a social construct. “Sex is considered a fact - one is born with either male or female genitalia. Gender is considered a social construction - it grants meaning to the fact of sex. Conversely, it could be said that only after specific meanings came to be attached to the sexes, did sex differences become pertinent” (Geetha). Gender based discriminations and exploitations are widespread and the socio-culturally defined characteristics, aptitudes, abilities, desires, personality traits, roles, responsibilities and behavioral patterns of men and women contribute to the inequalities and hierarchies in society. Gender differences are man made and they get legitimised in a patriarchal society.

**What is Patriarchy?**

Patriarchy literally means rule of the father in a male-dominated family. It is a social and ideological construct which considers men (who are the patriarchs) as superior to women. Sylvia Walby in “Theorising Patriarchy” calls it “a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women”. Patriarchy is based on a system of power relations which are hierarchical and unequal where men control women’s production, reproduction, and sexuality. It imposes masculinity and femininity character stereotypes in society which strengthen the iniquitous power relations between men and women. Patriarchy is not a constant and gender relations which are dynamic and complex have changed over the periods of history.

The nature of control and subjugation of women varies from one society to the other as it differs due to the differences in class, caste, religion, region, ethnicity and the socio-cultural practices. In the context of India, Brahminical patriarchy, tribal patriarchy and dalit patriarchy are different from each other. Patriarchy within a particular caste or class also differs in terms of their religious and regional variations. Similarly subordination of women in developed countries is different from what it is in developing countries. While subordination of women may differ in terms of its nature, certain characteristics such as control over women’s sexuality and her reproductive power cuts across class, caste, ethnicity, religions and regions and is common to all patriarchies.
Sexual harassment as the workplace is common across societies

This control has developed historically and is institutionalized and legitimized by several ideologies, social practices and institutions such as family, religion, caste, education, media, law, state and society.

Patriarchal societies propagate the ideology of motherhood which restrict women’s mobility and burdens them with the responsibilities to nurture and rear children. The biological factor to bear children is linked to the social position of women’s responsibilities of motherhood: nurturing, educating and raising children by devoting themselves to family. “Patriarchal ideas blur the distinction between sex and gender and assume that all socio-economic and political distinctions between men and women are rooted in biology or anatomy” (Heywood, 2003: 248). Gender like social class, caste, race or religion is a significant social cleavage and it is important to analyse it to understand social inequalities, oppressions and unequal relationship between men and women. It has been explained by feminist scholars / thinkers/ writers who believe that the theory of ‘sexual politics’ and ‘sexism’ are conscious parallels with theory of ‘class politics’ and ‘racism’ to understand oppression of women.
Patriarchy puts women in a subservient position in relation to men

The traditionalist view accepts patriarchy as biologically determined and as the biological functions of men and women are different, the social roles and tasks assigned for women are also different. Sigmund Freud stated that for women ‘anatomy is destiny’ and it is women’s biology which primarily determine their psychology and hence their abilities and roles. Similarly the traditional notion of ‘public-private divide’ which located politics in the public sphere and family and personal relationships in private sphere as non-political, believed that sexual inequality is natural and not political. While the political sphere was preserved for men the private sphere was reserved for women as housewives and mothers who were excluded from politics. These theories of male supremacy have been challenged and opposed by feminists as they lack historical or scientific evidence. Feminists argue that the biological difference might lead to some difference in their roles, but the former should not become the basis of a sexual hierarchy in which men are dominant. The dismantling of these theories enables us to acknowledge that patriarchy is man-made and has developed historically by the socio-economic and political processes in society.

Gerda Lerner in “The Creation of Patriarchy” (1986) has argued against single cause theories and against looking for one historical moment when patriarchy was established. Patriarchy has been conceptualized and analyzed by several feminist scholars in different ways. Feminists have challenged patriarchal knowledge, ideology, values and its practice. Despite a range of common themes within feminism, disagreements exist amongst the feminists in understanding patriarchy. All feminists do not like the term “patriarchy” for
various reasons and prefer the term “gender” and “gender oppression”. Patriarchy has remained a relatively undefined concept and some feminist scholars are at unease with the use of the concept of ‘patriarchy’ when it involves the notion of a general system of inequality. Michele Barrett argues that the use of the term patriarchy assumes that the relation between men and women is unchanging and universalistic. She suggests that it can only be appropriate if it is defined very narrowly and refers to specific aspects of ideological relations such as those of father-daughter relationship described in Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas (Barrett). The use of the term often involves confusion between ‘patriarchy’ as rule of the father and ‘patriarchy’ as men’s domination of women. However, Sylvia Walby critiques Barrett as the problem is not with the concept itself but with the way it is used in specific texts as it involves problems of reductionism, biologism, universalism, and therefore the inconsistent definition of patriarchy needs be overcome in an adequate analysis of gender inequality (Walby). Sheila Rowbotham also argues that ‘the term patriarchy necessarily implies a conception of women’s oppression that is universalistic, ahistoric and essentially biologistic and that it incorrectly leads to a search for a single cause of women’s oppression either in a base super-structure model or as quest for ultimate origins from capitalist relations’.

Suma Chitnis argues that because of the inadequate note of historical circumstances and values that render women’s issues different in India, a large section of the population recoils from the feminist rhetoric. Similarly the unease with the term patriarchy is because of the role that men have played in the emergence and growth of women’s question in India. In a hierarchical society often gender oppression is linked with oppressions based on caste, class, community, tribe and religion, and in such multiple patriarchies “men as the principal oppressors” is not easily accepted (Chaudhuri). However, Mary E. John argues that multiple patriarchies which are byproducts of discrimination along class, caste and communal lines, are diverse in nature and it is because of the unequal patriarchies that “there is a need to conceptualize the complex articulation of different patriarchies, along with the distinct and equally challenging question of how subaltern genders are relating to questions of power in the current conjuncture”.

The assertion of autonomous dalit women’s organizations have thrown up several crucial theoretical and political challenges besides underlying the brahmanism of feminist movements and patriarchal practices of dalit politics. Within the framework of ‘difference’ the issues of caste is primarily responsible for oppression of dalit women. Sharmila Rege argues that the category of ‘difference’ has been brought to the centre of feminist analysis by the black and third world feminists who question the sex/class debate of the 1970s and argue that the complex interplay between sex, class, race need to be underlined. Vaid and Sangari make a distinction between “the modernizing of patriarchal modes of regulating women” and the “democratizing of gender relations” both at home and work place and underline both the revolutionary potential and inherent contradictions that the democratizing movements constituted for peasants and working class women (Vaid and Sangari (1989) in Rege, 2004: 215). Thus feminist historiography made radical breakthroughs in redefining gender and patriarchies in the context of hierarchies of caste, class, community and ethnicity. Therefore it is pertinent to underline several perspectives of feminism for a comprehensive understanding of patriarchy in terms of its origin, characteristics, nature, structures and persistence.
FEMINISM

“Feminism is an awareness of patriarchal control, exploitation and oppression at the material and ideological levels of women’s labour, fertility and sexuality, in the family, at the place of work and in society in general, and conscious action by women and men to transform the present situation” (Bhasin and Khan). It is a struggle to achieve equality, dignity, rights, freedom for women to control their lives and bodies both within home and outside. As a cross cutting ideology feminists have different political positions and therefore address a range of issues such as female suffrage, equal legal rights, right to education, access to productive resources, right to participate in decision-making, legalization of abortion, recognition of property rights and abolition of domestic violence. Thus feminism passed through several paradigms which are referred to as first wave and second wave of feminism.

Since the origin of patriarchy and establishment of male supremacy can be traced to different factors and forces feminists differ in their approach to understand patriarchy and adopt different strategies to abolish it. One way to understand the various dimensions of feminist theories and their theoretical approaches to understand patriarchy is to locate them within the broader philosophical and political perspectives that have been broadly classified as Liberal, Marxist, Socialist and Radical. However, despite the ideological differences between the feminist groups, they are united in their struggle against unequal and hierarchical relationships between men and women, which is no longer accepted as biological destiny.

Feminist theorists generally share four concerns (Jaggar and Rothenberg) (i) They seek to understand the gendered nature of all social and institutional relations, which determines who does what for whom, what we are and what we might become. (ii) Gender relations are considered as problematic and as related to other inequalities and contradictions in social life. “Family, education and welfare, worlds of work and politics, culture and leisure are socially structured through relations of gender, power, class, race and sexuality”.

(iii) Gender relations are not viewed as either natural or immutable but as historical and socio-cultural productions, subject to reconstitution. In particular feminist analysis deconstructs errors and myths about women’s empirical realities, and constructs theories by and about women. (iv) Feminist theorists tend to be explicitly political about their advocacy about social change. They challenge the traditional race-class-sexuality-power arrangements which favour men over women, white over non-whites, adults over children and their struggle to embrace inclusivity continues.

Since feminism is not ahistoric, understanding several perspectives of it engages us in understanding the history of feminism (Chaudhuri, 2004). An uneasy relationship with western ‘feminism’ and the claim for an “indigenous feminism” led to the search for the indigenous roots of feminism, which is often linked to our colonial past. Kumari Jayawardena defines feminism as “embracing movements for equality within the current system and significant struggles that have attempted to change the system”. She asserts that these movements arose in the context of i) the formulation and consolidation of national identities which modernized anti-imperialist movements during the independence struggle and ii) the remaking of pre-capitalist religion and feudal structures in attempt to modernize.
Feminism challenges patriarchy

third world societies (Jayawardena). Indian feminists like Veena Mazumdar link the anti-imperialist struggle of the national movement with awareness of women’s issues as “the independence of the country and of women has become so intertwined as to be identical”.

Whether women’s movements from the Seventies onwards can only be termed as feminist is an equally important question of concern to some feminist scholars. With the women’s movement gaining momentum sharp critiques of mainstream conceptualization of work, development, legal process and the state emerged, which led to several theoretical and praxiological reformulations. It led to the debates of class v/s patriarchy, caste v/s patriarchy and women’s movements have addressed issues concerning women of working class, dalit, tribal and minorities. Gopal Guru located the need for dalit women to talk differently in a discourse of descent against the middle class women’s movement by dalit men and the moral economy of peasant movement. He argues that social location determines the perception of reality and therefore representation of dalit women by non-dalit women was less valid and less authentic (Guru). A dalit feminist standpoint is seen as emancipatory as it places emphasis on individual experiences within socially constructed groups and focuses on the hierarchical, multiple, changing structural power relations of caste, class, ethnic, which construct such a group (Rege). Since dalit women is not a homogeneous
group, the dalit feminist standpoint is open to interrogations and revisions and the subject of dalit women’s standpoint is multiple, heterogeneous and contradictory.

Since in the Indian context questions of cultural identity, difference, plurality and diversity have been important, some Indian feminists in their effort to counter attacks of being western have turned out to “Hindu iconography and Sanskrit idioms denoting women’s power, thus inadvertently strengthening communal identity that Indian, Hindu and Sanskrit are synonymous”. Flavia Agnes critiques such feminist groups. Maitrayee Chaudhuri also argues that in India the battle for recognition of ‘difference’ had to be worked out independently without the accepted terminology of today’s western feminism or multiculturalism. “Within the Indian sub-continent there have been infinite variations on the status of women diverging according to cultural milieu, family structure, class, caste, property rights and morals” (Thapar). Therefore despite several debates and discussion on Indian women’s movement there have been no clear ideological lines drawn and no major trends have emerged. In fact, the women’s issues taken up in the women’s movement since 1975 have arisen out of the movement itself and have been taken up by women’s groups representing all ideologies and tendencies (Omvedt). The effort to characterize the specificity of women’s oppression and to analyse the links with other forms of social oppression is more an ongoing theoretical research rather than an ideological dividing line. In India almost all feminists agree that women’s movement has to be linked to broader movements against all kinds of social oppression. While in the West there have been a wide variety of feminist positions, from those stressing male power and sexual dominance to “Marxist – Feminist” positions stressing social production, in India it has been mainly the Marxist who have dealt with the issue of women’s oppression and subjugation though there have been varying approaches.

**Approaches to Understand Patriarchy**

**Liberal Feminism:** Liberal feminists have championed equal legal and political rights for women to enable them to compete with men in the public realm on equal terms. The philosophical basis of liberal feminism lies in the principle of individualism and they campaigned for all individuals to participate in public and political life. Several women’s movement demanded female suffrage during the 1840s and 1850s in United States and United Kingdom. The famous Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 marked the birth of women’s rights movement which among other things called for female suffrage. Women were granted the right to vote in the US Constitution in 1920. In UK though franchise was extended to women in 1918 for a decade they did not exercise equal voting rights with men. Mary Wollstonecraft’s “Vindication of the Rights of Women” (1792) was the first text of modern feminism which campaigned for women’s right to vote/ female suffrage.

Wollstonecraft claimed that if women gained access to education as rational creatures in their own right the distinction of sex would become unimportant in political and social life. John Stuart Mill in collaboration with Harriet Taylor in “The Subjection of Women” proposed that women should be entitled to the citizenship and political rights and liberties enjoyed by men. It indicts traditional arrangements of work and family as tyrannizing women and denying them freedom of choice (Mandell). Thus, liberal feminists believed that female suffrage would do away with all forms of sexual discrimination and prejudice.
Walby contends that “first wave feminism was a large, multi-faceted, long-lived and highly effective political phenomenon”.

Betty Friedan’s “The Feminine Mystique” marked the resurgence of liberal feminist thought in the 1960s and is often credited as stimulating the emergence of ‘second wave’ feminism. She referred to the cultural myth that women seek security and fulfillment in domestic life and that their feminine behavior serves to discourage women from entering employment, politics and public life in general. In “The Second Stage” (1983) Friedan “discussed the problem of reconciling the achievement of personhood by making it possible to open up broader opportunities for women in work and public life while continuing to give central importance to family in women’s life which has been criticized by radical feminists as contributing to ‘mystique of motherhood’” (Heywood). Therefore, liberal feminism is essentially reformist and does not challenge the patriarchal structure of society itself. Critics suggest that the liberal reforms to increase opportunities for women, prohibit discriminations and to increase public consciousness of women’s rights have not been shared equally by all women because these changes have not addressed issues of socially structured inequalities (Mandell). Thus, while the first wave feminism ended with winning suffrage rights the emergence of second wave feminism in 1960s acknowledged that political and legal rights were insufficient to change women’s subordination. Feminist ideas and arguments became radical and revolutionary thereafter.

Marxist Feminism: Marxist feminist believed that both subordination of women and division of classes developed historically with the development of private property. Frederick Engels in “The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State” (1884) stated that with the emergence
of private property, women’s housework sank into insignificance in comparison to man’s productive labour. ‘The world historical defeat of the female sex with the establishment of capitalism based on private property ownership by men did away with inheritance of property and social position through female line’. Thus maternal authority gave place to paternal authority and property was to be inherited from father to son and not from woman to her clan. The bourgeois families which owned private property emerged as patriarchal families where women were subjugated. Such patriarchal families became oppressive as men ensured that their property passed on only to their sons. Therefore bourgeois family and private property as a byproduct of capitalism subordinated and oppressed women.

Marxist feminists unlike the radical feminists argue that class exploitation is deeper than sexual oppression and women’s emancipation essentially requires social revolution which will overthrow capitalism and establish socialism. Engels believed that “in a socialist society marriage will be dissolvable and that once private property is abolished its patriarchal features and perhaps also monogamy will disappear”. Therefore Marxist feminists like many socialist feminists connect structural changes in kinship relations and changes in the division of labour to understand women’s position in society. They argue that it is not women’s biology alone but, private property and monogamous marriage, economic and political dominance by men and their control over female sexuality which led to patriarchy.

However, the Marxist feminists have been criticized for differentiating working class women and bourgeois women and also for the focus on economic factors to explain subordination of women. Recent socialist feminists critique traditional Marxist feminists as the later emphasize only on economic origins of gender inequality and state that female subordination occurs also in pre-capitalist and socialist systems (Mandell). In fact socialist feminists accuse Marxists feminists of being ‘sex blind’ and only adding women to their existing critique of capitalism (Hartmann).

Socialist Feminism: Unlike the liberal feminists, socialist feminist argue that women do not simply face political and legal disadvantages which can be solved by equal legal rights and opportunities but the relationship between sexes is rooted in the social and economic structure itself. Therefore women can only be emancipated after social revolution brings about structural change. Socialist feminists deny the necessary and logical link between sex and gender differences. They argue that the link between child bearing and child rearing is cultural rather than biological and have challenged that biology is destiny by drawing a sharp distinction between ‘sex and gender’. Therefore, while liberal feminist takes women’s equality with men as their major political goal, socialist feminism aim at transforming basic structural arrangements of society so that categories of class, gender, sexuality and race no longer act as barriers to share equal resources (Mandell, 1995: 9).

Gerda Lerner’s (1986) explains how control over female sexuality is central to women’s subordination. She argues that it is important to understand how production as well as reproduction was organized. The appropriation and commodification of women’s sexual and reproductive capacity by men lies at the foundation of private property, institutionalization of slavery, women’s sexual subordination and economic dependency on male.

Most socialist feminists agree that the confinement of women to the domestic sphere of housework and motherhood serves the economic interests of capitalism. Women relieve men of the burden of housework and child rearing, and allow them to concentrate on productive employment. Thus unpaid domestic labour contributes to the health and efficiency
SOCIETY OF CLASSICAL ECONOMY and also accounts for the low social status and economic dependence of
women on men. But, unlike the Marxist feminists, socialist feminists look at both relations of
production as well as relations of reproduction to understand patriarchy. Unlike orthodox
Marxists who have prioritized class politics over sexual politics, modern socialist feminists
give importance to the later. They believe that socialism in itself will not end patriarchy as it
has cultural and ideological roots.

In ‘Women’s Estate’ (1971) Juliet Mitchell believes that gender relations are a part of the
superstructure and patriarchy is located in the ideological level while capitalism in the
economical level (Mitchell). Like traditional Marxist analysis she fails to consider the
significance of sexual division of labour as an economical phenomenon (Walby). She argues
that patriarchal law is that of the rule of the father, which operates through the kinship system
rather than domination of men. Mitchell stated that women fulfill four social functions (i) They
are members of workforce and are active in production, (ii) they bear children and thus
reproduce human species (iii) they are responsible for socializing children and (iv) they are
sex objects. Therefore “women can achieve emancipation only when they liberate from
each of these areas and not only when socialism replaces capitalism”.

Walby critiques Mitchell as she fails to consider the material benefits that men derive from
women’s unpaid domestic labour and the significance of men’s organized attempts to limit
women’s access to paid work. On the other hand, Delphy argues that the basis of gender
relations is the domestic mode of production in which the husband expropriates the wife’s
labour. Women share a common class position and are exploited by men as a class. Thus it is
not women’s position within the domestic mode of production which is the basis of their
class oppression alone but it is their main form of subordination. The forms of oppression
outside the family therefore derive from oppressions within the family (Walby). She further
argues that women’s relation to production is not determined by content of the task but
by the nature of the social relations under which they labour. Therefore it is the relations of
production which explain why their work is excluded from the realm of value. Delphy has
been critiqued by Molyneux for placing all women in one class without making a
distinction between the bourgeoisie and proletariat.

Similarly Zillah Eisenstein in “Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism”
(1979) argues that ‘male supremacy and capitalism are the core relations which determine
oppression of women’ She defines patriarchy as a “sexual system of power in which the male
possesses superior power and economic privilege’. Patriarchy is not the direct result of
biological differentiation but ideological and political interpretations of these differentiations.
“On the one hand the capitalist live a process in which exploitation occurs and on the other
the patriarchal sexual hierarchy in which the women is mother, domestic labourer and
consumer and in which the oppression of women occurs”. Social relations of
reproduction are therefore important and they are not the result of capitalist relations but
cultural relations. Thus, while in her early work in 1979 there was greater stress on the
synthesis between capitalism and patriarchy, in her later work in 1984, there is more
recognition of conflict and tensions between the two (Walby). Heidi Hartmann (1979)
argues that both patriarchy and capitalism are independent yet are interacting social structures.
She believes that “We can usefully define patriarchy as a set of social relations between men
who have a material base who through hierarchical, establish/create interdependence and
solidarity among men and enable them to dominate women (Hartmann). She argues that historically both had important effects on each other as the material base upon which patriarchy rests lies most fundamentally in men’s control over women’s labour power. “In capitalist societies a healthy and strong partnership exists between patriarchy and capitalism”. She has been critiqued for paying insufficient attention to tension and conflict between capitalism and patriarchy.

Maria Mies, in her paper “The Social Origins of the Sexual Division of Labour” refers to women’s labour as ‘shadow work’. She suggests that we should no longer look at the sexual division of labour as a problem related to the family, but rather as a structural problem of a whole society. The hierarchical division of labour between men and women and its dynamics form an integral part of dominant production relations i.e. class relations of a particular epoch and society and of the broader national and international divisions of labour. She argues that the asymmetric division of labour by sex, once established by means of violence was upheld by such institutions as the family and the state and also by the powerful ideological systems. The patriarchal religions have defined women as part of nature which has to be controlled and dominated by man.

Thus, socialist feminists have advanced theoretical boundaries by analyzing the ways class and gender relations intersect. Economic class relations are important in determining women’s status but gender relations are equally significant and therefore eradicating social class inequality alone will not necessarily eliminate sexism. Patriarchy existed before capitalism and continued to exist in both capitalism and other political-economic systems (Mandell). However, patriarchy and capitalism are concretely intertwined and mutually supportive system of oppressions. Women’s subordination within capitalism results from their economic exploitation as wage labourers and their patriarchal oppression as mothers, consumers and domestic labourers.

Sylvia Walby in ‘Patriarchy at Work’ (1986) attempts to conceptualise patriarchy not only in terms of the complexity of relationships of gender but also subtleties of interconnections of patriarchy with capitalism, which is a relationship of tension and conflict and not of harmony and mutual accommodation. Domestic labour is a distinct form of labour and core to patriarchal mode of production which is essential to exploitation of women by men and is independent of exploitation of proletariats by the capitalists (Walby, 1986: 52). Within the household women provide all kinds of services to their children, husband and other members of the family, in other words in the patriarchal mode of production, women’s labour is expropriated by their husbands and others who live there. The control over and exploitation of women’s labour benefit men materially and economically. “Patriarchy is a system of interrelated social structures through which men exploit”. She states that gender relations need to be explained at the level of social relations and not as individuals. Within the patriarchal mode of production, the producing class comprises of women and domestic labourer and husbands are the non-producing and exploiting class. And domestic labourer works to replenish/ produce his/ their labour power, she is separated from the product of her labour and has no control over it, while the husband always has control over the labour power which the wife has produced. She is separated from if at every level, physically, in the ability to use it, legally, ideologically etc. Thus the domestic labourer is exploited as the husband has the control over the wage he receives from the capitalist in exchange of his labour. The relations of production in such a mode of production are personalized relations between individuals. When the
patriarchal mode of production articulates with the capitalist mode, women are prevented from entering paid work as freely as men and are reinforced by patriarchal state policies.

The state is a site of patriarchal relations which is necessary to patriarchy as a whole as it upholds the oppression of women by supporting a form of household in which women provide unpaid domestic services to male. Thus capitalism benefits from a particular form of family which ensures cheap reproduction of labour power and the availability of women as a reserve army. Patriarchy is also located in the social relations of reproduction and masculinity and femininity are not biological givens but products of long historical process. Thus, socialist feminists combine both marxist and radical approach and neither is sufficient by itself. Patriarchy is connected to both relations of production and relations of reproduction.

Therefore reactionary feminism differed from conventional feminism challenging the traditional public/private divide and the influence of patriarchy not only in politics, public life and economy but also in all aspects of social, personal, psychological and sexual existence. This was evident in the pioneering work of radical feminists. Kate Millet’s “Sexual Politics” (1970) and Germaine Greer’s “The Female Eunuch” (1970), Simon de Beauvoir’s “The Second Sex” (1970), Eva Figes’s “Patriarchal Attitudes” (1970) drew attention to the personal, psychological and sexual aspects of female oppression. It is because of the ‘patriarchal values and beliefs which pervade the culture, philosophy, morality and religion of society that women are conditioned to a passive sexual role, which has repressed their true sexuality as well as more active and adventurous side of their personalities’ (Greer). Therefore the emphasis shifted from political emancipation to women’s liberation and the second wave feminists campaigned for the legislation of abortions, equal pay legislation, anti-discrimination laws and wider access to education and political and professional life. Women’s Liberation Movement during the 1960s and 70s called for radical social changes rather than legal and political reforms and criticized the repressive nature of the conventional society.

Radical Feminism: Unlike the liberal and socialist traditions, radical feminists developed a systematic theory of sexual oppression as the root of patriarchy which preceded private property. They challenge the very notion of femininity and masculinity as mutually exclusive and biologically determined categories. The ideology of motherhood subjugates women and perpetuates patriarchy, which not only forces women to be mothers but also determines the conditions of their motherhood (Bhasin). It creates feminine and masculine characteristics, strengthens the divide between public and private, restricts women’s mobility and reinforces male dominance. “While sex differences are linked to biological differences between male and female, gender differences are imposed socially or even politically by constructed contrasting stereotypes of masculinity and femininity” (de Beauvoir). Simone de Beauvoir in “The Second Sex” (1970) pointed out that women are made and not born. She believed that greater availability of abortion rights, effective birth control and end of monogamy would increase the control over their bodies. Judith Butler turned the sex-gender distinction on its head: by making sex the effect of gender, a legitimization subsequently imposed in order to fix the socially contingent through recourse to an unquestioned biology, “the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all”.

308
The #MeToo movement (2017-18) has exposed the extent of sexual harassment

Kate Millet in “Sexual Politics” (1970) defined politics as power structured relationships, which is not only confined to government and its citizens but also to family between children and parents and husband and wife. Through family, church and academy men secure consent of the very women they oppress and each institution justifies and reinforces women’s subordination to men with the result that women internalize a sense of inferiority to men (Mandell). Men use coercion to achieve what conditioning fails to achieve (Millet). She proposed that patriarchy must be challenged through a process of conscious-raising and women’s liberation required a revolutionary change. The psychological and sexual oppression of women have to be overthrown. Shulamith Firestone in “The Dialectic of Sex” (1972) believes that the basis of women’s oppression lies in her reproductive capacity in so far as this has been controlled by men. She stated that patriarchy is not natural or inevitable but its roots are located in biology which has led to a natural division of labour within the biological family and liberation of women required that gender difference between men and women be abolished (also see Heywood, 260). Firestone’s attempt to build a theory of patriarchy in which different sets of patriarchal relations have their place and specify their articulation with class and race relations is one of the most sophisticated and highly developed radical feminist theories (Walby). However, her analysis of relations of patriarchy with class and ethnicity are rather reductionist as she ignores various structures and institutions which have shaped these relationships through out history. Walby critiques her for her insufficient analysis of capitalist relations and their interrelationships with patriarchal relations, which Walby sees as a serious omission. Her believe that the connection between childbirth and child care is a biological rather than a social fact has also been critiqued.

Mackinnon argues that sexuality is the basis of differentiation of sexes and oppression of women and this she considers as parallel to the centrality of work for Marxist analysis of capitalism. “Sexuality is to Feminism what work is to Marxism: that which is most one’s
own, yet most taken away’. She considers that sexuality constructs gender and these are social processes and not biological givens. Walby critiques her for not assessing the relative importance of class/labour for gender equality as compared to sexuality. For radical feminists sexual relations are political acts, emblematic of male/female power relationships. The traditional political theory which divide personal and political spheres and believe that family is non-political and personal has been questioned by radical feminists who argue that family is that space where maximum exploitation of women takes place. It is this ‘public-private divide’ which legitimizes exploitation of women. In fact, it is essential that the private sphere must be mapped in terms of the same values of justice, equality and freedom which are necessary in the public sphere.

Radical feminists aim at the need to redefine individual identity, free language and culture from the clutches of masculinity, re-establish political power, re-evaluate human nature, behaviour and challenge the traditional values. Thus along with legal reforms and the right to franchise the protest against capitalist society is important to transform the traditional sexual identity through sexual revolution. Radical feminists therefore believe that unless sexuality is reconceived and reconstructed in the image and likeness of women, the later will remain subordinate to men (Mandell).

While radical feminists claim that ‘personal is political’ liberal feminist warn against the dangers of politicizing the private sphere, which is the realm of public choice and individual freedom. On the other hand the limitation of individualism as the basis of gender politics has been raised by radical feminists as an individualist perspective draws attention away from the structural character of patriarchy. Women are subordinated not as systematic individuals who happen to be denied rights or opportunities but as a sex that is subject to pervasive oppression (Heywood). They critique individualism which makes it difficult for women to think and act collectively on the basis of their common gender identity. Liberal individualism depoliticizes sexual relations and equal treatment might mean treating women like men. Finally the demand for equal rights only equips women to take advantage of the opportunities and may therefore reflect the interest of white, middle class women in developed countries and fail to address problems of women of colour, working class women and women in developing countries. Thus while ‘egalitarian feminists’ link gender difference to patriarchy as a manifestation of oppression and subordination and want to liberate women from gender difference, ‘difference feminists’ regard the very notion of equality as either misguided or simply undesirable. Alison Jaggar in “Feminist Politics and Human Nature” (1971) critiques the radicals for ignoring the causes that led to the origin of patriarchy and its structures which requires theorizing human behaviour and human society. She states that it is not that gender differences determine some forms of social organizations but the later which give rise to gender difference. Therefore instead of controlling their bodies women should be able to control their lives. Marxist feminists critique radical feminists for ignoring the historical, economic and materialist basis of patriarchy and therefore the later are trapped in ahistorical biological deterministic theory.

The new feminist traditions such as psychoanalytical feminism, eco-feminism, postmodern feminism, black feminism, lesbian feminism have emerged since the 1980s. Psychoanalytical feminists analyse the psychological process through which men and women are engendered. They do not hold biological factors as responsible for the construction of sexual difference. Psychoanalytical feminist explore the hidden dynamics at work in personal,
interpersonal and social relations and the unconscious dynamics that shape the way we think, feel and act in the world. Freudian psychoanalysis describes women oppression in patriarchy as a process, which need to be altered. After Juliet Mitchell’s book “Psychoanalysis and Feminism” (1974) the psychological process which determine patriarchy has expanded (see Brennan, 1989). Similarly “Feminism and Psychoanalysis” (1992) edited by Elizabeth Wright demonstrates the continued interest in this field. Psychoanalysis feminists may share the politics of radical, marxist or socialist feminists but the kind of questions and concerns raised by them are not acknowledged by the later. They analyse gender difference beyond conscious levels of experience and focus on the unconscious levels where gender-specific desires and meanings are constituted and formed. Dorothy Dinnerstein and Nancy Chodorow draw on a school for psychoanalysis called ‘object-relation theory’. Exclusive female mothering is seen to be the cause of gender inequality (Mandell).

**Eco-feminists** accept women’s attitudes and values as different from men. They believe that in certain respects women are superior to men and possess the qualities of creativity, sensitivity and caring which men can never develop. Vandana Shiva in her conception of ecofeminism critiques development and establishes the connection between ecological destruction and capitalist growth as a patriarchal project. **Postmodern feminists** claim that there is no fixed female identity. The socially constructed identities can be reconstructed or deconstructed. Thus the distinctions between sex and gender are criticized from two perspectives: (i) ‘difference feminists’ who believe that “there are essential difference between men and women and the social and cultural characteristics are seen to refer the biological differences” and (ii) ‘postmodern feminists’ who “questioned whether sex is a clear-cut biological distinction as is usually assumed”. In other words the features of biological motherhood do not apply to women who cannot bear children. Thus “there is a biology-culture continuum rather than a fixed biological/cultural divide and the categories male and female become more or less arbitrary and the concepts of sex and gender become hopelessly entangled” (Heywood).

Linda Nicholson in “Feminism / Postmodernism” (1990) claims that there are many points of overlap between a postmodern stance and position long held by feminists. According to Nancy Fraser and Nicholson if feminism pursues a trend towards a more historical non-universalizing, non-essentialist theory that addresses difference amongst women (lesbians, disabled, working class women, black women) then feminism will become more consistent with postmodernism (Nicholson, 1990: 34) This trend means giving up universal claims of gender and patriarchy. However, feminists hostile to postmodernism theory claim that no feminist politics is possible once one has called into question the nature of gender identity and subjectivity (Mandell).

**Black feminists** have prioritized differences based on race and challenge the tendency within feminism to ignore it. They portray sexism and racism as interlinked systems of oppression and highlight the particular range of gender, racial and economic disadvantages that confront “women of colour”. Black feminists argue that women are not subject to common forms of oppression due to their sex but ‘women of colour ‘in particular are more vulnerable to oppression and subjugation. They criticize the liberal, Marxist, socialist and radical feminists for ignoring race as a category of oppression and analysis (also see Brand, Dasgupta). By assuming that gender is primary form of subordination, oppression of class, sexuality and race become extensions of patriarchal domination. Radical feminists’ insistence that the
elimination of sexism is key to the elimination racism is inadequate to “women of colour” as they experience racism from white women as well as from men (Grant). Thus an analysis of the intersection of class, caste, race, sexuality and gender is important.

Similarly lesion feminists primarily struggle against homophobia which is as important as the struggle against patriarchy. Lesbian feminism and cultural feminism are two types of feminist separations advocating the creation of women identified world through the attachments women have to each other. They believe that since patriarchy is organized through men’s relations with other men, unity among women is the only effective means for liberating women. They position lesbianism as more than a personal decision and an outward sign of an internal rejection of patriarchal sexuality. Lesbianism becomes a paradigm for female-controlled female sexuality which meets women’s needs and desires.

‘Another popular strategy for resisting patriarchy has been to redefine social relations by creating women-centered cultures that emphasise positive capacities of women by focusing on creative dimensions of their experiences’

Therefore while earlier feminists struggled for a legally equal position for women and demanded democratic rights, which included right to education and employment, right to own property, right to vote, right to birth control, right to divorce, today feminists have gone beyond demanding mere legal reforms to end discrimination between men and women. They have raised issues of violence against women, rape, unequal wages, discriminatory personal laws, the sexual division of labour, distribution of power within the family, use of religion to oppress women and negative portrayal of women in media. Emancipation of women necessarily calls for challenging patriarchy as a system which perpetuates women’s subordination. Several structures of society such as kinship and family, class, caste, religion, ethnicity, educational institutions and state reinforce patriarchy. Some of the experiences of multiple patriarchies can be illustrated by analyzing the dynamics and interface of social forces which institutionalize and legitimate patriarchy in society.

Structures of Patriarchy

The first lessons of patriarchy are learnt in the family where the head of the family is a man/ father. Man is considered the head of the family and controls women’s sexuality, labour or production, reproduction and mobility. In a patriarchal family the birth of male child is preferred to that of a female. The former is considered as the inheritor of the family while the later is considered as paraya dhan. The Indian joint family is the “patriarchal family” and it was constituted by a group of persons related in the male line and subject to absolute power of the senior most male member (Maine). In the South Asian context kinship systems are largely based on patrilineal descent which is the foundation of a pervasive patriarchal ideology that rationalizes the differential access of men and women to the material and symbolic resources of society.

According to Gerda Lerner, family plays an important role in creating a hierarchical system as it not only mirrors the order in the state and educates its children but also creates and constantly reinforces that order. Family is therefore important for socializing the next generation in patriarchal values. The boys learn to be dominating and aggressive and girls learn to be caring, loving and submissive. These stereotypes of masculinity and femininity are not only social constructs but also have been internalized by both men and women.
While the pressure to earn and look after the family is more on the man, the women are supposed to do the menial jobs and take care of their children and even other members of the family. It is because of these gender stereotypes that women are at a disadvantage and are vulnerable to violence and other kinds of discriminations and injustices. Systemic deprivation and violence against women: rape, sexual harassment, sexual abuse, female foeticide, infanticide, witch-killing, sati, dowry deaths, wife-beating, high level of female illiteracy, malnutrition, undernourishment and continued sense of insecurity keeps women bound to home, economically exploited, socially suppressed and politically passive.

Patriarchal constructions of knowledge perpetuate patriarchal ideology and this is reflected in educational institutions, knowledge system and media which reinforce male dominance. More subtle expressions of patriarchy was through symbolism giving messages of inferiority of women through legends highlighting the self-sacrificing, self-effacing pure image of women and through ritual practice which emphasized the dominant role of women as a faithful wife and devout mother (Desai and Krishnaraj). Laws of Manu insist that since women by their very nature are disloyal they should be made dependent on men. The husband should be constantly worshiped as a god, which symbolized that man is a lord, master, owner, or provider and the shudras and women were the subordinates. It legitimized that a woman should never be made independent, as a daughter she should be under the surveillance of her father, as a wife of her husband and as a widow of her son (Chakravarti). While in ancient India (Vedic and Epic periods), women were by and large treated as equal to men, the restrictions on women and patriarchal values regulating women’s sexuality and mobility got strengthened in the post-vedic periods (Brahmanical and Medieval periods) with the rise of private property and establishment of class society.

Patriarchal constructions of social practices are legitimized by religion and religious institution as most religious practices regard male authority as superior and the laws and norms regarding family, marriage, divorce and inheritance are linked to patriarchal control over property biased against women. A person’s legal identity with regard to marriage, divorce and inheritance are determined by his or her religion, which laid down duties for men and women and their relationship. Most religions endorse patriarchal values and all major religions have been interpreted and controlled by men of upper caste and class. The imposition of parda, restrictions on leaving the domestic space, separation between public and private are all gender specific and men are not subject to similar constraints. Thus the mobility of women is controlled. They have no right to decide whether they want to be mothers, when they want to be, the number of children they want to have, whether they can use contraception or terminate a pregnancy and so on and so forth (Bhasin). Male dominated institutions like church and state also lay down rules regarding women’s reproductive capacity.

Similarly caste and gender are closely related and the sexuality of women is directly linked to the question of purity of race. The caste system and caste endogamy retained control over the labour and sexuality of women. Anuloma and pratiloma marriage by definition denigrate women. Caste not only determines social division of labour but also sexual division of labour. Ideologically concepts of caste purity of women to maintain patrilineal succession justified subordination of women. The prohibition of sacred thread ceremony for both women and sudhra, similar punishment for killing a women and sudhra, denial of
religious privileges are illustrations which indicate how caste and gender get entrenched (Altekar). Feminist writings illustrate how caste system upholds the patriarchal values and ideology which is used to justify the dominant, hegemonic, hierarchical and unequal patriarchal structures. Therefore it is important to emphasize the substantive question of subordination of certain sections of society and the structures that make their sub-ordination. For feminist scholars the issue is no longer whether the status of women was low or high but the specific nature and basis of their subordination in society (Chakravarti). Hence the historical developments of patriarchy/ies and how they have come to stay is important.

Uma Chakravarti argues that the establishment of private property and the need to have caste purity required subordination of women and strict control over their mobility and sexuality. Female sexuality was channeled into legitimate motherhood within a controlled structure of reproduction to ensure patrilineal succession. According to her the mechanism of control operated through three different levels. The first device was when patriarchy was established as an ideology and women had internalized through stridharma or pativartadharma to live up to the ideal notion of womanhood constructed by the ideologues of the society. The second device was laws, customs and rituals prescribed by the brahmanical social code which reinforced the ideological control over women through the idealization of chastity and wife fidelity as highest duty of women. Like Gerda Lerner she believes that patriarchy has been a system of benevolent paternalism in which obedient women were accorded certain rights and privileges and security and this paternalism made the insubordination invisible and led to their complicity in it. The relationship between women purity and caste purity was important and central to brahmanical patriarchy and women were carefully guarded and lower caste men were prevented from having sexual access to women of higher caste. The third was the state itself which supported the patriarchal control over women and thus patriarchy could be established firmly not as an ideology but as an actuality (Uma Chakravarti). Therefore gender relations are organized within the structural frame work of family, religion, class, caste, community, tribe and state.

Thus feminist theories provide explanation for a wide range of particular issues and have been enriched by different approaches and perspectives. The feminist movements need to draw on the strength of all feminist theories as each one on its own is incomplete. In fact, feminism will survive as long as patriarchy persists and ‘the challenge is to establish a viable and coherent third wave feminism’, which will explain the changing nature of gender relations and explore the ‘myth of post-feminism’ that society is no longer patriarchal as the most obvious forms of sexist oppression have been overcome.
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN SOCIETY
MEANING AND DEFINITION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Any alteration, difference or modification that takes place in a situation or in an object through time can be called change. The term social change is used to indicate the changes that take place in human interactions and interrelations. Society is a web of social relationships and hence social change obviously means a change in the system of social relationships. Social relationships are understood in terms of social processes and social interactions and social organisation. Thus the term social change is used to desirable variations in social interaction, social processes and social organisation. It includes alterations in the structure and functions of the society.

Definition

1. M.E. Jones: Social change is a term used to describe variations in, or modifications of, any aspect of social processes, social patterns, social interaction or social organisation.
2. Kingsley Davis: “By social change is meant only such alterations as occur in social organisation, that is, structure and functions of society.”
3. Majumdar, H.T. Social change may be defined as a new fashion or mode, either modifying or replacing the old, in the life of a people - or in the operation of society.”
4. Maclver and Page: Social change refers to a process responsive to many types of changes; to changes in the manmade conditions of life; to changes in the attitudes and beliefs of men, and to the changes that go beyond the human control to the biological and the physical nature of things.
5. Maclver (in some other context) also refers to social change as simply a change in the human relationships.

Social Change- A Complex Phenomenon

The fact of social change has fascinated the keenest minds and still poses some of the great unsolved problems in social science. The phenomenon of social change is not simple but complex. It is difficult to understand this phenomenon in its entirety. The unsolved problems are always pestering and pressurising us to find an appropriate answer. Some such problems are as follows- What is the direction of social change? What is the form of social change? What is the source of social change? What are its causes? Its consequences? What are its conditions and limitations? What is the rate of change? Whether the changes are due to human engineering or the uncontrollable cosmic design? Is it necessary to control social change? Can man, regulate it to suit his conveniences? Can he regulate and decide the direction of social change to satisfy his desires? These are some of the tantalising questions - tantalising not only because of their complexity but also because of their human significance.

NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

1. Social Change is Continuous. Society is undergoing endless changes. These changes cannot be stopped. Society cannot be preserved in a museum to save it from the ravages of time. From the dawn of history, down to this day society has been in continuous flux.
2. Social Change is Temporal. Change happens through time. Social change is temporal in the sense it denotes the time-sequence. In fact, society exists only as a time-sequence. As Maclver says, it is a becoming, not a being; a process, not a product. Innovation of new things, modification and renovation of the existing behaviour and the discarding of the old behaviour patterns take time. But the mere passage of time does not cause change as in the biological process of ageing.
3. **Social Change is Environmental.** It must take place within a geographic or physical and cultural context. Both these contexts have impact on human behaviour and in turn man changes them. Social changes never takes place in vacuum.

4. **Social Change is Human Change.** The sociological significance of the change consists in the fact that it involves the human aspect. The composition of society is not constant, but changing. The fact that people effect change and are themselves affected by it makes change extremely important.

5. **Social Change Results from Interaction of a Number of Factors.** A single factor may trigger a particular change, but it is always associated with other factors. The physical, biological, technological, cultural and other factors may, together bring about social change. This is due to the mutual interdependence of social phenomenon.

6. **Social Change May Create Chain Reaction.** Change in one aspect of life may lead to a series of changes in its other aspects. For example, change in rights, privileges, and status of women has resulted in a series of changes in home, family relationships and structure, the economic and to some extent, the political pattern of both rural and urban society.

7. **Social Change Involves Tempo (or Rate) and Direction of Change.** In most discussions of social change some direction is assumed. This direction is most necessarily inevitable. Sometimes, the direction is determined ideally. Change towards such a destination is more appropriately regarded as progress. In actuality, social change may tend towards any direction. The tempo or the rate of change is also not governed by any universal laws. The rate of change varies considerably from time to time and society to society depending upon its nature and character-open and closed, rural and urban and others.

8. **Social Change may be Planned or Unplanned.** The direction and tempo of social change are often conditioned by human engineering. Plans, programmes and projects may be launched by man in order to determine and control the rate and direction of social change. Unplanned change refers to change resulting from natural calamities such as famines and floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.

9. **Short Versus Long-run Changes.** Some social changes may bring about immediate results while some others may take years and decades to produce results. This distinction is significant, because a change which appears to be very vital today may be nothing more than a temporary oscillation having nothing to do with the essential trends of life, some years later. This is what historians mean when they say that time alone can place the events of the day in their true perspective.

10. **Social Change is an Objective Term.** The term social change describes one of the categorical processes. It has no value-judgements attached to it. To the sociologist social change as a phenomenon is neither moral nor immoral, it is amoral. It means the study of social change involves no-value-judgement. It is ethically neutral. One can study change even within the value system without being for against the change.

**SOCIAL CHANGE AND CULTURAL CHANGE**

The difference between social change and cultural change has a great sociological importance. By social change' is meant only such alterations as occur in social organisation, that is, structure and functions of society. Social change, in this sense, is only a part of what is essentially a broader category called cultural change. The term "cultural change", according to Kingsley Davis, embraces all changes occurring in any branch of culture including art, science, technology, philosophy, etc., as well as changes in the forms and rules of social organisation. As he says, cultural change is broader than social change, and social change is only a part of it.
All social changes are cultural changes, but all cultural changes need not necessarily be the social changes also. Cultural changes can be called social changes only when they affect human relations and the social organisation and cause some variation in them. Ex. Changes in the musical styles, painting styles, rules of writing poetry and drama, pronunciation of words, etc., represent cultural changes. They are purely cultural changes. They cannot be called social changes, because, they do not in any way affect the existing pattern of human interactions, social system and social organisation.

**FACTORS IN SOCIAL CHANGE**

In their book, Character and Social Structure, Gerth and Mills have outlined a model in terms of six major questions which can be asked about social changes: (i) what is it that changes? (ii) how does it change? (iii) what is the direction of change? (iv) what is the rate of change? (v) why did change occur or why was it possible? (vi) what are the principal factors in social change?

In dealing with the first of these questions it is useful, think, to define social change as a change in social structure (including here changes in the size of a society), or in particular social institutions, or in the relationships between institutions. Following the distinction proposed earlier between social structure and culture, we might then employ the term cultural change to refer to variations in closely linked in many cases; for example, the growth of modern science has been closely associated with changes in economic structure. In other cases, however, the relations may be less close, as in changes of fashion, or changes in the forms of artistic creation.

The questions concerning the manner, direction and rate of change require for their answer historical description and interpretation, such as have been provided, for example, in the various accounts of population changes, of the increasing division of labour in industry involve any value judgments; the diminishing size of the family, and the increasing size of economic units, are matters of historical fact. But in other cases, the direction of change may be less obvious and may become the subject of divergent interpretations. Moreover, the change itself may be one which is difficult to observe in a detached way, e.g. the increase in the divorce rate, or the extension of bureaucracy; and discussions of the direction of change are then likely to become closely involved with moral evaluations. Finally, when it is a matter of analysing changes in the total structure of a society, whether it be a historical or present day society, the line of demarcation between the critical analysis and the expression of a social philosophy becomes obscure and uncertain, and can perhaps never be rigorously established. This is apparent if we consider the widely divergent accounts of the changes taking place in the British Welfare State, or in the USSR since the death of Stalin, or in India since the attainment of independence; or, on a larger scale, the contradictory accounts proffered by Marx and Max Weber of the dominant trends of change in capitalist societies.

The **rate of change** has always interested sociologists, and it is a commonplace to refer to the acceleration of social and cultural change in modern times. W. F. Ogburn was one of the first to examine the phenomenon systematically and to undertake quantitative studies of the rate of change, especially in the sphere of technological inventions. He also focused attention upon the discrepancies between the rates of change in different sectors of social life; the hypothesis of ‘cultural lag’ is concerned with a major disharmony between the rapid growth of technology, and the slower transformation of familial, political and other institutions and of traditional beliefs and attitudes (religious, moral etc.). In recent years these problems have acquired greater importance, with the emergence of industrialization of underdeveloped countries as a major issue in world politics.
Research has followed two principal lines; sociological studies of the changes in social structure and culture induced by industrialization and the structural disharmonies of the transition period, and psychological studies of the adaptation of individuals to rapid social changes. The problems have also been studied in the industrial societies, both in the context of changes in the family, in social stratification, in religious and moral ideas, in law, etc., and from the aspect of attitudes, the reactions of the individual to social change, and the implications and consequences in education, crime and delinquency, and mental health. On the other hand, there has been relatively little study of the differences between societies in which change has been rapid but continuous, and societies in which revolutionary and abrupt changes have occurred.

The problem of why change occurred, or why it was possible, is closely linked with the general problem of the factors in social change and raises very complex issues concerning social causation. Gerth and Mills briefly discuss some of these issues, as for example, the role of individuals in bringing about social change, and the relative influence of material factors and of ideas. In a recent essay, Morris Ginsberg has undertaken a systematic analysis of the factors which have been invoked by different writers to explain social change: (i) the conscious desires and decisions of individuals (exemplified by the development of the small family system in Western countries); (ii) individual acts influenced by changing conditions (e.g. the decline of villages in England between 1130 and 1500); (iii) structural changes and structural strains (including as one instance the contradictions between forces of production and relations of production emphasized by Marxists); (iv) external influences (culture contact, or conquest); (v) outstanding individuals or groups of individuals; (vi) a confluence or collocation of elements from different sources converging at a given point (e.g. in revolutions); (vii) fortuitous occurrences (e.g. the Norman Conquest of England, the Black Death in the fourteenth century, the British conquest of India); and (viii) the emergence of a common purpose. The final section of the essay contains an illuminating discussion of the concept of cause in social science, and its connection with teleology.

Much recent sociology, under the influence of functionalism, has disregarded problems of change or has presented them in such a way as to suggest that social change is something exceptional. The emphasis has been upon the stability of social systems and of systems of values and beliefs, and upon consensus rather than diversity and conflict within each society. It is clear, however, that all societies are characterized by both continuity and change, and that a major task of sociological analysis is to discover how the two processes are related to each other. Continuity is maintained by force and by the social controls which discussed earlier, and especially by education, formal and informal, which imparts the accumulated heritage to new generations. On the other hand, there are also certain general conditions which make for social change; the most imports being the growth of knowledge and the occurrence of social conflict. The growth of knowledge has not been continuous, nor has it occur at the same rate in all societies; but since the seventeenth cent there has been a more or less steady growth which has now affected all societies. This has become a major condition of recent social change. Conflict, as a condition of social change, may be regarded from different aspects. In the first place, conflict between societies ha played an important part historically in bringing about larger social units (as Comte and Spencer recognized), in establishing or reinforcing social stratification (as Oppenheimer argued), and in diffusing social and cultural innovations. In modern times international conflict has profoundly influenced the economic and political structure of societies, social policies, and norms of behaviour but these phenomena have hardly received the attention they deserve. Secondly, conflicts between groups within society have been, and are, a major source of innovation and change. Among these conflicts, that between social classes, although it has not had the universal and decisive influence attributed to it by Marxists, has been an important agent of change, particularly
in modern times. The establishment of political democracy in Western Europe has been very largely the outcome of class struggles. Finally, we should consider the conflict between generations, which has received much less than its due attention from sociologists. Continuity in society, have noted, is maintained by imparting the social tradition to new generations by the process of socialization; but socialization is never complete in the sense that new generations exactly re-enact the social life of their predecessors. Always there is criticism, rejection of some aspects of tradition, and innovation. In modern times these features become more prominent because of the general changes which are taking place in the environment, and because of the diversity of norms and values, which allows the new generation to choose, in some degree, between different ways of life or to re-combine diverse elements in the culture in new patterns. It is a significant feature of the industrial societies that a distinctive youth culture and organized youth movements appear, which oppose in various ways the cultural values of the older generations; but the phenomena of inter-generational conflict are also apparent in societies such as India which are undergoing extremely rapid change from one type of society to another.

The early theories of social change tended to emphasize a single factor in the causation of change. For the most part, however, they were not monocausal theories, nor were they deterministic in any strict sense, as has been alleged by some recent critics. Comte and Spencer both conceived of some ultimate law of social evolution (the development of mind for Comte, and a cosmic process of differentiation for Spencer), but in examining actual social change they took into account many factors, not least the conscious and deliberate acts of individuals. Spencer, for example, did not confine his studies to differentiation within societies, but considered the effects of knowledge, warfare, and other factors in bringing about social change. Marx’s theory has often been condemned as mono-causal and deterministic, but his account of social causation is in fact extremely complex, involving several related but distinct phenomena the forces of production, relations of production, class relations and ideologies. Moreover, his doctrine of political action is the very opposite of a deterministic theory. In later theories, such as those of Hobhouse, Toynbee and Sorokin, the complexity of social causation is fully recognized; and Sorokin, in particular, examines very carefully the various factors involved in social change. Nevertheless, these theories raise a number of broad problems which need to be considered. The first is that concerning the part played respectively by individuals and by social forces in inducing change. It should be remarked that the term ‘social forces’ does not refer to any forces which are entirely distinct from the acts of individuals, but to values and tendencies which are resultants of the interaction of individuals yet which confront any single individual as something external to him and relatively impervious to his individual criticism or influence. Thus the voluntary acts of individuals enter as constituents into ‘social forces; in this sense any individual may contribute to social change, although the effects may only be perceptible when a number of individuals begin to act in a new way (for example, in limiting the size of their families). A different problem is that of the influence of outstanding individuals. At one extreme, it may be held that all important social and cultural changes are brought about by men of genius; at the other, that men of genius owe all their influence to the fact that they incarnate or represent the dominant social forces or tendencies of their time. Neither of these extreme views is acceptable. For one thing, the influence of outstanding individuals may be greater in some spheres of social life than others; for example, greater in the field of artistic creation than in that of technology. It would be arbitrary, however, to deny the personal influence of great men in the sphere of morals, religion, politics or economics. In the modern world, Lenin in Russia, and Mahatma Gandhi in India (as well as more recent political leaders such as Mao Tse-tung) have had a profound influence and it would be difficult to demonstrate that our world would have been the same had they not lived and acted as they did. Of course, they too were influenced by their environment, and their authority arose in part from their ability to formulate and
interpret the latent aspirations of large numbers of people; but they were also charismatic leaders in Max Weber’s sense, owing their positions of leadership to personal qualities, and imposing upon events the imprint of their own values.

A second major controversy has concerned the role of material factors and ideas in social change. Marxists, it is claimed, attribute a primary influence to material, economic factors, while others (e.g. Comte, Hobhouse) give pre-eminence to the development of thought. One of the principal disputes in sociology is that between Marx and Weber concerning the origins of modern capitalism, in which Weber argued, not that ideas rule the world, but that in some historical situations ideas or doctrines may independently affect the direction of social change. It would be a mistake in any case, to establish a simple opposition between material factors and ideas, for material factors as such do not enter into social behaviour. In Marx’s own theory of change the forces of production are a determining element, but they are no more than the applications of science and technology, and the development of the productive forces can only mean the growth of scientific and technical knowledge and ideas. The fundamental problem is to determine the ways in which the growth or arrest of knowledge and thought affect society, whether through the influence of science upon economic relationships and class structure, or through the emergence of new religious, moral or philosophical doctrines, and how these diverse strands are connected in particular sequences of change.

Recent sociological studies of social change have dealt with more limited problems and have not aimed to provide any general explanation of change. But they have perhaps gone too far in dispensing with any conceptual scheme which would make possible comparative studies and partial explanations.

SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The study of social change in the developing countries can be approached in various ways. Ideally, we should be able to apply to this particular case a general theory encompassing the processes of change in all societies; but as have indicated there is no such theory which is widely accepted, and the most common approach in recent work has been to treat the developing countries as a present day instance of a particular kind of change from traditional society to modern industrial society. However, even if we accept this framework for understanding the changes which are going on in these societies there are still many distinctions to be made and alternative interpretations to consider. The traditional structure and culture of a society will obviously influence the nature of the changes which take place, and here we can distinguish broadly between developing countries in four main regions: Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Again, the origins of the process of development whether it has begun from a social revolution or in a more gradual way will profoundly affect its course. So too will the nature of the relations economic, political and cultural between a developing country and one or more of the industrial countries. The recognition or neglect of these factors colours the diverse interpretations of development, and it is not too difficult to criticize some economic and sociological theories of the last decade which ignored the colonial past, the economic dominance and political influence of the advanced industrial countries at the present time, and the differences between revolutionary and non-revolutionary change, in their accounts of the development process. In addition to these factors of a traditional civilization, historical experiences affecting whole regions of the Third World, and present day international relations, it is essential finally to take account of particular elements in each individual country, so that any account framed in general sociological terms needs to be complemented by historical and anthropological studies and by detailed sociological surveys.
The case of India will illustrate some of these points. Two elements have played a decisive part in bringing about social change in India; first, Western science and technology, and secondly, social planning. The influence of technology has been apparent in diverse areas of social life. By the improvement of living conditions and medical care it has affected the mortality rate, and is thus largely responsible for the rapid growth of India's population. The introduction of capitalist industry brought about changes in the property system and in the division of labour, and gave rise to new social strata and classes which played an important part in the political development of India. Sociologists have traced some of the effects of industrialization upon the joint-family, property, law, and the caste system. But technology did not only bring about change indirectly through the gradual transformation of economic relationships; technology and the scientific thought which was its basis constituted a new view of the world which came into conflict with the traditional culture. Moreover, British rule introduced into India social as well as technological inventions (a new system of government and administration, judicial procedures, forms of education), and new cultural values such as rationalism, and later on, egalitarianism and socialism. The concept of cultural lag has great relevance to India. The development of a modern capitalist economy brought into existence some social movements which rejected traditional Indian culture and others which set out to reform and modernize it; but it is by no means the case that the social institutions and cultural values of present day India are adapted to the way of life of an industrial society, whether capitalist or socialist. The large joint-family is not a useful or necessary institution in a modern society where individual mobility is considerable and the provision of welfare services a public responsibility. A caste system is incompatible with the rationality, mobility, and egalitarianism of a democratic society; in India, the principle of caste is unmistakably in conflict with the assumptions of the political regime, with the educational system, and with the needs of industry. Yet caste, and the joint-family are fundamental elements in Hinduism, and thus in the traditional culture; as they become weaker so also do the cultural values of the past. Popular Hinduism itself is being directly influenced by the rationalization and secularization which accompany the growth of industrial society. The strains involved in this transition are, and have been for some time, apparent in the situation of Indian intellectuals who have to reconcile the divergent claims of two cultures, and in the conflict between generations. Many of the younger educated Indians dislike the caste restrictions upon marriage, are opposed to arranged marriages, and resent the patriarchal authority of family elders; yet they usually accept, in practice, the traditional forms of behaviour, moved by family loyalty and affection, and perhaps also by uncertainty as to the outcome if they choose a different path. There are other conflicts similar to those which occur in industrial societies, notably conflicts between social strata and classes. Caste, like every system of social stratification, involves economic differentiation and economic interest groups, although in the past these features have been partly obscured by the ritual significance of the institution. In conditions of economic change the privileged groups are led to resist innovations which would diminish their own prestige and economic advantage. These various conflicts are, in one sense, sources of change, but they may also retard change over a longer or shorter period, or even produce stagnation or regress. It is not a sociological law that every society can be successfully industrialized, although sociological research may well contribute to ensuring success, and to reducing its costs in tension, dis-orientation and suffering.

SOCIAL PLANNING, in India as elsewhere, overrides to some extent the conflicts have mentioned. It represents the factor in social change which has been described as the emergence of a common purpose. There is now, in almost all societies, central economic and social planning intended to promote social well-being. The extent and forms of planning vary widely from one society to another but the objectives and implications are similar. For the first time in human history, the mass of the people are drawn into a process of rational and deliberate transformation of their social life; social
change has been brought, to some extent, under human control. The Indian Constitution of 1950 defined the purposes of the new political system as being to establish social, economic and political justice, liberty of thought, expression, belief and worship, equality of status and opportunity, and fraternity. The Government Planning Commission, established in the same year, was conceived as a major agency for achieving these purposes, although its work has been somewhat narrowly restricted to economic problems. An excellent recent study by S. C. Dube surveys the changes brought about by one of the principal activities of the Planning Commission, the to change which these activities have revealed. In a detailed study of one Project in Uttar Pradesh, covering 153 villages, Dube shows that the more strictly technological innovations, such as improved seeds, fertilisers, improved breeds of animals, and so on, were accepted fairly readily, especially where the effects became apparent in a short time, as for example in higher cash prices for crops: but that the innovations which had, or were likely to have, repercussions on the social structure, or the cultural values, met with resistance. Thus, new agricultural techniques, co-operative methods of farming, measures to improve sanitation, and educational ventures, aroused much less interest and in some cases were opposed. In a general evaluation of the Project, Dube observes: Modest as they may appear, these projects have introduced certain ideas that will be long lasting. The people are slow and extremely cautious in accepting innovations, but on a limited scale they too make some experiments and watch their results carefully. Some of the project-sponsored innovations in the field of agriculture and rural health, though they appear to have been rejected or very reluctantly accepted today, may finally establish themselves in about a decade from now. Signs of a psychological change, too, are evident, although they cannot be attributed in every instance or even primarily to the project. There is an unmistakable change in the people’s level of expectation, and with the gradual removal of barriers between them and the government substantial progress can be expected. However, the Project studied here appears to have done little to further even the traditional modes of co-operation in these communities.

Dube establishes clearly the importance of communication between the government representatives who are seeking to induce change, and the villagers to whom the new ideas are addressed. The problems of communication involve several factors: the perceived character of those who originate the communications, the form and content of the communications themselves, and the response of the recipients. In the first of these problems the role of the Village Level Worker is crucial, and constitutes an important subject for sociological research. The form and content of communications pose a general problem of balance between continuity and change: communication is more effective where it can be related to existing aspirations (e.g. for economic betterment), or to traditional cultural norms (e.g. the improvement of breeds of cattle presented in terms of the traditional religious valuation of cattle). Finally, the response of the villagers is determined largely by the local elites and opinion leaders, and the successful induction of change depends very much upon identifying such leaders (formal and informal) and convincing them, in the first place, that the changes are desirable.

In recent years the assessments of the Indian way of development have become much more critical than they were during the 1950s in the heyday of Nehru’s leadership. Thus Barrington Moore, while he singles out India as the example of a fourth alternative route to the modern world contrasted with the bourgeois and Fascist revolutions of the past, and with the communist revolutions of recent times deals not only with the factors which made this kind of industrialization possible, but also with what he calls the price of peaceful change the very slow rate of economic development which makes the success of the venture doubtful. In similar fashion Gunnar Myrdal, in his massive study of South Asian countries, Asian Drama (New York, 1968), arrives at the conclusion that much of the momentum in Indian planning has been lost’, while fundamental problems of land reform,
modernizing village structure, raising levels of agricultural output, and controlling population growth remain unsolved.

On the other side, however, we should take account of some of the benefits of peaceful change. India, unlike many other developing countries, has not succumbed to authoritarian rule, whether it is that of a military elite or of a revolutionary party. In India the hundred flowers, which soon withered in China, can still bloom. It is not for a sociologist to pronounce a verdict upon these different courses of development. They are matters of political choice, and to some extent of necessity, if a situation occurs in which economic growth is halted and the aspirations of the mass of the people are frustrated by the incompetence and corruption of ruling groups. But the sociologist has still a responsibility to see the process of development as comprehensively as possible, recognizing the diversity and complexity of its goals, and not reducing them to a simple matter of technological and economic growth.

TYPES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

The construction of a typology of social change would have great value at the present time. In the first place, it would set in perspective the problems of development in the Third World and enable us to avoid at least one prevalent error, which consists in assuming that the industrial countries have attained a definitive form, while the developing countries are simply trying to catch up with them. It would be much more accurate to regard the late 20th century world as being involved in a general process of exceptionally rapid change, in which the transformations in one part of the globe influence profoundly the course of events elsewhere. This idea is indicated very clearly in Irving L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New York, 1966), where an attempt is made to see the connections between social changes in the first world of the capitalist democracies (especially the US), in the second world of the Soviet societies (especially the USSR), and in the third world of the non-industrial societies.

Secondly, however, the working out of a typology would lead us on to still more general questions concerning social changes in past as well as present societies; for example, the development of Western capitalism, the rise and decline of earlier civilizations and empires. This would provide a wider basis for comparison and generalization, and would restore to sociology the kind of historical awareness which has been so conspicuously lacking in the past few decades. And lastly, at a time when large numbers of people are becoming more aware of the potentialities for change in present day societies, and when young radicals of diverse persuasions urge the most sweeping transformations of culture and social structure, it would undoubtedly be useful to have even a very tentative scheme of classification which would reveal some of the causes, limits and consequences of social change. The formulation of such a scheme seems possible in terms of four major problems:

1. Where does social change originate? A distinction can first be made between endogenous and exogenous change, i.e. change originating within or outside a particular society. In practice, the origin of change cannot always be assigned wholly to one or the other category; but to take a modern example, it is evident that the changes now occurring in under-developed societies have originated very largely outside these societies, and are the product of Western technology which was introduced in most cases by conquest. The problem which has then to be posed is whether there are significant differences between processes of change which are either internally or externally induced. It seems probable that there are such differences, especially in the relationships which are established between the agents of change and the rest of the population. A second aspect of this question concerns the
problem of where the changes begin within a particular society (regardless of their more remote origin); i.e. which institutions first undergo change. Two other problems are involved here; that of the factors in social change, and that of the social groups which initiate change. Historical evidence may permit us to classify processes of change according to the spheres or groups in which they begin; economic, political, religious, etc., and to study more closely how change is diffused from one sphere to another. It is in this context, for example, that Marx’s theory of social change through class conflict needs to be reconsidered.

2. What are the initial conditions from which large-scale changes begin? The initial conditions may profoundly influence the course of social change; it cannot be assumed, for example, that the formation of ancient empires, of feudal states, or of modern capitalist societies, occurred in the same ways or can be accounted for in terms of a single generalization. In the contemporary world, industrialization is a very different process in tribal societies (as in Africa), and in societies of ancient civilization such as India or China. It is different again according to the size and complexity of the society. The sociological analysis of industrialization as a particular process of change would be greatly helped by a typology of underdeveloped societies themselves.

3. What is the rate of change? Social change may occur rapidly in some periods, or in some spheres, and more slowly, perhaps imperceptibly, in others. The rate of change may also be accelerating or decelerating. Ogburn and Gilfillan, whose work was referred to earlier, have shown that in industrial societies the rate of technological change, as measured, for example, by the numbers of patents issued, has been increasing. An important distinction is that between processes of gradual change and processes of revolutionary change (as a particular form of rapid change). In the economic and technological spheres it is not too difficult to identify revolutionary changes, and to trace their causes and effects. Gordon Childe has admirably described what he terms the neolithic revolution, the introduction of a food producing economy, and economic and social historians have documented and analysed the phases of the modern industrial revolution. Political and social revolutions, however, have been considered for the most part in historical, descriptive terms, while comparative and analytical studies have been lacking. There is, of course, a Marxist theory of social revolution but it has not been very effective in stimulating sociological research. The twentieth century social and national revolutions have been closely linked with war, although the connections have not been systematically explored. At the same time, they have revealed the important role of intellectuals, as well as social classes, in revolutionary movements.

4. To what extent is social change fortuitous, causally determined, or purposive? The principal distinction here is one which have already discussed in considering social planning. In one sense, of course, almost all social changes are purposive, since they result from the purposive acts of individual men. But such acts may have un intended consequences, because the individual actions are not coordinated and may actually impede or distort each other as, for example, in situations of conflict. In such conditions, which have been those of most societies until recent times, change may be causally determined, or there may also be quite fortuitous elements in it, but it is not purposive in the sense that it achieves the purposes of all, or most, of the individuals who are involved. Change may more properly be termed purposive in the case of modern societies where, as Ginsberg suggests, a common purpose emerges and may be realized by degrees through a process of planned social change. Even here, of course, fortuitous events may have an influence, an there may be (since planners, like other men, lack omniscience) many unintended consequences. It is plain, however, that human beings now have a greater control than in the past over the natural and the social conditions of their life; the social
sciences are themselves a product of the aspirations for control over the direction of social change and have contributed greatly to its establishment.

THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Sociologists, historians and social anthropologists have proposed a number of general theories of social change. These theories may conveniently be grouped into four main categories: evolutionary, cyclical, conflict theories and functional theories. The following explanation provides a glimpse of these theories:

1. EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES

Evolutionary theories are based on the assumption that societies gradually change from simple beginnings into even more complex forms. Early sociologists, beginning with Auguste Comte believed that human societies evolve in a unilinear way - that is, in one line of development. According to them, social change meant progress toward something better. They saw change as positive and beneficial. To them, the evolutionary process implied that societies would necessarily reach new and higher levels of civilization.

During the 19th Century due to colonial expansion soldiers, missionaries, merchants and adventurers came in touch with distant lands whose peoples had been almost unknown in Europe. Most of these peoples happened to be 'primitives. Early anthropologists made some attempts to study such primitives and their societies. Based on their limited observations, inaccurate and unconfirmed information and unqualified imagination they argued that there was a universal evolutionary process. They claimed that all societies passed through a number of stages beginning in primitive origins and culminating in civilisation of the Western type. L.H. Morgan, for example, believed that there were three basic stages in the process: savagery, barbarism and civilisation. Even Auguste Comte's ideas relating to the three stages in the development of human thought and also of society namely - the theological, the metaphysical and the positive - in a way, represent the three basic stages of social change.

This evolutionary view of social change was highly influenced by Charles Darwin's theory of Organic Evolution. Those who were fascinated by this theory applied it to the human society and argued that societies must have evolved from the too simple and primitive to that of too complex and advanced such as the western society. Herbert Spencer, a British sociologist, carried this analogy its extremity. He argued that society itself is an organism. He even applied Darwin's principle the survival of the fittest to human societies. He said that society has been gradually progressing towards a better state. He argued that it has evolved from military society to the industrial society claimed that Western races, classes or societies had survived and evolved because they were adapted to face the conditions of life. This view, known as Social Darwinism, got widespread popularity in the late 19th Century. It survived even during the first phase of the 20th Century.

Emile Durkheim identified the cause of societal evolution as a society’s increasing “moral density”

Durkheim viewed societies as changing in the direction of greater differentiation, interdependence and formal control under the pressure of increasing moral density. He advocated societies have evolved from a relatively undifferentiated social structure with minimum of division of labour and With a kind of solidarity called mechanical solidarity’ to a more differentiated social structure with maximum division of labour giving rise to a kind of solidarity called Organic Solidarity’.
Evaluation of Evolutionary Theories

The early evolutionary doctrines were readily accepted because they served the colonial interests of Europeans. This theory provided a convenient justification for colonial rule over primitive peoples. The enforced spread of western culture was conveniently thought of as the white man’s burden - the thankless but noble task of bringing higher forms of civilisation to “inferior peoples”. Those who supported this theory had no concept of cultural relativity and hence judged other cultures purely in terms of their own culture’s standards.

The unilinear evolutionary theories described but did not explain social change. They have not given any convincing explanation of how or why societies should evolve toward the western pattern. The theories were based on the faulty interpretations of the data. “Different theorists grouped vastly different cultures into misleading categories so that they would fit into the various ‘stages’ of evolution.

The theorists in an ethnocentric way treated the trends in western civilisation as “progress. They largely stressed the importance of economic and technological changes in development and neglected other aspects. Thus, the non-westerners may regard western cultures as technologically more advanced, yet morally backward.

Further, the recent ethnographic data from primitive societies have proved that the societies need not follow the same step by step evolutionary sequence. In fact, societies have developed in different ways, often by borrowing ideas and innovations from other societies. Ex: The Bushmen of the Kalahari and the aborigines of Australia are being introduced directly to industrial society. Hence they are skipping the stage’ which the theorists have spoken of.

The modem anthropologists have tended to support the theory of multilinear evolution rather than the unilinear one. Modem anthropologists like Steward agree that this evolutionary process is multilinear. It can take place in many different ways and change need not necessarily follow the same pattern everywhere. They do not press the analogy between societies and living organisms. They do not equate change with progress. They do not assume that greater social complexity produces greater human happiness. This theory is becoming relatively more popular in social anthropological circles today.

2. CYCLICAL THEORIES

Cyclical theories of social change focus on the rise and fall of civilisations attempting to discover and account for these patterns of growth and decay - {Ian Robertson). Spengler, Toynbee and Sorokin can be regarded as the Champions of this theory. Their ideas may be briefed here.

(a) Spengler: The Destiny of Civilisations’
Oswald Spengler, a German school teacher, in his book The Decline of the West -1918, pointed out that the fate of civilisations was a matter of destiny. Each civilisation is like a biological organism and has a similar life-cycle; birth, maturity, old age and death. After making a study of eight major civilisations, including the West, he said that the modem Western Society is in the last stage, i.e. old age. He concluded that the Western Societies were entering a period of decay - as evidenced by wars, conflicts, and social breakdown that heralded their doom. This theory is almost out of fashion today. His idea of ‘destiny’ is hardly an adequate explanation of social change. His biological analogy is also too unrealistic and his work is too mystical and speculative.
(b) Toynbee: ‘Challenge and Response’
Arnold Toynbee, a British historian with enough sociological insight has offered a somewhat more promising theory of social change. His famous book A Study of History” -1946, a multivolume work, draws on materials from 24 civilisations. The key-concepts in Toynbee’s theory are those of challenge and response”. Every society faces challenges -at first, challenges posed by the environment; later challenges from internal and external enemies. The nature of the responses determines the society’s fate. The achievements of a civilisation consist of its successful responses to challenges; if it cannot mount an effective response, it dies. (Ian Robertson).

Toynbee’s views are more optimistic than those of Spengler s, for he does not believe that all civilisations will inevitably decay. He has pointed out that history is a series of cycles of decay and growth. But each new civilisation is able to learn from the mistakes and to borrow from cultures of others. It is, therefore, possible for each new cycle to offer higher levels of achievement. Still he has not explained why some societies are able to offer effective responses to their challenges while others do not, or why a society should overcome one challenge but become a victim of another.

(c) Sorokin: ‘Sensate’ and ‘Ideational’ Culture
The Russian-American sociologist, Pitirim A Sorokin, in his book Social and Culture Dynamics” -1938, has offered another explanation of social change. His work has had a more lasting impact on sociological thinking. Instead of viewing civilisations into terms of development and decline he proposed that they alternate or fluctuate between two cultural extremes: The sensate and the ideational. The sensate culture stresses those things which can be perceived directly by the senses. It is practical, hedonistic, sensual, and materialistic. Ideational Culture emphasises those things which can be perceived only by the mind. It is abstract, religious, concerned with faith and ultimate truth. It is the opposite of the sensate culture. Both represent pure types of culture. Hence no society ever fully conforms to either type. Without mentioning the causes, he said that as the culture of a society develops towards one pure type, it is countered by the opposing cultural force. Cultural development is then reversed moving towards the opposite type of culture. In brief, too much emphasis on one type of culture leads to a reaction towards the other. Societies contain both these impulses in varying degrees and the tension between them creates long-term instability. Between these types, of course, there lies a third type ‘ideastic’ culture. This is a happy and a desirable blend of the other two, but no society ever seeps to have achieved it as a stable condition.

Sorokin’s theory has not been accepted by the sociologists for it portrays his prejudices and probably his disgust with the modern society. His concepts of sensate’ and ‘ideational’ are purely subjective. His theory is in a way speculative and descriptive. It does not provide an explanation as to why social change should take this form. Thus, the cyclical theories, in general are not satisfactory.

3. FUNCTIONALISTS OR DYNAMIC THEORIES OR EQUILIBRIUM THEORIES
In the middle decades of the 20th century a number of American sociologists shifted their attention from social dynamics to social statics or from social change to social stability. Talcott Parsons and his followers have been the main advocates of this theory. Parsons stressed the importance of cultural patterns in controlling the stability of a society. According to him, society has the ability to absorb disruptive forces while maintaining overall stability. Because it is constantly straining for equilibrium or balance. The conservative forces of society such as shared norms and resist radical changes and serve to hold the society together.

Between 1940-50s Parsons Theory of social order or stability, gained wide acceptance especially in America. But critics began to doubt Parsons’ assumptions during 1960s. Critics like C. Wright Mills
Parsons’ Theory of Social Change

Parsons considers change not as something that disturbs the social equilibrium, but as something that alters the state of the equilibrium so that a qualitatively new equilibrium results. He has stated that changes may arise from two sources. They may come from outside the society, through contact with other societies. They may also come from inside the society, through adjustments that must be made to resolve strains within the system.

Persons speaks of two processes that are at work in social change. In simple societies, insulations are undifferentiated, that is, a single institution serves many functions. The family for example, performs reproductive, educational, socialising, economic, recreational and other functions. A process of differentiation takes place when the society becomes more and more complex. Differed institutions such as school, factory, etc., may take over some of the functions of the family. The new institutions must be linked together in a proper way by the process of integration. New norms, for example, must be established in order to govern the relationship between the school and the home. Further, bridging institutions”, such as law courts must resolve conflicts between other components in the system.

Evaluation: The equilibrium theory is an ambitious attempt to explain both social statics and social dynamics. Still, greater stress is laid on the former. Parsons, as an advocate of this theory, concentrated more on institutional changes. Other functionalists such as R.K. Merton and others tried to overcome this limitation. Merton writes, The strain, tension, contradiction and discrepancy between the component parts of social structure may lead to changes. Thus, in order to accommodate the concept of change within the functional model, he has borrowed concepts from conflict theories of change.

4. CONFLICT THEORIES

Whereas the equilibrium theories emphasise the stabilising processes at work in social systems, the so-called conflict theories highlight the forces producing instability, struggle, and social disorganisation. Ralf Dahrendorf, a German sociologist, says that the conflict theories assume that (1) every society is subjected at every moment to change, hence social change is ubiquitous. (2) Every society experiences at every moment social conflict, hence social conflict is ubiquitous; (3) Every element in society contributes to change; (4) Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others.

Karl Marx: Change Through Class Conflict

The most famous and influential of the conflict theories, is the one put forward by Karl Marx, a famous German social thinker and philosopher. All history is the history of class conflict”- wrote Marx and Engels in the 'Communist Manifesto' (1848). “Violence is the midwife of history”- Marx declared. Individuals and groups with opposing interests are bound to be at conflict- Marx asserted.

Since the two major social classes, that is, the rich and poor, or capitalists and labourers have mutually hostile interests they are at conflict. History is actually the story of conflict between the exploiting (the rich) and the exploited (the poor) classes. This conflict repeats itself off and on until capital is overthrown by the workers and a socialist state is created. What is to be stressed here is that Marx and other conflict theorists deem society as basically dynamic and not static. They consider...
conflict as a normal, not an abnormal process. They also believe that the existing conditions in any society contain the seeds of future social changes.

Like Karl Marx, another German Sociologist, George Simmel too stressed the importance of conflict in social change. According to him, conflict is a permanent feature of society and not just a temporary event. It is a process that binds people together in interaction. Further, conflict encourages people of similar interests to unite together to achieve their objectives. Continuous conflict in a way keeps society dynamic and ever changing, Simmel maintained.

Conflict theory is quite impressive and influential, no doubt. But it does not account for all forms of social change. It only gives us a means of analysing some of the most significant changes in to story and present-day society. Still it is not a comprehensive theory of social change. It cannot tell us much about the direction of social change. Even the predictions of Marx have gone wrong.

5. MODERNIZATION THEORY

Modernization theory is used to explain the process of modernization within societies. Modernization refers to a model of a progressive transition from a ‘pre-modern’ or ‘traditional’ to a ‘modern’ society. Modernization theory originated from the ideas of Max Weber, which provided the basis for the modernization paradigm developed by Talcott Parsons. The theory looks at the internal factors of a country while assuming that with assistance, “traditional” countries can be brought to development in the same manner more developed countries have been. Modernization theor was a dominant paradigm in the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s, then went into a deep eclipse. It made a comeback after 1991 but remains a controversial model.

Modernization theory both attempts to identify the social variables that contribute to social progress and development of societies and seeks to explain the process of social evolution. Modernization theory is subject to criticism originating among socialist and free- market ideologies, world-systems theorists, globalization theorists and dependency theorists among others. Modernization theory stresses not only the process of change but also the responses to that change. It also looks at internal dynamics while referring to social and cultural structures and the adaptation of new technologies. Modernization theory maintains that traditional societies will develop as they adopt more modern practices. Proponents of modernization theory claim that modern states are wealthier and more powerful and that their citizens are freer to enjoy a higher standard of living. Developments such as new data technology and the need to update traditional methods in transport, communication and production, it is gaur ed, make modernization necessary or at least preferable to the status quo. That view makes critique of modern difficult since it implies that such developments control the limits of human interaction, not vice versa. It also implies that human agency controls the speed and severity of modernization. Supposedly, instead of being dominated by tradition, societies undergoing the process of modernization typically arrive at forms of governance dictated by abstract principles. Traditional religious beliefs and cultural traits, according to the theory, usually become less important as modernization takes hold.

Historians link modernization to the processes of urbanization and industrialization and the spread of education. As Kendall (2007) notes, “Urbanization accompanied modernization and the rapid process of industrialization.” In sociological critical theory, modernization is linked to an overarching process of rationalisation. When modernization increases within a society, the individual becomes
increasingly important, eventually replacing the family or community as the fundamental unit of society.

Sociological theories of the late 19th century such as Social Darwinism provided a basis for asking what were the laws of evolution of human society. The current modernization theory originated with the ideas of German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) regarding the role of rationality and irrationality in the transition from traditional to modern society. Weber's approach provided the basis for the modernization paradigm as popularized by Talcott Parsons, who translated Weber's works into English in the 1930s and provided his own interpretation.

Globalization and modernization

Globalization can be defined as the integration of economic, political and social cultures. It is argued that globalization is related to the spreading of modernization across borders.

Global trade has grown continuously since the European discovery of new continents in the Early modern period; it increased particularly as a result of the Industrial Revolution and the mid-20th century adoption of the shipping container.

Annual trans-border tourist arrivals rose to 456 million by 1990 and almost tripled since, reaching a total of over 1.2 billion in 2016. Communication is another major area that has grown due to modernization. Communication industries have enabled capitalism to spread throughout the world. Telephony, television broadcasts, news services and online service providers have played a crucial part in globalization. Former U.S president Lyndon B. Johnson was a supporter of the modernization theory and believed that television had potential to provide educational tools in development.

With the many apparent positive attributes to globalization there are also negative consequences. The dominant, neoliberal model of globalization often increases disparities between a society's rich and its poor. In major cities of developing countries there exist pockets where technologies of the modernized world, computers, cell phones and satellite television, exist alongside stark poverty. Globalists are globalization modernization theorists and argue that globalization is positive for everyone, as its benefits must eventually extend to all members of society, including vulnerable groups such as women and children.

Democratization and modernization

The relationship between modernization and democracy is one of the most researched studies in comparative politics. There is academic debate over the drivers of democracy because there are theories that support economic growth as both a cause and effect of the institution of democracy. “Lipset’s observation that democracy is related to economic development, first advanced in 1959, has generated the largest body of research on any topic in comparative politics,” (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997).

Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, who worked with Lipset in the book, Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, argue that economic performance affects the development of democracy in at least three ways. First, they argue that economic growth is more important for democracy than given levels of socioeconomic development. Second, socioeconomic development generates social
changes that can potentially facilitate democratization. Third, socioeconomic development promotes other changes, like organization of the middle class, which is conducive to democracy.

As Seymour Martin Lipset put it, "All the various aspects of economic development — industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education — are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy". The argument also appears in Walt W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth (1971); A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (1965); and David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (1965). In the 1960s, some critics argued that the link between modernization and democracy was based too much on the example of European history and neglected the Third World. Recent demonstrations of the emergence of democracy in South Korea, Taiwan and South Africa have been cited as support for Lipset's thesis.

One historical problem with that argument has always been Germany whose economic modernization in the 19th century came long before the democratization after 1918. Berman, however, concludes that a process of democratization was underway in Imperial Germany, for "during these years Germans developed many of the habits and mores that are now thought by political scientists to augur healthy political development".

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2009) contend that the realization of democracy is not based solely on an expressed desire for that form of government, but democracies are born as a result of the admixture of certain social and cultural factors. They argue the ideal social and cultural conditions for the foundation of a democracy are born of significant modernization and economic development that result in mass political participation.

Peerenboom (2008) explores the relationships among democracy, the rule of law and their relationship to wealth by pointing to examples of Asian countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea, which have successfully democratized only after economic growth reached relatively high levels and to examples of countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and India, which sought to democratize at lower levels of wealth but have not done as well.

Adam Przeworski and others have challenged Lipset's argument. They say political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes rise. Rather, democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of gross domestic product per capita remain democratic. Epstein et al. (2006) retest the modernization hypothesis using new data, new techniques, and three-way, rather than dichotomous, classification of regimes. Contrary to Przeworski, this study finds that the modernization hypothesis stands up well. Partial democracies emerge as among the most important and least understood regime type. Highly contentious is the idea that modernization implies more human rights, with China in the 21st century being a major test case.

**Technology and modernization**

New technology is a major source of social change. Since modernization entails the social transformation from agrarian societies to industrial ones, it is important to look at the technological viewpoint; however, new technologies do not change societies by itself. Rather, it is the response to technology that causes change.
Frequently, technology is recognized but not put to use for a very long time such as the ability to extract metal from rock. Although that initially went unused, it later had profound implications for the developmental course of societies. Technology makes it possible for a more innovated society and broad social change. That dramatic change throughout the centuries that has evolved socially, industrially, and economically, can be summed up by the term modernization. Cell phones, for example, have changed the lives of millions throughout the world. That is especially true in Africa and other parts of the Middle East, where there is a low cost communication infrastructure. With cell phone technology, widely dispersed populations are connected, which facilitates business-to-business communication and provides internet access to remoter areas, with a consequential rise in literacy.

**Development and Modernization**

Development, like modernization, has become the orienting principle of modern times. Countries that are seen as modern are also seen as developed, which means that they are generally more respected by institutions such as the United Nations and even as possible trade partners for other countries. The extent to which a country has modernized or developed dictates its power and importance on the international level.

Modernization of the health sector of developing nations recognizes that transitioning from 'traditional' to 'modern' is not merely the advancement in technology and the introduction of Western practices; implementing modern healthcare requires the reorganization of political agenda and, in turn, an increase in funding by feeders and resources towards public health. However, rather than replicating the stages of developed nations, whose roots of modernization are found...
with the context of industrialization or colonialism, underdeveloped nations should apply proximal interventions to target rural communities and focus on prevention strategies rather than curative solutions. That has been successfully exhibited by the Christian Medical Commission and in China through 'barefoot doctors'. Additionally, a strong advocate of the DE-emphasis of medical institutions was Halfdan T. Mahler, the WHO General Director from 1973 to 1988. Related ideas have been proposed at international conferences such as Alma-Ata and the "Health and Population in Development" conference, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation in Italy in 1979, and selective primary healthcare and GOBI were discussed (although they have both been strongly criticized by supporters of comprehensive healthcare). Overall, however, this is not to say that the nations of the Global South can function independently from Western states; significant funding is received from well-intention programs, foundations, and charities that target epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis that have substantially improved the lives of millions of people and impeded future development.

Modernization theorists often saw traditions as obstacles to economic growth. According to Seymour Martin Lipset, economic conditions are heavily determined by the cultural, social values present in that given society. Furthermore, while modernization might deliver violent, radical change for traditional societies, it was thought worth the price. Critics insist that traditional societies were often destroyed without ever gaining the promised advantages if, among other things, the economic gap between advanced societies and such societies actually increased. The net effect of modernization for some societies was therefore the replacement of traditional poverty by a more modern form of misery, according to these critics. Others point to improvements in living standards, physical infrastructure, education and economic opportunity to refute such criticisms.

**Criticism of modernization theory**

From the 1960s, modernization theory has been criticized by numerous scholars, including Andre Gunder Frank (1929 – 2005) and Immanuel Wallerstein (born 1930). In this model, the modernization of a society required the destruction of the indigenous culture and its replacement by a more Westernized one. By one definition, modern simply refers to the present, and any society still in existence is therefore modern. Proponents of modernization typically view only Western society as being truly modern and argue that others are primitive or unevolved by comparison. That view sees unmodernized societies as inferior even if they have the same standard of living as Western societies. Opponents argue that modernity is independent of culture and can be adapted to any society. Japan is cited as an example by both sides. Some see it as proof that a thoroughly modern way of life can exist in a non-Western society. Others argue that Japan has become distinctly more Western as a result of its modernization.

As Tipps has argued, by conflating modernization with other processes, with which theorists use interchangeably (democratization, liberalization, development), the term becomes imprecise and therefore difficult to disprove.

The theory has also been criticized empirically, as modernization theorists ignore external sources of change in societies. The binary between traditional and modern is unhelpful, as the two are linked and often interdependent, and 'modernization' does not come as a whole.
Modernization theory has also been accused of being Eurocentric, as modernization began in Europe, with the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution and the Revolutions of 1848 and has long been regarded as reaching its most advanced stage in Europe. Anthropologists typically make their criticism one step further and say that the view is ethnocentric and is specific to Western culture.

6. DEPENDENCY THEORY

Dependency theorists consider that the Brettonwoods institutions (above) promote the economic interests of the developed countries

Dependency theory is the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the “world system”.

The theory arose as a reaction to modernization theory, an earlier theory of development which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development, that today's underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's developed areas at some time in the past, and that, therefore, the task of helping the underdeveloped areas out of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development, by various means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into the world market. Dependency theory rejected this view, arguing that underdeveloped countries are not merely primitive versions of developed countries, but have unique features and structures of their own; and, importantly, are in the situation of being the weaker members in a world market economy.

Dependency theory no longer has many proponents as an overall theory, but some writers have argued for its continuing relevance as a conceptual orientation to the global division of wealth.

Dependency theory originates with two papers published in 1949 – one by Hans Singer, one by Raúl Prebisch – in which the authors observe that the terms of trade for underdeveloped countries relative to the developed countries had deteriorated over time: the underdeveloped countries were able to purchase fewer and fewemr manufactured goods from the developed countries in exchange for a given quantity of their raw materials exports. This idea is known as the Prebisch–Singer thesis. Prebisch, an
Argentine economist at the United Nations Commission for Latin America (UNCLA), went on to conclude that the underdeveloped nations must employ some degree of protectionism in trade if they were to enter a self-sustaining development path. He argued that import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), not a trade-and-export orientation, was the best strategy for underdeveloped countries. The theory was developed from a Marxian perspective by Paul A. Baran in 1957 with the publication of his The Political Economy of Growth. Dependency theory shares many points with earlier, Marxist, theories of imperialism by Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Lenin, and has attracted continued interest from Marxists. Some authors identify two main streams in dependency theory: the Latin American Structuralist, typified by the work of Prebisch, Celso Furtado, and Aníbal Pinto at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC, or, in Spanish, CEPAL); and the American Marxist, developed by Paul A. Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Andre Gunder Frank.

Using the Latin American dependency model, the Guyanese Marxist historian Walter Rodney, in his book How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, described in 1972 an Africa that had been consciously exploited by European imperialists, leading directly to the modern underdevelopment of most of the continent.

The theory was popular in the 1960s and 1970s as a criticism of modernization theory, which was falling increasingly out of favor because of continued widespread poverty in much of the world. It was used to explain the causes of overurbanization, a theory that urbanization rates outpaced industrial growth in several developing countries.

Baran placed surplus extraction and capital accumulation at the center of his analysis. Development depends on a population's producing more than it needs for bare subsistence (a surplus). Further, some of that surplus must be used for capital accumulation – the purchase of new means of production – if development is to occur; spending the surplus on things like luxury consumption does not produce development. Baran noted two predominant kinds of economic activity in poor countries. In the older of the two, plantation agriculture, which originated in colonial times, most of the surplus goes to the landowners, who use it to emulate the consumption patterns of wealthy people in the developed world; much of it thus goes to purchase foreign-produced luxury items – automobiles, clothes, etc. – and little is accumulated for investing in development. The more recent kind of economic activity in the periphery is industry—but of a particular kind. It is usually carried out by foreigners, although often in conjunction with local interests. It is often under special tariff protection or other government concessions. The surplus from this production mostly goes to two places: part of it is sent back to the foreign shareholders as profit; the other part is spent on conspicuous consumption in a similar fashion to that of the plantation aristocracy. Again, little is used for development. Baran thought that political revolution was necessary to break this pattern.

In the 1960s, members of the Latin American Structuralist school argued that there is more latitude in the system than the Marxists believed. They argued that it allows for partial development or "dependent development"—development, but still under the control of outside decision makers. They cited the partly successful attempts at industrialisation in Latin America around that time (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) as evidence for this hypothesis. They were led to the position that dependency is not a relation between commodity exporters and industrialised countries, but between countries with different degrees of industrialisation. In their approach, there is a distinction made between the economic and political spheres: economically, one may be developed or underdeveloped; but even if (somewhat) economically developed, one may be politically autonomous or dependent. More
recently, Guillermo O'Donnell has argued that constraints placed on development by neoliberalism were lifted by the military coups in Latin America that came to promote development in authoritarian guise.

The importance of multinational corporations and state promotion of technology were emphasised by the Latin American Structuralists. Fajnyzbler has made a distinction between systemic or authentic competitiveness, which is the ability to compete based on higher productivity, and spurious competitiveness, which is based on low wages. The third-world debt crisis of the 1980s and continued stagnation in Africa and Latin America in the 1990s caused some doubt as to the feasibility or desirability of "dependent development".

The sine qua non of the dependency relationship is not the difference in technological sophistication, as traditional dependency theorists believe, but rather the difference in financial strength between core and peripheral countries—particularly the inability of peripheral countries to borrow in their own currency. He believes that the hegemonic position of the United States is very strong because of the importance of its financial markets and because it controls the international reserve currency – the US dollar. He believes that the end of the Bretton Woods international financial agreements in the early 1970s considerably strengthened the United States' position because it removed some constraints on their financial actions.

"Standard" dependency theory differs from Marxism, in arguing against internationalism and any hope of progress in less developed nations towards industrialization and a liberating revolution. Theotonio dos Santos described a "new dependency", which focused on both the internal and external relations of less-developed countries of the periphery, derived from a Marxian analysis. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso wrote extensively on dependency theory while in political exile during the 1960s, arguing that it was an approach to studying the economic disparities between the centre and periphery. Cardoso summarized his version of dependency theory as follows:

- there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery;
- this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers;
- this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery;
- this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations;
- these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance.

The analysis of development patterns in the 1990s and beyond is complicated by the fact that capitalism develops not smoothly, but with very strong and self-repeating ups and downs, called cycles. Relevant results are given in studies by Joshua Goldstein, Volker Bornschier, and Luigi Scandella.

With the economic growth of India and some East Asian economies, dependency theory has lost some of its former influence. It still influences some NGO campaigns, such as Make Poverty History and the fair trade movement.
Other dependency theorists

Two other early writers relevant to dependency theory were François Perroux and Kurt Rothschild. Other leading dependency theorists include Herb Addo, Walden Bello, Ruy Mauro Marini, Enzo Faletto, Armando Cordova, Ernest Feder, Pablo González Casanova, Keith Griffin, Kunibert Raffer, Paul Israel Singer, and Osvaldo Sunkel. Many of these authors focused their attention on Latin America; the leading dependency theorist in the Islamic world is the Egyptian economist Samir Amin. Tausch, based on works of Amin, lists the following main characteristics of periphery capitalism:

1. Regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism.
2. Unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in export-oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade <1.0).
3. These structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system.
4. Chronic current account balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, and deficient business cycles at the periphery that provide important markets for the centers during world economic upswings
5. Structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong 'compradore' element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class.

Dependency theorists hold that short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth in the periphery will be imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account balances. Cyclical fluctuations also have a profound effect on cross-national comparisons of economic growth and societal development in the medium and long run. What seemed like spectacular long-run growth may in the end turn out to be just a short run cyclical spurt after a long recession. Cycle time plays an important role. Giovanni Arrighi believed that the logic of accumulation on a world scale shifts over time, and that the 1980s and beyond once more showed a deregulated phase of world capitalism with a logic, characterized - in contrast to earlier regulatory cycles - by the dominance of financial capital.

It is argued that, at this stage, the role of unequal exchange in the entire relationship of dependency cannot be underestimated. Unequal exchange is given if double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are <1.0.

The former ideological head of the Blekingegade Gang and political activist Torkil Lauesen argues in his book The Global Perspective that political theory and practice stemming from dependency theory are more relevant than ever. He postulates that the conflict between countries in the core and countries in the periphery has been ever-intensifying and that the world is at the onset of a resolution of the core-periphery contradiction – that humanity is "in for an economic and political rollercoaster ride."
Criticism of dependency theory

Economic policies based on dependency theory have been criticized by free-market economists such as Peter Bauer and Martin Wolf and others:

- Lack of competition: by subsidizing in-country industries and preventing outside imports, these companies may have less incentive to improve their products, to try to become more efficient in their processes, to please customers, or to research new innovations.

- Sustainability: industries reliant on government support may not be sustainable for very long, particularly in poorer countries and countries which largely depend on foreign aid from more developed countries.

- Domestic opportunity costs: subsidies on domestic industries come out of state coffers and therefore represent money not spent in other ways, like development of domestic infrastructure, seed capital or need-based social welfare programs. At the same time, the higher prices caused by tariffs and restrictions on imports require the people either to forgo these goods altogether or buy them at higher prices, forgoing other goods.

Market economists cite a number of examples in their arguments against dependency theory. The improvement of India's economy after it moved from state-controlled business to open trade is one of the most often cited (see also economy of India, The Commanding Heights). India's example seems to contradict dependency theorists' claims concerning comparative advantage and mobility, as much as its economic growth originated from movements such as outsourcing – one of the most mobile forms of capital transfer. South Korea and North Korea provide another example of trade-based development vs. autocratic self-sufficiency. Following the Korean War, North Korea pursued a policy of import substitution industrialization as suggested by dependency theory, while South Korea pursued a policy of export-oriented industrialization as suggested by comparative advantage theory. In 2013, South Korea's per capita GDP was 18 times that of North Korea. In Africa, states which have emphasized import-substitution development, such as Zimbabwe, have typically been among the worst performers, while the continent's most successful non-oil based economies, such as Egypt, South Africa, and Tunisia, have pursued trade-based development.

According to economic historian Robert C. Allen, dependency theory's claims are "debatable", and that the protectionism that was implemented in Latin America as a solution ended up failing. The countries incurred too much debt and Latin America went into a recession. One of the problems was that the Latin American countries simply had too small national markets to be able to efficiently produce complex industrialized goods, such as automobiles.

7. WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY

World-systems theory stresses that the world-system (and not individual/collective nation states or the distinct First World, Second and Third World countries, etc.) should be the basic unit of social analysis. This theory is an extension of Marxian concepts of Dialectical Materialism and Class Struggle on a global scale. The most well-known version of the world-system approach has been developed by Immanuel Wallerstein in 1970s in his book The Modern World System, 1974. The modern world system, essentially capitalist in nature, followed the crisis of the feudal system. Wallerstein locates the origin of the modern world-system in the 16th Century Western Europe and the Americas when Feudalism was replaced by Capitalism. According to him, process of exploitation
during colonial period produced a world system made up of core, semi-periphery and periphery. World System refers to the international division of labour in unequal terms. He develops the concepts of core and periphery from the wider Dependency Theory. Core forms the exploitative capitalist class on a global level. While countries may transit from core to semi-periphery and vice versa, structure of world system remains the same. Core countries focus on higher skill, capital-intensive production, and the rest of the world focuses on low-skill, labour-intensive production and extraction of raw materials. This constantly reinforces the dominance of the core countries. Economic exchange between core and periphery takes place on unequal terms—the periphery is forced to sell its products at low prices but has to buy the core's products at comparatively high prices. However, Wallerstein didn't foresee a radical change in the world system, as Marx visualised in the form of communism as inequalities are likely to be there and some countries will be replaced by others.

Dependency theory is criticised by liberals who term this theory as simplistic and suffering from ideological biases. Gunnar Myrdal contends that developmental deficit cannot be completely attributed to dependency, but its major causes are value deficit and institutional inadequacies in the third world countries. Another principal criticism of dependency theories has been that the school does not provide any substantive empirical evidences to support its arguments. Dependency theorists also fail to account for the rapid economic development of many East Asian economies and even Latin American countries like Brazil and Mexico. Amartya Sen also rejects dependency theory and argues that the third world countries have benefited from technology transfers and revolutionary changes in the social sectors like health, education, and communication. They have achieved results in a matter of a decade, what developed countries achieved in centuries. Liberal economists also cite a host of examples in support of their arguments against dependency theory. For example, North Korea started as a close economy, while South Korea adopted a liberal economic pattern. In 2013, as per a McKinsey report, average income of a South Korean was 18 times of the income of a North Korean. Closer at home also, critics cite an example of the growth that India witnessed after it embraced a capitalist pattern in 1991.

AGENTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Agents of social change can be various. They can be from within the society, i.e., endogenous/orthogenetic or can be from external sources, i.e., exogenous/heterogenetic. Internal causes include factors like stress and conflict in society, conflicts between ideals of society and actual reality, charismatic leadership, as in case of Gandhi, Lenin, Mandela, etc., planning, political rule, and inventions and so on. Russian Revolution is an example of social change driven by internal causes. External causes may include cultural causes, environmental causes, etc. External aggression, war, urbanisation, industrialisation, trade, migration, westernisation, etc. are some of the social causes and earthquakes, pollution, deforestation and ecological changes are some of exogenous physical factors. Global warming has emerged as a big challenge which poses imminent threat of adverse social changes for low lying countries. Christianity and Islam also brought considerable cultural changes in India when they arrived in India. Sorokin proposed a theory of inner causes which said that inner linkages and conflicts cause change in a particular society. The list can go on and on, but broadly various factors of social change can be classified as:

I. Cultural factors: A large part of change in society is caused by change in culture. Culture is a system that constantly loses and gains components. Invention, discovery and diffusion are considered to be the main sources of cultural change. Invention here refers to the discovery of new cultural ideas, discovery refers to meeting ideas which are new to oneself and diffusion is a process of the spreading
of ideas, culture and objects to other societies. Recent change in the position of women in many societies is an example of cultural change.

II. Ideas and values- New ideas and modification of old ideas in a new context bring wide-scale changes in society. For example, Max Weber established that rationalisation of religious ideas brought about phenomenal change in the Protestant world.

III. Social structure- The seeds of change sometimes lie within the very social structure, the changes arising out of tensions and conflicts. The most influential theory linking change to social structure was by Karl Marx, who claimed that social class was the basis of conflict between unequally positioned sections of the population which are the rich and the poor. The rising tension between the haves and the have nots, he held, would lead to class struggle, in which the capitalist system, which is advantageous to the haves, would be replaced by a socialist system.

IV. Political factors - Ruling class defines the political atmosphere of a society. For example, in a military dictatorship, resources are channelised in a different manner as compared to a democracy. Often a redistribution of power happens due to some big political events like revolutions and coups as in the case of French Revolution. Gradual changes also take place as a result of far reaching political initiatives like universal adult franchise.

V. Environmental and physical factors - Early civilisations were mostly situated in flood plains. Village life is drastically changed by Tsunami. Nowadays, global warming also looms large which may bring multitudes of change.

VI. Economic factors- According to Karl Marx, true social change, in form of communist revolution, can come only by change in economic infrastructure. Discovery of oil in the Middle East, rise of industrialisation and capitalism are some of the examples. Globalisation of economies is the most recent example.

VII. Demographic factors- Demographic change is caused by a change in birth rates, death rates and migration of population. Change emanates from the demographic transition in society.

VIII. Religious factors- Religion can act as an agent of change as well as resist the change. Weber has shown how Protestant Ethics brought industrialisation to Europe.

IX. Technological factors- Industrial Revolution is an example which led to massive social upheavals. In Ogburn’s concept of cultural lag and also, technology has been an important factor in social change.

X. Conflict and change - Social change is also caused by tension and conflict. Structural strain, deprivation, cultural revitalisation, etc. have been the major causes of conflict. Social division based on class, caste, gender, ethnicity, estate, etc. have also been important sources of conflict and change in society.

XI. Social movements and change - Social movements are organised efforts of groups of people to bring about deliberate change in the values, norms, institutions, culture relationships and traditions of the society. They also generate new identities and a new perspective.

**FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE**

Society is in continuous flux. Various forces and factors internal as well as external, are at work to make society changeful. The physical, biological, cultural and the technological factors have been generally regarded as the potential factors of social change. As Lapiere has pointed out these factors must be understood as intervening variables that condition social change rather than as ‘determining’ or ‘casual’ factors.
GEOGRAPHIC OR THE PHYSICAL FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

The physical factors consist of the surface of the earth, climate, rainfall, rivers, mountains, natural vegetation, forests, animal life, minerals, etc. They have a profound influence upon the human society. Social change is, to some extent, conditioned by the physical or the geographic factors. Rate and direction of social change are governed by the physical environment. At the polar regions, and in the deserts there can be no cities and almost changeless stabilities are maintained. The surface of the earth is never at rest. Slow geographic changes as well as the occasional convulsions in the form of storms, famines and floods, cyclones and hurricanes and earthquakes do take place. They may bring about social change. But these changes in nature are usually unaffected by the human activity. Here, the causation is one sided. The great volcanic eruption of Yokohama in 1923 was responsible for the new kind of architecture in Japan. It is said that the ancient civilisations of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Indus valley withered away due to bad climate. However, certain changes in the environment may be attributed to human activity. For example, soil impoverishment has taken place in South Italy, Greece, Palestine, Egypt and Morocco. The desert wastes of North Africa were once green and well populated. Man has disturbed the ecological balance by exhausting the minerals, destroying the forests and devastating the land and by the mass killing of the wild life. The modes of culture, and the whole system of social institutions have undergone modifications. Consequently, the centres of population, the routes of trade, the seats of empire and the systems of structures of societies have been vastly affected.

Some social geographers and social ecologists have attributed too much importance to geographic factors in bringing about social change. The influences that geographic factors exert upon human societies are neither decisive nor negligible, they are limiting but not determining. Man is capable of modifying the natural landscape into a cultural landscape. "Geographic factors account for what can be and for what cannot be in human societies, but they do not account for what is" - Robert Bierstedt. Geography alone cannot explain the rise and fall of civilisations. For no period of human history do we have information of a geographic character that will adequately account for the social changes that occurred. As human societies grow in complexity and as culture accumulates, geographic factors steadily decrease in sociological significance. Geography, in short governs the possible, not the actual. History is not a simple function of habitat, nor culture of climate; neither mistral nor monsoon determines morality, nor soil society. - Robert Bierstedt.

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Biological factors, too, set limits to the social possibilities of human societies. In certain ways they help to determine the form and structure of these societies. Plants and animals form a pan man’s non-human environment. Man is influenced by non-human biological factors. He modifies them to serve his purposes creating interaction between biological and cultural factors. Man, example, has always utilised plant and animal life to meet his basic needs for food, clothing, shelter. The biological factors influence the numbers, the composition, the birth rate, the death the fertility rate and the hereditary quality of the successive generations. Heredity, for example, one of the important agencies of variation. It contributes to vast amount of diversity between the parents and the children. Therefore, no new generation can be an exact copy of the old. Every life a different distribution of qualities and potentialities.

The biological factors like the size and composition of population, produce social changes. The phenomenal growth of population in the 19th century has led to vast social changes and brought problems. Food problem, housing problem, unemployment, poor health, poverty, low standard of living and the problems are its direct outcome. But there are also countries where there is the problem
of under-population. The falling rate of population has posed a serious problem for countries like U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Sweden. It is said that such countries are facing the threat of race suicide”. It has its own political implications also. Further, the proportion of younger people is decreasing in few countries like U.K., U.S.A., Sweden, etc. The death rate has fallen and hence the number of the old is increasing. It has its social implications. Some social arrangement such as taboos on inter-marriage, customs respecting the age at marriage, persecution of the minorities, war, etc. tend to lower the biological quality of the population. Hence the increase and decrease in population, a change in the ratio of men and women, changes in rates of birth and death are likely to affect our social system. The relations of man and his society to the biological environment are more dynamic than those of man and his society to the physical environment. The latter submits to his use and abuse. But the biological environment which is inherently unstable responds rather than submits to his uses and abuses. It is more sensitive. Hence man has to fight against the diseases, harmful bacterias, weeds, wild beasts constantly.

CULTURAL FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
Cultural factors constitute yet another source of social change. Cultural factors consist of our values, and beliefs, ideas and ideologies, morals and manners, customs and traditions and various institutions. Not only social values direct social changes but they themselves are subject to change ideas and ideals, ideologies and philosophies are inherently changeful. They change with time, and in turn, initiate change in the social order. In some periods ideas of liberty, equality and democracy may be found, in some others, ideas of strict discipline and centralised order may be observed, and still in some other periods religious orthodoxy or religious non-conformity may prevail. There is an intimate connection between our beliefs and institutions, our valuations and social relationships. Certainly cultural change involves social change (in so far as it affects human relations) as the social and cultural changes are closely related. “What people think, in short, determines in even measure...what they do and what they want”. - Robert Bierstedt.

Culture gives speed and direction to the social change. Actually, the field of social change is limited in comparison with the field of cultural change. Our ways of behaving, living, thinking and acting are very much influenced by the changes in social values. These changes in social values are no doubt influenced, if not determined by the technological factors.

Culture is not something static. No culture ever remains constant. It may undergo change due to immigration, foreign invasion, international trade and contacts, exchange of cultural delegations, conquest of one nation by another, foreign rule, etc. Further changeability is inherent in culture. Culture not merely responds to the outside influences, but it itself is a force directing social change. It creates itself or develops by itself. It is men who plan, strive and act. Culture gives cues and directions to social behaviour. Men are beset with stresses and strains for which the past offers no guidelines. New ideologies cause significant changes in the models of group life. It is said that ideologies rule the world'. The social philosophy of Marxism, for example has swept one-third of the world. Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity, too wielded great influence on the social institutions. No culture ever remains constant and no culture ever develops in isolation.

TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
The technological factors represent the conditions created by man which have a profound influence on his life. In the attempt to satisfy his wants, fulfill his needs and to make his life more comfortable, man builds civilisation. Technology is a product of civilization. When the scientific knowledge is applied to the problems of life, it becomes technology. Technology is a systematic knowledge which
is put into practice, that is, to use tools and run machines to serve human purposes. Science and technology go together. Technology is fast growing. The modern Age is often called the Technological Age or the Mechanical Era. In utilising the products of technology man provokes social changes. The social effects of technology are far-reaching. According to Karl Marx, even the formation of social relations and mental conceptions and attitudes are dependent upon technology. Karl Marx, Veblen and a few others have regarded technology as the sole explanation of social change. W.F. Ogburn says, technology changes society by changing our environments to which we in turn adapt.

Mobile phones have changed how we see the world

This change is usually in the material environment and the adjustment that we make with these changes often modifies customs and social institutions. A single invention may have innumerable social effects. Radio, for example, has influenced our entertainment, education, politics, sports, literature, attitudes, knowledge and so on. Ogburn and Nimkoff have given a list consisting of 150 effects of the radio in the U.S.A.

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON SOCIAL ORDER

The development in the field of technology culminated in the great event of Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution of the 18th century and the various developments woven around it, revolutionalised human life in several respects. The tempo of the technological changes has not vanished. Technology and technological changes continue to affect the human life and social order. The impact of technological change on the social order may be discussed here.
Effect of Technology

1. Industrialisation (The Birth of the Factory System of Production)
Technology has contributed to the growth of industries or to the process of industrialisation. Industrialisation is a term covering in general terms the growth in a society hitherto mainly agrarian of modern industry with all its attendant circumstances and problems, economic and social. It describes in general terms, the growth of a society in which a major role is played by manufacturing industry of the modern type. The industry is characterised by heavy, fixed-capital investment in plant and building, by the application of science to industrial techniques, and by mainly large-scale standardised production. Some writers hold that the best general test of the industrialisation of a nation's life under modern conditions is the rate and character of the growth of its industries.

The Industrial Revolution that took place in England during the 18th century contributed to the unprecedented growth of industries. Industrialisation is associated with the factory system of production. Today, goods are produced in factories and not in homes. The family has lost its economic importance. The factories have brought down the prices of commodities, improved their quality and maximised their output. The whole process of production is mechanised. Consequently, the traditional skills have declined and a good number of artisans have lost their work. Huge factories could provide employment opportunities to thousands of people. Hence men have become workers in factories in a very big number. The process of industrialisation has affected the nature, character and the growth of economy. It has contributed to the growth of cities or to the process of urbanisation.

2. Urbanisation
In many countries, the growth of industries (industrialisation) has contributed to the growth of cities (urbanisation). Urbanisation denotes a diffusion of the influence of urban centres to a rural hinterland. Mitchell refers to urbanisation as being the process of becoming urban, moving to cities, changing from agriculture to other pursuits common to cities, and corresponding change of behaviour patterns. Hence only when a large proportion of inhabitants in an area come to cities urbanisation is said to occur.

Urbanisation has become a world phenomenon today. In 1800 (i.e., before the Industrial Revolution) there were only 21 cities in the world each with a population of 100,000 or over, and all these were in
Europe. By 1950 there were 858 such cities in the world (364 of them in the European continent) with a combined population of over 313,000,000. An unprecedented growth has taken place not only in the number of great cities but also in their size. England, where the Industrial Revolution took place first, became urbanised at a relatively faster rate. England, America, Germany and Israel are the most urbanised countries of the world where more than 75% of the people live in towns and cities.

As a result of industrialisation people have started moving towards the industrial areas in search of employment. Due to this the industrial areas developed into towns and cities. A number of such industrial cities are there in the world now. Bangalore, Durgapur, Kanpur, Bombay, Calcutta of India, Manchester, Lancashire of England, Chicago and Detroit of America can be mentioned here as examples.

Growth of cities or urbanisation has resulted in urban concentration and rural depopulation. The unregulated growth of cities has caused problems such as overcrowding, congestion, insanitation, inadequate water and electricity supply; lack of privacy and intimacy, etc. The cities have also become centres of various socio-economic problems such as crime, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, etc.

3. Modernisation
Modernisation is a process which indicates the adoption of the modern ways of life and values. It refers to an attempt on the part of the people, particularly those who are custom-bound, to adapt themselves to the present time, conditions, needs, styles, and ways in general. It indicates a change in people’s food habits, dress habits, speaking styles, tastes, choices, preferences, ideas, values, recreational activities, and so on. People, in the process of getting themselves modernised give more importance to science and technology. The scientific and technological inventions have modernised societies in various countries. They have brought about remarkable changes in the whole system of social relationship and installed new ideologies in the place of traditional ones.

In the process of modernisation some typical forms of changes occur in the social structure of society. Changes in social structure involve role differentiations in almost all aspects of life. Growth of science and technology adds impetus to this process and finally accelerates the movement or the rate of change.

4. Development of the Means of Transport and Communication
Development of the means of transport and communication has led to the national and international trade on a large scale. The road transport, the train service, the ships and the aeroplanes have eased the movement of men and material goods. Post and telegraph, radio and television, newspapers and magazines, telephone and wireless and the like, have developed a great deal. The space research and the launching of the satellites for communication purposes have further added to these developments. They have helped the people belonging to different corners of the nation or the world to have regular contacts. The nations have come nearer today. The world has shrunk in size. The intermixing of the people has led to the removal of prejudices and misunderstandings.

5. Transformation in the Economy and the Evolution of the New Social Classes
The introduction of the factory system of production has turned the agricultural economy into industrial economy. The industrial economy is popularly known as the capitalist economy. This transformation in the economy has divided the social organisation into two predominant classes the Capitalist Class and the Working Class. These two classes, according to Marx, are always at conflict.
because both have mutually opposite interests. In course of time an intermediary class called the Middle Class' has evolved. This class which consists of the so-called white collar' people, is playing an important role in the society.

6. Unemployment
The problem of unemployment is a concomitant feature of the rapid technological advancement. Machines not only provide employment opportunities for men but they also take away the jobs of men through labour-saving devices. This results in what is known as technological unemployment.

7. Technology and War
The highly dangerous effect of technology is evident through the modern mode of warfare. Today, not men, but guns, not hands, but bombs fight the battle. The atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb have brought new fears and anxieties for mankind. The atomic and the bacteriological wars that can destroy the entire human race reveal how technology could be misused. Thus, the greater the technological advancement, the more ingenious is the devilish wholesale murder. However, technology could be used for constructive purposes also.

8. Changes in Values
Industrialisation, urbanisation, development in the means of transport and communication, the progress of democracy, introduction of secular education, birth of new organisations political and economic, etc., have had profound effects on the beliefs, ideals, tendencies and thoughts of the people. This has led to a vast transformation in the values of life.

Industrialisation and mechanisation have brought new values and philosophies. The traditional values have changed. Things are measured more in pecuniary terms. Men are devoted more to quantity than to quality, to measurement than to appreciation. Human beings by the use of machines have become less human, more passive and more mechanical. As MacIver and Page have said from the mechanistic point of view, all things are means to means and to no final end, functions to functions and of no values beyond.

Technological invention and industrial expansion have very directly promoted hedonism. People want to have good time always. They have become pleasure-seekers. They want to maximise their pleasure by putting forth minimum, or no efforts. Mounting production has provided them with sufficient money and also leisure to play and to enjoy. More importance is given to pomp and show than to contemplation and thought. Human relations are becoming impersonal and secondary. On all sides one is confronted with human machines which possess motion but not sincerity, life but not emotion, heart but not feelings.

There has been a movement towards individualism. Individuals are moving away from their family and community loyalty and responsibility. Individualism has intensified social and psychological uprootedness. Technology has substituted the' hand' work with the' head' work. This kind of work requires manipulation of people instead of things. Manipulating others and being manipulated by others enhance individuation, the sense of being alone and operating alone. “

9. Changes in Social Institutions
Technology has profoundly altered our modes of life and also thought. Technology has not spared the social institutions of its effects. The institutions of family, religion, morality, marriage, state, property, etc., have been altered.
Modem technology, in taking away industry from the household, has radically changed the family organisation. Many functions of the family have been taken away by other agencies. Women are enjoying more leisure at home. Much of their work is done by modern household electric appliances. Due to the invention of birth control techniques the size of the family is reduced. Marriage has lost its sanctity. It is treated more as a civil contract than a sacred bond. Marriages are becoming more and more unstable. Instances of divorce, desertion and separation are increasing. Technology has elevated the status of women no doubt, but it has also contributed to the stresses and strains in the relations between men and women at home.

Religion is losing its hold over the members. People are becoming more secular, rational and scientific, but less religious in their outlook. Though religion has not been directly affected by the modern technology, inventions and discoveries in science have shaken the foundations of religion. They have changed attitudes towards religious rituals and creeds.

The function of the state or the field of state activity has been widened. The modern states call themselves welfare states. They have become secular in nature. Modern inventions have made the states to perform such functions as- the protection of the aged, the weaker section and the minorities, making provision for the schools, colleges, universities, child labour laws, health measures, juvenile courts, etc. Transportation and communication inventions are leading to a shift of functions from local government to the central government of the whole state. The modem inventions have also strengthened nationalism. The modem governments which rule through the bureaucracy have further impersonalised the human relations.

Perhaps, the most striking change in modern times is the change in economic organisation. Industry has been taken away from the household and new types of economic organisations have been set up, such as, factories, stores, banks, joint stock companies, corporations, amalgamations, etc. Introduction of factories changes the character of relations between the employer and the employees.

**Conclusion**: It is clear from the above explanation that technology is capable of bringing about vast changes in society. But technology should not be considered a ‘determining’ factor of social life. Man is a master as well as a servant of the machine. He has the ability to alter the circumstances which have been the creation of his own technology. He is indeed, a creature as well as a critic of the circumstances.

**CULTURAL LAG**

William F. Ogburn, in his famous book Social Change, has formulated the hypothesis of cultural lag. Ogburn has divided culture into two parts namely: material and non-material culture. By material culture he means civilisation which includes tools, utensils, machines, dwellings, science, means of transport and technology, in brief, the whole apparatus of life. By non-material culture he means just ‘culture’ in its ordinary sense which includes beliefs, practices, customs, traditions, morals, values, and institutions (ike family, morality, religion, education, etc. ‘Cultural lag’, according to him, refers to the imbalance in the rate and speed of change between these two parts of culture. The word 'lag' denotes crippled movement. Hence culture means the faltering of one aspect of culture behind another.

According to Ogburn, changes are quick to take place in the material culture. These in turn stimulate changes in the non-material culture. But the non-material culture may be slow to respond, giving rise to a gap or a lag between the material and the non-material cultures. This lag is called the cultural lag. For example, the development in the field of industry requires a corresponding change in the system.
of education. The failure of education to cater to the needs of modern industrial development leads to the cultural lag. Similarly, the forests of the country may be destroyed because the art of conservation does not keep pace with industrial or agricultural development. Thus writes, the strain that exists between two correlated parts of culture that change at unequal rates of speed may be interpreted as a lag in the part that is changing at the slower rate for the one lag behind the other”. If the society is to maintain its equilibrium it has to seek ways and means of bridging this gap. Ogburn has, therefore, concluded that the problem of adjustment in modern life is chiefly one of enabling the non-material aspects of culture to catch up, as it were, with the material aspects.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Laws are a form of social rule emanating from political agencies. Laws become legislations when they are made and put into force by law-making body or authority. Legislations, particularly social legislations have played an important role in bringing about social change.

There are two opinions about the functions of law. The function of law, according to one view, is to establish and maintain social control. Hence the major problem of law is to design legal sanctions to minimise deviance and to maintain social solidarity and social order.

Another view stresses the dynamic role of law. It states that the function of law is not just to maintain social order through social control. It insists that law must bring about social change by influencing people’s behaviour, beliefs and values. We shall now analyse the role of law or legislation in bringing about social change.

A careful analysis of the role of legislation in social change would reveal two things. (i) Through legislations the state and society try to bring the legal norms in line with the existing social norms. (ii) Legislations are also used to improve social norms on the basis of new legal norms.

Social legislation can be an effective means of social change only when the existing social norm is given a legal sanction. No legislation by itself can substitute one norm with another. It can hardly change norms. Unaided social legislation can hardly bring about social change. But with the support of the public opinion it can initiate a change in social norm and thus a change in social behaviour. Some examples of social legislations made in India will help us to understand this point.

A number of social legislations were made in India both before and after independence with a view to bring about social change. Some of these could achieve success while a few others still remain as dead letters. The legislations that secured public support and the support of social norms could become a great success. For example, the Hindu Marriage Act was passed in 1955 enforcing monogamy and permitting judicial separation and divorce. Though polygamy was permitted among the Hindus, majority of the people practised monogamy only. Public opinion was in favour of monogamy. For a long time social reformers agitated that Hindu marriage should be monogamous. The Hindu women also resented the second marriage by a man when the first one was alive. Those who opposed monogamy were branded as conservative, orthodox and selfish. When the Hindu Marriage Act was passed in 1955 it could get the support of the people and the opposition gradually died down.

The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 could bring about a number of social changes. The Act abolished all caste restrictions as a necessary requirement for marriage. The Hindus of all castes have the same rights with respect to marriage. Intercaste marriages are now allowed. The Act provides for a secular
outlook with respect to marriage and enables the registration of marriage. It enforces monogamy making both the sexes equal in marital affairs. It provides equal rights for both to get judicial separation and divorce on legal grounds. It treats various sects of people such as Jains, Buddhists, Sikhs, Veera Shaivas, Harijans, Girijans and many others as Hindus’. Thus, it paved the way for bringing about a uniform Civil Code for all the citizens of India.

In the same way, the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 could attain success. The Act confers for the first time absolute rights over the property possessed by a Hindu woman. Both sons and daughters get the right of inheritance of property because of this Act. The Act removes the prejudice against women getting the property of the father. Since public opinion is in favour of women enjoying equal rights and opportunities, the Act could be enforced easily.

The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act of 1956 has been a step toward the upliftment of the status of women. It permits the adoption of a son or a daughter. It makes the consent of the wife necessary for adopting a child. It has also given the right to the widows to adopt.

The Legislative Acts mentioned above could bring about changes in some areas of our life because they are backed by public opinion and current social norms and values. Whenever the social norms are ahead of the legal codes, it becomes necessary to bring the legal code into conformity with the prevalent social values. Sometimes dominant minority groups may cherish some advanced values and may bring pressure upon the legislative bodies to make legislations to enforce such values on masses. Such legislations become an active social force only when they are internalised by the people.

In pre-independent India, social legislations such as - The Hindu Widow Remarriage Act of 1856, Female Infanticide Prevention Act of 1870, the Special Marriage Act of 1872 (which made marriage a civil marriage free from religious barriers), Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, etc., could attain success and pave the way for changes in society because they were in tune with the trends and tides of the time.

On the contrary, those social legislations that are far ahead of the social norms and values and those that lack popular support and public opinion are bound to be a failure. They may become only dead letters. Some of them may bring about changes very gradually in the long run. Some others may be simply ignored or even resisted.

The Untouchability Offences Act of 1955 was passed by the Parliament in accordance with the provisions of Article 35 of the Indian Constitution. It made the practice of untouchability a cognisable offence punishable under law. (This Act was, however, substituted by the Protection of Civil Rights Act in 1976). All the social disabilities from which the Harijans suffered have been removed legally and constitutionally. But in reality, Harijans suffer from many kinds of social disabilities especially in rural areas even today. Here the law is ahead of the social norm particularly in the villages where untouchability is still in practice. The institutionalisation of this new rule has not affected people’s ways of life. Because the majority of the village people have not yet internalised this norm. It makes clear that passing an Act is not enough to alter the social practice. A social movement educating the public through propaganda, is necessary to make effective such social legislations.

Law relating to prohibition was also a grand failure for want of public support. Gandhiji launched a crusade against drunkenness. He even tried to persuade Congressmen to work for total removal of alcoholism. But right from 1937 there has been a strong opposition against prohibition. Not all the
Congressmen supported it. Those who were used to liquor consumption carried on a silent wave against prohibition. All the provinces never legislated laws in favour of prohibition. Some states kept neutral while a few states enacted legislations against taking alcoholic drinks. In such states illicit distillation started as kind of cottage industry. Public opinion was not properly mobilised in favour of it. Hence it failed. In America also law relating to prohibition was a grand failure and hence it was withdrawn.

For the same reasons as mentioned above the Hyderabad Beggary Act of 1940 passed in order to prevent the beggars from begging, failed. Some other states such as Bengal, Bombay, Karnataka also made legislations for the prevention of beggary. Nevertheless, beggary continued to be practised by beggars in all these states. In the same way, the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 which made the giver as well as receiver of dowry punishable also has become ineffective. The social norms, in other words, have not been affected by this law, and hence the society follows the social norms rather than legal norms in these fields. Mere threat of punishment will not be effective. Such a situation produces what Festinger calls forced compliance. So long as behaviour involves forced compliance, there is no internalisation of the new values and so there will be disobedience of the law. Forced compliance can only create a discrepancy between public behaviour and private belief.

**Unintended Consequences of Legislations**

As Richard T. Lapiere has pointed out, one of the major tasks of the governments is to produce desired changes through legislative enactments. Hence legislations may be enacted for slum clearance, for providing assistance for the poor to construct low-cost houses, for providing social security to the labourers, handicapped persons, for providing protection to women, children, weaker section, minorities, etc. But sometimes such legislations may produce unintended consequences in society.

For example, the Government of Napoleon in its efforts to keep France agriculturally self sufficient, established subsidies for the production of sugar beets. No one anticipated or could have anticipated that this legislation would in the course of time help to make France the heaviest per capita consumer of alcoholic beverages in the whole world.

In the same way, a legislation in America also brought about an unintended result. The New Deal ideologists wanted to save the small single family agricultural units from the economic crisis of 1930s. Hence they designed the agricultural parity price system to help such small growers. The ideologists could hardly foresee that the long-run effects of such a legislation would be to speed up the growth of large-scale industrial agriculture and to hasten the doom of the small-scale agriculturists.

Legislation or any other governmental agency has its own inability to pre-determine the consequences of politically sponsored changes. Legislation has its own limitations in inducing significant qualitative changes by coercion. Of course, men may be deterred by coercion from doing something that they might like to do. They may be encouraged by the government to work at their trade, pursue their scientific investigations, treat sick patients, etc.

People cannot, however, in the same ways be induced either to want to be creative or to act for long in ways that are contrary to their established cultural attributes. It is for this reason the governmental efforts to increase national birth-rates through legal means have failed. Its efforts to establish racial equality through legislation have failed. Similarly, no legislation can be made to make a people
religious or to deprive them of an established religion; to change their sex morals, to improve domestic harmony, to substitute one custom with another, and so on. Legislations can be made by governments to sanction changes that have already occurred. In fact, in the long run, legislations are made for sanctioning changes. But legislations cannot be made in the social field directly. They cannot fix the course of social changes in a predetermined fashion.

**EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE**

Education is one of the intervening variables in the phenomenon of social change. ‘Durkheim’ conceives of education as the socialisation of the younger generation. According to James Welton, education consists in an attempt on the part of the adult members of human society to shape the development of the coming generation with its own ideals of life. As Samuel Koenig has pointed out, it is a process whereby the social heritage of a group is passed on from generation to another.

Education can also be understood as a factor of social change. The role of education as an agent or instrument of social change and development is widely recognised today. Education can initiate social change by bringing about a change in the outlook and attitudes of man. It can bring about a change in the pattern of social relationship and thereby it may cause social changes. One of the purposes of education is to change man and his life and living style. To change man is to change society only.

There was a time when educational institutions and teachers were engaged in transmitting a way of life to the students. During those days, education was more a means of social control than an instrument of social change. Modern schools, colleges and universities do not place much emphasis upon transmitting a way of life to the students. The traditional education was meant for an unchanging, static society, not marked by rapid changes. But today, education aims at imparting empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge, about science, technology and other type of specialised knowledge. Education was associated with religion. It has, however, become secular today. It is an independent institution now. Education today has been chiefly instrumental in preparing the way for the development of science and technology.

Education has brought about phenomenal changes in every aspect of man’s life. Francis J. Brown remarks that education is a process which brings about changes in the behaviour of society. It is a process which enables every individual to effectively participate in the activities of society, and to make positive contribution to the progress of society. As Drucker has stated that the highly educated man has become the central resource of today’s society and the supply of such men is the true measure of its economic, military and even its political potential.

Modern education has changed our attitude and outlook. It has affected our customs and traditions, manners and morals, religious beliefs and philosophical principles. It has removed to a great extent the superstitious beliefs and unreasoned fears about the supernatural beings. It has widened our vision and removed our narrow ideals, prejudices and misunderstandings. Higher education has brought about more refined behaviour.

Education has contributed to a radical improvement in the status of women. Educated modern women no more tolerate the double standard of morality. It has helped them to seek employment outside the family. Particularly, mass education in civilised societies has fostered the sense and the feeling of equality.
Referring to the relation between education and social change and development, Peter Worsely points out that education reflects society, and educational change follows social change. Though education conditions development it itself is a product of prior social and economic changes in society. Further, education is an independent factor in social and economic development producing intended and unintended consequences and conflicts of values and goals.

Education is an important means of attaining social and economic rewards of society. It has become essential for the economy. Education has now become a large-scale and a highly visible organisation. Education is now controlled by the dominant groups of society so as to meet their definition of society’s needs. Changes in the educational system condition social and economic changes, greater social mobility and more skilled man-power for technologically based industry. Planned educational innovations, policies and programmes may contribute to the social integration and a more highly educated labour force and electorate.

Education has been playing a great role in getting occupations which are key determiners of general social status. Thus the schools are agents in realising the desire for upward social mobility. In many highly industrialised societies the proportion of people in the manual working class has steadily declined. It is so in the case of America, Britain, France, etc. The schools have been instrumental in transforming the occupational structure and modifying the class structure as well. In most developing countries education is regarded as the gateway to an improved social position. Hence one may find an unsatisfied demand for education in such countries. This is especially true in the case of a developing nation like India. Educational change in these countries can effectively proceed only if corresponding changes take place in the other aspects of their social structure.

Where education is a condition of social and economic change, it is more likely to produce intended consequences. This happens because educational change is following other changes in society. The social context is thus favourable to particular change. For example, educational reforms, designed to
raise educational standards among low-income people have become more successful in Cuba than in Guatemala. This has been so, because, in Cuba, more than in Guatemala, educational change has followed social and economic changes enabling the low-income people to take an active participation in the development of national society. As far as India is concerned, there is no proper coordination between educational changes and socioeconomic needs.

Education increases political awareness among poor people also. This would bring about wider political changes with the increasingly organised participation of people in national politics. Modern states, particularly the totalitarian ones, have made education an instrument for establishing their regime. Under authoritarian principles, the control of the school touches every aspect of education. The teachers are carefully chosen and supervised, and deviations from the party line are severely punished. Students of all ages must be given nothing but the truth as the ruling elite see it. The principal of a school in Moscow once said: “the prime duty of the Soviet teacher is to train our younger generation for the work of building communism. On the contrary, in the democratic countries there is the belief that The State is for man, not man for the State. Education is made free and open. Here, education makes a man to become more conscious of his rights and also of his duty to provide and guard similar rights for others.

Education is expected to contribute to progress, to modify the cultural heritage as well as to preserve and transmit it. In modern industrial societies educational organisations have become innovators. They are gathering and storing new knowledge and are promoting change in the process of transmitting that knowledge.

It is now widely held that educational system should dedicate itself to the task of bringing about desirable changes. The emphasis upon research in universities reflects the judgment that discovery itself is good. For the first time in history, societies are marshalling their huge resources and talents to make advances in knowledge through educational organisations.

Changes do not take place with equal rate of speed in all areas of life. Generally, there is more enthusiasm for change in areas of material culture than in non-material culture. Through educational researches any kind of innovation can be made to maximise production and minimise cost. When education challenges cherished traditions, it becomes the object of some hostility. Education cannot be used as an instrument to bring about any kind of change. Because education operates in the context of other institutions and is constrained by them.

As Alex Inkeles has pointed out, different levels of education have different levels of effects. In the developing countries primary school education is enabling whole population to do things they would never have been able to do before. Literacy helps them to read labels on cans, bottles, tins, to read sign boards, newspapers, birth-control leaflets, to move around the strange city, etc. These events are social changes. In the developing countries primary school education is more important than higher education.

Even though widespread primary education can have a great impact upon people in the developing countries the ideological content of primary school education remains almost conservative. Because, governments organise school systems in a stereotyped way, there is less or no scope for the teachers to make researches or to become revolutionary leaders.
It can be said that basic literacy brings a society into the modern world. But only higher education provokes persons to question the values of everyday life. The high school or primary school teacher is not as free to speak critically as the university professor is. At elementary level of education students normally live with their parents at home and hence not free to entertain ideas which their parents may dislike. On the other hand, at the university level, the intellectual work requires students to do more critical thinking than they might do at a lower level.

University student movements have often been the major force demanding social change in many societies. A decade between 1960 and 1970 witnessed a large number of student upsurges resulting in social and political changes. For example, in China, India, Japan, America, Germany, France, Italy, England, Indonesia and in many other countries students agitated for various reasons causing vast changes. In some cases, the student movements stood with the establishment and in majority of the cases they tried to discredit, transform or topple governments. The students are today a new social force of incalculable significance. But student movements have been far less active in the late 1970s than a decade ago. It is true that college educated persons are still the most progressive group in society whether they are quiet or vocal in calling for social reform or change. More and more persons are receiving higher education. Majority will attain a degree. If that is so, it means that society will contain a built-in engine for social change. As long as universities continue to occupy an increasingly important place in society, so long changes are bound to be initiated through education in some way or the other.

EDUCATION - SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Social Stratification which is necessitated by the phenomenon of social differentiation refers to "a process of placing people in different strata or layers. It is an ubiquitous phenomenon of human society. All the existing societies are stratified. The essence of social stratification is social inequality which manifests in various forms. It may involve the differential allocation of income, status, privileges, and opportunities. A stratified society represents a ladder of hierarchy in which its population is distributed. People who occupy the higher place in this hierarchy or ladder enjoy higher status, opportunities and privileges and the people who occupy lower positions have limited access to the same.

Social Mobility refers to the movement of an individual or group from one social position or status to that of another. People who occupy different status or places in the above said hierarchy may often change their places depending upon the opportunities made available to them.

Based on this movement of people from status to stratum which is called social mobility two systems of social stratification are distinguished:

(i) The open society or the fluid system of stratification in which there is greater scope for movement up and down the hierarchy. The Western society with its class system of stratification is very often cited as the typical illustration of this.

(ii) The closed society or the rigid system of stratification is the second one in which the boundaries of various strata are very rigid and movement between the strata is extremely difficult, if not impossible. The Indian caste is very often mentioned here as the typical example of this. It may, however, be noted that as two broad types they are not found in pure form in any society of the world. Existing societies, however, lean towards one or the other depending upon certain economic and cultural conditions.
Education - as a Powerful Correlate of Social Stratification and Social Mobility

There are various correlates of social stratification and mobility. These correlates vary from society to society depending upon the level of their socio-economic and technological development. In general, in urban-industrial societies - education, occupation, income, and wealth - have been found to be the main correlates of social stratification and also of mobility.

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Education - As a Criterion of Social Stratification

In technologically advanced countries education has become the most important criterion of social stratification. In such societies occupation is the determinant of income. It is also found that recruitment to various occupations in these societies is determined by the education levels of individuals.

Education - As a Determinant of Social Placement and Social Stratification

In the technologically advanced countries normally the status gradation is defined by the occupational and educational levels of education. Briefly, in view of the close relationship between education and occupation, and to the extent that occupation is an important, if not the only avenue, for income and social status, education acquires significance as a determinant of social placement and social stratification.

It is noticeable that in the industrial societies the most prestigious jobs tend to be not only those that yield the highest incomes but also the ones that require the longest education. The more education people have, the more likely they are to obtain good jobs and to enjoy high incomes.

The Complex Relationship between Education and Social Stratification

Though education acts as a generator of upward mobility it does not invariably do that. Empirical evidences suggest that in the reciprocal relationship between education and social stratification it is stratification that affects education primarily. This effect is greater than the effect of education on stratification.

In many societies the facilities for education leading to higher levels of occupations and professions like medicine, engineering, management, etc., are limited. But the number of aspirants to make use of such facilities is very high. Since the cost of higher education is very high and several constraints govern admission to such education courses, only a select section of the society can manage to enter such courses. This section is normally the privileged section of the society, which occupies a top position in the stratification system. Such a system of higher education with all its constraints etc., is often defended on meritocratic grounds. Thus education instead of being a generator of upward social mobility is forced to function as an agency of stratification, to function as an agency of status retention'

Social Stratification Affecting Lower Levels of Education: Social Stratification affects lower levels of education especially in the rural areas. In many of the developing countries wastage and stagnation in school education is found to be very high. This problem seems to exist even in the advanced countries to a certain extent. It is found that generally students belonging to the lower stratum background drop out of the school in a large number. Even though education is provided free and additional incentives are given, the situation does not seem to improve much.
Education is seen as a powerful tool for social mobility, as the path to a better future

It is clear from the above that the relationship between education and social stratification is more complex than what it appears to be. It is true that education has enough potentiality for changing the system of stratification. But this potentiality itself seems to be governed by the existing system of stratification.

In conclusion, it can be said that from the point of view of an educational system those who are already at the upper strata of the society are likely to gain more. They have higher achievement motivation and their environment helps them. If we wish to provide equality of educational opportunities we will have to keep this aspect in mind.

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY
Education as a Promoter of Upward Mobility

In the context of urban-industrial society education functions as a promoter of upward social mobility. In such societies occupation is the principal channel of social mobility. Occupations that help social mobility require certain educational qualifications. It is in this context education acquires significance as a promoter of upward social mobility, sociologist Reid writes: The functions of the educational system are to provide people with the qualifications and aspirations to meet society's occupational needs. Built into the system is that assumptions that people will or should want to be upwardly mobile. Underlying such reasoning is, then, the belief that social mobility is a desirable characteristic of that society and that the education system exists to promote and facilitate it.

Peter Blau and Otis Duncan (1967), in their study of social mobility in America, found that the important factor affecting whether a son moved to a higher social status than his father's was the amount of education the son received. A high level of education is a scarce and valued resource, and one for which people compete vigorously.
Due to the increased awareness regarding the importance of college-level education, a large number of persons are trying to avail of the same to increase their social standing. As a result, the number of new college graduates is now far greater than the number of college-level jobs available to them. In fact, it has been calculated that only 15% of the increase in educational requirements for jobs during the course of this century can be attributed to the replacement of low-skill jobs by new jobs requiring greater expertise [Collins]. What has actually happened is that the educational threshold has risen: people need higher qualifications to get jobs that previously required much lower educational credentials.

**Lack of Educational Qualification Restricts Social Mobility**

In developed nations people want to attain higher levels of education to equip themselves to obtain more prestigious jobs. What is observed is that people want to receive extra years of education even if it is not necessary for some of the jobs or occupations that they are seeking for. There is evidence that educational achievement has no consistent relationship to later job performance and productivity. What is significant, however, is that the lack of educational qualifications restricts social mobility of those people who for one reason or another, have been unable to obtain them.

**Education as a Solvent of Inequalities?**

Education serves as a solvent of inequalities to a certain extent especially in societies where the traditional systems of stratification did not permit large-scale social mobility. Here the introduction of formal education [as was done by the British in India] gave an opportunity for people who were hitherto confined to lower or intermediary statuses in the traditional system of stratification [say caste] to try for attaining a higher status in the changed situation. That is what the scheduled caste and the scheduled tribe people and the people belonging to the backward classes have done and are doing. Thus, education under conditions has the potentiality of radically altering the previous system of stratification. Thus education has often been hailed as a solvent of inequalities.

**Education and Internal and External Constraints on Mobility**

There are a number of factors which impede mobility of the individuals in a social structure. They are referred to here as constraints on mobility. These constraints may be internal or external. The internal constraints are values, aspirations and personality patterns of the individuals. The external constraints are the opportunity structure of a society with which the individual is influenced.

(i) **System of Beliefs and Values.** The major constraints in the upward mobility is a system of beliefs and values prevailing in social structure. H.H. Hyman in his study 2 regarding - class differences in educational values, motivations for economic advancement and perceptions of the opportunity structure - found that the lower socio-economic groups place less emphasis upon college education as necessary for advancement, and are less likely to desire college education for their children. This holds true in the Indian situation also. Further, opportunities for education to the lower classes are very limited, particularly in the rural areas. Thus the prevalent value system governs their aspirations and actions. Hence they may lag behind the upper classes in this regard.

(ii) **Family Influence.** Upward mobility is also restricted due to the family influences. In a study made by Stephenson it was found that both occupational plans and aspirations are positively associated with the prestige ranking of father’s occupation. If the family itself lacks initiative it is reflected in the child’s desire for not moving out of the family bonds. The child develops a tendency to take up a job which the parent wants him to take up in his hierarchical set up. The child also does not show much interest in education because the parents are least concerned about it. This influence is very much visible in joint families.
(iii) Factors in individual personality. Individual’s personality structure may also contribute to his immobility. It has been found in a number of studies that achievement motivation, intelligence, aspirations and values are related with mobility. In one study it was found that I.Q (Intelligence Quotient) plays an important role in the school performance in the early years of an individual’s life. But as the person grows older he begins to shape his performance according to certain values that he learns from his family and friends. Here desire to go to the college is taken as an aspect of mobility. One who performs well is expected to go to college and thus is mobile in upward direction.

In the above mentioned study it was found that upper-status boys learn that good performance in school is necessary, and that they are expected to do well enough in secondary school to get admitted to college. On the other hand, a boy from a lower status home is taught that college is either not meant for him or at best a matter of indifference to his parents. The boy’s friends are not interested in college nor in high school. Consequently, even a bright boy among them gets discouraged.

Various findings have revealed that the strength of the achievement motive is clearly related to upward mobility. It seems that youth from upper strata of society may not need strong personal motivation for mobility. Such youth get good advice, they live in such environment where looking up is encouraged and where they are provided with wise decisions for setting up their careers. This is not the case of lower class youth. They have to learn a great deal to make these decisions.

EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
It is an accepted working policy of all the democratic nations to make provision for equal opportunities. As Dr. Radhakrishnan had pointed out long back Democracy only provides that all men should have equal opportunities for the development of their unequal talents. The Indian Constitution also as per the articles 15, 16, 17, 38 and 48, guarantee that the State shall not discriminate between persons on account of their religion or region and caste or class. The Preamble of the Constitution also assures equality to all the citizens. It means that our Constitution is committed to the principle of equality and accepted it as an article of faith. It is in tune with this spirit of the constitution the Education Commission has observed thus: One of the important social objectives of education is to equalise opportunity, enabling the backward or underprivileged classes and individuals to use education as a lever for the improvement of their condition. Every society that values social justice and is anxious to improve the lot of the common man and cultivate all available talent, must ensure progressive equality of opportunity to all sections of the population. This is the only guarantee for the building up of an egalitarian and human society by which the exploitation of the weak will be minimised.

Need for Equalisation of Educational Opportunities
The equalisation of educational opportunities is essentially linked with the equality notions in the social system. The social system which intends to provide equal opportunities for the advancement of all has to make provision for equal educational opportunities also. The need for emphasising the equality of opportunity in the education arises for various reasons. They may be cited here.

1. Equality of educational opportunities is needed for the establishment of egalitarian society based on social equality and justice;
2. It contributes to the search for talents among all the people of a nation;
3. It is essential to ensure rapid advancement of a nation;
4. It is needed for the successful functioning of a democracy. Educated and enlightened people alone can ensure a meaningful democracy, and
5. It helps to develop a closer link between manpower needs of a society and the availability of the skilled personnel.

Problems Concerning Equality of Opportunities in Education
Education is of great help in establishing equality and ensuring social justice no doubt. But the system of education itself can add to the existing inequalities, or at least perpetuate the same. This has been the major problem in providing equal educational opportunity for all.

EDUCATION AND MODERNISATION
Education has become today an essential aspect of the modern industrial society. It is more regarded as an agent of social change than an instrument of social control. It has become increasingly secular. All the nations of the world are investing huge amount of money on education for it has become an essential condition of advancement.

Education, modernisation, advancement in science, technology and industry normally go together. Formal professional education has become an absolute necessity today. Education is needed just to read, write and do simple calculations but, it is essential to earn one's living. It is the main source of supply of trained and technical persons to industry. The job that one gets today depends largely on the type of education that one has secured.

Modern schools, colleges and universities do not give much emphasis upon transmitting a way of life to the students as was given by the earlier forms of education. This is due to the fact that traditional education was meant for an unchanging and static society, a society not marked by rapid changes associated with industrialisation. Modern society, on the other hand, is a changing society. In such a society education aims at communicating empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge about science, technology and other types of specialised knowledge. A transformation in the contents and methods of education has taken place to meet the demands of the changing society.

SOCIAL PLANNING: CAN CHANGE BE DIRECTED?
Is it possible to predict and control the direction of social change? To do this demands that we know what changes are going to take place. All of the major changes of the 1960s— the New Left, the youth counterculture, the black nationalist movement, the new feminist movement— caught most social scientists by surprise. Most attempts to predict future change are little more than projections of recent trends into the future. By this technique, one could have predicted two centuries ago that today's streets would be hip-deep in horse manure and that today's American population would exceed a billion people. Obviously, by projecting recent trends, we cannot accurately predict the future. One scholar [Rosen, 1976] has published a book carrying the confident title, Future Facts: A Forecast of the World as We Will Know It Before the End of the Century, and a magazine called The Futurist carries many forecasts. But most social scientists are more modest. Some feel that social change is caused by social forces beyond our effective control [Sorokin, 1941, 1948; Lapiere, 1965]. For example, when the necessary supporting knowledge is developed, an invention will be made by someone, even if this invention is most troublesome to human existence. The hydrogen bomb is an example. Although we fear it may destroy us, we go on advancing it because others will do so anyway. Could the Indian wars possibly have been avoided? The Indians had land the settlers wanted for a growing population, and their advance was certain to destroy the Indian's way of life. The many brutal episodes were merely the symptoms, not the cause, of a conflict which was unavoidable, given
these groups with their respective needs and cultural backgrounds. Practically any great social change can be thus described in terms of blind social forces, so that we conclude that what did happen was about the only thing that could happen in that situation.

Some social scientists, however, believe that we can exert some influence over the course of social change [Mannheim, 1949; Bottomore, 1962; Horowitz, 1966]. Social planning is an attempt at the intelligent direction of social change [Riemer, 1947; Adams, 1950; Gross, 1967; Bennis et al., 1969, Kahn, 1969; Havelock, 1973; Friedmann, 1973; Gil, 1973; Kramer and Specht, 1975]. But just how the conflicting wishes of different publics are to be reconciled remains a perplexing problem.

Elite direction of social planning is characteristic of communist societies. Decision making has been highly centralized, and plans have been exceedingly intricate and detailed. Planning which attempts to program practically all the activities of a society is less successful than planning that is limited to only one, or a small number, of activities or goals. This kind of social planning is an old American tradition. When the framers of our Constitution rejected primogeniture (the European provision that the lands pass intact to the eldest son) and entail (the provision that prevents him from selling them), these American planners were seeking to construct a society of small, landowning farmers instead of a society of landed estates. This purpose was reinforced by the Homestead Act of 1862, which gave public lands in small parcels to individual farmers instead of selling it in large blocks to the highest bidders. Zoning ordinances, building codes, public education, and compulsory school attendance laws are examples of social planning. Some problems which call for planning at the national or international level include the use of the world's water resources and fishing rights, use of mineral resources under international waters, the acid rain problem, and many others.

A critic of planning would contend that such planning efforts do not really change anything but are merely slightly more orderly ways of carrying out changes that are inevitable anyway. The comment perhaps sums up the matter. Certainly, no social planning will prevent or reverse a change which present knowledge and longtime trends are creating. There is, for example, no way of returning to the "simple life," nor is it possible by planning to steer social change in a direction contrary to most people's wishes and values. The major social changes are probably uncontrollable, but social planning may be able to reduce the delays and costs of integrating them into the culture.

We would always like to know—and can never be sure we know—what the future holds. A flood of books and articles are telling us how computers and robots will transform society as greatly as did the industrial revolution [e.g., Chamberlin, 1982; Kidder, 1982; Osborne, 1982; Papert, 1982]. Whether they are any more correct than yesterday's forecasters remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION

All societies change continuously. Evolutionary theories see all societies passing through quite similar stages of development until some final (presumably ideal) stage is reached when social evolution ends. Cyclical theories see societies passing through a cycle of changes returning to the starting point and repeating the cycle. Functional and conflict theories concentrate upon explaining, somewhat differently, the conditions and processes of change.

New traits appear through discovery and invention or through diffusion from other societies. The rate of social change varies enormously from society to society and from time to time. Geographic changes can produce great social change. More often, migration to a new environment brings changes
in social life. Changes in population size or composition always produce social changes. Since isolation retards change and cross-cultural contacts promote change, physically or socially isolated group show fewer changes. The structure of the society affects change: A highly conformist, traditional society or a highly integrated culture is less prone to change than the individualistic, permissive society with a less highly integrated culture. A society's attitudes and values greatly encourage or retard change. The perceived needs of a people affect the speed and direction of change. Perhaps most important of all, the cultural base provides the foundation of knowledge and skill necessary to develop new elements; as the cultural base expands, the possibilities of new combinations multiply in an exponential manner, while knowledge in one area often cross-fertilizes other areas of development.

Not all innovations are accepted. The attitudes and values of a group determine what kind of innovations a group is likely to accept. If an innovation's usefulness can be demonstrated easily and cheaply, the proof is helpful; but many social inventions cannot be tested except through a complete acceptance.