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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN MODERN INDIA
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movements are universal found in all societies in the past and present. Their nature, scope and frequency vary. In the early period of political formations social movements shaped the state – its functions, responsibilities as well as accountability and also its political boundary.

They also played an important role in distribution of power among various segments in society. In modern times they have played a very important role in challenging the Church and feudal authority, foreign rules and authoritarian regimes. French and Russian revolutions, Indian freedom movement, various peasant movements have profound impact on our life. The fascist movement in Germany, Islamic movement in Middle east, Hindutva movement in India or Tamilian movement in Sri Lanka have not only influenced political system but also value system of the people. Their legacies influence us all in a variety of ways. In the contemporary times their occurrences are in all the states. They often though not always play decisive role in all political systems – democratic and authoritarian. They make and unmake political institutions, norms of social and political behaviour and also nature of regimes. Social and political conflicts as well as expectations of the people get reflected in movements.

Understanding of social movements is important not only for all those who are dissatisfied with the present social and political order but also to those who are contented with the system to understand fragility of the political institutions and their future. Any socially sensitive person, no matter one is activist or academic, one is sympathetic or critic of the political system cannot ignore social movements of the time. Our understanding of nature of political institutions and their working, nature of Constitution, political decisions and legislation remain incomplete without understanding social movements. We will have a better understanding of the Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights of the Indian Constitutions, if we carefully analyse political
processes which affected Indian freedom movement in the 1930s and 1940s. Similarly various land reform legislations of the 1950s have antecedents in peasant movements in different parts of the country. In short our understanding of political institutions and processes remain incomplete without the understanding of social movements. The study of social movements offers “a way to blend humanistic and social scientific concerns. The humanist’s concern with historical understanding and values and the social scientist’s concern with using general principles to systematically order empirical data can be joined.” Factual knowledge of these events is required if we are to know how to interpret, order and compare them.

DEFINITION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In common parlance, media and political circles the term ‘social movement’ is often used loosely conveying different meanings. Sometimes it is used to show a historical trend like modernisation or urbanisation. The term is also used to indicate a set of activities undertaken by one or many organisations to bring ‘change’ in society such as education movement launched by the government department of education for starting schools and enrolling students. It is also used for collective action of a segment of society. The phrase social movement is in vogue among political leaders and social activists to camouflage their political activities.

However, the term ‘social movement’ gained currency in European languages in the early nineteenth century. This was the period of social upheaval. Church and authority the absolute power of the monarchs were challenged. People were demanding democratic rights and asserting for freedom and equality. The political leaders and authors who used the term ‘social movement’ were concerned with the emancipation of the exploited classes and the creation of a new society by changing property relationships. Their ideological orientation is reflected in their definition. Hence there is no one definition of ‘social movement.’ Scholars and social activists have different ideological positions on political system and expected social change. And even those who share the same meaning of social change often differ in their views on strategy and path to bring change. But one thing is certain among all conceptualisation of social movement i.e. collective action. It is about the mobilisation of the people for political action. However, collective action as such is not synonymous of social movement. Action of a mob in streets is though a collective behaviour, it cannot be called a social movement. For instance when a mob at the railway station stops a train for misbehaviour of railway staff or prefer to travel without ticket can not be called social movement. Nor riots between two ethnic groups or act of looting food grains from shops or destruction of public property can be called so. These acts by themselves are not social movements. They may be a part – one of the programmes of the social movement.

We do not call these collective behaviour as social movements because they are often impulsive and do not aim at bringing social change. They are reaction to a particular situation. However, when they are engineered as a programme of the larger agenda for social change — challenging or even perpetuating power of a particular group for status quo — then rioting may become a part of the social movement. For instance those who desire to establish dominance of a community engineer riots to create insecurity and thereby ‘community consciousness’ against other community. In such a case riot is not an impulsive isolated phenomenon. Or in several cases social movements emerge from riots as they breed political activities to sustain emotion of the people. Collective action for bringing ‘social change’ is an important dimension of definition of social movements. Of course the collective action for maintaining or not disturbing social change as perceived by others is also social movement. Such collective action for status
quo may be called counter-movement. Moreover, there is no one meaning of social change. This is evident from the following sample definitions of social movements used in social science literature.

✓ Paul Wilkinson defines social movement as “a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into ‘utopian’ community. Social movements are thus clearly different from historical movements, tendencies or trends. It is important to note, however, that such tendencies and trends, and the influence of the unconscious or irrational factors in human behaviour, may be of crucial importance in illuminating the problems of interpreting and explaining social movement”.

✓ According to Herbert Blumer. “Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. They have their inception in the condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life, and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme or system of living.”

✓ For Doug McAdam, social movements are “those organized efforts, on the part of excluded groups, to promote or resist changes in the structure of society that involve recourse to noninstitutional forms of political participation.”

✓ Social movements are, according to Sidney Tarrow, “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities”.

Note three important elements of the above definition. They are (1) collective action; (2) social change and (3) common purpose.

IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Many political philosophers and leaders conceive the ideal political system and social order. They plead for a necessity and sometimes inevitability of social movements including a revolutionary movement to oppose the ‘present’ political regime and the system and to establish the system which they consider ‘ideal’ and perfect capable to resolve the problems of society. So once the ‘new’ or ideal social order is established social movements have no place to exist. What at the most requires is changes in institutional mechanism to resolve conflict that may arise. They find social movements not only redundant but also detrimental in the ideal social order. Often such movements are looked upon either as ‘counter revolutionary’ and reactionary and/or impulsive, and naïve and/or irresponsible. In this view dissent is not appreciated and even not tolerated. This is what happened in soviet Russia after the October Revolution in 1917. During the 1950s and 1960s not only several leaders of the ruling party but also political scientists in India looked down strikes, demonstrations and mass movements as disruptive and therefore ‘illegal’. One of them argued: ‘One can understand if not justify the reasons which led the people in a dependent country to attack and destroy everything which was a symbol or an expression of foreign rule. But it is very strange that people should even now behave as if they continue to live in a dependent country ruled by foreigners.’
The assumption that the ideal political system is ipso facto capable of resolving all conflict in society is simplistic. Such view is dangerous for democratic social order. There is not, and cannot be an end of history; the final destination and fool proof system. This is not a static concept of political system and society. Each society has its own contradictions. The system may resolve some issues but also can generate new areas of conflict among different segments of society. The leaders and the members of their class or social group leading the movements are likely to occupy seat of power and reap benefits. That situation generates conflict between the beneficiaries and the deprived.

Moreover, those who dominate and occupy seat of power tend to claim to have ultimate and all wisdom for the ‘good of society’. There is a tendency among the political leaders not to step down from power. Sometimes they feel that without them others would harm society. Such a tendency leads to intolerance towards dissent and opposition. Dissent is a spirit of democracy. And social movement is one form of organised dissent.

Social movements provide a possibility for articulation of grievances and problems. They bring pressure on the state, keep check over the authority needed for healthy democracy. Social movement is way of people’s/segment’s collective politics to express their aspirations and priorities. Without understanding politics of the people we cannot understand complexities and dynamics of political system.

APPROACHES TO STUDY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: MARXIST, STRUCTURE-FUNCTIONAL AND GANDHIAN

MARXIST APPROACH

Scholars following the Marxist approach to analyse various social movements and those who are involved in social movements claiming to be Marxist are primarily interested in bringing about revolutionary change in society. According to the Marxist approach conflict is the central core of social movements. There are different kinds of conflicts in society. Some conflicts are between individuals for personal power, style of functioning, between the communities—social, ethnic, religious, regional etc.— and other conflicts are around material interest and domination of one over the others. The nature of the non-class conflict varies from society to society and can be resolved through negotiations and institutional mechanism. Sometimes though not always such conflict is in a garb of ‘class’/economic conflict. That is, economic conflict of different classes belonging to separate communities take the form of ethnic conflict. Class conflict is located in economic structure of society, in-built in the production and distribution system. It is around domination and subjugation between the classes. Those who own means of production dominate social and political system. In all forms of class society specific form of production predominates, which influences other forms of social relations. Ralph Miliband observes, ”Class domination can never be purely ‘economic’, or purely ‘cultural’: it must always have a strong and pervasive ‘political’ content, not least because the law is crystallized form which politics assumes in providing the necessary sanction and legitimation of all forms of domination. In this sense, ‘politics’ sanctions what is ‘permitted’, and therefore ‘permits’ the relations between the members of different and conflicting classes, inside and outside their ‘relation of production’.”

Those who own and control the means of production take away the surplus from those who produce. They accumulate surplus for their end and expand and perpetuate their control over the
society. The former may be feudal lord in feudal system or industrial bourgeois in capitalist system. Antagonistic interests between the propertied and labour classes are inherent in a class-based society that generates contradictions. The former use the coercive as well as persuasive power of the state, and also other institutions, including religion, culture, education, mass media etc, to perpetuate their hegemony in society and to control the exploited classes. The latter resist, protest and occasionally revolt or launch organised and collective action against the dominance of the propertied classes. It is their effort to bring about revolutionary political change by overthrowing the dominant classes in power. In short, class struggle is the central driving force for resistance. Such collective actions take the form of social movements.

Though to Marxists, structural causes of conflicting economic interests are central, number of Marxist scholars have begun to pay attention to ethnic, religious and other cultural factors. Some of them have begun to analyse the nature of the consciousness of exploited classes. According to Marxist scholars, members of the same class not only have common interests vis-a-vis other classes, but also share a common consciousness regarding their position in society that they share common interests. This facilitates their collective action against the ruling classes and state.

They assert that the parliamentary democracy in capitalist state protects the interests of the haves and facilitates exploitation of the labour. Hence the conflict between the haves and have-nots cannot be resolved through institutional mechanism. A.R. Desai argued in the 1960s that civil and democratic rights of the underprivileged were increasingly violated in capitalist system. The state failed to provide basic human rights of the vast majority of the exploited classes. The have-nots in rural areas were deprived of their livelihood natural resources of land, forest and water. People resist against anti-people measures of the state and dominant classes. Through various organised and unorganised struggles the poor demand for the protection of their basic rights. He asserted, “The parliamentary form of government, as a political institutional device, has proved to be inadequate to continue or expand concrete democratic rights of the people. This form, either operates as a shell within which the authority of capital perpetuates itself, obstructing or reducing the opportunities for people to consciously participate in the process of society, or is increasingly transforming itself into a dictatorship, where capital sheds some of its democratic pretensions and rules by open, ruthless dictatorial means. Public protests will continue till people have ended the rule of capital in those countries where it still persists. They will also continue against those bureaucratic totalitarian political regimes where the rule of capital has ended, but where due to certain peculiar historical circumstances Stalinist bureaucratic, terrorist political regimes have emerged. The movements and protests of people will continue till adequate political institutional forms for the realisation and exercise of concrete democratic rights are found (1965).”

For Marxists, social movements are just not a protest and expression of the grievances. The exploited classes are not interested in reforming this or that institutions though they do fight for incremental rights to strengthen their strength. For instance working class fights for more wages, regulation of work, social security and also participation in management. Through this they build up solidarity among the workers and expand their struggles. Ultimately their attempt is to crack the dominant political system so that in the process the struggles move in the direction of revolutionary changes in the ownership of means of production and over through the dominant state structure. The struggles of the oppressed are both violent and non-violent depending upon the strength and means adopted by the state and propertied classes for the oppression. They are not averse to violent path but it does not mean that they always follow the
violent means. For them the means is not that important as the ends. They often highlight the violence and oppression of the state and the dominant classes against the exploited classes. In such a situation the latter are left with no choice to counter the adversaries with the same method.

There is a good deal of debate among Marxist scholars on theoretical and methodological issues. Recently a group of Marxist historians, the ‘Subaltern Studies’ group, has begun to study ‘history from below’. They criticise the ‘traditional’ Marxist historians for ignoring the history of the masses, as if the ‘subaltern’ classes do not make history of their own, depending solely on the advanced classes or the elite for organisation and guidance. It is argued that the traditional Marxist scholars have undermined cultural factors and viewed a linear development of class consciousness (Guha 1983). On the other hand, the Subaltern Studies historians are strongly criticised by other Marxist scholars for ignoring structural factors and viewing ‘consciousness’ as independent of structural contradictions. They are accused of being Hegelian ‘idealists’.

**STRUCTURE — FUNCTIONAL APPROACH**

There is a great deal of variation amongst the non-Marxist scholars, in their approach to the analysis of social movements. The ideological positions regarding a need for social and/or political change, and the role of movements therein differ. It is argued by several liberal scholars such as William Kornhauser, Robert Nisbet, Edward Shils and others that mass movements are the product of mass societies which are extremist and anti-democratic. These scholars are in favour of excluding the masses from day-to-day participation in politics, which hampers the efficient functioning of the government. Some Indian scholars who approved of the agitation for independence from foreign rule, did not favour agitation by people in the post-independence period. They condemned them outright as ‘dangerous’ and ‘dysfunctional’ for ‘civilised society’. Though some other liberals do not favour revolutionary change in the political and economic structure, they advocate ‘political change’ which is confined to change in government and political institutions. A few are for ‘revolutionary’ change but they differ from Marxist scholars in class analysis. They lay emphasis on political institutions and culture. In their analysis of the movements, some do not inquire into social and economic causes of conflict and collective struggles. Others differ in their emphasis on the causes responsible for the movements. Some emphasise individual psychological traits, some focus on elite power struggles and their manipulation; and some others emphasise the importance of cultural rather than economic factors.

The scholars who adhere to the theory of political development consider that the rising aspirations of the people are not adequately met by existing political institutions which are rigid or incompetent. As the gap between the expectations of the people and performance of the system widens, ‘political instability and disorder’ leading to mass upsurge increases (Huntington 1968). Rajni Kothari argued that ‘direct action’ is inevitable in the context of India’s present-day ‘parliamentary democracy’. ‘The general climate of frustration, the ineffectiveness of known channels of communication, the alienation and atomisation of the individual, the tendency towards regimentation and the continuous state of conflict (which may remain latent and suppressed for a time) between the rulers and the ruled—all these make the ideal of self-government more and more remote and render parliamentary government an unstable form of political organisation’ (1960).
It is also argued by some that that public protests have a certain ‘functional utility’ even in a parliamentary form of government. David Bayley (1962) observes that before and after independence, a large number of the people felt that the institutional means of redress for grievances, frustrations and wrongs—actual or fancied—were inadequate.

GANDHIAN APPROACH

Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of India’s freedom movement has a far reaching influence on social movements in India during his life time and in the post-independent India. Though Gandhi did not offer systematic analysis on social system, its functioning and causes of conflict, he was a critic of ‘modernity’ as developed in the West under industrial revolution. He was against capitalist economic system. And, he had deep concern for the poor – poorest of the poor. Conflict in society, according to him is not because of conflicting economic and social interests among the communities/classes. It is because of different ‘understanding’ of interests and society; different moral and ethical values on good and evil; or prejudices against each other. During his life time he led struggles not only against the British rule but also racial discrimination in South Africa, against untouchability and ‘discrimination’ to women.

“Purity of means” in social struggles and resolving conflict is the central concern of Gandhian ideology. According to Gandhi the means are as important as the ends in resolving conflict. For that he strongly advocated ahinsa i.e. non-violence. Violence he believed, was not only wrong, it was a mistake. It could never really end injustice, because it inflamed the prejudice and fear that fed oppression. For Gandhi, unjust means would never produce a just outcome. “The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree,” he wrote in 1909, “and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree...We reap exactly as we sow.”

Gandhians advocate a need for resistance of those who are the victims and suffer against injustice. The method of resistance was satyagraha i.e satya (truth) and agraha (insitance, holding firmly). Bondurant (1988) has called this approach the “Gandhian dialectic.”
Satyagraha was a dialectical process where non-violent action (antithesis) engages existing structures of power (thesis) in a truth-seeking struggle leading to a more just and truthful relationship (synthesis).

In this technique the victims oppose unjust law and also the act of the oppressor/foreign ruler/landlord/upper caste. They even break the ‘unjust’ law and in consequence suffer punishment imposed on them by the authority. Such peaceful resistance, Gandhi believed, would open the eyes of oppressors and weaken the hostility behind repression; rather than adversaries being bullied to capitulate, they would be obliged to see what was right, and that would make them change their minds and actions. But satyagraha soon took on a larger dimension, one that was less a function of its spiritual provenance than its feasibility. Gandhi recognised that there were limits to the exemplary value of personal sacrifice; even the most committed resisters could absorb only so much suffering, and the pride and prejudices typical of entrenched regimes could not be dissolved quickly. If satyagraha was to become a practical political tool, Gandhi realised, it had to bring pressure to bear on its opponents. “I do not believe in making appeals,” he emphasised on moral force of the opponents.

The potential of satyagraha to change an opponent’s position, Gandhi believed, came from the dependence of rulers on the co-operation of those who had the choice to obey or resist. While he continued to argue that satyagraha could reveal the truth to opponents and win them over, he often spoke of it in military terms and planned actions that were intended not so much to convert adversaries but to jeopardise their interests if they did not yield. In this way he made satyagraha ‘a realistic alternative’ for those more interested in what could produce change than in what conscience could justify.

The method of satyagraha is often called as “passive resistance”. But Gandhi made the distinction between the two. In 1920, he argued that they were not synonymous. Passive resistance is generally practice by the weak and non-violence is not their credo. Sometimes it has narrow self-interest which fail to reach out the opponent. But it is no so in satyagraha, “…. passive resistance does not necessarily involve complete adherence to truth under every circumstance. Therefore it is different from satyagraha in three essentials: Satyagraha is a weapon of the strong; it admits of no violence under any circumstance whatever; and it ever insists upon truth.”

David Hardiman calls Gandhi’s method as “dialogical resistance.” For Gandhi the adversary was not an enemy. “It is a breach of satyagraha to wish ill to an opponent or to say a harsh world to him or of him with the intention of harming him.” He believed in changing heart and reasoning of the enemy through persuasion and dialogue. But he did not rule other methods to build pressure on the opponents. “He knew that in many cases, reason by itself would not win an argument. This was where self-inflicted suffering, such as fasting, could be important…additional political pressure was often needed, entailing mass demonstrations, non-co-operation, tax refusal, hartals and like.”

Wehr (1979) has termed Gandhi’s approach to conflict as a self-limiting one. Gandhi was challenging a number of political and social conditions in British India, most notably colonial rule, caste and religious discrimination, and exploitation of workers and peasants. He had to confront these “opponents” but he had to do so without unleashing the enormous potential for violent upheaval existing in the India of that time. His moral and political philosophies found practical form in methods he used to inhibit runaway responses. To prevent proliferation of
issues, for example, Gandhi was careful to focus each satyagraha campaign on a single, clear issue around which agreement might be reached. This helped to keep the conflict within bounds. His practice of maintaining good personal relations with his opponents during a campaign prevented the shift from disagreement over an issue to personal antagonism. His policy of complete openness in both interpersonal and media communication reduced the threat and suspicion that secrecy and unpredictability introduce into a conflict.

CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

REFORM, REBELLION AND REVOLUTION

Generally those who follow Marxist framework examine social movements in terms of their potentialities for revolutionary transformation in society. They characterise the movements in reference to not only of the participants and leaders’ ideology as well as their immediate and long term objectives but also the scholars’ own expectations from social movements. In this framework the movements are classified on the basis of what they attain or likely to attain and the objectives of the collective action against the political system. According to this theoretical perspective social movements are of three types: revolt or rebellion, reform, and revolution. Revolt or rebellion protests against the political system or regime and may also make attempts to change in the authority – government and/or ruling elite/ rulers. But it does not question nor it aims at changing the political system. In short, the movement is against the regime rather than the system. A revolt is a challenge to political authority, aimed at overthrowing the government. A rebellion is an attack on existing authority without any intention of seizing state power to change the system.

The social movement which aims at bringing certain changes in the system and not transforming the system completely is called reformist movement. Such movements question the functioning of political institutions and build pressure on the government to introduce certain changes in their structure and procedures. While doing so they do not question the political system as a whole; nor do they relate a political institution with the larger political structure. In other words they focus on reforming a particular part of an institution or the system. For example, the movement that primarily aims at changing election rules and procedures does not relate elections with the economic structure and power relationship in society. In that sense it is reformist movement. Or, various social reform movements try to reform certain customs like child marriage or dowry, norms such as animal sacrifice, untouchability; or social arrangements such as hierarchical order in status and social mobility rather than challenging the whole social order based on pollution and purity around the principles of inequality. When women’s movements struggle to have reservation for women in the parliament it is reformist movement aiming at changing the representation system. Reform does not challenge the political system per se. It attempts to bring about changes in the relations between the parts of the system in order to make it more efficient, responsive and workable.

In a revolution, a section or sections of society launch an organised struggle to overthrow not only the established government and regime but also the socio-economic structure which sustains it, and replace the structure by an alternative social order. For instance the Naxalite movement is not only challenging the particular government but aims at over-throwing the state which is feudal/semi–feudal and desires to establish communist state. Or the dalit movement aims at transforming social order based on caste system and desires to create egalitarian social
system. In the same way when women movement challenges patriarchy in society and attempts its abolition then it becomes revolutionary movement.

Nature of social movements often overlaps. Many movements undergo change in the course of time. Some apparently reformist movements may take revolutionary course; and some which begin with revolutionary agenda become reformist also. All social movements do not necessarily begin with clear objectives in terms of the maintenance or the transformation of the system. They often get shaped in the process through the leaders, participants and ideology.

**NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

The classification based on Marxist theoretical framework focusing on class structure of the participants, with ultimate objectives to overthrow the present state aiming at bringing total change in production relation is considered as ‘old’ social movement. They are also called classical movements. These movements, it is argued, primarily focus on the state power and on class consciousness of the participants. The examples of the peasant or working class movement against the feudal/semi-feudal economic structure fall in this category.

As against this, some of the recent movements particularly in and after the 1960s in Europe such as peace movement, ecological movement, women’s movement etc. are called ‘new’ social movement. In India the movements around the issue of identity – dalit, adivasi, women, human rights, environment etc. are also labeled as the ‘new’ social movement. In one sense they are called ‘new’ social movements because they have raised the issues related to identity and autonomy which are non-class issues and do not confront with the state. They are the new forms of social movements. However, it is simplistic to say that in the past people did not raise and struggled for identity and autonomy. For instance the Birsa Munda movement in Chhota Nagpur during the 1830s was the struggle to resist the intervention of the British state in their life. It was the movement to protect their autonomy. According to K.S. Singh (1966) the movement aimed at the “liquidation of the racial enemies, the Dikus, European missionaries and officials and the native Christians. The Mundas would recover their ‘lost kingdom’. There will be enough to eat, no famine, the people will live together in love”. So it is not correct to say in the past people did not struggle for identity and autonomy. In fact as Andre Gunder Frank and Marta Fuentes (2002) argue that the ‘classical’ working class movements are the product of the 19th century industrial society. “On the other hand, peasant, localist community, ethnic/nationalist, religious, and even feminist/ women’s movements have existed for centuries and even millennia in many parts of the world (2002).” Therefore the ‘old’ and new’ are not related to time. They differ in their features.

The scholars who reject the framework of the classical or Marxist framework identify the following characteristics of the ‘new’ social movements.

1) The New Social Movements (NSM) are not directing their collective action to state power. They are concerned with individual and collective morality. Andre Gunder Frank and Marta Fuentes find that NSMs “share the force of morality and a sense of (in)justice in individual motivation, and the force of social mobilisation in developing social power. Individual membership or participation and motivation in all sorts of social movements contain a strong moral component and defensive concern with justice in the social and world order. (2002).”
2) The new social movements are not class-based. They are multi-class. In fact, they do not subscribe to the theory that society is divided on class line and the classes are antagonistic. The new social movements are either ethnic or nationalist and plural. Women’s movement is an example. Gail Omvedt treats the contemporary farmers’ movement as ‘new’ and non-class movement. It is a movement of small and poor as well as middle and rich farmers. These movements, she argues also have support of agriculture labourers. It also has support of shopkeepers and also of high and low castes. She argues, “ideologies of the farmers’ movement thus provided a clear challenge to Marxism that limited its analysis only to capital-labour struggles as defined within a realm of commodity exchange; they looked to a wider arena of capital accumulation and economic exploitation taking into account factors other than class defined in the narrow sense, and in many ways their thrust coincided with that of the developing environmental movements (1993).”

3) The new social movements are confined to and concern with civil society. According to the proponents of NSM “civil society is getting diminished; its social space is suffering a shrinkage and the ‘social’ of the civil society is eroded by the controlling ability of the state. The expansion of the state, in the contemporary setting, coincides with the expansion of the market. State and market are seen as two institutions making inroads into all aspects of the citizen’s life. Under the combined impact of the forces of the state and the market, society grows helpless. Consequently, the NSMs raise the issue of the ‘self-defense’ of the community and society against the increasing expansion of the state apparatuses: agencies of surveillance and social control.(Singh 2001)”

4) NSMs are not around economic issues of land, wages or property. They are primarily concerned with self-identity and autonomy of an individual and community against the state, market and social institutions. Therefore, dalit movement for dignity and adivasis movement for their autonomy are treated as NSM.

5) NSMs are not concerned for the benefit of one class or group. They are concerned for the good of every one irrespective of class. Environmental movement in that sense according to some scholars, is NSM as it does not raise the issue of a particular class.

6) For some NSMs are grassroots or micro movements and do not have to capture state power on their agenda. They are democratic in their organisational structure. According to Jean Cohen NSMs raise issue which emerge from society rather than form state and economy. They are concerned with democratisation in day to day life. They focus on communication and identity. According to Rajendra Singh “the aim of NSM is to recognise the relations between state, society and the economy, and to create a public space in which democratic discourse on autonomy and freedom of the individual and collectivities, their identities and orientations could be discussed and examined. In its many expressions, the NSMs generally confine themselves to social action with a spirit of what Cohen calls ‘self limiting radicalism’ (2001)”.

ISSUE-BASED MOVEMENTS

Some of those who follow structure-function approach classify social movements on the basis of issues around which people are mobilised. People do get mobilised around number of issues
from local and immediate to systemic and long term. They vary from time to time and from society to society. Sometimes the issue–based classification treat different issue separately. Sometimes issues are conceptualised in theoretical framework such as developmental, livelihood, human Right issues or political, economic, cultural and social issues; or local, regional and national issues. Classification of the issues depends upon scholars’ perspective. For instance the movement of the dam-affected people can be called as ‘rehabilitation’ movement of dam-affected people and it can also be called as anti-development movement or human right movement.

Similarly, struggles of the forest-dwellers can be classified into: forest movement, civil rights or livelihood movement or movement for common resources.

CLASSIFICATION BY SOCIAL CATEGORIES

Those who follow Marxist frame work often classify social movements on the basis of classes such as peasant movement or rich peasant movement, working class movement or middle class movement and so on. Those who follow cultural or community framework divide movements on the basis of community such as ethnic movement, western movements, black movement, dalit movement etc. Sometimes social categories are divided by region such urban and rural. Movements may also be classified on economic as well as ethnic categories and also by issues together. Some others classify movements on the basis of the participants, such as peasants, tribals, students, women, dalits, etc. In many cases the participants and issues go together.

AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS

Different agrarian classes have resorted to collective action throughout the pre-Impendence and post-Independence periods. The volume of participation of the classes, response of the state and success of the agrarian movements have depended on the nature of leadership, issues, patterns of mobilisation and the attitude of the authorities. These days the agrarian movements are referred to as among the social movements.

WHAT ARE THE AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS AND AGRARIAN CLASSES?

Agrarian movements include the movements of agrarian classes which are related to agriculture in terms of working on the land or in terms of both working on land and its ownership. In other words, these are the movements of the agricultural labourers, poor and small peasant/tenants and farmers/kulaks/rich peasants/rural rich. The issues taken up in the agrarian movements are generally economic. But in several cases the economic and social issues overlap. Such cases include where the agrarian class is both an economic and social group; for example in the case of dalits and women the economic and social (self-respect, dignity and gender based discrimination) are also involved.

Differentiation within the Agrarian Classes

Agrarian society is not a homogeneous unit. It is divided on economic and social basis. The mobilisation of an agrarian group depends on the specific issues related to it. The collaboration between different groups or conflict among them also depends on the convergence of the group interests. Therefore, in order to understand the movements of different agrarian classes it is necessary to discuss the criteria to designate a particular class. There two broad frameworks...
which are used by the scholars to differentiate or identify different agrarian classes —, i.e., non-Marxian and the Marxian.

All Indian Kisan Sabha march from Nashik to Mumbai to gherao Vidhan Sabha in 2018

The advocates of the former take into consideration the multiple factors like caste, geographical zones and size of land holdings to identify the agrarian classes. The classes which belong to the low castes are usually identified as those belonging to the agricultural labourer/poor and small peasants and those belonging to the high castes and middle castes are identified as belonging to the upper classes — rich peasants and land lords. The followers of the latter — the Marxian approach consider the non-Marxian approach as unscientific and give an alternative framework. They argue that a scientific way to differentiate peasantry is to see the proportion of family labour-power in relation to the outside labour-power in working on the land along with the ownership of land. This criterion is based on the writings of Mao and Lenin. Utsa Patnaik has synthesised the criterion of Mao and Lenin in her book Peasant Class Differentiation: A Study in Method with Reference to Haryana (Oxford, 1987). Patnaik’s model has been used by some other scholars as well. According to this framework those who do not own land but work on others’ land or own smaller size of the land holdings and work more on others land than on their own land belong to the classes of agricultural labourers and small and poor peasants; those who own land and agricultural resources, employ agricultural labourers, poor and small peasants or those who own land and do not themselves work on land (except for supervision) but depend on the outside labour are categorised as the rural rich (middle peasants, rich peasants and landlords). Utsa Patnaik’s model, however, is more applicable to the areas which have witnessed capitalism than those which still have predominance of feudal mode of production.

We can group the agrarian groups into the following classes:

i) The Rural Poor: Agricultural labourers and small/poor/marginal peasants — Agricultural labourers do not own land but work on others land for wages either as agricultural labourers or
tenants. Small/poor/marginal peasants have land but it not enough to meet the basic needs. They have to work on others land also; and

ii) Farmers/middle peasants/kulaks/rich peasant/rural rich — These classes own land and other required paraphernalia in agriculture. They work on their land or do not work themselves except doing the supervisory work along with employing agricultural labourers.

The last three decades of the twentieth century saw the movements of a group of agrarian classes, which shared a lot of common characteristics. Notwithstanding, the reservation on the usage of these terms, this category has been addressed as kulaks, middle peasants or the farmers.

APPROACHES TO STUDY AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS

Traditionally there have been two approaches to study the agrarian movements – the Marxian and non-Marxian. The former analyse these movements in the light of the social relations of production or the economic relations – how the poorer agrarian classes get mobilised against their exploitation by the exploiting classes. The latter give more emphasis to the cultural and non-economic factors. In the early 1980s there was an addition to the Marxian approach. Influenced by the Gramsci’s writings this approach came to be known as the subaltern approach. Subaltern school has had the most profound impact on the study of the agrarian movements. It has been popularised by Ranajit Guha in the series of subaltern studies. This approach is critical of the classical Marxism, which gives primacy to the economic factors over other factors. The subaltern school argues that the peasants have their own consciousness, leadership and other cultural factors which play much more important role than the class. The subaltern school is also criticised by classical Marxists as separating consciousness and culture from the economic structure and thus not giving the true picture of the reality.

AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

Ghanshyam Shah while reviewing the literature on social movements in India in the book Social Movements in India: A Review of Literature points out that Political Science has been averse to the peoples’ participation in politics and movements. In the similar vein a section of literature has categorised the peasants as passive and docile subjects, uninterested in participating in the movements. Barrington Moore Jr. is representative of this perspective. A large number of scholars disputed this view, prominent among them included Kathleen Gough, A. R. Desai, D. N. Dhanagare and Ranajit Guha. In fact, Kathleen Gough identified 77 revolts during the 19th and 20th centuries.

Almost all regions of the country witnessed agrarian movements during the pre-Independence period. Popularly known as the peasant movements, these movements involved all exploited classes – tenants, agricultural labourers, artisans, etc. Ranajit Guha, actually includes those landlords as exploited classes who were indebted to the moneylenders. Among the most prominent of these movements were Oudh peasant movements in UP, Kheda movement in Guajarat, Mopilla movement in Malabar (Kerala), Champaran peasant movement in Bihar, Wahabi, Fairabi and Tebarga movements of Bengal and Telengana movement in Madras presidencies (areas forming present Andhra Pradesh).

When you compare the characteristics of these movements with those of the post-Independence period, you will notice that there are differences in the issues, nature of leadership, ideologies and pattern of mobilisation in the agrarian movements of these two phases — pre and post-
Independence. The pre-Independence period movements can be termed as the anti-colonial movements as well, since these movements were against the classes which were supporters of the British empire — the landlords, moneylenders and other exploiting classes. The issues raised in these movements were related to the nature of agrarian relations. These relations were built on the exploitation of the agrarian classes — tenants/peasants/agricultural labourers, artisans, etc. In order to meet the requirement of the colonial forces and to satisfy their feudal needs, the landlords exploited them in several ways. These included unreasonable increase in the rent, forced gifts (nazars), begar (forced labour) physical torture, insecurity of tenure (eviction). These problems were compounded by natural calamities like famines and flood, commercialisation of crops, indebtedness. The failure to meet the economic and non-economic requirements of the landlords the poor agrarian classes were not only evicted from the land they cultivated they were also tortured physically.

Agrarian classes were not silent sufferers. They reacted to the exploitative system in different ways. These ways included both — the ways which James Scott calls “everyday forms of resistance” and in the forms of organised peasant movements. The leadership of the peasant movements of the pre-Independence period articulated the problems of the peasants and mobilised them into action against the landlords, moneylenders and the British administration. The general point which emerges from a large number of studies is that the leadership of these movements came from the non-peasant classes. Kapil Kumar in his book Peasants in Revolt: Tenants, Landless, Congress and the Raj in Oudh indicates that though the leadership Oudh peasant movement did not belong to peasants as such, it ran parallel to the leadership of the national movement. In the course of time with the merger of this movement with the national movement the leadership of the peasant movement was taken over by the leadership of the national movement. Similar observation is made by scholars some about the Champaran peasant movement. Religion, caste, nationalism and Marxism provided ideological basis of the peasant during this phase. Religion and caste became the rallying points of the peasants in Oudh, Mopillaha and Wahabi and Fairidie uprisings. The usage of religion generated a debate among the scholars; one group of them categorising such mobilisation as communal while other linking region with the economic problems of the peasants. The attack on the Indian exploited classes — landlords and moneylenders and participation of the peasantry in the armed insurgency in Telengana under the banner of the Communist Party of India are examples of how ideologies of nationalism and Marxism contributed to the mobilisation of the peasants in their movements. The movements took different forms — demonstration, destroying the properties of the landlords and money lenders, boycott of the landlords by the barbers and washer men. On several occasions the movements resulted in violent clashes between the agents of landlords and police.

The peasant movements of the pre-Independence period had impact on the programmes of the Indian National Congress. The Congress Socialist group within the Congress which included later generation of socialists, communists and future Prime Minister of India advocated the need for the drastic land reforms. The Congress appointed a committee to look into the distress of agrarian classes and to suggest measures to ameliorate their conditions. This had its impact on the agrarian policies of country when it became independent. As the land reforms became the state subject, depending on the willingness and political will of the leadership, land reforms became the subject to reckon with in different states of India.

**AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS IN POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD**
Certain developments in Indian political economy of the post-Independence era can provide landmarks about the genesis and decline of the agrarian movements. These are the policy measures introduced by the state during the 1950s, both at the national and provincial levels to bring about the agrarian transformation — through land reforms, community development programmes and agricultural Extension schemes; the green revolution in select areas of the country during the 1960s, and opening of agricultural sector to the world market through the latest phase of globalisation from the 1990s. These developments have resulted in emergence of new set of issues, rise of new agrarian classes and decline of erstwhile classes, new types of organisations and patterns of political mobilisation. We discuss movements of different agrarian classes. These classes are agricultural labourers, poor and small peasants and the farmers/middle peasants/kulaks/rich peasants/rural rich.

Rural Poor: Agricultural Labourers and Small/Poor/Marginal Peasants

The rural poor is a conglomerate of the poorer classes — landless agricultural labourers, tenants, poor, small or marginal farmers who own uneconomic landholdings and supplement their income by working as wage labourers either in agriculture or informal non-agrarian sectors. Most of them belong to low castes — lower backwards and dalits. Unlike the kulaks/middle/rich peasants they face dual problems — social discrimination and economic exploitation. Therefore, while the mobilisation of the better off agrarian classes has mainly been around the economic issue, that of the rural poor has focused both on the social and economic issues. They are sometimes mobilised exclusively on the social and cultural issues, they are also mobilised mainly on the economic issues. Assertion of dalit identity, mainly under the influence of Ambedkarism through different social and cultural organisations of dalits, finding expression in different ways including conversion to another religions are examples of mobilisation on the social and cultural issue. As economic problems are intertwined with their social status, their social and economic issues cannot be mechanically separated.

The agricultural labourers and poor/small peasants have been mobilised into collective actions throughout the post-Independence era in different states of India by different kinds of organisations. The latter included the socialist and communist parties, Gandhians, voluntary groups/NGOs, independent individuals and naxalites. This sub-section discusses some examples of movements of agrarian classes which form the rural poor.

The first two decades following Impendence saw the movements of the rural poor in Uttar Pradesh by the socialists and communists on the one hand and by the naxalites and the Communist Party of India on the other hand. The issues on which they were mobilised in the western Uttar Pradesh included redistribution of the Gaon Samaj land, abolition of begar, giving better wages, lifting of the sanction imposed by the rich classes on the poorer classes for cutting grass needed as fodder from the fields of the former, and protection of the women of the poorer classes from the exploitation of the men belonging to the richer classes. The forms of protest included hunger strike and demonstrations. The 1960s also saw the mobilisation of dalits by Republican Party of India, which unlike the BSP of the later period took up the cultural issues along with the economic problems. Besides, there are innumerable examples of the protest of the agricultural labourers and poor/small peasants in the form of informal group organisations or “every day forms of resistance” (Jagpal Singh, Capitalism and Dependence: Chap.IV “Dependence, Resistance and Sanctions”). In Basti district of eastern Uttar Pradesh, the CPI had...
organised the Land Grab movement during the 1960s in order to give surplus land to the poorer classes. However, the traditional left and the socialists were unable to mobilise dalits in several parts of the country like some area of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkahnd, Chhattisgarh and Orissa. This was because of their neglect of dalit question; though the socialists showed concern for the caste, their focus were the backward castes, not the dalits. This lacuna of the conventional left was corrected by the naxalites in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa. Their ability to combine the economic issues with the castes disabilities enabled them to mobilise the low caste agricultural labourers and poor peasants. Their resolve to get the land reforms implemented and abolish caste discrimination made them popular among these sections. They are not averse to use violence to eliminate “class enemies”, which include police personal, landlords and some politicians. Till recently all naxalite organisations did not participate in the elections; now some of them do take part in elections. Among the most important naxal outfits are Janashakti and People’s War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha (BPKS) and Marxist Coordination Committee (MCC) in Bihar.

Recent decades have seen the movement of poor peasants who have been affected by the negative impact of development introduced by the state, especially funded by the World Bank. Taking recourse to Gandhian means of protest these movements emerged have as alternative mode of movements. Concerned individuals, civil society organisations, voluntary organisations and NGOs are playing significant roles in such movements. Narmada Bachao Andolan led by Medha Patkar is one of the most important examples of such movements.

**Farmers/Middle Peasants/Kulaks/Rich Peasants/Rural Rich**

The two decades of the last century — the sixties and seventies, witnessed the movements of a section, which is known by different names — farmers, middle peasants, kulaks, rich peasants or rural rich. These movements had their own organisations and leadership. These movements were: those of two separate organisations of the same name — the Bharatiya Kisan Unions (BKUs) led by Bhupender Singh Mann in Punjab and by Mahender Singh Tikait in Uttar Pradesh; of Shetkari Sangathan led by Shirad Joshi in Maharashtra; of Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha led by Prof. Nanjundaswami; of Khedyut Samaj in Guajarat; of Vivasayigal Sangam led by Narayanaswami Naidu in Tamil Nadu.

**Characteristics**

These movements shared certain characteristics: they emerged in prosperous regions of the country, which have benefited from the green revolution; they were the movements of rural rich, which included rich peasants, landlords and self-cultivating middle peasants in which the middle peasants had the preponderance; these groups had benefited from the land reforms including the abolition of landlordism; socially the middle or intermediate castes (Jats, Gujars, Yadavs, Muslim high castes in UP; Marathas in Maharashtra; Vokaliggas and Lingayats in Karnataka; Patels in Guajarat) formed the largest composition of them); unlike the peasant movements of the pre-Independence period their issues and demands are related to the market economy like remunerative prices of the agricultural produce, subsidised inputs, reduction in the electricity bills, increase in the time of availability of electricity; their “apolitical” or “non-political” character; claim to represent the rural (bharat) interests against urban (India) on the plea the bharat is exploited by India; they overlook the division in the rural society and project themselves to be representative of entire rural society; they were being led by a new kind of leadership; they raise new types of issue, etc.
Of these three movements — Shetkari Sangathan in Maharashtra, Karnataka Raitha Sangha in Karnataka and BKU movement of UP deserve special discussion for different reasons. It was the “Bharat vs. India” thesis of Sharad Joshi which highlighted the rural-urban divide more prominently. Besides, Sharad Joshi is only leader who has supported the liberalisation policy of the state, and who also worked as the advisor to the Government of India during the V. P. Singh’s regime. The Karnataka Rajaya Raiytha Sangha movement in Karnataka occupies special place due to the socialist background of its leader - Prof. Nanjundaswami. The most striking has been the nature of leadership of the BKU in UP and the role of the traditional institution of khap (caste council) in mobilising the farmers.

**Genesis of Farmers’ Movements**

Since farmers movements are the post- green revolution movements and largely occurred in the green revolution belt, they found the terms of trade against the agricultural sector. The rising cost of input in agriculture could not be met with the returns of the produce. Besides, inability of the system to provide electricity along with the increasing indebtedness to the public institution mainly to meet the input and infrastructural requirement gave birth to the new set of problems of the farmers. Though placed in superior position to the large proportion of the rural poor, this section found itself neglected by the state. Populist promises by the politicians and the hold of this section on the rural vote bank contributed to the feeling of being cheated by the political class. Their expectation from the system further rose with the increasing share of legislators in the centre and state since the era of the Janata Party government in the 1970s. This happened when people in general lost faith in politics, which to them meant formal political institutions — mainly leaders, political parties and elections.

Under these circumstances the farmers responded positively to alternative mode mobilisation, which was marked by the mobilisation on the “apolitical” or “nonpolitical” plank, projected the rural sectors as a homogeneous unit, which was exploited by the urban vested interests. The leadership which not was professional type found it easy to provide leadership to these movements. The example of the BKU movement in UP can be an appropriate example in this context. It was the last of these movements; while other farmers movements took place in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the BKU movement of UP took place mainly in 1988-1989. It was a time when there was complete vacuum of leadership of the farmers caused by the death of Charan Singh on May 29, 1987 and earlier disintegration of the farmers movement in UP following the death of R M Lohia in 1967. This gap was filled up by political party of Charan Singh with frequent changes in its nomenclature. Earlier while in the Congress, Charan Singh was opposed to the agitational politics, though he successfully devised a strategy to create his political constituency among the backward classes and the middle/ rich peasants. But collective mobilisation into political agitation by his party was not as regular or organised as was by the socialists and the communists. The massive political mobilisation by non-party political organisation was by the BKU of Tikait. For the first time the traditional institution of khap (caste council) was active in mobilisation of the farmers. This traditional leadership of khap (caste council), which was headed by the leader of a khap of Jats, Mahender Singh Tikait also included the leaders of khaps of several castes.

**Farmers’ Movements before the BKU**

Prior to the BKU mobilisation in the 1980s, the farmers of UP were mobilised mainly by the leftist forces which included both the socialists and the communists. But their mobilisation
mainly took place in the 1950s and the 1960s. Apart from the socialists and communists, Charan Singh also attempted to mobilise the farmers of UP during this period. But he did not mobilise them into a collective action. He, in fact, was opposed to the agitations. His mobilisation of farmers was in the form of carving out an electoral base for himself among the middle and backward caste peasants like Jats, Yadavs, Kurmies, Kories, Lodhs, etc of UP. He did so while he was still a member of the Congress. He adopted two-pronged policy for this purpose: first, he articulated the interests of the peasant proprietors; second, he identified himself with the backward caste peasantry. Largely both these groups—backward castes and the peasant proprietors overlapped. This created resentment within the Congress about Charan Singh’s attempt to carve base for himself even while he was its member. At an opportune time, following the defeat of Congress in 1967 election in nine states, Charan Singh came out of Congress to form his own party — the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD). After the decline of the mobilisation by the socialist and the communist, as mentioned earlier unlike when he was in the Congress even Charan Singh’s party mobilised farmers into agitational politics. But it was not as regular and organised as the mobilisation by the socialists and the communists. Having consolidated his base among the middle caste peasants Charan Singh changed his focus to state and nation politics which catapulted him to the post of Prime Minister in 1980.

The principal issue of the mobilisation was related to cane price, though other issues also mattered. Therefore, the peasant movement in UP was basically sugar cane growers’ movements (Jagpal Singh, pp. 87-92). A comparison of these issues with the issues taken up by the farmers movements of the later period shows that there were almost same. However, there was a difference; the socialists and communists took them up before the impact of the green revolution was actually felt, while the BKU took them up after the impact of the green revolution had been realised. Opening up sugar mills in different parts of Uttar Pradesh in the 1930s not only encouraged the commercialisation of cropping pattern, it also gave rise to the new issues like the sugar cane growers problems. The peasant mobilisation on these issues took place during the pre-Independence period also, but it was during the 1950s-1960s that the socialists and the communists mobilised them regularly.

Problems of the sugarcane growers, some of which exist even today, were the following: the sugar cane growers would supply the sugar cane to the sugar mills, payment for which was supposed to made later on; the sugar mills did not mention the price of the sugar cane on the receipt of the sugar cane from the farmers; rampant corruption at the “centres”, the distant places connecting with mills, where sugar cane would be supplied. The problem was compounded by the fact that the price of the sugar cane was not provided to the farmers on time. It was also not paid in full; it was paid in installments. Therefore, the major demands during the peasant movements of the 1950s-1960s included regular, timely and full (not in installments) payment of the price of the sugar cane to the cane growers.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the sugar cane growers were mobilised by the socialists and communists during the months of December and March - the peak season for sugar cane harvesting under the banners of organisations like Hind Kisan Panchayat and Kisan Sabha. They resorted to organising rallies, dharnas at the mill gates, conferences of the peasants, etc. Apart from the local leaders, the national and state level leaders like Acharaya J. B. Kripali, A. K. Gopalan, E. M. S. Naboobdaripad, Z. A. Ahmed, Gainda Singh and Dada Dharamdhikari visited UP in order to mobilise sugar cane growers. Sometimes this resulted in scuffle between the cane growers and “agents” of the mill owners, and arrest of the leaders of the movement and foisting of charges on them. Towards the end of the 1960s, the leaders of these movement either joined
Congress, Charan Singh’s party or became inactive and a phase in the peasant movement came to an end. The peasant mobilisation was done in the coming decades by Charan Singh’s party and by the BKU headed by Tikait.

Globalisation and Farmers’ Movements

Unlike the earlier movements those of the farmers in the era of globalisation have reacted to the issues related to globalisation. The attempt of the western countries, especially to interfere in the agrarian economy of the country, especially through the Dunkel Draft and GATT evoked different reactions from the farmers movement. While Sharad Joshi, the Shetkari Sangathan leader from Maharashtra supported the globalisation, two supported leaders Prof. Nanjudaswami of Karnataka Rajya Rytha Sangha and Mahendra Singh Tikait of BKU in UP opposed it. Sharad Joshi argued that the opening of Indian agriculture to the world competition would benefit Indian farmers. His perspective helped him to become an advisor to the Government of India during the regime of V. P. Singh. The opponents of globalisation Nanjudaswami and Tikait got support of academic activist like Vandana Shiva and a large number of the socialist and Gandhians. They argued that that globalisation would not only expose the Indian farmers to the unequal competition with the European farmers, an attempt to change the patent laws about seeds would deprive them of their traditional rights over the preservation and generation of seeds. They opposed the attempt of the government to change the patent laws, demanded abrogation of the subsidies given by the European governments to their farmers. They also opposed the Multinational Companies which used Indian natural resources like water to manufacture soft drinks. In fact, intellectuals like Vandana Shiva argue that modern technology popularised in green revolution has harmed the fertility of land rather than helping it. The opponents of the globalisation organise rallies, demonstration and seminars to register their protest. Following the death of Prof. Nanjudaswami the farmers protest against globalisation has got weakened.

WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

Like other social groups women also have been involved in collective actions equipped with their agenda, leadership, ideologies and organisations in order to have their proper and dignified place in all aspects of life. Women as individuals and as a group are among the most discriminated sections of world population. As a marker of this discrimination, societies across the world have shown preference for boy child. The preference for boy child has taken societies to the extent of killing girl child in the womb itself. All practices of discriminations in societies have been legitimised through either invoking socio-cultural needs or the need to maintain a lineage or for material production. The patrileneality, where descent is through father’s lineage and patrilocality where the wife and children lives in father’s home or village have added to the preference for the boy child. All these arrangements have the consequence of women being relegated to what Simon De Bouvoir so poignantly termed as the Second Sex.

As the second sex in material terms means that women is quite often denied political, economic and even cultural rights. She quite often does not have right to inherit property along with her male siblings. She does not have either equal access to education and health care equal to a male counterpart. She is also perennially in the danger of being the target of male violence within the family or outside. Historically religion, polity and society have been so organised as to make her position vulnerable to any discriminatory trends in the society. There have been protests and
revolts by people including women to question such discriminating arrangements within the society.

Women protesting against rape

They, however, remained at the level of individual protest while the structure and power of patriarchy being so strong as to crush them or appropriate them easily into the existing arrangements. It is during the last two hundred years or so that the modern times have provided the space, ideas and principles of organisation to people to question as well as alter the arrangements by either aligning the women’s protests with the parallel movements to change the society or by incorporating the basic digits of modernity into the women’s movements. Nationalist movement in the colonial countries, socialist and communist movement and feminist movement across the world and the larger trend of democracy have been some of the powerful streams that presented themselves as catalyst of change in this regard. In the increasingly globalising world women’s issues and concerns are becoming increasingly part of the larger movements.

The relationship between women and social movements is quite intricate. First, one is not very clear as to where and how do women figure in the broad contour of different social movements. It has been found that women were merely part of the mobilised section of some movement whose overall objectives are detrimental to women’s interests and concerns. For example, the fundamentalist movements across the globe have tended to circumscribe women’s role as merely that of a mother or provider of children to the community as defined by the group. The glorification of a mythical German women by the Nazi ideology has its counterpart in many other groups. In fact, any move to give the rights of ownership of property, marriage etc., have remained in the domain of the personal and any change in that domain invites the wrath of the section of the fundamentalist groups. Any demand to take women’s issues and rights away from community to the larger public domain has been opposed by the fundamentalist groups.
Second, related to the nature of social movement is: whether it allows the space for the articulation of issues and concerns regarding women. Indian national movement was one such movement whose democratic and secular character had given the space for many democratic movements to spring up and voice their concern. Women’s movement in India is one such example where the contours of the movement coalesce with the mass phase of the Indian national movement. The notion of equality, idea of justice and democracy, central to the core of the movement of national liberation, were also the premises of the women’s movement.

Historically, changing conditions of women and their status constituted the core of the social reform movement that began to take shape in the early decades of the nineteenth century. By the early decades of the twentieth century this core is enlarged by bringing two issues, i.e., equality of women in modern political, social and cultural realm, and women’s role in the developmental process, into its ambit. Though the rapid changes in the society, economy and culture have led to rethinking on many issues, the social movements in the country more or less have directed their concerns about women along this core.

THE COLONIAL CONTEXT: THE VISION OF A NEW SOCIETY AND THE REFORM MOVEMENTS

In India, like in many other colonised countries, it was colonialism in the 18th and 19th centuries that brought the new economic and political processes into operation. The coming of the British, the Christian Missionaries and their criticism of the Indian society presented a big challenge to the local intellectuals and social leaders. The former attacked the indigenous society and its treatment of women and the lower caste. It presented new organising principle, equality, or Christianity in some cases. It also brought blueprint for a new organising principle for the society. While colonialism as a system exploited the colonies and stunted its natural and potential growth, it brought, at the same time, the new ideas of democracy, idea of equality and justice.

The nineteenth century Hindu, Parsee, Muslim reformers took the challenge and first tried to reform their own societies in the face of such a massive criticism. Ram Mohan Roy, for example, while he attacked the missionaries for presenting distorted picture, was also preparing agitation against Sati and the customs of caste inequalities. In the later part of the century, reformers took the questioning of women’s condition very prominently and all the major reform efforts aimed at ameliorating their conditions. Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar made great efforts in getting widow remarriage society established. Similarly women’s education too was thought to be one of the most important steps in this direction. Veereshlingam Pontulu, Jyotiaba Phule, Badruddin Tybaji, Dadabhai Naoroji all contributed greatly in this direction.

In the later part of the nineteenth century, when there was in some sense a reassertion of the racial and imperialist ideas, there were a movement among the Indians which tried and asserted its own historical superiority. In this line that they looked into the past to suggest that woman was in some sense better placed in those days than they were now. In this sense the problem of integrating women’s question into the social movement become more intricate— if the situation became bad what should one do was the question that led to the major indicator of the movements’ thrust. It was to the credit of the intelligentsia who fought the issue of social reform that the issue of women remained in the forefront. One of the most intensely fought issues was the between the social reformers and the those who separated the social issues from the political fight.

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The Issue of Priority: Social or Political?

What was the exact nature of women’s issues and how should they be addressed? Should they be treated purely as question about social inequality or attitude or as part and parcel of larger political questions of equality, freedom and justice? These have been serious questions before the reformers as well as the political leaders since the nineteenth century. It should, however, be noted that except Phule most of the social reformers were concerned with social reforms among the high castes. The problems like widow remarriage and sati were not prevalent among the lower strata of society. And low castes in general irrespective of gender were deprived of education. To the early reformers this division did not present itself very sharply as people like Raja Rammohun Ray articulated women’s cause as integral part of his overall vision for what we now referred to as a modern India. Those who began to mobilise opinion regarding the economy and issues related to the operation of the colonial system in the second half of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century were also concerned with the reforms in society and equality of men and a more just society for the women in a possible modern India. For them the issues of economy and politics were not dissociated. M.G. Ranade, Veereshlingam Pontulu, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Phirojshah Mehta, Dadabhai Naoroji, Badruddin Tyabji, Jyotiba Phule and many more actively campaigned for women’s education and more public space. The symbol of this unity of perception was the fact that the annual conference of the Indian social conference used to meet at the Annual Congress session pandal itself. The question whether the social issue or the political issue is more important emerged by this time. The Congress realised that the differences of perceptions on social issues among different communities were given priority over the political issues, it would breach the unity of people while was essential in the national movement.

In ensuing debate between the social and political question, the idea of priority and the location of the principle of equality was very important. Those who opposed the social conference working anywhere close to the Indian National Congress, in fact, did not oppose the principle of equality. But the separation of the social question from the political turned out to be some way detrimental to the women’s questions. The debate on the issue of Age of consent Bill which created an uproar in the 1890s saw that the progressive voices were opposed quite powerfully by sections which were not in favour of a legislation which was primarily a legislation in raising the marriageable age for women. The attempt to separate the two also impeded any serious theoretical debate on the ways and means to incorporate the women’s issue in the movement for social equality.

Women’s Issues During the Gandhian Era

In the 1920s the Gandhian movements brought back a sense of unity on the women’s question. Along with the question of untouchability, and Hindu Muslim question, women’s condition also became a primary issue to be solved immediately. This has serious implications for the women’s movement in general and the mobilisation of women’s issues for the larger political context. The national movement now created the largest possible space for the women to come out and participate on an issue which was ostensibly political, i.e., political freedom. But at the same time the masses, including large number of women, were galvanised to raise their own groups’ issues in the process of the movement. In 1927 All India Women’s Association was formed as the national body giving voice to some of the issues. This was the time when we have voices from women as well as from other sections for giving women the voting rights as well as representation in any possible government formation. Interestingly, this was also the time that
suffrage movement in Europe gained its momentum. Many of the women who were in forefront of the Gandhian movement later became involved in institutions all over the country. These institutions would play a major role in taking up serious social issues, and mobilising and leading movements in later years. In fact, the methods that Gandhi used in his struggle against the colonial state as well as in his movement against the untouchability and on the question of communal conflict became hallmark of some of the movements by women quite often inspired by these women and institutions. In the seventies when women fought in Uttaranchal against the liquor vendors or against the falling of trees, their movement was characterised by the Gandhian ways of protest-non violent and arousing the moral conscience in the opponent.

The success of Russian Revolution in 1970s encouraged a large number of women to join the communist movement in India, who were involved in the national movement and women’s movements at the same time. In fact, the communist movement helped the later day progressive movement to take up issues related to women as well as women’s position as the central political and social question. These communist women continued their legacy of women’s movement in the post-independence period.

THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD: STATE, REFORM AND WOMEN

The post-independent Indian state launched the array of reforms which had been demanded even before the independence. There were, for example, demands that all customary and religious and traditional laws which regulated the larger Hindu society and which to a great extent therefore determined the legal status of the Hindu women in religious terms should be codified and brought into the public domain. In 1948 there were attempts to bring to the Constituent Assembly what is known as the Hindu code Bill. However, the stiff opposition led to the dropping of the idea. After a couple of other attempts, finally it was in 1955-56 that the Code Bill was passed in sections known as the Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Succession Act, etc. In spite of the strong support from the Congress party under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru the opposition was very strong. The government could not enter into the issue of the personal laws of the other communities, i.e., Muslim, Christian or Parsees. Crucial aspects of their lives continued to be determined by the personal laws of their religious communities in which man was the supreme arbiter in most of the cases. This was an anomalous situation as women found to their chagrin that the community structures were more authoritarian and Indian state in that sense would be more of an agency of liberation from such structures.

The post-independent Indian state geared itself to the consensus that modern developed state and the political democracy would be safeguarded by the economic democracy. Women got franchise – the democratic right and the development would see that she got the economic rights to practise that democracy. Thus a full blown theory of equality, rights and justice was in place.

It was the violence against women in the form of bride burning and rape that galvanised the women’s movement led by the feminist groups especially since the 1970s. The campaign against dowry and rape are called the first campaigns of the contemporary Indian feminists movement. The violence against women at the ground level, rape by the landlords, caste oppression etc., made the movement gradually try and incorporate them into the concerns for women. The theoretical and organisational structures of the parties and the movement though highlighted some of the issues, did not develop any new perspective on them. This had set in motion a rapid disenchantment with the state apparatus. There began to be strong voices against the nature of the development and there were demand for more women-centric development in...
many parts of the country. In fact, several cases, for example, the Chipko movement in the Himalayas, became an eye opener where along with the saving of the trees there were demands for development planning which is sensitive to the local needs and resources.

These criticisms have been yoked into theoretical mode by the criticism of development process that India has been undergoing. The international feminists’ criticism of the state sponsored development process which marked its decisive beginning in the seventies also influenced these works during the decade of the UN women’s decade. A section of these intellectual critics though not directly coming from the feminists, began to uphold community, tradition and the local bonds as the counterpoint to the project of modernity which they argued was against women. Some fragments of Indian intellectual too joined in those critique. In the nineties these critique merged with sections of the feminists movement which was also waging a battle against the globalisation processes.

The post-independent Indian state is grounded on the idea of equity with justice and this has been the consensus developed during the freedom movement. The development was supposed to bring the equity closer and the democratic functioning of the system would see to it that the fruits of development would reach to the different segments of population. Regarding the issue of women, the consensus was on women’s development. On the equity front the legal system was found to be unequal and the one of the first major restructuring tried by the Constituent Assembly in 1948 itself was to try and effect a standardised Hindu code which would try to do away with a large number of discriminatory personal and customary rules applied to women in different Hindu communities. The ultimate conceived goal, as the Women’s representative would argue, was to usher a common uniform civil code. This was thought to be very significant because the state continued to treat women through the personal or community laws where male was the dominant and authoritarian figure. It was argued that unless the rules, conventions and laws are brought out of the personal or community into the public domain women would not be able to enjoy the equality as promised by the constitution.

The Shah Bano affair brought an entire range of issues related to women to the fore. It brought the Indian state’s attitude towards the issue of women in the context of her religious community. It also showed the weakness of the women’s movement to mobilise its strength to fight for a common civil code. Thirdly, it brought the weakness of the progressive sections in the society to come forward and demand uniform civil code for all the communities so that the women’s rights come out of the domain of religion into the secular legal domain. The Indian government’s act in some sense weakened the liberals within the Muslim community and the voice of the educated women who found at this point of time the strength of the orthodoxy vis a vis the state.

The Governments’ act also emboldened the fundamentalist groups in other communities who could now on show that Indian state appeases the minority community sentiments and not concerned about development really. From Now it is the fundamentalist and communal groups among the Hindus which started demanding uniform civil code to provoke the minority. Thus in sum, one of the most important issues concerning women’s equality became part of the real politics of the Indian democracy. By the eighties the political movements by communal parties which had a large middle and lower class support gradually affected the original discourse on women and her legal and political entitlements.

**THE LEFT AND WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS**
The communist parties, since 1950s, not only provided women leadership but also kept the women’s question in the centre of political discussion. However, with the split in the communist movements in 1964 and emergence of many new voices within the left movement which questioned old assumptions of the Marxist parties, new ideas and organisational principles to articulate demands of communities and groups began to emerge. The Shahada movement, in Dhuulia district of Maharashtra was one such movement. The exploitation of the local Bhil tribal landless labourers by the non–tribal local landowners was the key issue in this. To add to the woes of the tribals came the successive drought and famine in Maharastra. Different exploitative practices of the landowners and the moneylenders pushed the tribals to take extreme steps of protest. Though the movement had its origin in the late sixties through the traditional folk ways, singing bhajans etc., the seventies saw a complete metamorphosis when the newly inspired left leadership joined the movement and Bhil women were mobilised gradually and in large number. However, in the course of the movement it was realised that the issues that were central to women in these area was not exactly what the organisation had initially thought out as such. For example, after the agitation began in Shahada movement that it was realised that most of the women were landless wage earners and the demand for higher wages would address the women’s issue more directly. The movement gradually shifted to cover issues such as higher wages and anti-alcoholism because it was found that the husband’s habit of having liquor eats into the domestic economy and women had to struggle more to keep the household going. Alcoholism also led to regular wife beating. Issues such as these which earlier were not part of the concerns of the movement came to be realised as intimate reality of the women’s life and were taken up. This encouraged women too to come out in larger number to join the groups by women formed and went from village to village destroying liquor pots.

In the 1970 again, the Maharastra agitation soon spread to Gujarat where the women in major cities like Bombay, Poona and Ahmedabad came out in streets protesting against the government for such a situation. It happened in the background of economic worsening conditions of the people following Bangladesh War. In Bombay, for example, Socialist Mrinal Gore and Communist Ahilya Rangnekar led the movement. The Maharastra and Gujarat agitation gradually added to the larger oppositional politics that was being galvanised around this time. In fact, in Gujarat and Maharastra, the lower classes were conspicuous by their absence. Hence, the issues and concerns of the women from the lower classes or the tribals had not become part of the movement. It was soon through different sets of movements that this section began to voice its concerns. In Maharastra, for example the tribal women in the Shahada movement brought the issues of landless wage earning women and the perils of alcoholism while on the other hand in Bodh Gaya the issue of land was involved. One realised that after a gap of a decade or so the political and social questions were rapidly becoming closely involved.

The arrival of the new classes into the picture meant that the political landscape would have become more complex and sharper questions to resolve. Gandhian ideas of femininity and role of female were now questioned and so were the symbols used by him. It is in such a situation that the mobilisation of the women too began to take place. This was also the time that when the western feminists began to raise the questions whether the issues that they have been fighting for really applied to he third world women as there are doubly suppressive, patriarchy and poverty. The same situation prevailed in India when the issues that were raised by the women movement either under the rubric of equality or right really applied to the women of different social strata. It is vividly portrayed in the experience of the Shahada movement when in the course of the movement the organisers came across the differential issues and changes the
demand and mobilisation patterns land rights issues which even the recent feminist writers have shown to be the most important issues – where most of the population is without land. The issue of who would give land to them brings us back to the issue of the state and also the democracy that obtains in India.

The year 1975 was declared as the world women’s year by the United Nations. The Women’s decade, 1975-85, witnessed women related activism by feminist groups as well as political parties. These were primarily urban–based activist groups. It was however the state which was promotor of many progressive steps for ameliorating women’s condition and saw a large number of activities. Maharastra was hotbed of the left inspired women’s activism. The Maoist inspired women organised the Purogami Stree Sangathan (Progressive Women’s Association), and Stri Mukti Sangathan in Bombay. Conferences of women were organised in Poona by the Lal Nishan Party and the Shramik Sangathan, both Maoist Organisations, which were attended by a large number of women from across party lines and from across the state.

It was also during this time that dalit movement and the feminism got linked. A Mahila Samata Sainik Dal too was formed by some dalit groups in Maharastra. The Maoist groups and the dalit organisations gradually provide a new edge to the argument that religion and caste system provide additional legitimacy to the oppression of women and hence have to be attacked for any possible women’s liberation.

The new phase also came with a new consciousness. How should women be organised and represented? While movements like Shahada showed that women could be organised in the process of the movement in which issues, close to women’s lives, would emerge. A self conscious feminist stream also came to assert by now. While most of the feminists were drawn from the urban middle classes and were seen to be unable to represent the whole of the women of the society, there were serious thinking that there need to be organisation outside the movements. These groups, referred to as autonomous groups, could think about women’s issues and the movement without falling pray to the organisational hierarchy and blinded by the assumptions that have plagued the left parties of the country. Many women’s groups that originated during and after seventies decided to keep themselves women only group without any party affiliation or traditional organisational structure and quite often structured around one or few serious issues relating to the day to day life and struggle of the women in Indian society. By 2000 we have thousands of such groups working in different parts of the country and in fact the Indian women’s movement by 2000 is characterised more by these groups across the country than by the organisationally structured movement as such.

**EQUALITY OR DIFFERENCE**

While the entire edifice of the social movement in India, which wanted to change the status of women, has been raised on the principle of equality, by the eighties there were realisation that even equality was not enough to protect women from being victims of violence perpetrated on her solely because she happened to be a woman. This was in spite of the fact that in many cases she was equal or superior to the male perpetrator in status, education or other indicators. Women were the target of rape simply because she was women – biologically different from Man. It soon became a major theoretical as well as organisational point of debate as to where should the movements place their focus, i.e, on equality or difference. The case of the rape of a tribal girl Mathura in 1987 by the police and despite a campaign and fought by many prominent legal personalities, the judiciary was unmoved and declared Mathura a women of easy virtue.
This created uproar and made the women’s group realise the insensitivity that the state apparatus has on women’s issues. Similarly, the dowry deaths primarily among the affluent middle class households too was a shattering blow to some of the earlier held assumptions, i.e., the development process by raising the status of the women would help her practice her democratic rights fully. The same development was now seen to be capable of making life unsafe for her. By the time the census of 2001 was published, the increasing decline in the sex ratio in the most developed states of India pointed to the same phenomenon.

It was also realised that while it has been pursuing the developmental agenda ostensibly for the betterment of women, the state at times was amenable to the forces of patriarchy. This had further implications. Thus, the feminists and women activists have come to accept that movement for democratisation has to be strengthened so as to strengthen the force behind the demand for better and safer daily lives of women. The need for a strong women’s movement got further underlined in the age of globalisation where new forces of violence were unleashed on women.

Issues of not only women’s right in a democratic system but also the question of overall equality in a situation when the state is withdrawing is not merely a crucial political issues that the women’s movement has to solve.

**NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

By the late eighties the overall scenario in India and the world created situation where the women’s movement could not remain outside the domain of the issues that have led to the world wide movement regarding ecology, environment and issues of sustainability in the face of the a new globalising economy. Very soon we have movements in different parts of the country, which have voiced the concerns of the day-to-day life and survival in the face of the new forces of economy and politics. While the national politics seems to retreat into the caste and community and costly and corrupt electoral practices, a large number of movements from different parts of the country saw the coming of people from the local communities and villages. One of the chief characteristics of these movements has been the prominent role including that of the leadership being played by women. Survival and dignity seems to have become the twin issues, which these movements have infused to the already existing issues of equality and justice. Participation of a large number of women in the movement for the rights of labour and the tribals in Chhattisgarh by the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha, in the Narmada Bachao Andolan and the agitation against the authorities in Bhanwari Devi case where the authorities were trying the shield the oppressors, and recently in the agitation for rights to information has shown that the social movements have been trying to fuse the issues of politics and society at a larger canvass and convert them into struggles for a more democratic and just society. Interestingly enough, a careful perusal of the voices from these movements would show that women in these movements have often questioned the validity of the representative nature of our democracy. While they have tried to forge alliances with similar movements across the country and even the world, they have, at the same time, demanded from the state to change its electoral system to have more participation from the women. All these were taking place quite close to the time when a large number of new forces were getting unleashed on the ground without adequately preparing the population for it. The women, without the adequate even elementary education and primary health care facilities, had to face these forces. There were also indications that the state, which till now declared that it would take care of the vulnerable sections, has began to waver and withdraw.
It is these circumstances that one found women in the forefront of many of the new movements. The results of these new mobilisations is that the woman found herself face to face with extremely powerful combination of patriarchal structures entrenched within the state apparatus. In Meghalaya and Kashmir, for example, it is the state legislatures which tried to debar women from any inheritance, if she marries outside the religiously or otherwise defined community boundaries. This was an attempted check on women’s right to take decisions on her own on crucial issues such as on choosing her own partner. In a world, caste, community and state boundaries have been brought to suppress the mobility of the women.

The Women’s movement in the meantime also tried to fight against the structures of community and tradition as they have been found quite often to be impediments in the way to equality and freedom. This was evident in the case of two powerful movements in the 1980s, one against the issue of dowry and another in the famous case of Roop Kunwar in which the latter was being burnt as Sati. In cases of the dowry deaths tradition has been forwarded when as in the latter case a young Rajput lady was made to die along with her husband. The opposition by feminist and other groups of the Sati and its later glorification was countered by the powerful combination of the caste and community politics which defended not only the act of sati but also those who forced Roop Kunwar to the funeral pyre. However, in the process there were awareness of the new forces both which supported the women’s cause of equality and those opposed came face to face and was an educating for the Women’s movement.

DALIT MOVEMENT

WHO ARE DALITS?

The term ‘dalit’ is a Marathi word and literally means ‘ground’ or ‘broken to pieces’ and it was first popularised by the Dalit Panthers in Maharashtra by which they meant the Scheduled Caste population. Later on there had been attempts to broaden this definition to any oppressed group (Chandra, 2004). Dalits generally refer to the Scheduled Castes alone, the castes that in the Hindu Varna system were outside the Varna system and were known as Avarnas or Ati-shudras. They were considered as impure and untouchables and were placed in the caste hierarchy which perpetuated inequality. There are even some people who include the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, the Other Backward Classes and even other converted minorities into this category. For our present purpose we shall, however, refer to the SCs alone and not the other categories. The Dalits constitute around 15 per cent of the Indian population and belong to the lower rungs of the Indian society, economically and socially. According to the 1991 census their number was 138 million persons i.e., around 15.8 percent of the Indian population. According to the 2001 census they constitute more than 1,666 lakhs and around 16.2 per cent of the entire population. They are spread throughout the country though they are concentrated more in some states like Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa and Maharashtra.

Their population is spread throughout the parliamentary and assembly constituencies but in the country as a whole it constitutes around one third of the electorate (Chandra, 2004).

The Dalits not only belong to the lower caste category but also belong to the lower class category of the Indian society. They are mainly poor peasants, share-croppers and agricultural
labourers in the rural economy. In the urban economy they basically form the bulk of the labouring population.

A Dalit rally against violence and oppression, 2018

Studies show that the condition of the Dalits in the country as a whole has not changed significantly over the years (Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998) even though the state in India had pursued pro–poor policies aimed at ameliorating the condition of the poor among whom the Dalits constitute a large chunk. Mendelsohn and Vicziany argue that the “post-independence regime has failed to bring about a systematic redistribution of resources in favour of those at the bottom of society, and it has also failed to pursue a consistent, albeit non radical, strategy of supplying ‘basic needs’ (health education and simple welfare) to the poor”.

As a result of the policy of protective discrimination an elite (mainly middle class) has emerged among dalits and it is these elite who have been the main beneficiaries of the state policies. As D L Sheth has noted that the middle class that comprised essentially of the upper castes now includes a small section of the lower castes or dalits (Sheth, 2002). As a result of these changes the entire dalit population may now be divided roughly into two sections; a section of dalits who have remained as they were earlier and a small, a narrow section who are relatively better off than the majority of the dalit population. This, however, may be considered as a positive change since it is this section (the middle class) among the Dalits who are primarily responsible for their mobilisation and assertion in contemporary India. Another change may also be noted and that is blatant form of caste discrimination which was practised for centuries is not practised in India today.
POLITICAL MOBILISATION OF THE DALITS

Pre-Independence Period

At the All India level Ambedkar initiated the articulation of dalit interest for the first time in the 1920s. Prior to Ambedkar there had been attempts to bring about reforms in their condition in some of the Indian states, for example, Phule in Maharashtra. But it was an attempt towards reform rather than towards the mobilisation of the dalits for political objectives. Ambedkar is known to have developed differences with Congress on several important questions relating to dalit issues and more or less remained the only spokesperson and the pre eminent advocate of the dalits from 1919, for more than three and half decades in the pre–independence period. Though the Congress talked about the necessity of removing untouchability, yet it did not articulate any concrete demand or programme to protect the interests of the depressed classes till 1917 (Shah, 2001). In contrast, mobilisation by Phule and Ambedkar in 1930s was firmly based on the belief that unless the caste system is destroyed the social evil of untouchability cannot end and that it is possible only if dalits acquire power. Hence in 1942 he formed the All India Scheduled Caste Federation (AISCF). Earlier he formed several organisations, the most important being the Indian Labour Party (ILP). The ILP was an organisation of a different kind in the sense that it aimed and attempted to mobilise a broader section of the Indian society and not exclusively the dalits. He sought to use this organisation to appeal to wider audience including the industrial workers and the agricultural labourers. Duncan argues that he formed the ILP probably because he was convinced that a wider support base than the Scheduled Caste was essential and hence he embarked on a more class like strategy (Duncan, 2000).

Post-Independence Period

The formation of the AISCF was a very significant development in the history of dalit mobilisation in the country though it was not much successful and suffered defeat in the elections of 1946 and again in 1951. These reversals convinced Ambedkar that a separate political party was required which will have a wider electoral strategy. After his death in 1956, the AISCF was dissolved and the Republican Party of India (RPI) was formed in 1957. The party, the first of its kind accepted the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and vowed to pursue its objective through the medium of parliamentary democracy. It functioned for almost two decades and was successful in establishing its base in the state of Maharasi and to a limited extent in the state of Uttar Pradesh, though it is in the latter the RPI succeeded more in electoral terms than in Maharasi. The RPI was also able to launch some major agitations for example, the agitations for land distribution in 1959 and 1964-65. These agitations, however, were more of an aberration rather than a general feature of RPI politics; they were, in fact, isolated episodes and not ‘harbingers of sustained mass movements’ (Duncan, 2000). The sporadic nature of RPI politics was probably the main reason why the RPI could not keep its base intact and always had to confront the problem of losing its support base as soon as the agitations ended.

By the mid 1960s it had established itself in the state of Maharasi and Uttar Pradesh. These were the states in which it had a strong presence. Very soon, however, the RPI weakened largely because of internal differences on the issue of aligning with the Congress. A section of the leadership within the party was pragmatic and was interested in joining hands with the Congress whereas others were of the view that an alliance with the Congress would lead to a dilution of the greater objective of the party of promoting solidarity of the SC population in the
country. On this issue some of the leaders broke away from the party and joined the Congress. It broke into several factions and today the various factions only play a marginal role in the politics of Maharashtra.

The failure of the RPI to keep up to the lofty ideals of Ambedkar and to fulfill the aspirations of the dalit youths led to the formation of the Dalit Panthers in Bombay in 1972. The Dalit Panthers drew its inspiration from the writings of Ambedkar and Marx. Its leaders criticised the RPI leaders for having failed to keep up to the ideals of Ambedkar and for its persistent splits and electoral failures. They sought to project themselves as an alternative to the RPI and very soon were successful in attracting the Dalit youths and students. Though initially it tasted success in the state of Maharashtra, yet very soon the movement (organisation) fell prey to the same problems that had confronted the RPI. Due to internal conflicts among leaders on several issues, the movement collapsed in a few years after its inception.

Why is it so that dalit political parties including the association formed by Ambedkar could not succeed or could succeed only partially in their political objectives? There are numerous reasons behind these. Duncan (2000) has noted three problems with these associations. Firstly, the parties/association to him always ‘relied on the support of particular caste groups rather than on the Dalits as a whole’. The organisations mainly relied on the Mahars in Maharastra and the Chamars (Jatavs) in northern India, particularly in Uttar Pradesh. It is these castes that formed the backbone of the associations. As a result the other dalit castes felt neglected and suspected these parties as a party of that caste group and not theirs. Secondly, according to Duncan one of the issues for the organisation was the issue of whether to support other political parties as a part of their strategy during the elections or not? Ambedkar had left no clear directives in this regard. In the absence of a clear guidance from Ambedkar, the party leaders were caught up in ideological and strategic struggles. Some were in favour of supporting the Congress and other parties, whenever the need arose, whereas others felt that supporting the Congress will lead to dilution of the aim and objectives of the party. On this question alone many of the parties including the RPI split and this weakened the movement in the country as a whole. Thirdly, these political parties did not develop any modern organisational structure which could be geared up or could be used for the purpose of diffusing inner party struggles and help achieve cohesion. All these hastened the decline of the Ambedkarite parties including those formed by Ambedkar. Another cause of decline may be added. The Ambedkarite parties were unable to cut into the vote banks or support base of the Congress party, which was really an overwhelming phenomenon. Since Congress was a political party of all section of the Indian population the lower caste population did feel comfortable with the programmes and policies of the RPI. The welfare policies of the Congress appealed to the dalits in the country in general and in Uttar Pradesh and Maharastra in particular. The expansion of the dalit parties in recent years has taken place only after the Congress had declined considerably and has created a vacuum for other political forces in the country. Hence, it is not surprising that the BSP has grown in a state (Uttar Pradesh) where the decline of the Congress has been more rapid and complete than in any other state in India.

THE BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY AND THE DALITS

The formation of the BSP by Kanshi Ram in 1984 marks a new beginning in the history of dalit mobilisation and politics in the country. One of the significant features of the BSP happens to be the fact that it had succeeded at least partially (particularly in North India) where Ambedkar and Ambedkarites failed in their objective in the country in more than fifty years. The BSP
succeeded at a time in north India when the dalit parties in western India were under disarray. The BSP after its formation has not only succeeded in establishing a stronghold in some states in northern India but it has also been able to form governments along with its pre or post electoral allies in the critically important state of Uttar Pradesh. Though the governments were short lived, yet these are remarkable events since it has important implications for the dalits not only in the state of Uttar Pradesh but throughout the country.

BSP politically mobilized the Dalits of Uttar Pradesh

Gail Omvedt has termed the formation of this party as deliberate. It has its root in a government employee’s federation called the BAMCEF i.e., Backward and Minority Central Government Employees Federation, which was formed in 1978 by Kanshi Ram in Punjab but later on extended to Uttar Pradesh. Initially the BAMCEF supported the activities of the RPI in Maharashta and sought the support of all the SCs and politicians from other parties (Chandra, 2004). Its primary aim, however, was to organise the elite section of the dalits who had benefited from the policies of reservation of the Government of India. The formation of this organisation was critical because it is this organisation that provided the initial organisational and financial base for the BSP. Kanshi Ram tried to argue and mobilise dalits on the grounds that the further advance of the community could only take place if the whole community stood in a group. He was successful in this effort considering that within a span of more than a decade in the early 1990s the BAMCEF had a membership of around of 2 lakhs (Hassan, 2000).

The most important decision that was taken in the course of the formation of the BSP was the formation of Dalit Shoshit Sangharsh Samaj Samiti commonly known as the DS4 in 1981. The formation of this organisation was of critical importance considering that it is through this organisation Kanshi Ram tried to increase his influence among other sections of the society, which were hitherto not touched by the BAMCEF. The DS4, in fact, served as the organisational base for the formation of the BSP and took up political issues. It did so in two
significant ways. One was through ideological campaigns that it carried with its mouthpiece “The Oppressed Indian” and secondly through the organisation of meetings, rallies mainly bicycle rallies and social action programmes throughout the country. Through the first it sought to ‘educate, organise and agitate’ the oppressed groups and through the second it sought to restore self-respect and equality for the oppressed castes in the society (Singh, 2002). The activities of the DS4 were prominent and frequent in 1983 and 1984, i.e., just before the formation of the BSP. Hence, it is clear that the DS4 was the precursor to the formation of the BSP by Kanshi Ram and in this sense the formation of the BSP was a calculated and deliberate one. It appears that it is through the DS4 Kanshi Ram sought to do the necessary spadework before the formation of the BSP.

Having set the stage and the ground Kanshi Ram inaugurated the BSP on the 14th of April 1984. He acquired a useful partner when he persuaded Mayawati to join the party in Uttar Pradesh. The joining of Mayawati in Uttar Pradesh became crucial for BSP because with this the party was able to get a solid leader in the state. Mayawati belong to a Chamar family and studied in Meerut and Delhi Universities and was in the teaching profession. She left her job to become a full time politician. Her family was in fact associated with the RPI for some time in Uttar Pradesh.

Kanshi Ram, it is said, deliberately tried to construct a new ethnic category, the Bahujan which included the SCs, STs, OBCs and the converted minorities (Chandra, 2004). This he did deliberately keeping in mind that the SCs alone cannot give him the much needed power because of their number which is around 15 per cent of the population and one third of the total electorate in the country. With a careful appeal to the ex-untouchables and with the appealing slogans of Brahmin, Bania, Thakur Chor Baki Sab DS4, the BSP made an immediate impact on the dalits vote bank in north India. Dalits in northern India had traditionally rallied behind the Congress party but soon it was found that the BSP was making inroads into the Congress vote bank. In the Lok Sabha elections which were held in December 1984 and the assembly elections in March 1985 though it lost all the seats in the state it contested, it was able to draw million of votes. More importantly it was able to draw the votes of the Congress as a result of which 51 seats went to the Lok Dal (Omvedt, 1994). It was able to repeat its performance in Punjab in the same year held after a few months. It adversely affected the Akali Dal in Punjab. In this period the BSP and DS4 campaigned throughout the country through naïve means and could consolidate its support base further in northern India. Naïve forms of campaign included the use of by-cycles, organising huge cycle and other form of rallies and awakening programmes. In these campaigns the BSP chose to attack the domination of the upper castes in the society and the wretched condition of the scheduled castes and other downtrodden in the country. This helped the party, extended and consolidated its base and its proof was the Allahabad Lok Sabha bye-elections in 1987. Kanshi Ram as the BSP candidate was able to secure 18 per cent of the popular votes against 24 per cent of Sunil Shastri and 54 percent of V P Singh (Omvedt, 1994). On the whole in the elections, the BSP showed its growing popularity among those social groups, which were earlier with the Congress. It was with this election that the BSP emerged as a central political force and Kanshi Ram became a national figure.

The 1989 Lok Sabha elections followed and the party faired quite well by securing three seats with 2.4 per cent all-India votes from the 235 Lok Sabha constituencies that it contested. With this impressive performance, the BSP was able to become the sixth all India party in terms of votes polled. It continued its electoral gains and was successful in getting itself recognised as a National Party by the Election Commission in 1997. In Uttar Pradesh it has been the largest
gainer. It seats went on increasing in the state assembly from 13 in 1989 to 66 in 1993 (Kumar, 1999). In the elections held in 1996 it gained 66 seats, its best performance however has been in the 2002 elections when it secured 97 seats. This performance of the BSP is remarkable considering that in the previous elections it had secured 66 seats, though its strength ultimately got reduced to 43 by 1998 due to a number of splits in the party. Its vote share in the state has been around 20 per cent, which is very impressive. After having discussed about the spectacular growth of the party let us turn to its ideology and strategy that it had adopted so far.

Ideology

The BSP ideology has to be understood in the background of the overall effort made towards mobilisation of the dalits since the national movement in India. It must be noted in the beginning that its ideology has been shifting from time to time according to its strategic needs. Gail Omvedt has noted that the BSP ideology can best be described as vague. She argues that there is no clear ideology in the programme and functioning of the party. The sole thrust is on the breaking of the caste system after acquiring state power (Omvedt, 1994). What is, however, true is that it has no economic programmes as such and hence the party is not clear what it intends to do after acquiring power. It is because of this ideological vagueness one finds that most of its agitations are symbolic in nature and it is not around economic issues. And secondly because of this it had vacillated on economic issues after acquiring power in the state of Uttar Pradesh.

Due to this vagueness it becomes very difficult to comment on its ideology. A tentative effort must, however, be made here. One thing that needs to be said in the beginning is that, ideologically the BSP draws heavily from the writings of Ambedkar and to a large extent from the speeches of Kanshi Ram and Mayawati. The party also draws inspiration from Phule and Periar. The central point regarding its ideology is that it provides a critique of the Brahminical social order in the country. In this critique it draws heavily from Phule who provided a critique of Brahmanism and Brahmin power in Maharashtra in the second half of the nineteenth century. The BSP and Kanshi Ram believe that the Indian society consists of two different groups. The first group consists of the low castes including the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and the religious minorities. In the second category it is the Brahmins, Kayasthas, Baniyas and Rajputs or the traditional upper castes (Singh, 2002). The higher castes though constitute only a minority (around 15 per cent of the population), yet still they manage to rule, because of the votes and thus the consent they acquire from the lower castes. This system, according to the BSP, will not continue and will come to an end as soon as the lower castes capture political power.

In Kanshi Ram’s opinion the Brahminical social order that exists is Aryan in its origin. The Aryans evolved this social order after invading India and subjugating the original inhabitants or the Mooul Nivasis that is the Dravidians in the country. After the Aryan conquest the Dravidians were reduced to the level of untouchables. This social order that came into being after the Aryan conquest to Kanshi Ram is based on caste and not class and it rests upon falsehoods and religious myths. Hence the Brahminical social order, which emerged was a social order that was unjust and in which, Brahminism became the ruling socio-cultural ideology. The purpose of this ideology was the complete justification of the division of the society into major caste groups. Historically, the BSP argues that no Hindu community but only Jati’s and the Samaj, ever existed which came into existence. Hence, one notes that the perception of the BSP on the Indian society is similar to the perceptions, which emerged in South India during the colonial
period as reflected in the Dravidian movement of Naicker (Periar) and the early ideology of DMK and also that of Phule.

It is from this assessment of the Indian social order that they construct their objective and strategy. The main aim is to end or destroy Brahminical rule and attain political power for the Bahujan’s. Attainment or capture of political power is the key to them. According to Kanshi Ram ‘political power is the master-key with which you can open any lock, whether it is (a) social, educational or cultural lock’ (quoted in Chandra, 2004, p. 145). Therefore, the attainment of political power is central to their strategy by which any transformation (real transformation) can be made. This will help improve the economic advancement of the bahujan’s in the society. It is only after the attainment of state power historical injustices can be corrected and the bahujan’s and more particularly the dalits can improve their socio-economic conditions. Thus, the BSP believes in total revolution; in the total destruction of the Hindu social order but this was to take place only through the ballot box. It firmly believes that the condition and position of the dalits can improve for the better by a two stage revolution. The first is through electoral victory from the Brahmmins and the upper castes those who constitute only around 15 per cent of the Indian population and in the second stage the revolution will penetrate deeper into the society and will thoroughly transform it (Singh, 2002).

The BSP contends that democracy which exists in the country is a fake dominated by the upper castes. It belongs to them. The establishment of this democracy through adult franchise has helped the upper castes and their parties who continue to hold power over the political and social system. The Congress, the dominating political party in the country, has been the political party of the upper castes and had pursued policies throughout for the benefit of the upper castes. The policies, which it pursued for the lower castes did not benefit them at all. In this kind of the situation what is therefore necessary is to establish real and substantial democracy where power would be in the hands of the majority, the dalits—the bahujans.

**Limitations of the BSP**

One of the more serious problems, which BSP confronts, is the problem of ideology. It appears that the BSP has an exclusive ideology. It has a programme for the dalits in the country but not for the vast mass of the poor even though it claims that it represents the majority or the bahujans. Secondly, the ideological programme does not contain any economic programme for the category which it sought to mobilise. In the absence of an economic package or content the BSP ideology looks very limited, or restricted to social justice alone. That is why it has become difficult for the BSP to pursue or give directions to economic policies whenever it has attained power in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Thus the ideology of the BSP happens to be an exclusive one.

The second problem with the BSP, which Jagpal Singh (2002) and others have noted is that the BSP is a leader–centric party. Though it has adequate number of leaders and functionaries, yet it is a party in every sense led by its supremo Kanshi Ram and to some extent by Mayawati though in more recent times Kanshi Ram had been sidelined. On several important occasions it is these two important leaders who have taken decisions alone by ignoring the party altogether. This is a problem, which we have noted earlier, a problem common with the Ambedkarite parties formed after the death of Ambedkar. The RPI and other Ambedkarite parties have faced similar kind of problems. Even Ambedkar himself never had any inclination for a strong organisation and an organised movement. Ambedkar’s biographer Keer has noted that:
Ambedkar did not try to organise his political party on modern lines. He had no taste for individual organisation. There were no regular annual conferences or general meetings of the organisations with which he was connected. Where and when he sat was the venue of the conference and the time for decision.

The more serious problem with the BSP is its limited social base. Despite of all the talks of Bahujan Samaj and all the claims that the BSP will represent 85 per cent of the population in the Indian society the fact remains that in north India it remains a political party of Chamars/Jatavs. The Chamars constitute the backbone of the BSP support. We have seen earlier that the Chamars or the Jatavs in Uttar Pradesh were the most politicised of the castes in the state. It is this caste which benefited from the policy of reservation of the central and the state governments and it is this category that forms the backbone of the BSP. It does not represent the interest or the Balmikis or the Pasis who are the poorest among the dalits but it represents only the elite among the dalits. In UP it had expected to increase its appeal, it has even attempted to become a catchall political party but failed miserably in this effort. The primary contenders in UP of the party are the Samajwadi Party, the BJP and the Congress. In a situation of this in a fragmented party system where the competition is highly multi-cornered kind it looks very unlikely that the BSP will be able to improve its vote share further though in terms of seats it may gain some more seats as seen in the 2002 elections. The expansion of its social base is more unlikely also because the BSP governments in the state have clearly shown its caste bias in favour of the Chamars which alienated other castes and the minority communities from it. Moreover, apart from UP the BSP does not have a significant presence in other states especially in the west, southern states and the east.

Fourthly, since the prime agenda of the BSP is to capture power and this had led the party to pursue unusual strategies to attain power in Uttar Pradesh. It had formed alliances with parties with which it does not have any ideological and programmatic affinity at all. Its alliance for example with BJP on three different occasions including during the 2002 elections has raised considerable doubts about the sanguine purpose and objective of the party. This had two different kinds of effects. In political circles and in the eyes of the electorate, the BSP’s credibility has gone down; very often it has been referred to as an opportunist party ready to form coalitions with strange forces. This kind of opportunism and lack of purpose to a large extent has eroded the credibility among a large section of the non-dalits, these non-dalits are included by the BSP in the category of bahujans. With these limitations, the BSP will find it extremely difficult to expand its social base among these sections of the community. But despite these limitations the progress of the BSP in the recent years particularly in the 1990s has been dramatic.

BACKWARD CLASS MOVEMENTS

Past three decades have seen the emergence of the backward classes in different fields of life. This has been more spectacular in electoral politics. Though backward classes became a significant social and political force in some parts of the country, especially south India even earlier, they got national attention following the introduction of the Mandal Commission Report by the V P Singh-led government at the centre in 1990.

WHO ARE THE BACKWARD CLASSES?
Marc Galanter in his book Competing Equalities: Law and The Backward Classes in India observes that backward classes is a very loose concept. Sociologically, these classes consist of a large number of the backward castes which remain above the Scheduled Castes and below the upper castes. These castes consist of intermediate castes — the cultivating castes, artisans and service castes. In the traditional social and economic structures, while the intermediary castes were involved in the production process in the land, the service castes and artisans provided services to the society. The backward classes known as the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), are other than those backward classes, which include the dalits/Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. The principal intermediary OBCs are Yadavs, Kurmies, Koeris, Gujjars and Jats in north Indian states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan and some of them in Haryana and Madhya Pradesh; Kappus, Kammas, Reddies, Vokkaligas, Lingayats, Mudliars in south Indian states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu; Patles, Kolis, Kshatriyas and Marathas in west Indian states like Guajarat and Maharashtra. They belong to the upper or dominant backward classes. The service castes and artisans, principal castes among them being carpenters, blacksmiths, barbers, water carriers, etc., are found in almost all states in varying numbers. They are also known as the Most Backward Castes (MBCs) in some states. Their relations were regulated by Jajamani System. In this system the service castes and artisans were known as clients of the dominant or superior castes. The latter included both the high castes and the intermediary cultivating castes.

The OBCs, in fact, include heterogeneous caste groups with differences in their social and economic conditions and political participation. Even the OBCs which share common characteristics in terms of their place in the social hierarchy differ from each other depending on their agrarian history. Not all intermediary castes which are now identified as OBCs belonged to the inferior group so far as their position in the agrarian structure was concerned. For example, Jats in most part of UP, Punjab which also consisted of the area of present day Haryana and Bharatpur region of Rajasthan were a dominant community even in the pre-Independence period. They had their on traditional caste councils or khaps headed by the hereditary chief or chaudhary to manage their juridical and social affairs. They were independent peasant-proprietors involved in the cultivation of land; they did not have the landlord above them and they paid rent to the state through their own representatives. While they were independent of any landlord between them and the state, they were placed in the dominant position over other village communities. But most of other intermediary castes were not independent peasant-proprietors. They were the tenants of landlords, who in several instances were the absentee. They were exploited by the latter in several ways. These intermediary castes were subjected to the exploitation of the landlords like the service and artisan castes. Thus, despite belonging to different castes, the intermediate castes, artisans and service castes shared certain cultural and economic characteristics. That is why the OBCs are those castes which are educationally and socially backward, not necessarily economically and politically.

To get categorised or recognised as an OBC, is political issue. A community should possess enough political clout to get itself identified as an OBC. There are several instances of demand by the castes to get themselves identified as OBCs. In 1999 the Rajasthan government and in 2000 the Uttar Pradesh government added the Jats to the lists of OBCs.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE BACKWARD CLASSES: IMPACT OF THE STATE POLICIES

The backward classes emerged as a powerful social, economic and political block during the post-independence period in the countryside as a result of the policies of the state. But there have remained internal differentiation among them. While the intermediary castes came to control the affairs of the village society, the artisans and the service castes joined the ranks of the marginalised groups of the wage labourers, marginal and poor farmers. Even though the upper backward or the intermediary castes also are undergoing differentiation in terms of the economic and educational entitlements, in political terms these differences get blurred. It will be imperative to discuss the impact of the state policies on the rise of the backward classes in the country. The principal policies which impacted them included: the land reforms which consisted of the abolition of landlordism, putting ceilings on the size of the landholdings, consolidation of landholdings, and Green Revolution in the selected areas of the country; welfare schemes for the welfare of the lower backward classes. Besides, the state policies the changes which occurred from within the society — population growth, breaking down of the Jajmani system also affected them. Although the state policies in different states of the country did not have the uniform and desired impact on the backward classes in the country, they definitely gave rise to the backward classes. They became the owners of their land, which they had been cultivation before the land reforms as the tenants, captured the local level political institutions like village panchayats in several parts of the country. On account of their numerical strength along with the control on the village land they came to control the village vote banks. All the upper backward classes are relevant examples of this change — Jats, Yadavs, Kurmies, Gujjars, Kappus, Kammas, Reddies, Lingayats, Vokaliggas, Patels, Kolis, Marathas, etc., in different regions of the country.

It must be emphasised that among the state policies it was the Green Revolution which had the most remarkable impact on the rural economic, social and political life. Most of the groups affected by this belonged to the upper backward classes. It not only disturbed the traditional patterns of relations it also gave rise to the emergence of capitalism in agriculture. It was marked by the mechanisation, displacement of human labour in agriculture and development of marker economy and commercialisation of agriculture. Even the capitalism had the differential impact on the backward classes. While the upper backward produced mainly for the market and remained largely the self-cultivators, those belonging to the lower backwards joined the ranks of the wage labourers in the agriculture or the non-agrarian sectors or even migrated to the cities.

The fact that the OBCs belong to distinct economic categories and to the middle castes and the artisans and the service castes have given rise to the issues which are both economic and caste-related. As you study in sub-sections 8.4.2 and 8.4.3, these have been the focus of the mobilisation of backward classes throughout the post-Independence period both at the national and state levels. However, the nature of these issues have changed over a period of time. For example, the social issues were combined with those of abolitions of landlordism and demand for providing ownership right to them in land before the implementation of the first phase of land reforms. Theses were replaced by the issues which emerged mainly after the Green Revolution — remunerative price of the crops, subsidised inputs, better infrastructure along with the issue of reservation in the political institutions and public jobs for the backward classes.

Another factor which is related to the changes in the socio-economic conditions of the backward classes is rise of a middle class among the OBCs. Despite the failure of the education policies a
group of educated persons, who became their spokespersons, had emerged among the backward classes. However, this group was not as big as it was among the high castes. In north India Charan Singh, S. D. Singh Chaurasia and Chaudhry Brahm Prakash were some of the spokes persons of the backward classes belonging to the early decades following Independence.

BACKWARD CLASS MOVEMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE

North-South Comparison

In comparison to North India, the backward classes in south India were mobilised much earlier. They not only got reservation in the government jobs but they were also mobilized into the social movement and entered politics in south India much before than the backward classes of North India. Christophe Jaffrelot in his book India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics attributes the early rise of backward classes in South India and their late rise in North India to the processes of ethnicisation and sanskritisation respectively. Through ethnicisation the backward classes of south India questioned the Brahminical domination and sought to replace it with that of the backward classes or dravidians. It was a revolt against sanskritisation in south. They not only got reservation in the public institutions and they replaced the brahminical domination in politics also. As compared to the north Indian states, where reservations for the OBCs were introduced from the 1970s at different points of time, the south India states had completed the process of granting reservation for the OBCs by the 1960s. This process in south India, in fact, had started as far back as in 1921 when the Maharaja of Mysore decided to implement reservation for the OBCs in the government jobs in order to end the Brahmin monopoly there. In the post-independence period different states in south India appointed backward classes commissions under pressure from the backward classes organisations and political parities, which espoused for the causes of the backward classes. In contrast, the north Indian backward classes were undergoing the process sanskritisation. Unlike their counterparts in south India they attempted to follow the customs, habits and rituals of the high castes. Several backward castes traced their lineages to the high castes — Brahmins or Kshatriyas.

Scholars explain this difference between north and south in the following way. The Brahmins had monopolised the high castes domination over the low castes in South India and their number in comparison to Brahmins of north India was much smaller. In contrast, the Brahmins were not the only high castes in north India. Their domination over the low castes was shared, thus diluted, by several high castes - Rajputs, Kayasthas or even Vaishyas. In north India the organisation like Arya Samaj spread the message among the backward castes that it was the karma not the birth which determined the place of a person in society. While it encouraged the backward classes to sanskritise themselves by tracing their lineages to the high castes, wearing janeo (sacred threads), etc., it also attempted to bring back to Hinduism those Muslims who were supposed to have converted from Hindu religion through the Suddhi movement. This instead of challenging the hegemony of the high castes or Brahminism revived it and strengthened it. As a result it dampened the chances of strong backward class movement in north India. The backward classes virtually were the non-Brahmin classes in south India. Unlike their counterparts in north India, they did not attempt to follow the high casts, i.e. Brahmins, they in fact questioned their domination in culture, administration and politics. The most effective expression of the dravidian revolt against the Brahmin domination in south was provided by the Self-Respect Movement led by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, alias Periyar, during the 1920s and 1940s. The Self-Respect Movement was based on the premise that the original
inhabitants of India were non-Brahmins or the dravidians, not the Brahmins. The main principle of this movement was Samadharma or equality. In order to get their self-respect and the non-Brahmins should replace the dominance of Brahmins in education, culture, politics and administration. The Self-Respect Movement included: boycott of Brahmins in rituals like weddings; condemnation of varnashrama dharma; burning of Manu Smriti. The non-Brahmins added suffix “Dravida” and “Adi” to their associations. M. C. Raja (1883-1947) was another advocate of the dravidian ideology. He became president of the Adi Dravida Mahasabha in 1916 and chaired the All India Depressed Classes Association since 1928.

Not only in south India even in west India the backward classes were mobilised much earlier in comparison to north. Jyotiba Phule belonging to backward Mali caste who became a source of inspiration for the latter day social reformers including E.V. Naicker, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and the non-Brahmin Maratha rulers of Kolhapur Sahuji Maharaj, set up Satya Shodak Samaj in 1873 in the Bombay Presidency in order to mobilise the low castes including dalits and non-Brahmins or backward classes. Satya Shodhak Samaj was able to unite untouchables and backward caste peasants. Christophe Jeffrelot considers Phule to be the first social reformer who did not fall into the “traps of sanskritisation”. He was also the first reformer who worked for the alliance of the Bahujan Samaj, the low castes, backward peasant classes and untouchables. He gave Aryan theory which suggested that the high castes Aryan were not the original inhabitants of India; they had come from outside. The original inhabitants were the untouchable, artisans, services castes and the peasant backward classes. The high cases had subjugated the low castes and established their dominance over them. His Aryan theory inspired several low castes leaders of the early 20th century and the latter period; Mangoo Ram held that the dalits in Punjab were Ad Dharmis; Achhootanand in UP held that dalits in UP were Adi-Hindus; and south Indian reformers believed that the Brahmins were outsider Aryans in their areas, and they as dravidains were the original inhabitants of their area.

The Maratha princes like Maharaja of Baroda and descendent of Shivaji, Maharaja of Kolhapur, Shahu, inspired by the philosophy of Phule challenged Brahmins’ domination of their administration. Shahu introduced policies to empower the non-Brahmins in administration and to end Brahmin's domination in it. He set up boarding houses for the students belonging to the low castes; made primary education free and compulsory in 1917; and most importantly he introduced 50 per cent reservation of seats in government jobs for the “members of backward communities” in the state administration. He also encouraged Marathas to replace the Brahmins in administration and replaced the Brahmin priests with them. Again, the British administration reserved seven seats for the Marathas and allied castes in the Legislative Council of the Bombay Presidency in 1919. Organisations like All India Maratha Mali Union, Yadav Gavli Association emerged in the Bombay Presidency. These organisations strove to forge an alliance of different non-Brahmin castes.

The Electoral Mobilisation

The backward class politics in India has largely been related to electoral mobilisation and creation of support base among them by the political parties and leaders. Other issues like the reservation for the OBCs or their mobilisation on the class issues like those related to the farmers also get linked to the electoral politics. The increasing participation of the OBCs, their entry into the state legislatures and parliament is indicative of the empowerment of the backward classes. During the post-Independence period there have been attempts on the parts of individual leaders and political organisations to mobilise the backward classes into the
participatory politics. While the backward classes in south India emerged before the independence and they benefited from this legacy in the post-Independence period, in the north India their systemic mobilisation took place in the post-interdependence period. The main leaders and political parties which mobilised the backward classes in north India include Charan Singh, Karpoori Thakur, Socialist parties and the different political formations at different point of times like Samajwadi Party and Rashtriya Janata Dal in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

Charan Singh carved out a political base for himself among the middle caste peasantry in UP and Bihar through a well designed strategy. He could do this while he was still a member of the Congress Party. Though Jats, the caste he belonged to did not fall in the official category of the OBCs till 2000 in UP and 1999 in Rajasthan, he identified himself with the backward classes of UP and Bihar. These castes were mainly Yadavs, Kurmies, Koeries, Kachhis, Lodhs, etc. His strategy was two fold — he combined the caste issue with the class issue. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, he addressed a large number of meetings of the backward classes belonging to Yadavs, Kurmies, Koeries and Lodhs in UP; attended the backward class meeting in Badhni in 1953. He also praised the role of Congress in abolition of landlordism, in which he had played prominent and decisive role. These activities of Charan Singh projected him as a backward class leader. This created division within the Congress; a section of the high caste Congress leadership accused him of identifying with the backward classes. They argued that Charan Singh's activities had alienated Congress from the high castes, and suggested that attempts should be made to win back support of these castes to the Congress. Charan Singh defended himself by arguing that he was not favouring the backward classes. Rather the Congress had neglected them. When Charan came out of Congress in 1967 and formed the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal’s (SVD’s) coalition government, he gave 29.63 per cent representation to the backward classes in ministry. Merger of his Bharatiya Kranti Dal headed by him with the Samyukti Socialist Party (SSP) which resulted in the formation of the Bharatiya Lok Dal in 1974 made him a close ally of the socialists. This won him ally allies among the backward classes in both state — UP and Bihar. Through the allies like Karpoori Thakur in Bihar and Devi Lal in Haryana, Charan Singh emerged as a leader of the backward classes and peasantry in north India. Meanwhile, after becoming the self-cultivators as a result of the land reforms, Green Revolution and having availed of educational and other policies a generation of leaders belonging to the intermediary castes emerged on the political scene by the 1970s in north India. After the death of Charan Singh in 1987 and Karpoori Thakur in 1989, they have come to occupy a an important place in politics of north India, especially UP and Bihar. Mulayam Singh Yadav, Lalu Prasad Yadav and Nitish Kumar provide some of such example. As far back as 1930s in Bihar, three major backward classes — Yadavs, Kurmies and Koeries formed Treveni Sangh to replace the dominance of high castes — Brahmans, Bhumihars and Rajputs in the electoral politics. This alliance, however, could not sustain after the elections of 1937.

Sanjay Kumar observes in his article “New Phase in Backward Caste Politics in Bihar, 1990-2000” (1999) that it was 1995 assembly election in Bihar which showed a new trend towards the empowerment of the OBCs in the state. It was marked by the polarisation of the backward support base; Yadavs supported the Janata Dal while the Kurmies and Koeries supported Samata Party. The fact remains that despite the division in their support to different parties including the BJP, the OBCs have become a force to reckon with in politics of Bihar. The division of support of backward classes to different parties is indicative to the competitive politics among the backward classes, to their empowerment. In case of Gujarat Ghanshyam Shah argues that the OBCs’ support to BJP there does not mean their support to the ideology of
“Brahminical dominance”. It is “part of an electoral game” in which the needs of the upper backward classes are satisfied.

It can be said that after the backward classes have emerged as a social block by the 1970s in north India their mobilisation has largely been in terms of electoral politics, i.e. allotment of tickets by political parties to the OBCs, their entry into the legislative assemblies and parliament and formation of governments by the political parties headed by the backward class leaders or those who identified with them. The political parties with different denominations led by Charan Singh, Janata Dals of different factions and Samajwadi Pary led by Mulayam Singh Yadav can be identified as backward class parties. The emergence of the BSP in the 1980s as a political force opened an opportunity for an alliance of the Bahujan Samaj, the backward classes and the dalits. This brought the together the Bahujan Samaj Party and BSP — the representatives of the OBCs and dalits, together to form the government in UP in 1993-1994. But because of the contradictions among the OBCs and dalit social basis of these parties and personality differences among the leaders, they could not continue the alliance. Even a large number of the BJP leaders belong to the OBCs.

It must be noted that the backward class mobilisation by different parties has largely been confined to the upper backward or the intermediate castes, who form the dominant sections of the village society. The artisans and the service castes, generally known as the Most Backward Classes (MBCs) remain largely excluded from empowerment. However, some attempts are also made to empower them. For example, in 1975 the Congress government appointed the Most Backward Class Commission in UP generally known as Sathi Commission named after its chairman, Chhedi Lal Sathi. Even Rajnath Singh, the BJP Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh appointed Social Justice Forum under the chairmanship of Hukum Singh in 2001 in order to suggest measures to empower the MBCs of UP. But these measures were unsuccessful for one or the other reasons.
At the same time when Charan Singh was attempting to carve out his base among the backward classes in UP, the socialists were also involved in this pursuit in north India. In an attempt to end the monopoly of the high castes Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia sought to mobilise the backward classes as soon as he broke away from the Congress. He advocated 60 per cent reservation for the backward classes, dalits and minorities in the government jobs. Merger of the Indian National Backward Classes Federation, a splinter group of the All India Backward Classes Federation in 1957 with the Socialist Party brought the socialists and the backward classes together. Throughout the 1960s socialists and backward class leadership continued to raise the issues of the backward classes. The most important of these was the demand to implement the Kaka Kalelkar report. Leaders like Mulayam Singh Yadav and B. P. Mandal were active during this period. But by the 1970s the AIBCF became defunct. However, the emergent backward class leadership continued to raise their issues even after that.

Politics of Reservation

The introduction of Mandal Commission Report by the V P Singh’s government in 1990 recommending reservation 27 per cent reservation for the OBCs in the central government jobs made the reservation a national issue in Indian politics. It not only drew reactions in its support or against it, it also changed the contours of Indian politics. The appointment of Mandal Commission by the Janata Party government in 1990 was result of the pressure of the backward classes leadership and their clout. As mentioned earlier by the 1970s the backward classes, especially those belonging to the intermediate castes had already made their presence felt in the politics of India and states.

The demand for reservation for the backward classes was raised in the Constituent Assembly by Punjab Rao Deshmukh, like Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had raised the similar demand for the Scheduled Castes. In order to articulate the reservation issue for the backward classes he founded All India Backward Classes Federation (AIBCF) on 26 January 1950. Within the AIBCF the differences grew between those having allegiance to the Congress on the one hand and those having allegiance to the Socialist Lohiaites. This resulted in the split in the AIBCF, with the splinter group naming itself as National Backward Classes Federation (NBCF). The former was headed by Punjab Rao Deshmukh, a Congress leader and the latter was headed by R L Chandpuri. After the death of Chandpuri, Chaudhry Brahm Prakash became its leader. Besides, a large number of informal and unregistered organisations existed in different states and different levels in country.

The Mandal Commission was result of the consistent demand by the backward class leadership to get the Kaka Kalelkar Commission’s, the first backward class commission report accepted. The Kaka Kalelkar Commission was also the result of the demand for such commission by the backward class leadership at the time of Independence. But Kaka Kalelkar’s recommendations of class as the criterion for identification of the backward classes and rejection of the Commission’s report by the parliament led to the demand of appointment of another commission which would take social and educational backwardness as the criteria for identification of the backward classes.

The implementation of the Mandal Commission report, however, has not settled the issue of reservation. Newer groups continue to demand to be recognised themselves as the OBCs. Whether a community can get itself identified as OBCs is a political question; it depends on the political factors.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS

Environmental and ecological movements are among the important examples of the collective actions of several social groups. Protection and recognition of constitutional and democratic rights, which are not defined by law but form an important part of the day to day living of the subaltern masses like the control over their resources, the right of indigenous people to preserve their culture, protection of environment and maintenance of ecological balance are significant concerns of these movements, as they affect the human life to a great extent.

Chipko movement in Garhwal region in 1970’s received global attention

These movements also reflect an enlarged vision of economics and politics. Economic justice sought by these movements does not mean mere distribution of resources but encompass a larger vision like enhancement in the quality of life through recognition of people’s right over their natural resources, their right to live with dignity, and their participation in the decision-making. The concerns of human environment received spectacular attention of scholars following the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm in 1972. By the 1980s the “green movement” became a worldwide phenomenon encompassing various countries of the world including India. It is signified by several movements of people for the protection of their environmental and ecological rights in India, ‘eco-greens’ or ‘green movement’ in Germany and North America.

It may be mentioned here that scholars have tried to understand and analyse these movements in diverse ways. In general these movements are grouped under tribal and peasant movements and as well under New Social movements. This is so because ecological aspects are generally associated with peasant and tribals whose survival is associated with the state of natural resources like forests, water etc. Some treat them as middle class or elite movements as the problems and concerns of the local communities, indigenous people or non–tribal poor are generally articulated by the urban middle class elite. In fact, there has been no single unified and
homogenous environmental discourse in India. There has been what Guha calls ‘varieties of environmentalism’.

ENVIROMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

The environmental movement is a broad generic term which is generally used to describe and understand different types of local struggles and conflicts concerned with livelihood issues and ecological security within the larger context of the development debate. These struggles in fact critiqued and questioned the notion of development and conservation ecology pursued by the Indian state and its officials since colonial time. The genesis of the environmental movement in India can be traced to the Chipko movement (1973) in Garhwal region in the new state of Uttranchal. In fact, between 1970s and 1980s there were several struggles in India around issues of rights to forest and water which raised larger ecological concerns like rights of communities in forest resources, sustainability of large scale environmental projects like dams, issues of displacement and rehabilitation etc.

The Indian environmental movement is critical of the colonial model of development pursued by the post–colonial state. The post–independent state failed to build up a development agenda based on the needs of the people and continued to advocate the modern capitalist agenda which led to the destruction of environment, poverty and marginalisation of rural communities. Formation of national parks, sanctuaries, protected areas in India, in fact represents the conventional environmentalism which the Indian state advocated with the aim of preserving wildlife and biodiversity by pushing people out of these areas. In response to this conventional environmentalism which considered the Indian state to be the custodian of natural resources, the environmental movement in India advocated the ideology of ‘environmentalism of the poor’. It not only criticised modern developmentalism but also strongly advocated the revival of traditional ‘self – sufficient village economy’. It brought communities to the centre stage of Indian environmental discourse. The environmentalist stated that local communities were best suited to conserve natural resources as their survival depended in the sustainable use of such resources. They argued that in order to make the sustainable use of the resource the customary rights or traditional rights should be given back to the people which were taken away by the State, and traditional institutions should also be recognised. In a nutshell, the environmental movement in India concentrates on the issue of equity in relation to access and use of natural resources.

Unlike in the West, a significant characteristic of environmental movements in India is that they have mainly involved the women, the poor and disadvantaged masses who have been directly affected by or are victims of environmental degradation. Thus these movements are primarily political expressions of the struggle of local communities and people who are victims of environmental degradation or abuse of resources.

Gadgil and Guha identify four broad strands within the environmental movements in India based on vision, ideology and strategy. The first types are those which emphasise on the moral necessity to restrain overuse and ensure justice to the poor and marginalised. Mainly Gandhians belong to this strand. The second strand stresses on the need to dismantle the unjust social order through struggle. Marxists mostly follow this strand. The Third and fourth strands advocate reconstruction, i.e. employing technologies appropriate to the given context and time. They reflect the concerns of the scientists or the spontaneous efforts of the communities at the village
level who aim at protecting local community forests or the right to pursue environment-friendly agricultural practices.

SOME POPULAR ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN INDIA

Chipko Movement

The origin of modern environmentalism and environmental movements in India can be ascribed to the Chipko movement in the central Himalayan region in the early 1970s. Chipko movement, launched to protect the Himalayan forests from destruction, has its’ roots in the pre-independence days. Many struggles were organised to protest against the colonial forest policy during the early decades of 20th century. Peoples’ main demand in these protests was that the benefits of the forest, especially the right to fodder, should go to local people. These struggles have continued in the post-independent era as the forest policies of independent India are no different from that of colonial ones. The origin of ‘Chipko’ [chipak jayenge - to hug] took place during 1973. In the early 1973 the forest department refused to allot ash trees to the Dashauli Gram Swarajya Sangha (DGSS), a local cooperative organisation based in Chamoli districts, for making agricultural implements. On the other hand, the forest department allotted ash trees to a private company, i.e., Symonds Co. This incident provoked the DGSS to fight against this injustice through lying down in front of timber trucks and burning resin and timber depots as was done in Quit India movement. When these methods were found unsatisfactory, Chandi Prasad Bhat - one of the leaders, suggested of embracing the trees and thus ‘Chipko’ was born (for details see Bahuguna, 1990 and Guha, 1989). This form of protest was instrumental in driving away the private company from felling the ash trees. With its success the movement spread to other neighbouring areas and subsequently the movement came to be popularly known as Chipko movement internationally. From its beginning the Chipko movement concentrated on ecological issues such as depletion of forest cover and soil erosion.

Three important aspects were responsible for the success of Chipko movement. First, the close links between the livelihoods of the local people and the nature of the movement. The local people consider Chipko as a fight for basic subsistence which have been denied to them by the institutions and policies of the State (Guha, 1989). In addition, specificity of the area where Chipko movement took place; involvement of women in the contribution to households’ subsistence and the overwhelming support to anti-alcohol campaign have led to the overwhelming support of women which is unique to the Chipko movement. The second aspect is with regard to the nature of agitation. Unlike other environmental movements Chipko has strictly adhered to the Gandhian tradition of freedom struggle, i.e., non–violence. Third, the simplicity and sincerity of the leaders like Sunderlal Bahuguna and their access to national leaders like Mrs. Indira Gandhi, other politicians and officials also helped to the success of the movement to a large extent.

The demands of the Chipko movement were as follows:

i) complete stoppage of cutting trees for commercial purposes;

ii) the traditional rights should be recognised on the basis of minimum needs of the people;

iii) making the arid forest green by increasing people’s participation in tree cultivation;
iv) formation of village committees to manage forests;

v) development of the forest related home-based industries and making available the raw materials, money and technique for it; and

vi) giving priority to afforestation in the light of local conditions, requirements and varieties.

What is distinctive about Chipko movement is that it was the forerunner as well as direct inspiration for a series of popular movements in defense of community rights to natural resources. Sometimes these struggles revolved around forests, in other instances, around control and use of pasture, mineral or fish resources.

**Appiko Movement**

Inspired by the Chipko movement the villagers of Western Ghats, in the Uttar Kannada region of Karnataka started Appiko Chalewali movement during September – November, 1983. Here the destruction of forest was caused due to commercial felling of trees for timber extraction. Natural forests of the region were felled by the contractors which resulted in soil erosion and drying up of perennial water resources. In the Saklani village in Sarsi, the forest dwellers were prevented from collecting usufructs like twigs and dried branches and non timber forest products for the purposes of fuelwood, fodder, honey etc. They were denied of their customary rights to these products.

In September 1983, women and youth of the region decided to launch a movement similar to Chipko, in South India. Women and youth from Saklani and surrounding villages walked five miles to a nearby forest and hugged trees there. They forced the fellers and the contractors of the state forest department to stop cutting trees. The people demanded a ban on felling of green trees. The agitation continued for 38 days and this forced the state government to finally concede to their demands and withdrew the order for felling of trees. For some time government stopped felling of trees which was resumed again after some time which resumed the movement again. The movement was backed by the local people. Even the daily wage labourers hired by the contractors to fell tree stopped doing their work.

In October, the movement entered into its second phase and this took place in Bengaon forest. Here the forest was of mix tropical semi–evergreen type and mostly on hilly terrain. The inhabitants of the region who were primarily tribal or the indigenous people depended on the forest for their survival and livelihood. Disappearance of bamboo due to commercial felling deprived them of the basic source to make items like baskets, mats, etc. The main source of their income was the sale of these items. When felling of trees did not stop people started the movement. The movement was spontaneous in nature. The local indigenous people hugged tree to stop them from cutting and finally the government had to give in to their demands. Similar movements also started in other areas like Husri. It also inspired the local people to launch the movement.

In fact Appiko movement became a symbol of people’s power for their rights of natural resources vis-a-vis the state. In November, the movement spread to Nidgod village in Siddapur taluka preventing the state from commercial felling of trees in this deciduous forest of the region. The Appiko movement was successful in its three fold objectives, i.e., protection of the existing forest cover, regeneration of trees in denuded lands and utilising forest wealth with
proper consideration to conservation of natural resources. The movement also created awareness among the villagers throughout the Western Ghats about the ecological danger posed by the commercial and industrial interests to their forest which was the main source of sustenance. Like the Chipko, the Appiko movement revived the Gandhian way of protest and mobilisation for sustainable society in which there is a balance between man and nature.

Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA)

Narmada river project encompassing three major states of western India Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra is the most important case study in terms of maturation of environmental movement and dynamics related to politics of development. No other development project in India has brought into focus the intensity of magnitude of ecodevelopment problems to such a level of informed debate, political mobilisation and grass root activism as this project. The controversy which surrounded this project has challenged the government at all levels and at the same time was successful in creating and forging linkages with civil society organisation and NGOs, both at the national and international level. In fact, it has contributed to the political discourse of alternative development in India.

Sardar Sarovar Project which is a interstate multi-purpose project with a terminal major dam in Gujarat is being built on river Narmada which is the fifth largest river in India– 1312 km long. The Narmada Valley Project, with its two mega projects- Sardar Sarovar Project and Narmada Sagar Project in Madhya Pradesh, is the largest single river valley project with the objective of making the world’s largest man–made lake.

The consequences of the project are, however, quite glaring and alarming. The reservoir will submerge 37,000 hectares of land of which 11,000 hectares are classified as forest. It will displace about one lakh persons of 248 villages– 19 of Gujarat, 36 of Maharashtra and 193 of Madhya Pradesh. The state government initiated the project as Gujarat was one of the worst water–starved regions in India and there was drastic shortage of water for domestic, commercial, agricultural and industrial needs. Further, the state had witnessed one of the worst droughts between 1985-88 which further reinforced this project. However, according to the critics, it is seen as “the world’s worst man–made ecological disaster” and it is considered unviable. It may be mentioned here that originally Narmada project was considered to be an irrigation project of a 161 feet high dam. Later it was found that water could be technologically harnessed making it a multipurpose dam if its level is raised to 455 feet. Consequently, the state governments started looking for finances not only from the centre but also from the World Bank.

Plans for damming the river at Gora in Gujarat surfaced as early as 1946. In fact, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru laid the foundation for a 49.8-meter-high dam in 1961. After studying the new maps the dam planners decided that a much larger dam would be more profitable. The only problem was hammering out an agreement with neighboring states– Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. In 1969, after years of negotiations attempting to agree on a feasible water-sharing formula, the Indian government established the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal. Ten years later, it announced its award – the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award. The award envisaged that land should be made available to the ousters at least year before submergence.
Before the Ministry of the Environment even cleared the Narmada Valley Development Projects in 1987, the World Bank sanctioned a loan for $450 million for the largest dam, the Sardar Sarovar, in 1985. In actuality, construction on the Sardar Sarovar dam site had continued sporadically since 1961, but began in earnest in 1988. Questions arose concerning the promises about resettlement and rehabilitation programme set up by the government. As a consequence, each state had a people’s organisation which addressed these concerns. Soon, these groups came together to form the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), or, the Save the Narmada Movement under the leadership Medha Patekar, a social activists.

It may be mentioned here that the NBA began as a fight for information about the Narmada Valley Development Projects but developed as a fight for just rehabilitation for the lakhs of people to be ousted by the Sardar Sarovar Dam and other large dams along the Narmada river. Eventually, when it became clear that the magnitude of the project precluded accurate assessment of damages and losses, and that rehabilitation was impossible, the movement challenged the very basis of the project and questioned its claim to development.

In 1988, the NBA demanded formally the stoppage all work on the Narmada Valley Development Projects. In September 1989, more than 50,000 people gathered in the valley from all over India to pledge to fight “destructive development.” A year later thousands of villagers walked and boated to a small town in Madhya Pradesh to reiterate their pledge to drown rather than agree to move from their homes. Under intense pressure, the World Bank was forced to create an independent review committee, the Morse Commission. It published its report the Morse Report in 1992. The report “endorsed all the main concerns raised by the Andolan (NBA). Two months later, the Bank sent out the Pamela Cox Committee. It also known as suggested exactly what the Morse Report advised against: “a sort of patchwork remedy to try and salvage the operation”. Eventually, due to the international uproar created by the Report, the World Bank withdrew from the Sardar Sarovar Project. In response, the Gujarati government decided to raise $200 million and go ahead with the project.

Many issues of the project are yet unresolved. However, what is more important is that the Movement has been successful a considerable extent. The achievements of the movements include:

• Exit of the World Bank from Sardar Sarovar in 1993
• Halt of Sardar Sarovar construction 1994-99
• Withdrawal of foreign investors from Maheshwar dam 1999-2001

The NBA is unique in the sense that it underlined the importance of people’s right to in formation which the authorities finally had to concede under media and popular pressure. It was successful not only in mobilising hundreds of thousands people from different walks of life to put pressure on the State government for its anti-people policies affecting and displacing lakhs of tribals from their homes and livelihoods. It also received immense international support. Resorting to non-violent mode of protest and following Gandhian vision of constructive work, NBA, as its popularly known is distinctive landmark in the history of environmentalism in
India. However, in the face of recalcitrant attitude of the governments, the NBA continues with the involvement of effected people and civil society organisations.

**Urban-based Environmental Movements**

In the recent past environmental pollution caused due the industrialisation has become the focus of collective action by the civil society organisations, NGOs, concerned individuals, especially lawyers, scientists, environmentalists and social activists. They sought the intervention of the judiciary and drew the attention of the state for showing concern to the pollution caused by the process of modernisation. However, the main focus of the collective action against pollution has been in the urban areas. Certain tragedies like gas leakage in Bhopal based Union Carbide MNC, Charnobyl in former Soviet Union where thousands of people were killed created worries among the people on the negative effect of the industrialisation. Though the 1990s have seen increased concern about the environmental pollution, awareness about the disastrous impact of the environmental pollution started growing in the 1960s. All the major cities of India are facing acute air, water and other kinds on environmental pollution. Continuous immigration of the people from rural areas into the cities, their habitat in the congested areas which exist along with the polluting small scale industries; increasing number of vehicles; and unplanned expansion of cities, open drainage, etc. have created levels environmental hazards. This pollution made people susceptible to multiple diseases.

The protection of environment did not form significant part of the policies of the state. The Nehruvian model gave more emphasis to the industrialisation without showing much concern for the pollution it was going create. However, in 1976 an Constitutional Amendment called upon the state “to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forest and wildlife of the country” and made the fundamental duty of every citizen “to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to have compassion for living creatures”. In the following decades the state passed legislations to prevent air pollution and environmental protection like The Air Act of 1981 and Environmental Protection Act of 1986. The judiciary has become the arbiter of people’s rights which include their protection from the environmental protection also since the emergence of the device of the Public Interest Litigation ( PIL). In the face of indifference of the executive and legislature about the people’s problems, the PIL has become an effective weapon through which people seek the intervention of the state on these issues. The intervention of the judiciary forced the state to introduce some measures for prevention of environmental pollution. Justice Krishna Iyer, Justice Kuldeep Singh and advocate MC Mehta have made remarkable contribution in protection of the environment.

Delhi is one of the most polluted cities in the world. Three issues related to the environmental pollution have been focus of activities of some concerned of the civil society components in the recent past. These are air pollution caused due to the vehicular and industrial pollution and water pollution in Yamuna river. The number of private and public vehicles has increased many fold in the recent past. This has polluted the environment and made people, especially children and old vulnerable to multiple diseases. Reacting to the court order which was result of a PIL, the government made it compulsory to introduce the CNG vehicles and make the pollution check mandatory for all private vehicles. The introduction of the CNG vehicles has resulted in the reduction of the environmental pollution in the city. Similarly, the Delhi government has been force to shift the polluting industries out of the city and launch the Yamuna river cleaning operation. The closing down of the polluting factories and industries proved the labour unrest in the city. It resulted in the police firing, which killed one labourer. In fact, this is related to the
unplanned development policy. The migration to the cities from the villages is inevitable. Unless some measures are adopted to absorb the migrating population, and increasing usage of the vehicles is stopped, it seems the environmental pollution will remain.

ETHNIC MOVEMENTS

Even before India could assume its present shape a sovereign, democratic and secular republic following the attainment of Independence from the British rule, different ethnic groups have been clamouring for their recognition in the society in terms of cultural, economy and politics. Such claims became more strident after the country became independent. As the time passes more and more claims are made by several groups, many of whom were not visible on the political scene earlier. Many scholars categorise such movements as ethnic movements.

A movement by an ethnic group in Manipur to protect their land, rights and identity

WHAT ARE ETHNIC MOVEMENTS?

For a proper understanding of ethnic movements it necessary to understand what we mean by ethnicity as such movements are associated with it. Ethnicity is denotes towards identification of a group of people on the basis of certain criteria or markers which they are supposed to share with each other. These markers include culture, race, language, religion, customs, history, economic experiences, etc. For a group of people to share such attributes another requirement is that they get mobilised into some collective action for attainment of certain demands. The number of markers or attributes which form the basis of an ethnic group depends on the choice of these factors by the ethnic group or its leadership. But there are differences among the scholars regarding the number of attributes which constitute and ethnic group. Scholars in India generally consider that mobilisation as ethnic which is based on the multiple attributes — language, religion, culture, history, economy, etc. For example, the language based mobilisation
is considered as linguistic mobilisation and the groups as such is considered as linguistic group. Similarly caste based mobilisation is considered as dalit, backward or any other caste mobilisation. In India the religion-based mobilisation is called communal mobilisation. But the scholars who follow American and European traditions categorise even the mobilisation based on the single attribute — language, religion, caste, etc, as ethnic mobilisation. They also do not distinguish between the communal and ethnic mobilisation. For example, Paul R. Brass uses ethnic and communal mobilisation interchangeably. On the other hand, Dipankar Gupta in his book The Context of Ethnicity: The Sikh Identity in a Comparative Perspective differentiates between communalism and ethnicity. He argues that the ethnic mobilisation is related to the nation-state — the territory and the sovereignty. And the communal mobilisation does not involve the nation-state. It is confined to the government and two or more communities in the conflict, one of which alleges that the government discriminates against it in preference to the other. The point in dispute could be job, specific rights of the communities, etc. According to him in the ethnic mobilisation the loyalty of one ethnic group to the referent of nation-state is questioned. It is not so in the case of communal mobilisation. Also, the group identities are not permanent. In the changing context of time and space an ethnic identity can become communal and vice versa. However, the general tendency among the scholars is to consider the multi-attributes mobilisation of the communities as ethnic.

Ethnicity is also a relative term. An ethnic group differentiates itself from another groups which also shares certain attributes which are different from it. It feels that it has to preserve its identity and interests from the perceived or real threats of other ethnic groups and institutions, and processes associated with them. Ethnic movements are concerned with the preservation and protection of the cultural identities of the ethnic groups and their other interests. Another concept which is related to the ethnicity is nationality or nation. While some scholars differentiate between ethnicity, nationalities or even nations they are used interchangeably. If one section of scholars considers a multiple-marker based mobilisation as ethnic, there are others which call these as the mobilisation of the nations or the nationalities.

**APPROACHES TO STUDY ETHNIC MOVEMENTS**

The most commonly used approaches to study the ethnic movements are: the primordial, the instrumentalist and the approach which combines the features of primordial and instrumentalist approaches. The primordial approach holds that the basis of the formation of the ethnic groups are “given”. There are traits of an ethnic group which are inherited by them, i.e., culture, language, customs, religions, etc. Similarly other ethnic group also has certain inherited characteristics. Since the differences in the markers of various ethnic groups vary from each other, they involve in the ethnic movements because of these “given” traits. There are bound to be conflict between different ethnic groups. The advocates of the instrumentalist approach on the other hand believe that ethnic groups are creation of the leadership or the elites belonging to these groups. The differences in the language, culture, customs, economic conditions of the people or the social cleavages are manipulated by the elite of the ethnic groups to generate ethnic consciousness and start ethnic movements. There both real and imagined reasons for the formation of ethnic movements and generation of the ethnic movements. The ethnic community when created on the basis of imagined attributes are thus “imagined” or “constructed” communities. The advocates of the third approach believe that both of these approaches are marked into “bi-polarity” — the basis of ethnicity is either “given” or “imagined” or
“constructed”. But there are problems with both of these approaches. While the “primordial” approach does not explain why and how an ethnic group gets mobilised into the collective action, the “instrumentalist” approach does not explain as to why an ethnic group responds to the call of the elite, leaders or politicians. They advocate a combination of both the primordial and instrumentalist approaches instead of “bi-polar” approach.

**ETHNIC MOVEMENTS DURING POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD**

Almost all the major regions of the country have witnessed ethnic movements. They take the forms of movements for regional autonomy, for creation of separate states, demand for secession or insurgency. These manifestations of ethnic movements are also called self-determination movements. In several cases ethnic movements give rise to conflicts or riots on the lines of ethnic divide based on all or some the markers – tribe, caste, language, religion, etc. The self-determination movements actually question the nation-state building model which was introduced by the Independent India. Known as Nehruvian or the Mahalanobis model this model presumed that in the course of development or modernisation the identities formed on the basis of ascriptive factors – language, caste, tribe, religion will disappear and the development will take place on the secular lines. But much before the effect of this model could be felt, it was questioned on the all major consideration – language, region and nationality. Although the movements started with the demand based on single marker like language or culture, they drew support of people who shared more than one attribute in a particular region. Starting with the rejection of the Indian Constitution by the Nagas in the North-East, (see sub-section 9.5.4) it spread in the form of Dravidian ethnic movement and demand for the formation of linguistic states with classic example of the movement of for creation of separate state of Andhra Pradesh in South, movements in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab and Shiv Sena's against South Indians in Mumbai.

In Tamil Nadu following the legacy of E V Ramaswami Naicker three issues formed the basis of ethnic movement in the first two decades following independence – language, dravidian culture, and religion. The leadership of the movement argued that imposition of the North Indian Hindi language, Brahminical Hindu religion and Aryan culture were detrimental to the development of the dravidian identity. Therefore, the Tamil ethnic movement had demanded, stopping of the imposition of Hindi language secession from India. However, towards the end of the 1960s the demand for secession was given up by the Tamil nationality/ethnic group. It then shift its demand to get autonomy to the states. Though the Dravidian assertion in India has become milder since the late 1960s, sentiments against the imposition of Hindi language still are important factors of mobilisation there. In the light of the movements and violence generated by them prompted Salig S. Harrison to describe the decades of the 1950s-1960s as the “most dangerous decades”.

The state was initially reluctant to reconsider the demand for the linguistic reorganisation of the state. But it had to consider this demand following the death of a Gandhian P. Srinivasulu who died of hunger strike demanding a linguistic state of Andhra Pradesh. Government’s acceptance of demand to create Andhra Pradesh led to the reorganisation of the states on the linguistic basis in 1953. But reorganisation of the state did not halt the demand for the separate states.

The ethnic movement in Punjab was based on three types of issues – regional, religious and economic. Spearheaded by the Akali Dal, the leadership in Punjab argued that since Sikhs follow a separate religion and speak different language, they should get a separate state. On
some occasions, it got reflected in the communal divide between the Hindus and Sikhs in the state, resulting in the ethnic conflict. They launched a Punjabi Suba movement during the 1950s and 1960s demanding a separate state of Punjab for them. Baldev Raj Nayar observes that Akali Dal’s strategy during the Punjabi Suba movement included constitutional means like memoranda, rallies and marches; penetration into the Congress organisation in order to influence the party in favour of a separate state; and, agitational means which included marches to shrines, intimidation and force. As a result of the Punjabi Suba movement, Punjab was created as separate state on November 1, 1966. According to Paul R Brass, the attitude of the central government towards the ethnic conflicts or mobilisation in the 1950s and 1960s was marked by an unwritten code — aversion to the demands for creation of the states on the religious grounds; no concession to the demands of the linguistic, regional or other culturally defined groups; no concession to groups involved in ethnic dispute unless there was support to the demand from both groups involved in the conflict. In his opinion, demand for creation of a separate state of Punjab was accepted only when there was also a demand for creation of the separate state of Harayana for Hindi speaking population of the same state.

The ethnic movement in Punjab again arose in the 1980s. It challenged the sovereignty of the Indian state the notion of India as a nation-state. It sought to establish a sovereign state of Khalistan, to be based on the tenets of Sikhism. The Khalistan movement and the issues related to were generally referred to as “Punjab Crisis”. The movement became violent and came to be identified with terrorism in the popular, academic and political discourse. The advocates of the Khalistan movement argued that Sikhs, as followers of the minority religion have been discriminated in India despite their contribution to Indian economy and army. The rise of Khalistan movement, terrorism or the in the 1980s has been a sequence to the political developments in the country which preceded it. The 1970s were marked by the challenge of the Akali Dal to the dominance of the Congress in Punjab. In order to meet this challenge the Congress took the help of Sikh religious leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhinderanwale in the 1980 Legislative assembly elections in Punjab. The use of services of Bhinderanwale had its cultural and political implication for the country and the state. It encouraged Bhinderanwale to assert his authority independently and assume the leadership of the Khalistan movement. Not only a large number of Sikh youths were attracted to the movement, the movement also received support of the foreign forces. The state responded with the Operation Blue Star: sending of the armed forces to nab terrorists who were hiding in the Golden Temple at Amritsar including Sant Bhinderanwale. This, ultimately led to the assassination of Indira Gandhi. The Khalistan movement also resulted in the ethnic divide between the Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab.

The scholars have explained the ethnic movement of the 1970s and 1980s in Punjab in terms of socio-economic and political factors. Those who explain it in terms of the socio-economic factors follow the Marxian perspective. They argue that the “Punjab Crisis” occurred in the wake of green revolution; inability of the Sikh farmers to meet the rising cost of investment in agriculture, rising unemployment among the youth and growth of the consumerist culture which gave rise to the feeling of losing Sikh identity, etc., contributed to the rise of militancy in Punjab. The scholars who give the political explanation find the socio-economic explanation inadequate. They argue that the Punjab crisis was the result of a manipulation of the religion and problems of the people by the politicians.

The basis of ethnic movement in Jammu and Kashmir are language, religion and geographical location. A section of people of the state have argued since the ethnic composition of state in terms of language, religion and geography is different from the dominant ethnic groups in the
country, region should be treated differently. Some of them have not considered themselves as members of the Union of India. As a result, they have demanded cessation from India; some have advocated merger with Pakistan, some have demanded a separate state for the region and some have advocated merger of two Kashmirs — one occupied by Pakistan and other of India, to become a single state. Supporters of this perspective have launched insurgency involving violence and loss human beings and material. They are supported by the foreign forces, especially Pakistan. The popular leadership in the state has also been divided on the issue of relationship of the state with the nation-state. Hari Singh, the ruler of the Jammu and Kashmir initially opposed the accession of the state into the union of India. But he had to agree to it in the face of attack of the Pakistani forces. Sheikh Abdullah had supported the merger of the state with Union of India. But in the course of time he wavered on the issue. He formed Plebscrite Front, which led to his incarceration by the central government from 1953 till 1964. According to Balraj Puri the reasons for the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir include: attitude of the central government, the lack of opposition in the state, derailment of democracy by the central and state leadership, rising unemployment and other problems of people, cold war and Pakistan. Even within Jammu and Kashmir there are ethnic movements by the smaller groups in Laddakh and Jammu and Kashmir, demanding autonomy within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. These regions allege that they are discriminated against by the dominant religious communities and prosperous regions — Muslims of Kashmir.

ETHNIC MOVEMENTS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRIBALS

The tribals provide the most appropriate examples of the ethnic movements in the country. In their case, almost all factors, both real and imagined, which the tribal communities share among themselves – culture, customs, language, race, religion (indigenous or otherwise), economic issues, contribute to their mobilisation. Even if the their mobilisation starts with a single marker, it is the multiple markers which come to play their roles in the due course. Tribal ethnic movements find their expression in all forms — insurgency, protection of the culture and economy of the “sons of the soil” from the outside exploiters, secession from the Union of India, autonomy movements/ demand for the separate state; and, ethnic conflicts and riots.

The most common issues which account for the tribals’ ethnic mobilisation are: perceived or real threat to their indigenous culture and economy including the natural resources like mineral, forest and modern market opportunities by the outsiders (non-tribals middle classes, businessmen, moneylenders, bureaucrats); their discrimination by the state, especially at the central levels and its representatives (central government employees, army, police, etc.).

Who are Tribals?

Unlike the Scheduled Castes, there are differences among the scholars on the criteria to identify the tribals or the Scheduled Tribes. While the Scheduled Castes consist of the erstwhile untouchable castes placed in the lowest rung of the Hindu society, the tribals follow multiple religions in the country – Buddhism, Christianity, Islam or their indigenous religions. However, there is almost a unanimity among the scholars on certain characteristics of the tribals. The principal of these characteristics are as follows:

1) Their close association with nature, mainly the forests;
2) Relatively traditional means of cultivation and less developed market;
3) Near absence of the rigid division within the community and discrimination on the basis of birth, unlike the caste division among the Hindus;

4) Presence of the traditional chiefs or headmen and better position of women as compared to the non-tribals;

5) Attachment/reverence to traditional customs and culture.

Article 342 of the Constitution attributes “isolation, backwardness and cultural distinctiveness” as the characteristics of the Scheduled Tribes.

These characteristics, however, have undergone changes as a result of modernisation – education, impact of Christianity on many tribes, changing cropping pattern or penetration of market, economic differentiation and emergence of middle classes and in some cases decline in the authority of the traditional chiefs. These changes have given rise to the ethnisation of tribes reflected in their ethnic movements. Article 342 mentions 212 Scheduled Tribes in the country. The tribes are found in all parts of the country – all states of north-east India, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Dadra Nagar Haveli and Lakshadweep Islands. The tribals of north-east are called frontier tribes and those of other parts of the country are called non-frontier tribes. Of the entire tribal population 11 per cent are found in north-east India and 89 per cent are found in other regions. Tribals have been involved in the collective action for one or the other goals. (Ghanshyam Shah, pp.92-96).

Tribals of North-East India

North-East India as a single region has the largest number of the tribal population in the country. They follow different religions especially Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and indigenous religious tenets. They can further be divided between the plain and hill tribes. Almost all state of North-East India have witnessed one or the other forms of ethnic movements. In this sub-section we will deal with some ethnic movements with examples from states of North-East India – Nagaland, Assam and Meghalaya.

It is important to note ethnic issues of North-East India are related to the geographical factors, its regional dimensions. Though there are differences among different tribals of North-East India in terms of their cultural practices, they share common experience of deprivation due to their regional location. A large amount of literature exists on the North-East which seeks to explain the ethnic problems of the region. But there are wide differences in the discourse on explaining the ethnic issues of the region. And the divide in the discourse also reflect on the basis of the formation of the ethnic identities and the movements in the regions. The problems of the North-eastern region – insurgency, autonomy movements, ethnic conflicts, riots, etc., have been explained by mainly two perspectives: first, the modernisation/development/“nation-state building” perspective and; second, the “federation-building perspective”. The followers of the first perspective largely argue that the problems of the North-East are related to the issues of “nation-state building”; conflict between the new middle classes, especially among the tribals of the region, which has emerged as a result of the modernisation/development/transition Democratisation) with the traditional leadership; inability of the system to meet the rising aspiration of this group. The main advocates of this perspective are S K Chaube, B P Singh, B G Verghese and Myron Wienor. Most of these writers do not hail from the region. The second perspective is actually the critique of the first one and is available in the writings of the scholars who hail from the region. The principal adherents of this perspective are Sanjib Baruah, Udy
Sharma, Sanjay Hazarika, Sajal Nag, M P Bezbaruah. They argue that problems of the North-East India arose because the nation leadership overlooked the perspective of the people of the region in their quest for “nation-building”. In order to build “nation-state” the central government adopted “step motherly” treatment towards the North-East; ignored the “periphery” and the smaller nationalities; shown arrogant attitude towards them; have been indifferent to the human rights violation in the region. They argue for a “Federation-Building” perspective in place on the “nation-state” building perspective. (Jagpal Singh (2005), “Challenge of Ethnicity to Federalism: Discourse on the North-East India” in Akhtar Majeed (ed.), Federal India: A Design for Good Governance, Centre for Federal Studies in association with Manak Publications, New Delhi). The need for a “Federation-building” perspective has been most prominently underlined by Sanjib Baruah in his books India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality (Oxford University Press, 1999) and Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of North-East India (Oxford University Press, 2005). Let us now discuss some examples of Ethnic movements of tribals in North-East India.

The Nagas

Movement of the Nagas which is often referred to as Naga insurgency is called the Naga national movement by the Nagas. It is the oldest movements relating to the ethnicity or the nationality question in the country. The nationality/ethnicity in Nagaland had all dimensions relating to the ethnic movement – demand for autonomy, secession from India and ethnic conflicts. Nagas believe that they form a nation which is different from other ethnic groups or nationalities/nations in India. They had always enjoyed their sovereignty with distinct culture, customs and history. A section among them believe that they have never been part of India and they would like to retain their identity, by joining Indian Union their sovereignty would be compromised. They do not recognise the merger of Nagaland with the Union of India and and consider it as done under coercion. That is why many Nagas did not recognise the Indian Constitution, the VI Schedule meant for the North-East India and participate in the first general election held in 1952.

The Nagas elite consisting of the those educated in the Christian educational institutions and few neighbouring village headmen formed Naga Club in 1918 to take up the social and administrative problems of the people of Naga Hills. In a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929, the Naga Club pleaded to exclude the Nagas from the administrative reforms which it was supposed to recommend and retain the Nagas directly under the British administration. At the initiative of the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District, District Tribal Council, an organisation of the individual Naga Councils was formed in 1945. In 1945, the name of the District Tribal Council was changed to the Naga National Council (NNC). The NNC reached an agreement on a 9-point programme with the representative of Government of India, the Governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydery on 27-29 June, 1947. The main provisions of the agreement included – protection of tribal land from alienation, creation of administrative autonomy and special responsibility of Government of India to implement the agreement. Asserting that Nagas are a separate nation from India, they announced formation of the Honkin Government or the “People’s Sovereign Republic of Nagaland”. This resulted in violence between the Indian Army and Nagas. This was followed by a 16-point agreement between the Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru and the Nagas in July 1960. This finally led to creation of Nagaland as a separate state on August 1, 1960, out of Assam of which it was a part.
It should be noted that there were differences among the Naga leadership over the issue of Nagaland as a separate state within the Union of India and Nagaland as a sovereign state/nation. The former founded Nagaland Nationalist Organisation (MNO) and the latter formed the Democratic Party of Nagaland. The MNO which was active in getting the Nagaland made a separate state were in favour of giving up the violence and accepting the Constitution of India. According to it the Nagas accepted the Indian Constitution, deposited their arms to the Government of India, and in turn the government released Naga political prisoners and promised their rehabilitation.

The signing of Shillong Accord was not welcome by a section of the Nagas. The latter denounced the Accord for compromising their sovereignty and betraying Christianity. They now sought to mix the issue of Naga sovereignty with Mao’s ideology of socialism and formed National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) led by a Tangkhul Naga T. Muivah and Isak Swu. The NSCN leadership has guided the Naga movement while staying outside India. In their negotiations with the Government of India under the Prime Mastership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh they have raised two main issues – the issue of sovereignty of Nagaland and creation of a Nagalim, territory merging all areas of the North-Eastern states where Nagas stay. Apart from Nagaland, these states are Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. They argue that while creating the boundaries of various states, the Government of India merged the territories inhabited by the Nagas into different states. This divided them. They demand that the Nagas should be reunited into Nagalim. This demand has provoked opposition from these states. This has repercussion on the ethnic relations within these states. The Nagaland also has witnessed the ethnic riots and conflict between two major tribes of the state – Nagas and Kukis. The former allege that the latter are not the original inhabitants of the state, while the latter refute it.

**Bodos of Assam**

The tribals of Assam – Bodos, Karbis and Adivasis have been involved in collective ethnic mobilisation since 1980s. The Bodos and Karbis are demanding creation of the separate states respectively from within the present Assam. The Bodos and Karbis are the indigenous tribes inhabiting their respective habitats. The former are found in lower Assam districts like Kokrajhar, and Karbis inhabit Karbi Anlong district of the state. The Adivasis consist of tribes like Oraons and Santhals who mainly immigrated to the state during the colonial period as tea plantation labourers principally from Orissa, Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh. Apart from the working as the plantation labourers, they also cultivate land as poor peasants. The Adivasis demand protection of their rights in terms of reservation in the government jobs, protection from the dominant ethnic tribes as there have been several instances of violent ethnic riots between the Bodos and the Adivasis.

The tribals of Assam participated in the six year long Assam agitation led by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) from 1989 to 1985. The movement which was directed against the foreigners united major communities of Assam — tribals and non-tribal Assamese, on the common perception they shared common experience in terms of their belonging to a backward and discriminated state, facing the challenge of the foreign infiltration, especially from Bangladesh and Assam. In the course of time, however, the differences between Bengalis who had been living in the state since the 19th century and were the citizens of the country and the Begladeshi immigrants got blurred. Led mainly by the students and the middle classes, the
movement had become violent on a number of occasions. But as soon as AASU transformed itself into a political party – the Assom Gana Parishad (AGP) and formed the government following its victory in the 1985 assembly elections, the tribes like Bodos and Karbis which had participated in the AASU agitation started agitation for creation of their separate states. They felt that the AASU movement was led by the dominant communities of Assam utilised the support of the smaller tribes like them. Once the AASU signed Assam. Accord with the government of India and formed AGP government in the state, the AASU leadership did not give due recognition to the smaller tribes like them and attempted to impose their cultural code on them. They asserted that they were different from the Assamese. Regarding this Sanjiv Baruah quotes a Bodo source saying “We Are Bodos, Not Assamese” in his book India Against Itself (Chapter 8). The new generation of leaders provides leadership to the Bodo movement.

The All Bodo Student Uniot (ABSU) presented a 92-point Charter of demands to the government, which included demands for the recognition of their culture, language and providing opportunities for their educational and economic development. For achieving these demands they demand a separate state of Bodoland. It must be noted that like Karbis they also do not question of the sovereignty of the Indian state. Unlike ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) they want a separate state for them within thin Union of India under the Constitution of India. They have resorted to violent means targeting the state agencies, especially those belonging to the central government and the armed forces. They have also directed their violence against the Adivasi immigrants, triggering of the ethnic violence. The government has responded by setting up Bodo Autonomous Councils to grant them local autonomy. But it has not responded to their demand for creation of separate state.

**Tribes of Meghalaya**

Meghalaya has three main tribes – Khais, Jaintias and Garos, who inhabit Khasi, Jaintian and Garo hills of the state. They are distinct for the existence matrilineal system which accords better position to women as compared to the patrilineal found among other communities of India. Like some other tribes of the North-East India, educated Christian elite had already emerged among them in the state, especially the Khasis during the pre-Independence period. Shillong which remained capital for around a century of Assam, of which areas consisting present Meghalaya state were constituent, provided a suitable place for the growth of an elite section among them. The tribals of Meghalaya have been coexisting with non-tribals in Meghalaya, especially Shillong since the late 19th century, following shifting of the capital of Assam from Cherrapunjee to there. The non-tribals who migrated into Shillong and other parts of Meghalaya since the late 19th century consist of mainly Bengalis, Biharis, Rajasthanis, Sikhs and till formation of Meghalaya as a separate state in 1972, the Assamese. The non-tribals despite their differences form a separate ethnic groups in the sense that their culture, features, customs, etc. are different from those of the tribals.

The 1960s witnessed the movement of the ethnic groups of areas of Assam, which later assumed the form of a separate state of Meghalaya, for creation of a separate. This movement saw the involvement of all ethnic groups – tribals and non-tribals of the region. It was their combined resentment against the language policy of the dominant group, the Assamese. They resisted against the language policy of Assamese government which sought to make the Assamese as a medium of instruction in schools and also an official language. This was seen as an imposition of the Assamese on the non-Assamese including the tribals and the non-tribals. Both set of ethnic groups – tribals and non-tribals jointly participated in the movement for creation of Meghalaya as a separate state.
The relations between the tribals and non-tribals of Meghalaya, however, underwent changes following the formation of the state in 1972. These were now marked by the ethnic divide. The state government in the state introduced land regulations prohibiting the transfer of land from the tribals to non-tribals, reserved seats in the legislative assembly for the tribals (56 out of 60 assembly seats for the tribals), reserved 85 per cent state government jobs for the tribals. This provoked reaction from the non-tribals of the state; who alleged that their contribution to the economy of the state was not recognised and they were being discriminated against. The views of the tribals are articulated specially by the organisations of women, students and politicians, most assertive among them being the Khasi Students Union (KSU) and the Federation of Khasi, Garo and Jaintia people (FKJGP). The KSU and other tribals representatives argue that due to the influx of the outsiders – the non-tribals, their cultural identity is eroded, economic opportunities are exploited. The central government symbolised by the army, central paramilitary forces is seen to be encroaching upon their rights. Therefore, the tribals of the state demand: the cancellation of trade licenses of the non-tribals, their removal from the state, increase in the reservation for the tribals in the state government jobs, etc. The KSU and other tribal organisations often raise these issues through pamphlets, in the rallies, newspapers, etc. The divide between the ethnic groups also resulted in ethnic riots on some occasion. Since the late 1990s the state has also seen the rise of some insurgent groups.

Tribals of Regions other than North-East India

The tribals of other regions than the North-East or the Frontier tribes of the states of Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh, Bihar/Jharkhand, Gujarat, Rajasthan and several other states have been mobilised on ethnic lines on several occasions. In modern history their revolt had been conspicuous against the intervention of the British authorities in the power of the tribal chiefs and against exploitation of their natural resources by the British and their collaborators such as the outside businessmen and bureaucrats or dikus. The tribal chiefs mobilised their fellow tribals in order to restore their power and resources and evoked their golden past in order to retain their ethnic identity and autonomy. The British administration retaliated against these movements with ruthless violence including assassination of the leaders of these movements. Birsa Munda revolt in Chhotanagpur was among the most prominent of such movements during the pre-Independence period. Such movements have been termed as “millenarian movements” by K S Singh.

The issues which formed the basis of collective mobilisation of the non-frontiers tribals in the post-independence period have varied from state to state. These have included the movements for creation of separate states for the tribals out of the existing states like Jharkhand out of Bihar and Chhattisgarh from Madhya Pradesh or separate districts within the same state like demand by the Dang tribes for creation of a separate state within former Bombay state; against the encroachment of tribal land for the creation of dams resulting in the displacement like in the Narmada Valley. Some scholars have observed that during the 1990s the tribals have been mobilised by the Hindutva forces against the Christian and Muslim tribals in some states, especially Guajarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. This contributed to the division of the tribals on the communal basis (Shah, 2004).

The movement for autonomy expressed in the form of demands for separate states, districts out of present states or creation of autonomous administrative bodies are among the most commonly raised demands of the tribal movements. The basis for such demands are their grievances against the dominant for political formations: their cultural and linguistic identities.
are under the threat of erosion; their economic resources and opportunities are appropriated by others/outsiders; they are not given due recognition, etc. The tribal leadership, both traditional and modern, mobilises the tribals into collective actions. The acceptance of their demands depends on the political circumstances. But once a set of demands is accepted, the leadership looks for other issues. For example, after the creation of separate state of Jharkhand out of Bihar, the tribal leaders attempted to change the domicile laws. Similarly, after the creation of a separate state of Meghalaya, the tribal leadership introduced legislation changing the rules regarding inheritance and transfer of land. Thus, the ethnic mobilisation is a continuous process in a democracy.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY

‘People’ are central in the democratic system. But people are not homogeneous. In a stratified society there are some people who are economically, socially and politically very powerful. And on the other hand, many people are powerless. They depend on the powerful for their economic survival. People of different social and economic strata have different interests. They have different life chances. Their perception of the system differs. In such a stratified and plural society the term ‘people’ become complex and elusive.

Ingredients of Democracy

Democracy has three essential and overlapping ingredients. They are: (1) political institutions; (2) political processes, and (3) substantial functioning. In democratic system political institutions such as electoral system and legislature provide scope and necessary mechanism to citizens to participate directly or indirectly in decision making processes. They elect their representatives to from the government which takes decisions on behalf of the people for society as a whole. These representatives execute their decisions through various agencies like bureaucracy, police and military. They enjoy authority over societal resources and their management. When the citizens are not satisfied with their representatives in their functioning, decisions and use of power, people change them and elect other representatives. In that sense people have final authority who should manage the state and society. This is a formal institutional aspect of democracy.

The elected representatives cannot rule society according to their whims. Rule of law is an essential component of the democratic system. That means that the rulers/representatives are not above law. The representatives exercise their power and take decisions within the Constitutional framework – written or by convention- that spells out their power and responsibility. In democracy political power of any one institution is not absolute. Different institutions maintain check on each other. It is a system of checks and balances. The rulers are the representatives of the people and are accountable to people for decisions and management of social affairs. Political institutions are mechanism to attain the substantive objectives of the system –serving common good. The functioning of these institutions therefore has to be transparent so that people can judge and differentiate between right and wrong.

Democracy without politics is body without soul. Politics means conflict and struggle of interests and ideologies. Politics is concerned with control over resources, their use and distribution. It involves debates and decisions on identifying priorities in policy making regarding use of resources and generation of surplus. It is a system in which different points of views and ideological formations on societal matters contest with each other. They compete for power and influence political decisions. It involves the process of monitoring political institutions and policy makers as well as the executive.
Mere elections and government of elected representative do not make the political system democratic. Democracy in substance does not mean number game: rule of, for and by majority. It cannot be called democratic system if the government by majority vote prevents dissent and opposition parties or majority wipes out minority communities or prevents them to follow their religion. In democratic system, management or governance is hinged on certain basic moral, social and political principles – not only to protect but also to enlarge secular and humane interests.

Objectives of the political institutions are to cater to the needs and aspirations of the people. It should function and aim at ‘development’ of all; and not one or small section of society. In that sense democratic system in ‘developing’ societies in the Third world, is a process of social transformation so that all citizens can participate in the system with equal capacity. Social and economic equality is therefore the core of effective and viable democracy. Besides other principles and objectives, equality before laws is necessary but not sufficient condition for free and equal participation of all people in decision-making process, particularly those who are at lower and most exploited strata. Inequality in substance hampers effective functioning of the political system. Such a situation has potentiality to reduce democratic institutions as a game of musical chair limited to those who have money and muscle strength. Greater inequality results into lesser possibilities for effective and meaningful participation of the deprived section(s) in political processes. Their vulnerability in social, cultural and economic spheres provide them less space to be equal with those who are in upper echelon in production and reproduction system. Capacity of the powerful to manipulate choices of the vulnerable is related to the extent of gap between the two. Wider inequality tends to provide less opportunity to the deprived for asserting their needs and rights. For the health of the democratic system an ideal of ‘equal capabilities’ needs to be translated into reality. Dr. Ambedkar rightly emphasised before the Constituent Assembly, “We must make our democracy a social democracy as well. Political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it social democracy. What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognizes liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be treated as separate items in trinity. They form a union of trinity in the sense that to divorce one form the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy…”

MASS POLITICS AND MASS MOVEMENTS

Some social scientists like by William Kornhauser, Robert Nisbet, Edward Shils argue that democratic system has evolved various institutions to manage societal affairs on behalf of the people. The system provides opportunities to express their desires, grievances and problems to their representatives through periodical elections. People can change their representatives in elections. But according to these scholars direct collective actions in the forms of mass movement is ‘anti-democratic’. Such movements bring unnecessary pressure on the elected representatives and hamper efficient functioning of the political institutions. The government is often pulled in different directions and forced to take policy decisions under pressures rather than merits of the issues. This paves way to populist politics. Therefore, these scholars are in favour of excluding movements from democratic system. In the 1950s and 1960s some Indian scholars who approved of the agitation for independence from foreign rule, did not approve of agitations in the post-Independence period. They condemned them outright as ‘dangerous’ and ‘dysfunctional’ for ‘civilized society’. One of them argued, ‘One can understand, if not justify the reasons which led the people in a dependent country to attack and destroy everything which was a symbol or an expression of foreign rule. But it is very strange that people should even now behave as if they continue to live in a dependent country ruled by foreigners’. They blame the opposition parties, leaders and trade unions for instigating the masses to direct action.
RISING EXPECTATIONS, FRUSTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

Number and coverage of social movements in different forms have increased in all societies including in democratic system. This is primarily because the rising aspirations of the people are not adequately met by existing political institutions which are rigid or incompetent. Many scholars such as Huntington, Rajni Kothari and several others observes that as the gap between expectations of people and performance of the system widens mass upsurge in the forms of movements increase. Alain Touraine and Jurgen Habermas argue that democratic system in post-modern society is not able to guarantee individual freedom, equality and fraternity. In the view of these theorists, democracy is degenerating into an authoritarian, technocratic state. The state in turn has become subjugated to market forces. The state’s technocracy and the forces of the market thus dominate people. There are no longer workers, but only consumers. The old class of workers has ceased to be a class in production process. Instead people’s main social role has become that of consumers. In this role, people are manipulated entirely by the market. For Habermas, social movements are seen as defensive reactions to defend the public and the private sphere of individuals against the inroads of the state system and market economy. While highlighting limitations of parliamentary democracy in India A.R. Desai argued in 1960s:

“The parliamentary form of government, as a political institutional device, has proved to be inadequate to continue or expand concrete democratic rights of the people. This form, either operates as a shell within which the authority of capital perpetuates itself, obstructing or reducing the opportunities for people to consciously participate in the process of society, or is increasingly transforming itself into a dictatorship, where capital sheds some of its democratic pretensions and rules by open, ruthless dictatorial means. Public protests will continue till people have ended the rule of capital in those countries where it still persists. They will also continue against those bureaucratic totalitarian political regimes where the rule of capital has ended, but where due to certain peculiar historical circumstances Stalinist bureaucratic, totalitarian political regimes have emerged. The movements and protests of people will continue till adequate political institutional forms for the realization and exercise of concrete democratic rights are found.”

Rajni Kothari also believes that ‘democracy’ in India has become a playground for growing corruption, criminalisation, repression and intimidation of large masses of the people. “There is discontent and despair in the air—still highly diffuse, fragmented and unorganised. But there is a growing awareness of rights, felt politically and expressed politically, and by and large still aimed at the State. Whenever a mechanism of mobilisation has become available, this consciousness has found expression, often against very heavy odds, against a constellation of interests that are too powerful and complacent to shed (even share) the privileges. At bottom it is consciousness against a paradigm of society that rests on deliberate indifference to the plight of the impoverished and destitute who are being driven to the threshold of starvation—by the logic of the paradigm itself.” In such a scenario mass mobilisation at the grassroots level is both necessary and desirable. Electoral system, political parties and established trade unions do not provide space to the masses to bring social transformation. “In their place there is emerging a new arena of counteraction, of countervailing tendencies, of counter-cultural movements and more generally of a counter-challenge to existing paradigms of thought and action’.

MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRATISATION

As we have seen above that many scholars believe that social movements play positive role in democracy in different ways. One, social movements are the outcome of people’s political
consciousness. It is an expression of people’s consciousness for asserting their demands. Two, social movements encourage participation of people on political issues. While articulating agenda of the struggle the leaders discuss/explain various aspects of the issues with the participants. Such process of discourse also contribute in developing and sharpening consciousness of the people. Political participation and consciousness of the people are backbones of democracy. Third, success and effectiveness of social movements depend on extent of mobilisation. Greater mobilisation tends to expand political horizon and lead to further democratisation of society. Fourth, Social movements express aspirations, needs and demands of the people who can only assert through collective action and become effective. They keep the policy makers on toe and accountable of their decisions. Fifth, number of social movements influence policy makers and compel them to enact laws to meet their demands – advancing or protect their interests. The followings are illustrations.

During the 1920s and 1930s there were number of peasant movements in different parts of the country. Some of them were spontaneous of local peasants and some were organised by Kisan Sabha, Gandhians and left parties. These movements were against the landlords demanding land to the tenants/share croppers/tillers. In several places the demand was for abolition of forced labour. Such movements influenced the Congress party, which led the freedom movement. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru observed, “the growth of the National movement under the leadership of the Congress, resulted in the peasant masses joining the Congress and looking to it for relief from their many burdens. This increased the power of the Congress greatly and at the same time it gave it a mass outlook. While the leadership remained middle class, this was tempered by pressure from below, and agrarian and social problems occupied the Congress more and more… The struggle for independence began to mean something much more than political freedom, and social content was given to it”. The Congress Manifesto of 1946 declared that “The reform of the land system which was urgently needed in India involves the removal of intermediaries between the peasant and the state”. Soon after Independence several state/provincial government initiated action to enact laws for the abolition of the intermediary interests in land. Zaminadari system, forced labour etc. were made illegal.

However, these laws were not implemented with speed and efficiently in most of the states. By the late 1950s series of poor peasant movements took place in different parts of the country against landlords and rich peasants. Most effective and widespread movement was Naxabari, which bean in West Bengal and spread in many parts of the country. In the 1960s socialist and Left parties organised land grab movements. There were also number of grassroots movements of agricultural laborers demanding higher wages and distribution of surplus land. In order to pacify these classes and woo them in elections, Indira Gandhi gave a slogan of “garibi hatao”; and formulated number of programmes for eradication of poverty. However, movements of the poor peasants and laborers have not been widespread and strong since 1970s.

In the 1920s Dr. Ambedkar organised number of movements of dalits against untouchability which included temple entry, use of water from public tank, use of public roads etc. In 1930s he launched a movement for separate electorate. Gandhi and Hindus opposed it. Gandhi then went on fast against the demands of dalits. That lead to famous Poona Pact between Gandhi and Ambedkar. As a result Gandhi had accepted reserved seats, and Ambedkar had accepted a joint electorate. This struggle influenced the later events. M.S. Gore notes, “One wonders whether without the Poona fast and the subsequent emphasis that Gandhi gave to untouchability work, there would have been a sufficient change of opinion by 1947 for the Constituent Assembly to have declared untouchability to stand abolished, to have provided for reserved seats for ‘scheduled castes’ in the legislatures for a period of ten years to begin with and to have agreed to the provision of special protective measure for them. It
is equally possible that without Ambedkar’s protest and astute leadership, there would neither have been the Poona fast and pact nor the subsequent churning of public opinion.”

One can assess similar kind of impact of movements such as of women, adivasis, organised working class etc. on formation of state policies on different issues. Regional and ethnic movements of Nagas and Mizos, people of Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand etc. resulted into formation of linguistic or ethnic states. The Navniraman movement of 1974 in Gujarat on the issue of corruption in general and of political corruption in particular resulted into the change of the government. The ministers and members of the state assembly were forced to resign.
POPULATION DYNAMICS
POPULATION STUDIES

India has the advantage of a youthful population, called demographic dividend

Population study is the education about population growth and its remedial measures. It is the education about population matter like fertility, mortality and migration and its remedial measures to check the rapid growth of population. It aims at the growth of the qualitative life of the people. In the various fields of healthcare, a population study is a study of a group of individuals taken from the general population who share a common characteristic, such as age, sex, or health condition. This group may be studied for different reasons, such as their response to a drug or risk of getting a disease. Population studies are broadly defined as the scientific study of human populations. Major areas studied include broad population dynamics; fertility and family dynamics; health, aging, and mortality; and human capital and labor markets. Researchers in population studies also focus on methodology. Population studies is an interdisciplinary area of study; scholars from demography, epidemiology, sociology, economics, anthropology, and various other disciplines study populations.

1.1 Definition of the Population studies

A population is a summation of all the organisms of the same group or species, who live in the same geographical area, and have the capability of interbreeding. Defined population studies are designed to measure the impact of an intervention in a defined target population (i.e. women, racial and ethnic minorities). These studies can provide further validation of the methods utilized and information about whether or not an intervention works in various population groups.

Populations studies help determine how governments allocate their funds and where aid resources go. The fields of advertising and economics also use demography statistics to a large extent. Because most of the information used in population studies come from surveys, it's important for people to respond to them and give accurate answers. This is especially true regarding government census surveys. The analyzed results are often used to advocate for disadvantaged groups of people by
researchers and independent organizations as well as government agencies. They can help determine policies and decide which town gets a new health clinic or job creation resources.

**Nature of the Population studies**

Population studies helps and enables us to be aware of the process and consequence of population growth on the quality of our lives and the environment. The child gets opportunity to investigate and explore the interaction between the population and their environments, population characteristics, the meaning, the nature of process. The child also knows the causes and consequences of population increase at the local, national level. It is multidisciplinary concept and related to number of subjects. It neither provides nor prescribes any contraceptive education or any other measures to limit the size of the family. Under population studies three main aspects are covered namely, size, composition and distribution of population.

1. **Size**: In connection with size, the study is taken which deals with such problems as to how many people live in a given population group, what changes are taking place in the size of the group and how these changes are affected.

2. **Composition**: It covered all the measurable characteristics of the people who form a given population. The composition of two groups are differs number of ways. The characteristics must be effectively related to demographic processes and that these must be relevant to his attempt to understand certain specific aspects of national life. Age and sex are most widely used characteristics of population study.

3. **Distribution**: Population distribution study is concerned with such matters as to how is the people distributed and what is the nature of changes in population distribution.

**1.2 Subject Matter and Scope of the population studies**

The scope of population studies is quite wide. Population study provides the learners with a knowledge and understanding of the prevailing population situation in their own country and the world. It also creates an awareness among the learners about the inter-relationships between population situation in their own country and the world. It assists us to make conscious rational and informed decisions regarding family size and population matters in the community and policy adopted by the State. It equips us with necessary knowledge, skills, attitudes, values to ascertain and evaluate the impact of population change both in terms of the students future, welfare and the welfare of their community, society, nation and the world. Population studies the nature, causes, changes, characteristics, co-operation and distributional aspects of human population. It studies the relationships of man with his environment along with his quality of life.

On the one hand, this subject is concerned with a quantitative study of the size, structure characteristics and territorial distribution of human populations and the changes occurring in them. On the other hand, it is concerned with the study of the underlying causes of population phenomena. Thus, a student of population is engaged in describing and comparing the size, structure, characteristics and territorial distribution of the population, and the changes occurring in it through the study of fertility, mortality, migration and social mobility. He also attempts to explain population phenomena and situations and the changes in them in the context of the biological, social, economic and other setting. For instance, population phenomena take place in a social setting and cannot be studied in isolation.
Hence, while describing, comparing or explaining the determinants and consequences of population phenomena, social phenomena have to be taken into consideration. It can be seen that the study of population is multidisciplinary in nature, involving an understanding of biology, genetics, mathematics, statistics, economics, sociology, cultural anthropology, psychology, politics, geography, medicine, public health, ecology, etc. It is also implied in this description that the subject matter of population studies includes the study of fertility, mortality, migration and social mobility, that is, the components of change in the size, structure, characteristics and distribution of population.

In short, the qualitative study of population. That is, it deals with size, structure, characteristics and territorial distribution of a human population. Further, Fertility, mortality, migration and social mobility also included its study area. The study of population is multidisciplinary in nature. It deals with all other sciences and its relationship.

1.3 Sources of Population Data:

CENSUS: A census of population may be defined, as the total process of collecting, compiling and publishing demographic, economic and social data pertaining at a specified time of times, to all persons in a country. The census is the collection of information about birth, death, occupation, social and economic conditions of the people. A census is the procedure of systematically acquiring and recording information about the members of a given population. It is a regularly occurring and official count of a particular population. The term is used mostly in connection with national population and housing censuses; other common censuses include agriculture, business, and traffic censuses. The United Nations defines the essential features of population and housing censuses as "individual enumeration, universality within a defined territory, simultaneity and defined periodicity", and recommends that population censuses be taken at least every 10 years. United Nations recommendations also cover census topics to be collected, official definitions, classifications and other useful information to coordinate international practice.

According to V.M. Dandakar, “A census of population is the total process of collecting, compiling, evaluating, analyzing and publishing demographic, economic and social data pertaining at a specific time, to all persons in a country or in a well delimited part of the country.” Census has become a very popular method of collecting information about the people. It helps not only in collecting figures but is also much more informative beyond that. It provides information about the economy of the nation, rate of birth and death, rural-urban migration, living standard of the people, family size, educational achievements, etc. The word is of Latin origin; during the Roman Republic, the census was a list that kept track of all adult males fit for military service. The modern census is essential to international comparisons of any kind of statistics and censuses collect data on many attributes of the population, not just how many people there are, although population estimates remain an important function of the census.

Uses of Census data

In the nineteenth century, the first censuses collected paper enumerations that had to be collated by hand so the statistical uses were very basic. The government owned the data and was able to publish statistics themselves on the state of the nation. Uses were to measure changes in the population and apportion representation. Population estimates could be compared to those of other countries. By the beginning of the twentieth century, censuses were recording households and some indications of their employment. In some countries, census archives are released for public examination after many decades, allowing genealogists to track the ancestry of interested people. Archives provide a
substantial historical record which may challenge established notions of tradition. It is also possible to understand the societal history through job titles and arrangements for the destitute and sick.

As governments assumed responsibility for schooling and welfare, large government departments made extensive use of census data. Actuarial estimates could be made to project populations and plan for provision in local government and regions. It was also possible for central government to allocate funding on the basis of census data.

Even into the mid twentieth century, census data was only directly accessible to large government departments. However, computers meant that tabulations could be used directly by university researchers, large businesses and local government offices. They could use the detail of the data to answer new questions and add to local and specialist knowledge.

Now, census data are published in a wide variety of formats to be accessible to business, all levels of governance, media, students and teachers, charities and researchers, and any citizen who is interested. Data can be represented visually or analysed in complex statistical models, to show the difference between certain areas, or to understand the association between different personal characteristics. Census data offer a unique insight into small areas and small demographic groups which sample data would be unable to capture with precision.

**Sample Survey:** This is another technique developed to collect primary data of interest to demographers, economists, anthropologists and other social scientists. That is, another method of data collection for population studies. In this, information is collected only from a sample of the population, which is representative of the whole and from which conclusions are drawn by the use of scientific methods. Since independence, the data on rural lives through these surveys have been collected on a great variety of topics in diverse field of social sciences including demography, sociology etc. The collection of data is mainly through three ways. That is, the survey conducted by National Sample Survey organization, city surveys sponsored by the research programmes committee of the planning commission and the demographic fertility and family planning surveys which have acquired popularity. The NSS a permanent organization established in 1950 with the board objective of obtaining a continuous comprehensive information on social, economic, demographic and agricultural characteristics on entire country.

**International Publications:** International publications are considered as important data source about population. UNO and other international organizations which contain very useful information about countries spread over different parts of the world. Demographic Year Book which is annually published by UNO. It contains information about population, size, area, density, population growth, population growth, fertility, mortality etc. Statistic Year Book is another publication about it. In world health organization bring out a monthly publication entitled, Epidemiological and Vital Records which contains information about many countries of the world on public health and mortality.

**THEORIES OF POPULATION**

2.1 Malthusian Theory

Malthus thought that the dangers of population growth precluded progress towards a utopian society: Thomas Malthus was the first economist to declare a methodical doctrine of population in the year 1798. This theory was regarded a highly contentious since it had many incorrect senses with the economic changes that occurred in Europe in 19th and 20th century. Malthusian Theory Explained.
Malthus became widely known for his theories about change in population. His An Essay on the Principle of Population observed that sooner or later population will be checked by famine and disease. He wrote in opposition to the popular view in 18th-century Europe that saw is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man". As a cleric, Malthus saw this situation as divinely imposed to teach virtuous behaviour.

Malthus appalled against the existing sanguinity shared by his father and Godwin that an ideal state could be accomplished if human fetters could be isolated. Malthusian hostility was that the heaviness of mounting population on the food supply would devastate perfection and there would be depression in the world. Malthus was relentlessly censured for his cynical outlook which directed him to trek on the continent of Europe to congregate statistics in sustaining his hypothesis. Malthusian Theory elucidates the affiliation amidst the growth in food supply and in population. It declares that population amplifies quicker than the food supply and if unimpeded it would consequent to desolation. In order to have a clear understanding of Malthus’ ‘Principle,’ it is necessary to look closely at the logic underlying his argument. He stated that population increases ‘geometrically’ or exponentially and that subsistence increases arithmetically. Thus, population increases along the order of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32..., whereas subsistence limps along at the rate of 1, 2, 3, 4, …. That is, according to Malthusian theory of population, population increases in a geometrical ratio, whereas food supply increases in an arithmetic ratio. This disharmony would lead to widespread poverty and starvation, which would only be checked by natural occurrences such as disease, high infant mortality, famine, war or moral restraint. His main contribution is in the agricultural sector. According to this theory there are two steps to control the population: preventative and positive checks. Preventative means control in birth rate, and uses of different methods to control birth; and positive checks means natural calamities, war, etc. In short, his principles are:

1. There are natural combining of genetic traits in human beings to increase at a fast rate. As a consequence, increase in population in statistical sequence if unimpeded two-folds itself every 25 years.
2. On the other hand, the food supply increases in a slow numerical sequence due to the function of that law of diminishing returns based on the presumption that the supply of land is invariable.
3. Since population increases in statistical progression and the food supply in the numerical sequence, population is likely to elude food supply. Thus an imbalance is created which directs to over populace.
4. To control over population consequent from imbalance of food and populace, Malthus proposed preventive measures and optimum checks.

The preventive measures such as control of birth rate, late marriage, celibacy, ethical moderation etc. has to be taken by man in order to control population. This was requested by Malthus to his countrymen to avoid depression. His theory was wrong because Malthus only considered two factors when he established his basic graph: food supply and population growth. Other factors such as improvements in technology proved him wrong. He was right at his time but development made him wrong. Moral restraint, vice and birth control were the primary preventative checks. Moral restraint was the means by which the higher ranks of humans limited their family size in order not to dissipate their wealth among larger numbers of heirs. For the lower ranks of humans, vice and birth control were the means by which their numbers could be limited - but Malthus believed that these were insufficient to limit the vast numbers of the poor.
The positive checks were famine, misery, plague and war; because preventative checks had not limited the numbers of the poor, Malthus thought that positive checks were essential to do that job. If positive checks were unsuccessful, then inevitably (he said), famine would be the resulting way of keeping the population down. Before starvation set in, Malthus advised that steps be taken to help the positive checks to do their work. He wrote:

It is an evident truth that, whatever may be the rate of increase in the means of subsistence, the increase in population must be limited by it, at least after the food has been divided into the smallest shares that will support life. All the children born, beyond what would be required to keep up the population to this level, must necessarily perish, unless room be made for them by the deaths of grown persons. ... To act consistently, therefore, we should facilitate, instead of foolishly and vainly endeavouring to impede, the operation of nature in producing this mortality, and if we dread the too frequent visitation of the horrid form of famine, we should sedulously encourage the other forms of destruction, which we compel nature to use.

Instead of recommending cleanliness to the poor, we should encourage contrary habits. In our towns we should make the streets narrower, crowd more people into the houses, and court the return of the plague. In the country we should build our villages near stagnant pools, and particularly encourage settlements in all marshy and unwholesome situations. But above all, we should reprobate specific remedies for ravaging diseases: and those benevolent, but much mistaken men, who have thought they were doing a service to mankind by projecting schemes for the total extirpation of particular disorders. If by these and similar means the annual mortality were increased ... we might probably every one of us marry at the age of puberty and yet few be absolutely starved. In Malthus' opinion, the masses were incapable of exercising moral restraint, which was the only real remedy for the population problem. They were therefore doomed to live always at bare subsistence level. If all income and wealth were distributed among them, it would be totally wasted within one generation because of profligate behaviour and population growth, and they would be as poor and destitute as ever. Paternalistic attempts to help the poor were therefore highly likely to fail. Also, they were a positive evil because they drained wealth and income from the higher (and therefore more moral) ranks of society. These people were responsible - either in person or through patronage - for all the great achievements of society: art, music, philosophy, literature and so on owed their existence to the good taste and generosity of these people. Taking money from them to help the poor would deprive the world of culture.

Criticism

The Malthusian Theory had the following Criticisms. The geometrical and arithmetical theory was incorrect regarding population and food supply. He failed to anticipate the opening up of new areas in other countries like US, Australia and Argentina which had extensive farming. His law of mathematical progression regarding food supply pertain to any one point of time and not as a whole. One of the chief weakness of this theory is he failed to evaluate the man power. Malthusian failed to analyse and compare populace with the national wealth, instead he compared just with the food supply. Malthus only requested his men to control birth rate and was one sided. He failed to look into death rate which is diminishing which is the ultimate cause of population. In reality pragmatic evidence substantiates this thesis to be incorrect. Actually the population has to be matched up with the per capita income since when this increases, the fertility rate is lowered and the population rate declines. Preventive measures cannot be taken in the case of ethical moderation, late marriage, celibacy etc. to control population rate. Thus Malthus is regarded as a false mystic.
2.2 Optimum population Theory

The Optimum theory of population was propounded by Edwin Cannan in his book “Wealth” Published in 1924 and popularised by Robbins, Dalton and Carr-Saunders. Unlike the Malthusian Theory, the optimum theory does not establish relationship between population growth and food supply. Rather it is concerned with the relation between the size of population and production wealth.

Definitions

Robbins defines as "the population which just makes the maximum returns possible is the optimum population or the best possible population." Dalton defines as "Optimum population is that which gives the maximum income per head." Carr-Saunders defines as "that population which produces maximum economic welfare."

Postulations

The natural resources of a country are given at a point of time but they change over time. There is no change in techniques of production. The stock of capital remains constant. The habits and tastes of the people do not change. The ratio of working population to total population remains constant even with the growth of population. Working hours of labour do not change. Modes of business organisation are constant.

Thesis

Based on the postulations the optimum populace is that ultimate size of population which affords the utmost income per head. Any climb or dwindling in the size of the populace above or below the optimum stage will lessen earnings per head. Specified the stock of natural resources the technique of production and the stock of capital in a nation, there is an explicit size of population matching to the highest per capita income. Other things being equal, any divergence from this optimum sized populace will direct to a drop in the per capita income, the nation is under populated and it can give to boost its population till it attain the optimum level. Alternatively, if the rise in populace leads to lessen per capital income, the nation is over populated and requires a decline in population till the per capita income is maximised. This notion is shown in the pictorial representation as shown below.

In the first sketch, OE populace is weighed along the horizontal axis and per capita income on the vertical axis. In the beginning there is under-population and per capita income rises with the growth in population. The per capita income is EN which is less than the maximum per capita income FM. The
OF size of population represents the optimum level where per capita income FM is the maximum. If there is a continuous rise in population from OF to OG then the law of diminishing returns applies to production. As a consequent the per capita production is lowered and the per capita income also declines to GH due to increase in population. Thus FG represents over population. This is static version of the thesis. The per capita income is the highest at the point where the average product of labour starts falling. This is represented in the following sketch.

The size of population is measured on the horizontal axis and the average product of labour on the vertical axis. NP is the average product of labour or income per head curve. Up till the level OP increase in population direct to a rise in the average product of labour and the per capita income. Beyond OP, the average product of labour and per capita income drops. Hence when population is OP, the per capita income is the highest at point L. Thus OP is the optimum level of population. To the left of OP the country is over populated and beyond OP, it is over populated. However OP is not a fixed point. If due to inventions there are improvements in the techniques of production, the average product of labour might increase and push the level of per capita income upward so that the optimum point rises. This is represented in the diagram where NP1 curve represents the higher average product of labour and point L1 shows the maximum per capita income at the new optimum level of population OP1.

CRITICISM OF OPTIMUM THEORY

This theory has been criticized on the following grounds:

1. NO PRACTICAL VALUE :- It is not possible in practice to find the size of population less than or greater than optimum population.

2. NOT AN INDEX OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT :- The size of population cannot be an index of economic development. If there is a continuous increase adverse effect on the economy.

3. QUALITY OF PEOPLE IGNORED :- This theory does not throw the light on the quality of people. An honest and educated society per capita output will be more than others.

4. OTHER FACTORS IGNORED :- This theory ignores the social political and historical accident which are also essentials for economic development.

5. CONSTANT CHANGES :- The size of population is related to the national resources. Since the state of technology and resources are subject to constant changes. So its become very difficult to find out the optimum size of population.

2.3 Demographic Transition Theory

Demography is a science short on theory, rich in quantification. Nevertheless, demography has produced one of the best documented generalizations in the social sciences: the demographic transition. What is the demographic transition? Stripped to its essentials it is the theory that societies progress from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high mortality to a post-modern regime of low fertility and low mortality. The cause of the transition has been sought in the reduction of the death rate by controlling epidemic and contagious diseases. Then, with modernization, children
become more costly. Cultural changes weaken the importance of children. The increasing empowerment of women to make their own reproductive decisions leads to smaller families. Thus there is a change in values, emphasizing the quality of children rather than their quantity. In short, the fertility transition is becoming universal phenomenon, in which every country may be placed on a continuum of progress in the transition.

Human overpopulation is a serious global phenomenon that is still taking place today. The demographic transition theory explains one of the methods in which overpopulation can slowly decline as a nation develops.

Definition

The demographic transition theory is a model that tries to explain the stages of population growth for nations over a period of time. For example, before industrialization many nations had significant high death and birth rates; however, this allowed the population to remain stable. For example, before the industrialization of Great Britain, its population had both high death and birth rates.

By analyzing this value between death and birth rates and studying the growth of a population, theorists can evaluate how a nation increases in population based on its development. The demographic transition theory is often divided into four stages, however theorists also speculate that there may be a fifth or sixth stage. This article will speculate on the four stages. The demographic transition is a model and theory describing the transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates that occurs as part of the economic development of a country. As countries industrialize, they undergo a transition during which death rates fall but birth rates remain high. Consequently, population grows rapidly. This transition can be broken down into four stages.

Stage One: The Pre-Industrial Stage

During the pre-industrial stage, societies have high birth and death rates. Because both rates are high, population grows slowly and also tends to be very young. Many people are born, but few live very long. In pre-industrial society, children are an economic benefit to families, reinforcing high birth rates. Children contribute to the household economy by carrying water and firewood, caring for younger siblings, cleaning, cooking, or working in fields and household chores. With few educational opportunities, raising children costs little more than feeding them. As they became adults, children become major contributors to the family income and also become the primary form of insurance for adults in old age.

Stage Two: The Industrial Revolution

In stage two, as countries begin to industrialize, death rates drop rapidly. The decline in the death rate is due initially to two factors: Improved food production and improved health and sanitation. Food production is improved by more efficient agricultural practices and better transportation and food distribution, which collectively prevent death due to starvation and lack of water. Health improves with improved sanitation, especially water supply, sewerage, food handling, and general personal hygiene, as well as medical progress. As death rates fall, birth rates remain high, resulting in a population explosion. Population growth is not due to increasing fertility, but to decreasing deaths: Many people continue to be born, but now, more of them live longer. Falling death rates also change the age structure of the population. In stage one; mortality is especially high among children between five and 10 years old. The decline in death rates in stage two improves the odds of survival for
children. Hence, the age structure of the population becomes increasingly youthful. In Western Europe, stage two occurred during the nineteenth century, with the Industrial Revolution. Many less-developed countries entered stage two during the second half of the twentieth century, creating the recent worldwide population explosion.

**Stage Three: Post-Industrial Revolution**

During the post-industrial stage, birth rates fall, eventually balancing the lower death rates. Falling birth rates coincide with many other social and economic changes, including better access to contraception, higher wages, urbanization, commercialization of agriculture, a reduction in the value of children's work, and greater parental investment in the education of children. Increasing female literacy and employment lower the uncritical acceptance of childbearing and motherhood as measures of the status of women. Although the correlation between birth rates and these changes is widely observed, it is not certain whether industrialization and higher incomes lead to lower population or whether lower populations lead to industrialization and higher incomes. As birth rates fall, the age structure of the population changes again. Families have fewer children to support, decreasing the youth dependency ratio. But as people live longer, the population as a whole grows older, creating a higher rate of old age dependency. During the period between the decline in youth dependency and rise in old age dependency, there is a demographic window of opportunity called the demographic dividend: The population has fewer dependents (young and old) and a higher proportion of working-age adults, yielding increased economic growth. This phenomenon can further the correlation between demographic transition and economic development.

**Stage Four: Stabilization**

During stage four, population growth stabilizes as birth rates fall into line with death rates. In some cases, birth rates may even drop below replacement level, resulting in a shrinking population. Death rates in developed countries may remain consistently low or increase slightly due to lifestyle diseases related to low exercise levels and high obesity and an aging population. As population growth slows, the large generations born during the previous stages put a growing economic burden on the smaller, younger working population. Thus, some countries in stage four may have difficulty funding pensions or other social security measures for retirees. So how does the demographic transition model relate to overpopulation? In a sense, it can depict how developed nations can contribute to a lower emphasis on population growth by adhering to certain principles such as having couples focus on having fewer children. In developed regions where there are significant populations (such as China) it is important to mandate certain ideas (such as contraception) in order to minimize population growth. By having countries follow through these stages, one can understand how overpopulation can be minimized due to the improving healthcare for birth and death rates as well as certain ideology that couples follow.

**CRITICISM**

It is not a theory in the strict sense of the term because it is only a broad generalization and does not encompass the experience of even all the western countries. It even does not fully explain after economic recovery. The theory does not provide a theoretical explanation of fertility which is so necessary for any demographic study. It does not extract fundamental processes from a phenomenon and identify crucial variables. Another limitation of this theory is that it cannot be applied with confidence in the developing countries.
STRUCTURE, CHARACTERISTICS AND DYNAMICS OF POPULATION

POPULATION DYNAMICS

Population in a country is not static. Population changes from time to time. Population is influenced by many factors. Fertility and the growth of population and decline in Population is known as Population Dynamics. Population of a country or in a place is influenced by physical, physiological and environmental factors. When, these factor one among these factor affect population positively or negatively population size, structure and composition will be affected. This process of change in the population size and structure is known as population dynamics. Fertility, mortality and migration are the most influencing factors on population dynamics. Divorce, marriage age at marriage, widowhood and separation are also factors involved in population dynamics.

I FERTILITY

Human fertility is responsible for biological population is known replacement and for the maintenance of human society. The growth of population depends on the human fertility. Fertility is a positive force through which the population expands.

The process of replacement of members through fertility is a complicated process, but the need and necessity of fertility was felt from the very beginning of society. Efforts were made through prayer and magic to make women fertile in primitive society. In some societies women without children were, considered as the cursed. Through medical treatment, efforts were made to maintain, for the continuation of human society. Fertility of women has become a matter of interest for social scientists after second world war.

The term fertility is generally used to indicate the actual reproductive performance of a women or group of women; Fertility starts with adulthood. The beginning of puberty is an indication of fertility. Thus fertility is, the actual reproductive performance applied to an individual /a group.

Bernard and Benjamin say: “fertility measures the rate at which a population acts to it self by birth and it is normally assessed by relating the number of birth, but the size of some section of population, such as number of married couples and the number of women of child bearing age”

In order to understand the concept of fertility, it is essential to analyse some important term related with fertility.

Fecundity refers to the capacity of a man or woman or a couple to participate in reproduction. The fertility of an individual is limited by her or his fecundity. The term fecundity is biological. It refer to the maximum fertility level that can be obtained. On the other hand fertility is the actual reproductive performance. Fertility can be studied from the statistics of birth. There is no direct measurement for fecundity. Fecundity of an individual or a couple may be quite normal. But fertility performance may be low. Thus the term fertility indicate the actual level of reproductive performance influenced by the psychological, social, cultural, political and economic factors.

Natural fertility is fertility of human population that make no deliberate efforts to limit the birth. Fertility may be considered natural if no contraception or induced abortion is used. Prolonged breast feeding or abstinence after child birth causes in lowering fertility. The highest level of natural fertility
is much below the level of biological maximum fertility. The levels of natural fertility differs from society to society.

**Sterility** may be used in connection with individual or group when a man or woman or a couple has not had a single child is considered sterile. In common practice sterility measures are associated only for women. Sterility can be natural (involuntary) or artificial (voluntary). But the term sterility is generally used to denote natural sterility.

**Conception** takes place when male sex cell, sperm is united with female sex cell, ovum. In fertilization a new cell called zygote is produced. Thus conception has a beginning of a long process of growth and development of child in uterus. Contraception refers to the measures taken in order to prevent conception in sexual intercourse. The contraceptive methods are also termed as birth control methods.

**Family size** refers the total number of children of a woman or a couple born at a point of time. The completed family size indicates the total number of children of a woman up to end of the reproductive period. The live birth of woman is classified according to the birth order. For e.g.: the I order birth, II order birth and so on. Women may be classified according to the number of children born active to them. The first parity women are those who have given birth to one child. Parity refers to the mother.

**The factors affecting fertility:**

The birth of a child is a biological process. But it is influenced by customs, values and norms. The biological limits in fertility are associated with sex and age. Only women can conceive and give birth to children within a certain age limit. A woman becomes biologically fecund with beginning of menstruation. Her capacity of bearing children comes to an end when menstruation stops. Women can bear normally from the age 15 to 49 years. The reproductive span of women is 32-35 years. The reproductive span of males is not well defined. It is generally found to be longer than that of women.

There are several factors influencing fertility. The factors are generally categorized into physiological and socio-cultural factors.

1. **Physiological Factors:**

The most important physiological factors are:

a) Adolescent sterility:

Certain degree of adolescent sterility is observed for girls below age of 13-17 years. This is because of irregularity of ovulatory cycle.

b) Post Partum Sterility:

After the birth of the child a woman is generally sterile for some period. This is a period of temporary sterility and known as post partum sterility. Breast feeding, abstinence from sexual relationship etc. are responsible for post partum sterility.
c) Primary and Secondary sterility:

A certain %age of women or couples is unable to participate in reproduction either throughout their life or after having one or more children. The average number of children ever born per women depends upon the %age of women/couples those who suffer from the primary sterility. Secondary sterility is the inability of women to conceive a child after birth of one or more children.

d) Reproductive Wastage:

Reproductive wastage is fetal wastage. This may be due to natural abortion. Reproductive wastage varies from country to country.

2. Socio-Cultural factors:

In the process of child bearing and birth three stages are identified. They are:

a) Intercourse   b) Conception  c) Gestation

The union of sperm and ovum results in conception. Then the termination of successful gestation of the fetus takes place. These processes are biological. But the different stages are influenced by socio-cultural factors. These factors can be categorized into intercourse, conception, gestation variables.

a) Intercourse Variables:

1. The age of entry into sexual intercourse.
2. Permanent celibacy
3. Part of the reproductive period spend after/between union. When unions are broken by divorce, separation or desertion and death affects fertility.
4. Voluntary abstinence.
5. Involuntary abstinence because of separation, illness etc.
6. Coital frequency

b) Conception Variables:

1. Fecundity or infecundity as affected by involuntary causes.
2. Use or non use of contraceptions by mechanical/chemical or by any other means.
3. Fecundity/infecundity as affected by voluntary causes such as sterilization or medical treatment.

c) Gestation Variables:

1. Foetal mortality from involuntary causes
2. Foetal mortality from voluntary causes

Each of these variables have either positive/negative effect on fertility.

Other Socio-cultural factors:
a) Child Marriage: Generally low age at marriage increases fertility.

b) Marriage, sex attitudes and practices: The positive attitude towards marriage and family life play an important role for high fertility rate. Marriage promotes socially accepted pregnancy and birth in a higher degree. The attitude towards sex is another factor. Where sex is considered as the means for procreation the fertility rate will be maximum.

c) Rituals and Customs: Religious rituals affect fertility. The ritual that restrict sexual relationships in certain condition influence pregnancy and birth.

d) Family Structures: The type of family promotes or depromotes rate of fertility. Joint family favorably promotes high fertility than nuckar family. The security and the care assured by joint family increase fertility.

e) Economic Conditions: The economic status of family is closely associated with fertility. It has seen that lower classes have high fertility rate than upper class.

f) Education: Higher educational level reduce family size. Interest in education and career delay the marriage.

g) Religion and Caste: Belief system influence fertility. Contraceptive methods are considered as a sin by some religions. Their faith restricts the usage of birth control methods. Lower castes have higher fertility than higher castes groups. Societies with ethnic heterogeneity have high fertility.

h) Political factors: The population policy and the programmers existing in a country influence the rate of birth. Governments propose pronatalist or anti natalists policies. Pro nationalist policy refer to the measure that encourage fertility. Anti natalist policies are of controlling the population and supporting family planning programmes and abortion.

i). Mortality: High infant mortality is one of the reasons for high birth rates. Since probability of infant survival was low, parents will be more active in reproduction.

j). Preference for sons: Male members are considered more functional in many countries. Continuous efforts were made for birth of a son or sons.

k). Urbanization: Fertility is high in rural areas than in urban society. High cost of living, the long process of child education, accommodation problems etc. are responsible for low fertility in urban area.

l). Occupation: Type of education and occupation of husband and wife and the income influence fertility. Employed women have small families. Wives in white collar jobs have lower fertility.

m) Infanticide: Some societies accept infanticide for social security. Females are killed where girls are considered to be liability

n) Abortion: Abortion has been legalised in many countries. India has liberalised abortion and legalised medical termination of pregnancies in certain cases.
All these factors are closely related. Age at marriage is linked with education and occupation. Economic conditions are related with political factors. So the socio-cultural factors create the structure of society, socialization process and development of personality. These processes are influencing attitudes and practices associated with fertility. Motivational factors like importance in community life and kinship relationship promote fertility. The values and life styles of society are associated with several socio-cultural factors.

**Trends of Fertility Behavior:**

Major trends in fertility behavior are:

1. Less developed countries have higher fertility rate.
2. Fertility rate is lower in urban area than rural areas.
3. Fertility of educated person is less than fertility of uneducated person.
4. Women with higher education have lower fertility rate.
5. Fertility rates are higher among manual and unskilled workers.
6. Higher income group has low fertility than lower income group.

**Measurement of fertility:**

The important source of information about fertility and mortality are:

1. Vital Registration
2. National Periodic Census
3. Sample Surveys

On the basis of data obtained fertility measurement can be made by using different methods mentioned below.

1. **Crude Birth Rate (CBR)**
   \[
   CBR = \frac{B \times K}{P}
   \]
   \[B = \text{No. of total registered live births}
   \]
   \[P = \text{Mid year population}
   \]
   \[K = 1000
   \]

2. **General Fertility Rate**
   \[
   GFR = \frac{B \times 10K}{FP}
   \]
   \[B = \text{Number of registered live births during the year}
   \]
   \[FP = \text{Mid year population of females}
   \]
K = 1000

3. Age Specific Fertility Rate (ASFR)

\[ \text{ASFR} = \frac{B_1}{P_1} \times K \]

B1 = Number of live births to mother of a specific age group during a year
P1 = The mid year female population in the same age group
K = 1000

II MORTALITY

Mortality also plays an important role in population dynamics. The factor of mortality has played a dominant role for the decrease in population rate. The developed countries have remarkably effected by the fallen death rate. The study of mortality is useful for analysing current demographic conditions. It helps to determine the possible changes in mortality conditions of the future. The public health administration depend on the study of mortality. The implementation and evaluation of public health programmers are made by accessing the mortality rate. The statistics on death is also used for preparing the policies of insurance companies. Thus the study of mortality deal with the affects of death on population.

The UN and WHO have defined death as a “permanent disappearance of all evidence of life at any time after birth has taken place”. The death can occur only after a live birth.

The span between birth and death is life. Live birth is the complete expulsion from its mother, of a product of conception, with evidences of life such as breathing, blood circulation and movement of muscles. So any death after live birth is considered as mortality. Abortion and still birth are not referred as death. Any expulsion of fetus before it became capable of independent existence outside its mother is known as abortion. It can be induced or spontaneous (natural). When a birth does not have any of the characteristics of life, it is known as still birth.

From the very primitive society itself human beings have been interested in trying to control diseases and to prevent death. The interests and attempts in health science increased during 18th and 19th centuries. The association below death and growth of population was assessed in 17th century.

And the measures for preventing the death have been taken seriously.

Sources of data on Mortality: The major sources of mortality are:

1. Vital Registration
2. Census Report
3. Sample Surveys
The Demographic Year Book of UN provides statistics on the number of death, death by age and sex, causes of death etc. Special issue of demographic year book may give data on death in great details. Statistical report of WHO also provides information on mortality.

**Causes of Death: Factors of Mortality:**

An important aspect of the study of mortality cover the causes of death. The information provided by medical science constitute the basis for the study of causes of death. But reliable data on causes of death are not available in many countries. Very few deaths are registered and causes of mortality or deaths are not recorded. Death often results not because of single cause. This also make difficulty in the analysis of mortality on the basis of causes of death. And despite of all these difficulties the causes of death are identified for the study of mortality.

WHO prepared a manual on the International Statistics, classification of diseases, injuries and causes of death. According to the manual from this list of 50 group of causes of death 5 major groups are identified thousand groups of diseases have been identified. Out of these diseases 50 groups of cause of death noted.

1. Infectious and parasitic diseases and diseases of respiratory system
2. Cancer
3. Diseases of circulatory system
4. Death by violence
5. All other causes

It is possible to study the changes in the causes of death, if the causes of death are enumerated, they can also used in the study of changes in the mortality rate. It was pointed out that up to 19th century the death rates were high throughout the world. The main reasons for high mortality rates were:

1. Famines and Food shortage:

In pre-industrial society human beings have limited control over the environment. Food supply was seriously affected by the geographical conditions. Agricultural production were limited by flood, draught and plant diseases. Severe malnutrition is resulted from the famines and food storage.

2. Epidemics:

Small pox, Malaria, T.B, Plague etc are quite common until recent times. It take a heavy toll of life. These diseases are spreading rapidly because of lack of drinking water supply, and dense population. Poor sanitary conditions also spread epidemics easily.

3. War:

War has been an important factor affecting population size. It affect in two ways. It caused for death of soldiers and civilians.

4. Poor Sanitary conditions:
Sanitary conditions were poor and worst in the past. There was a very little knowledge about the importance of cleanliness and hygienic conditions. So in the preindustrial society generally the standard of living was low and poor sanitary conditions caused for spreading of diseases and epidemics.

These factors contributed high level of mortality in the past. Man has succeeded to a great extent over these factors. As a result the mortality has notably declined throughout the world.

**Environmental Factors:**

1. Community and Residence:

   Residential condition are influencing death rate. Contagious diseases are frequent in the slums. Overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions are the reasons for most of the diseases. In rural area comparatively the death rate are low. Fresh air, space and availability of food are related with mortality.

2. Occupation:

   The type of work is associated with the probability of death. Occupation determines the income and surroundings of the works and family. White collar workers have lower death rates. Mine workers have high death rates. As the economic status declined and the labour became heavier the death rate raises.

3. Marital status:

   It has been observed that married people live long than unmarried. Among the diseased married are minimum. High death rates among widows and divorced persons have been noted.

**Levels and Treads in Mortality:**

Economic progress results from the agricultural and industrial development. The level of mortality rate differs from country to country. It is higher in under developed countries. Some factors responsible for decline in mortality rate in developed countries are:

1. Increase in production and supply of food.
2. Advancement in technology
3. Improvement in standard of living
4. Improvement in sanitary conditions and public health measures
5. Measures of environmental control like water supply, immunization, public health etc.
6. Health education programme
7. Curative medicines developed out of technological development and advancement in surgery
8. Various social reform movements of (19th and 20th centuries )

Death affects social system. It positively or negatively influence the living individual. Usually mortality affects family structure. The place of dead one cannot be easily substituted. The result is widowhood, widowerhood and orphan hood. The death of the older ones may not make sudden impacts on family. But the premature death affect severely. Some times it makes isolation. Some
times people feel lonelier after death of nearest or dearest. Mortality influences interpersonal relationships. The group relationship may be affected because of death of some persons. The group relationship may be weakened by the death of a single person. Even infants death seriously affects mother or father. Some times death of a person influences the fate of a country or an organization also. Religions explain affects of death. It tell us the life after death. The influences of the dead also noted. There are rituals and customs to please the souls of dead ones.

**Mortality Differentials**

Mortality differentials have been seen on the basis of age, sex, community conditions etc.

1. **Age**

Age is one of the important variables in the analysis of mortality. Death rates vary with the age. It may be observed that age specific death rates are higher at the age of zero than above twelve months. It is relevant in developed as well as developing countries. The death rates suddenly decreases for the age group of 1-4, then gradually decreases upto the age group of 10-14. The lower values of the age specific death rates are observed for age group 10-14. After age of 14 the values of age specific death rate gradually increases upto 50-55. Then rapidly death rate increases.

2. **Sex:**

Mortality conditions differ from males to females. Females have an over all advantage over males with respect to mortality. In most countries the average expectation of life is higher for females than males. The gap between average expectation of life for females and males is wider in developed countries than in developing countries.

3. **Community and Country:**

Data on mortality were not available for many countries in the past. After 1980 WHO has made remarkable attempt to collect data on mortality for these countries. Now it is possible to estimate approximate levels of mortality for different countries of the world. It is on the basis of data collected in sample surveys. While in 1950-56 the crude death rate for the world was 18.8% as per 1000 population. In 1970-75 it has decreased to 12.8, in 195-90 to 9.8. The average expectation of life at birth increased from 46.7 years (1950-56) to 63.9(1985-90). During the 15 years period the crude death rate is declining in less developed countries also. More developed region experience a decline in crude death rate and increase in the average expectation of life at birth.

Striking mortality differences between developed and developing countries are also noted. The crude death rate for more developed countries were 10.1 and it is 23.3 for less developed countries per thousand population in 1950-56

In 1970-75 it was 9.2 for developed countries and 40.3 for under developed countries. African continent has the worst mortality rate in the world. South Asia, Middle South Asia and Western South Asia are also having bad mortality conditions. Africa had the highest crude death rate, 16.6/per 1000 population in 1980-85.
The variations in mortality rate have been identified on the basis of rural urban background, occupational conditions, and marital status.

**Level & Trends in Mortality in India:**

The history of population growth in India before 1920 is the history of great war against death. Upto 1920 population growth in India was very often marked by the high death rates taken by epidemics and famines. Millions of lives were lost during massive calamities. It is unfortunate that the actual death rates during these periods are not available. But the mortality rates were high fluctuating due to calamities and epidemics. However demographics have estimated the mortality rates on the basis of available information.

The two striking features about Indian mortality are

1. The higher level of mortality rate before 1921
2. The decline in mortality rate after 1921

The average expectation of life at birth for an Indian was very low in 1901-1920. In 1920 it was 19.4 for males and 20.9 for females. This may be considered as the lowest anywhere in the world. But mortality conditions in India have remarkably arrested over the last seven decades. The average life expectancy has increased in each successive decades. The main reason for the low expectancy in India has been high infant mortality. During 1901-1911 the infant mortality rates for males were 219 per 1000 and for females 284 per 1000. One fourth of the babies died before the completion of the first year of the life. Once the last decades infant mortality rates in India have also declined. In 1982 this rate was 104.8 per 1000 live births.

The fight against death in India was undertaken in three important fields:

1. The control over famines & food shortage
2. Control over epidemics and diseases
3. Control over war and dacoity

The achievements in these three fields were slow. But still mortality rate remains very high as compared to other countries. Crude Death Rate for 1000 population for Asian countries in 1985 proves this. The average expectation of life at birth in India is very low as compared to other developing countries. In Sri Lanka it is 67 but it is 56 in India in 1985.

The mortality in urban India is lower than rural India. This is true to all states in the country. The major reasons are lack of sanitary conditions, lack of medical care, unavailability of drinking water etc. For infant mortality rate also rural India record high rate.

The crude death rates in various parts of India differ notably. In 1988 the highest crude death rate was observed in UP. Among the Union Territories, Chandigarh has the lowest crude death rate, 4.7 per 1000. There are some regional variations in infant mortality rates. Rural Kerala has the lowest infant mortality rate, 2.5 per 1000. In rural UP infant mortality rate is 126 per 1000 in 1989.

It may be concluded that India has made considerable progress in the process of decline of mortality. The fight against death is considered most effective and successful, Plague, small pox and malaria.
have been almost controlled. Famine, is no longer a threat to human life in many regions. Despite of all these developments the younger generation and women of Indian population are still severely affected by mal nutrition and under nutrition. Infant mortality rates are still very high. The average life span is low when compared to that of developed countries. So India has to go long way in death control programmes.

Infant Mortality:

Mortality during the first year of life is high for all countries. It varies from country to country religion to religion. In countries like Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Africa and South America, infant mortality rate is very high. Countries like Japan and Sweden stand with very low infant mortality rate. It is interesting to note that infant mortality rates in some east European countries are comparatively higher than west European Countries. Sample surveys proved that the infant mortality rate is about 200/1000 in Africa.

The reasons for the infant death at the earlier and later stages differ. Various factors are affecting infant mortality. These factors are classified into biological, and environmental. The level of mortality is very high in the first few hours, days and weeks of life. Reasons for this condition differ. The study of infant mortality is grouped into two categories. The first category consists of those infant who died before completion of four weeks of life. This is known as Neo-Natal Mortality. The other category consists of infant who die between 28 days and one year. This is known as post Neo-Natal Mortality.

Factors which effect factual and neo-natal death primarily indigenous, those which effect post neo-natal mortality rate are primarily exogenous. Indigenous factors are primarily biological.

They are related to the formation or expulsion of factors. The important biological factors are:

1. Age of the mother
2. The birth order
3. The period of spacing between birth
4. Premature birth
5. Weight at birth
6. Multiple birth

It has been observed that foetal and neo-natal mortality rates are higher at the younger ages of the mother. The maturity of an infant at birth is also related with neo-natal mortality. The weight of the lady at birth is an important factor that is influencing death. Still birth rate and neo-natal mortality rate are very high in the case of multiple births.

Exogenous factors are external factors like epidemics, disease, occupation of parents etc. The environmental factors include:

1. Over crowding
2. Low sanitary surrounding
3. Lack of fresh air
4. Lack of Proper Sun
5. Illegitimacy
The trends in infant mortality differ from country to country. The highest infant mortality is observed in Africa 300 per 1000. It is 126 per 1000 in Pakistan, 115 per 1000 in Egypt; 105/1000 in India. Sweden and Japan have the lowest infant mortality rate. Notable changes in the decline of infant mortality rate are noted in developed countries. It was pointed out that a drastic decline in infant mortality would be difficult without some revolutionary achievement in medical science.

III. MIGRATION

Migration is one of the important factors of population change. Migration affects population size, socially, culturally economically and politically. Migration may increase or decrease the size and structure of population. It always plays an important role in the distribution of population. So the study of migration is important to demographer, sociologists, economist, planners and administrators. Because of various reasons study of migration is important. It is a symptom of basic social change. Migration was the base for industrialization. For the emergence of cities and metropolis migration played a vital role. Migration has an economic interest. It does affect production, supply and distribution of products. Migration makes a change in the economic status of people. Due to the socio-economic impact made by the migration, planners and administrators try to study the process of migration. It helps to prepare a policy and a plan for socio-economic development. The socio-psychological problems created by migration will be existing in sending and receiving places. To solve these problems the causes and consequences of migration are studied in detail.

For the earlier migration, there are no records. People were nomads and moving around. After practice of agriculture human beings started to settle. People moved in groups to the fertile lands and settled on the banks of rivers. This is considered to be the first migratory movements. But there is not much historical evidences regarding this migration. The impacts of migration in the traditional societies cannot be evaluated due to the lack of information. The nature of the physical environment was the major cause. The availability of water and fertility of land were most prominent elements influenced in the process of migration. The techniques and tools developed by the communities were also motivating forces for migration. The social organizations of the group also attracted other communities. So the factors influenced for migration are categorized under four groups:

1. Climate
2. Fertility
3. Flora and Fauna
4. Cultural factors

Definition:

The UN Demographic Dictionary defined Migration as follows:

“Migration is a form of geographical mobility or spatial mobility between one geographical area to another, generally involving a change in residence from the place of origin or place of departure to the place of destination or the place of arrival”. Such migration is called permanent migration. It can be distinguished from other forms of movement which do not involve a permanent change of residence.

The term immigration refers to movements into and emigration refers to the movement out of a population territory. Thus migrants leaving Kerala to USA to settle down are immigrants to USA and
emigrants to Kerala. In-immigration refers to movement into a particular area. Out migration refers to movement and out of a particular area. In migration and out migration refers to movements within a country. Both refer internal migration. Thus migrants who came from Kashmir to Delhi are considered to be immigrants for Delhi and out migrants for Kashmir. The term Migratory Movement is used for that section of population movement which is due to migration. The place from which a move is made, is the place of origin or departure. The place of arrival or destination refers to the place at which a move terminates. The total of the arrivals of immigrants and immigrants and departures of emigrants and out migrants is known as gross Migration. This is also known as Volume of Migration. Net migration is the difference between the total number of persons who arrives and the total number of persons who leave. This is also referred as Balance of Migration. The phrase migration stream refers to the total number of moves made during a given migration interval. The persons involve in migration streams have a common area of origin and a common area of destination.

Types of Migration:

The mobility of people within a national boundary is very difficult to measure. People move from one place to another. These movements are diverse in nature. The distances covered vary from few kilometers to several kilometer and large number of movements are casual. The duration of stay involved may also vary from few hours to several years. Some movements do not involve a permanent change of residence. They are not considered as migrants. The restriction on the concept of migration also eliminates other types of movements such as nomads. They have no fixed places of residence. Internal and International migration are noted. Internal migration is migration of persons within a country. International migration is movement of population from one country to another. Census report, Vital Registration and Sample Surveys are three sources of information on internal migration. In census enumeration the question on the places of birth is widely asked. In 1971 the question concerned the place of the last usual residence was asked. From1981 onwards the information was obtained about the reasons of migration. Sample surveys help to study the internal migration. The study of differential migration is helping to study the factors of migration.

Internal Migration:

Migration is affected by economic, political, social and educational factors. Those who have studied internal migration adapted two distinct approaches. The first is associated with push and pull factors. It attempts to study the conditions in the place of origin and the situations outside. The second approach attempts to formulates empirical generalisation. It prepares Mathematical models of migration.

Push and pull factors are related with the circumstances prevailing at the place of origin and place of destination.

The major push factors are:

1. High density of population that creates pressure on existing resources
2. Exhaustion of natural resources
3. Calamities like flood, draught, famines etc.
4. Socio-religious political conflicts.
The special condition of place of destination are pull factors

1. The establishment of new industries or trading centers with the provision of employment opportunities.
2. Following commercial and economic opportunities
3. Facilitates for high education and training
4. Favorable climate conditions

National sample survey shows that 75.4% of migrated mass in India had migrated to gain better employment 12.6% had done so for educational purposes. It is obvious that push-pull approach has been useful in history of migration. This approach does not had to any theory of migration studies proved that migration occur not because of either push or pull factors alone. But combined of both.

Everest Lee analysed the factors associated with the decision of migration. Four categories are identified:

1. The factors associated with the area origin:
2. The factors associated with the area of destination
3. Intervening obstructs
4. Personal factors

Lee has attempted to formulate several hypothesis regarding the types of migration. These hypothesis cover:

1. Volume of migration
2. Development of streams and counter streams of migration

There are direct and indirect techniques to measure the internal migration. The direct techniques are based on the data obtained from census report. Questions on the following items provide informations for direct estimate of migration movement:

1. The place of birth of the person
2. The last or previous place of residence
3. The duration of stay of a person at that present place of residence
4. Place of residence at a fixed prior date.

The indirect techniques of migration do not require special questions. The exend of migration can be estimated from census report.

**International migration:**

International migration is defined as geographical mobility of people from one country to another. The concept of country is defined in terms of political as well as cultural factors. International migration is as old as the history of human society. But the first international migration were natural rather than political. It is estimated that the first international migration has begun from Africa towards East African countries; but we have no clear statistics about this migrations. The major migratory scheme was geographical mobility from Europe to America. Millions of European migrants crossed the Atlantic Ocean in search of fortune and to settle down in north and south America. They
were from Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy and France. Another significant stream of European migrants settled in Latin American countries. Europeans also migrated to Australia New Zealand etc. British migrants moved towards south Africa in 18th and 19th. Centuries Chinese moved towards Taiwan, Philippines and Japan. Indians moved towards Burma, Ceylon and Malaysia. Countries like Fiji, Trinidad, Mauritius Mali etc. were also attracted in that period. Most of the Indian migrants were traders or labourers. The most important transfer of civilians occur in India in 1947 from Pakistan. It is estimated that 7.2 million migrants came to India from Pakistam. Almost the same member migrated from India to Pakistan. The most dramatic event in the history of international migration is founding of Israel. Israel is the only country that collected and assimilated the immigrants within a few years. Form May 1948 up to December 1951 Israel added about 7 lakhs of immigrants. No other country in the world has ever recorded such a rapid immigration rate without any compulsion.

International migration is also influenced by push and pull factors. It also affects the place of origin positively or negatively. It helps the place of destination positively in developmental affairs.

**Causes of Migration:**

General as well as personal causes are pointed out for migration. The most significant reason for geographical mobility is associated with economic development, political, social and demographic pressures are also associated. There are important factors of obstacles in the international migration. The main principles that have been found in the international migration are:

1. When the population growth in a region exceeds the economic growth
2. When a region of low population attracts other regions.
3. For seeking suitable employment and business opportunities
4. The unskilled labourers are attracted.

The intensity of migration varies universally. The international migration may be selective as it regards sex, age, occupation and skills of unskilled labourers is unfavourable to local unskilled labourers, but beneficial for skilled labourer. The possible personal reasons for internal and international migrations are:

1. To help others
2. To be with relatives
3. To find a climate more suitable for health
4. To find neighbors with same status
5. For voluntary service like military or social work.

The other causes for migration are:

1. Education
2. Marriage
3. Business
4. Employment
5. Purchasing of property
6. Luxurious and glamourous life
7. Calamities and famine
8. Excommunication
9. Group conflicts like war
10. Fertility of land
11. Religious reasons
12. Death of some persons

Thus internal and international migration takes place due to various reasons. The internal migration cannot be measured easily. International migration can be measured from various sources. The important sources for collecting information about international migration are:

1. Port and Airport statistics
2. Land frontier statistics
3. Passport statistics
4. Population register statistics
5. Transport contract statistics

Migrational Differentials

The stream and volume of migration differ in terms of various factors. The difference in the migratory movements are defined as differential migrations. Differential migration is analysed by the following factors.

1. The Differential Volume of migration will be higher from the youth group. The physical capacity and the desires or dreams pull the youth from several countries. Among the children and the aged the migration rate will be minimum.

2. Differential Migration by sex: Among the migrants males constitute the largest volume. Only very few females are able to migrate. The occupational environment is not much favourable for females in the process of migration.

3. Differential Migration by education: The educated and those who find out a better job in their place of origin will be more in migration. And for better education people migrate.

4. Differential Migration by marital status: Marriage is another relevant factor that influences migration. Unmarried migrate more than the married. Even among married the first period of marriage will be promoting migration than after several years of marriage. The married with children move lesser to another country than childless couples.

IV. MARRIAGE

Marriage is another factor influencing population growth. Marriage, separation, divorce and widowhood are affecting the population. They are also related to the process of migration. Marriage has profound influence on fertility. It is the first step of reproductive process. Though marriage is not a necessary biological condition, for the birth of a child, marriage is widely practiced. Many countries of the world do not allow to have a child before marriage. Marriage means the legal union of persons of opposite sex. Constituted by an act or ceremony or process. The legality of this union may be established by civil, religious or other means recognised by the society. Marriage provides the...
biological continuity of the society through procreation. Marriage provides cultural continuity through
the suitable atmosphere for socialization. The age of marriage for females makes the beginning of
reproductive life. It is through the variables of marriage that replacement takes place in a meaningful
way.

Generally marriage is that stage in the life of man or a woman when they are socially permitted to live
together. So the legal recognition of physical relationship between two sexes is known as Marriage.
Several established customs are determining the factors like age at marriage, number of marriage,
size of family etc. It is a social as well as biological necessity for human beings. A change of marital
status may also have an influence on mortality and migration. The number of marriages are materially
affected by changes in the number of men and women in the country. Marriages tend to become a
curse in bad times. Economic depression reduces the number of marriages. Many couples have to
postpone their weddings due to unfavourable circumstances. They also exhibit some seasonal
variation. Preference is given for holiday period or time after harvest. This variation differ from
region to region. Data on marriage is collected from marriage registration. Marriage is studied under
 crude marriage rate and specific marriage rate.

Factors affecting marriage rate:

The marriage rate of any population is affected by the following factors:

1. Fertility: Fertility rate of population is positively correlated with the proportion of
married to unmarried. It increase or decrease the number of children born for married couple.

2. Sex differentials: The marriage rate of a country also depends on the number of
unmarried men and women. It is rarely found that the number of adult women and men are equal. If
by chance the number of unmarried women exceeds number of unmarried men the marriage rate for
women will be lower than men.

3. Proportion of married: There is greater fluctuation in marriage rates than the proportions.
Generally proportional marriage has a tendency to become constant in between 45-60 years. The
proportions married is only affected by death at higher ages.

4. Marriage dissolutions: Dissolution of marriage is breaking up of marital relationship. It is
found in the form of divorce and death of partner. Separation and desertion also function as temporary
marital dissolution. These events bear a positive co-relationship between age and marriage widow is
very common in several countries due to the wide range of age difference between the partners. In
those countries generally wife is lesser in age than the husband.

5. Mean age at marriage: Mean age at marriage is the estimated average years of unmarried life
of a woman. In other words it is estimated average year of life of woman related to a life table before
the first marriage.

Age at Marriage:

The child marriage as a practice started during the middle ages. But for long time many countries
were known for child marriage. In India child marriage was an integral part of social system. Age at
marriage was low and still it is lower than many countries. Marriage is considered as social
compulsion in India. Social customs rooted in patriarchy supports and strongly enforce the norm of child marriage. In almost all religious groups, in all states in India child marriage was practiced. The age at marriage of girls was below 13, in almost all parts of India except some tribal groups. Social reformers started movements against child marriage in the beginning of 20th century. Government has been forced by reformers to change the situation by presenting some legal sanctions. The situation was severely changed by the Sharada Act of 1930. It fixed in that time minimum age of marriage for boys as 18 and girls as 14. The act was further amended in 1949 by raising the age of females to 15. The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 made severe changes in the age at marriage. According to 1971 census about 50% do not marry at the age of 10.

V. DIVORCE:

Divorce is a form of marriage dissolution. It is commonly found as a process after separation and sometimes after desertion. Divorces occur only after marriage. Divorce weakens and breaks the familial relationship. The causes of divorce may be social or personal. And the consequences of divorce are also affect personal and social life. But divorce affects the growth of population. Divorce events bear a positive co-relationship with age. More divorce are occurring in the later period of marital life in India. But the western experiences are different. In those societies divorce rate is higher immediately after the marriage and within five years after marriage. Divorce bear a direct impact on the demographic process in the form of production in reproductive period. This influence the total fertility rate.

Separation is a state in the marriage life of a couple when they do not live together due to some reasons. Separation is found in two forms:

1. Separation because of personal reason
2. Separation before divorce.

Before divorce informal arbitration may be made. If it fails the legal separation occur. Separation may be due to physical inability, imprisonment, military service etc. Legal separation is break up of marriage contract. The impotency of male member, infecundity, diseases etc are some significant reasons for divorce.

Divorce is a developed form of separation. After divorce remarriage is possible. In separation there is a possibility of living together by partners. But usually in divorce this chance is minimum. Divorce is quite different annulment. Marriage annulment may be enforced in the case of violation of any law. A divorce can be obtained on account of any event in married life. The different ways used to determine the frequency of divorce are:

1. Annual divorce per 1000 mid year population
2. Divorce in a specific year per 100 annual marriage
3. Annual divorce per 100 couples or per 1000 married persons in a mid year
4. Annual divorce difference on the basis of age of wife and husbands in relation to their marriage periods

Divorce rates are the absolute number of divorces granted each per year for 1000 persons present in the population at the mid year. Crude Rate of Divorce is indicator of the gross addition to the marriage population and from the marriage segment. Thus the estimation of divorce helps to analyse the
changes occurring in the population. In India the study of divorce cannot be made easily as we are not getting it correct records in Divorce. Many divorces are informed only to religious organizations but not to governmental institutions

VI. WIDOWHOOD:

Widowhood is a state obtained when anyone either husband or wife is died. If husband die wife is called widows and if wife is dead husband is called widower. But any of them remarriage he/she is counted as married. The proportion of widow than the widows is always high in all societies at any time. The reason is that age of wife’s is always lesser than husband’s and another major reason is the possibility of remarriage is high for males.

The mean age specified rate of married males is generally taken as rate of widowhood, for any age of wife. The widowhood age was slow in 1911-30 because of world war, epidemics and famines. It was higher in independent India, because of decrease in mortality and medical care. Higher age of widowhood is seen in UP, Punjab and Rajasthan. It is because of the remaining age found among Jaits, Gujars and Aheers. The average widowhood lies in between 36-37 years in Maharashstra, M.P, U.P,Punjab, A.P and Jammu Kashmir. It is between 34-36 years of age in Kerala, Karanataka, Tamilnadu, Orissa, West Bengal and Bihar. Now we find that 30-50 widows per 1000 married women. The incidence of widowhood in India in the early age group is high. It is low in the age group of 10-14 years.

It is found that the mean age of widowhood is maximum in Christian and minimum in Jains. The order follow like this, Christians, Muslims, Hindu, Sikhs and Jains.

There is a complete silence about widow remarriage in Indian census. So it is very difficult to have a quantitative analysis of widowhood in India. Some studies show that only 25.5% of widows are remarried in rural areas. It has been proved that widow marriage decreases when age of women increases. The widows of age 14 years generally occupies a great % in remarriage especially those who have not gone to bridegrooms house.

Widow remarriage depends upon the number as children of the widow. Widow remarriage is also depending upon the duration of widowhood. It has been found that childless widows are probably marrying within one year of widowhood. Some communities promote remarriage. It should be performed before the first anniversary of death of husband in some communities. Marriage of widows of one or two children takes place within four years. There are great restriction for remarriage among higher caste group than the lower caste group.

Widows remarriage was a takes in India for a longer period especially in Middle ages. This situation still prevails in some communities. Our social reformers have considerably succeeded in changing the social views about remarriage. At present widow remarriage is even legally encouraged. In urban areas widow remarriage is being increasingly supported among the educated classes. These are the major factors that influence population dynamics.

POPULATION GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

The concept of progress and development are widely used to mention the process of change. Progress is very much related to the idea of development. The idea of progress has been controversial.
concept of development in the sense of the process of national growth, is of fairly recent origin. The idea of development has been widely accepted. Development is both an economic and social process. The process of social and economic development involves a variety of interrelated factor. These factors may operate in single or in combination. The process of development would bring about several changes through interrelated factors. They may be material like a rise in the income level or greater availability of food. Changes may also occur in ways of thinking, in attitude towards women’s education opinion against caste system. Changes may take place in the social system such as changes in the systems of communication due to technological innovations. So development is a very complicated process. And there is no single input, output law governing total development.

Contents of Development:
There are three ingredients of the process of development they are:
1. Goals or values
2. Instruments or Means
3. Structures

1. Goals/Values:

Many countries have certain development objectives. They are:

1. Increase national per capita income
2. Achieving better status of health
3. Increasing educational opportunities

These are the main objectives. When development is not planned the goals are not declared. The goals of development plans may not reflect the pattern of popular preferences. The process of establishing development goals is itself a process of development.

2. Instruments:

Development process involves the building up of instruments or infra structure, like capital, equipments, schools, hospitals etc. There is a relationship between goal and means of development. Factors which are goals in themselves also become a mean to reach at.

3. Structures:

As development takes place some change may occur. The final goals may be achieved. Industry may be bloomed up and new structures may be developed. When industrialization takes place there will be reduction in the involvement of agriculture.

Development may accompany other changes. Some undesirable changes may be accompanied. Eg: pollution in industrial area, crime and disorganization in urban areas. Such changes are not to be considered as part of development.

Measurement of Development:

Development projects or programmes are to be evacuated. It is to be done on the basis of certain measures. For international comparisons of levels of development, it is necessary to have some measures of development.

1. Per Capital National Income (PCNI):
The most common means of measuring development is the Per Capita. National Income. Some have opinion that an increase in real national income is the most convenient single measure of economic development. If a country’s real national income increases by 2% per year and it just population increases at the same rate there would hardly be any economic development. The per capita real income is more, meaningful measure of development than the real national income. The per capital income have some limitations. It does not measure the distribution of income in the population. The gross income disparity is not reflected in per capita income. Therefore per capita income found to be inadequate for measuring social and economic change. It is to be supplemented by other indicators to measure the development.

2. Multiple Indicators of Development:

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) has prepared a list of indicator for a more quantitative analysis of development. It consists of sets of both economic and social indicators. So

Social and Demographic Indicators:-

a) Health and Demographic:
1. Infant Mortality Rate
2. Expectation of life at birth
3. Inhabitants per physician
4. Inhabitants per hospital bed

b) Nutrition:
5. Calorie consumption per capita per day
6. Protein consumption per capita per day
7. Consumption of animal protein per capita per day

c) Education:
8. Literate as % of total population
9. Combined and secondary enrollment as % of age group 15-19.

d) Housing:
10. Average number of persons per room
11. Dwelling with electricity

e) Communication:
12. Newspaper circulation per 1000 population
13. Telephones per 1000 population

f) Transport Services:
14. Railways; net ton kilometers per capita
15. Passenger railway kilometer per capita
16. Motor vehicles per 1000 population

g) Agriculture:
17. Agricultural production for male worker

h) Industry:
18. Electricity consumption kilowatt per capita
19. Energy consumption

i) Trade:
20. Foreign trade per capita

j) General:
21. Gross Net Product Per Capita (GNP)

Population and Development:

The relationship between population and development can be looked at from three different angles.

1) Development depends on Population: Population is the independent variable and the development is the dependent one.

2) Population depends on Development: Development is the independent variable and population is the dependent one.

3) Population and Development affect each other: They have a reciprocal cause and effect relationship. Population should be modified to suit the prevailing economic situation. Development can meet the requirements of population. If the development is not fast enough to meet the needs of population, poverty and over population will be the result. So fertility control is a must for advance in economic conditions.

Economic development may control population growth. Any independent policy of Population control in a developing country is unnecessary. Economic development eventually brings about quality control over the population.

Both population and development have an impact on each other. Economic development affects population growth. Population growth has an impact on economic development. There is a reciprocal relationship. This is more realistic idea. The World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) has supported idea of population planning and development planning. This relationship between development and population is not of a final quantitative nature. They both affect each other in varying degrees from country to country. It depends upon cultural, religious and other factors.

The demographic transition theory explains the relationship between population and economic development. Demographic transition describes the passage through which countries move from high birth and high death rates to low ones. This has been the experience of countries going through a process of modernizing economic and social development. The demographic transition is a historical process.

The inter relationship between population and economic development may be divided into three stages.
The first stage is characterized by almost a stationary population with high birth rate and death rate. The economy of the society is pre-industrial and agrarian with a traditional organization. High death rates in such a society are due to chronic malnutrition, famines and epidemics. High birth rates are supported by the socio-cultural system such as illiteracy, early marriage, traditional values, religious belief, demand for family labour etc. In the first stage of demographic transition the country is economically backward. In the second stage of demographic transition death rates begin to decline. Birth rates continue to remain high.

It is because of better nutritional and living conditions. There is an increase in the net growth rate of population. During the third stage, when the country’s economy is properly developed birth rates decline faster. Low death rates decline slowly. The birth rates remain slightly higher than the death rates. The low to birth death rates are stabilised. Thus with the continuing process of economic development growth rates of population slows down.

**Consequences of Rapid Growth of Population:**

In the history of mankind, long term economic growth is comparatively a recent phenomenon. The improvement in the economic conditions of nations has been associated with the industrial revolution. It radically transformed their economy. It brought about changes in the manufacturing processes. It also revolutionized other economic activities such as agriculture, transportation, commerce and banking. Social institutions and way of life were also influenced by the industrial revolution. These changes caused for several demographic trends.

Decrease in mortality rate following substantial improvements in life styles, living standards and environmental situations influenced the population growth in developed regions. People in developed countries responded to increase in population growth by resorting to abortions by limiting the family size, by marrying late and by migration. The relationship between population growth and socio-economic development is very complex. The experiences of different countries vary in this regard. Out of those experiences it is stated that the high rate of Population growth is not desirable for socio-economic development.

**Population growth and socio-economic development in India:**

Indian population problem may be viewed from:

1. The absolute size of population
2. The rate of growth of population
3. Age structure of population

The total count of population in India was 68.38 crores in 1981. It has reached more than 100 crore. The large sized population demands faster economic development. But because of the broad base even a low rate of growth would add a large population each year. The geometric rate of population growth in India in during 1971-81 was 2.24 % per year. This growth rate appears to be low. But it has a tremendous effect on population increase.
The enormous size of population and rapid population growth are the two most important characteristics of Indian population. They have significant consequences for the country’s social and economic progress. The age structure of the population is also affecting the process of development. When a country’s birth rate is high, a large number of non productive persons are added to the population every year. If the population base is large the number of such low entrants is even bigger. The high birth rate and the large number of children in the population increase the pressure on different kinds of services, such as maternal and child health services, nutritional services, primary and secondary school services etc.

The consequences of rapid growth of population cause for different problems:

1. Development and absorption of human capital is the biggest problem. Illiterate people increases.


3. A rapidly growing population overstrains the available infrastructure and opportunities like education, housing, transportation, health care etc.

4. A rapidly growing population puts pressure on land and other natural resources, such as forest and water. Over exploitation of these resources results in deforestation and desertification.

5. The cost of production of basic necessities of life increases.

6. The rapid growth in population has adverse effects on the equitable distribution of income. The increase in GNP is greatly reduced. In India during the past 40 years GNP has increase at the rate of 3.6% per year, whereas per capita income has by only 1.6% per year. When population increase rapidly increased rapidly the major concern of a developing country tends to be focused more on economic, growth. The inequalities within the country tend to widen.

The consequences of rapid population growth in India can be analyzed by assessing the three areas of social life. They are:

1) food and nutrition
2) Educational attainment
3) Health and medical services

1. Food and Nutrition and population growth:

The production of food is a high priority item in the economic planning. The increase in agricultural production rise the standard of living. Food situation in India is satisfactory. The green revolution has raised the hopes for the availability of food in substantial quantities. The affects of the green revolution are mainly visible in the production of wheat. Protein deficiency is indirectly caused by a low calories intake. When not enough food is available for a major section of population, it would be under and. It may be observed that for India the per capita dietary energy supply false short of requirements by about 6%. Though there has been a raise in agricultural production the calorie and
protein intake for an average Indian has declined from 1961 to 71. It was because of the excessive growth of population.

2. Educational Attainment:

Population growth and education are closely related. In any educational planning the demographic factor occupies an important position. If the number of children increases more rapidly than the population, the need for educating them puts a heavy pressure on the nations resources. Those countries which have a large proportion of children in the school going age are precisely the countries which are educationally backward. It is in these countries that the age structure of population becomes a barrier to educational improvement.

It was found that the general literacy rate in India in 1981 was 36.17%. The problems posed by rural illiteracy and female illiteracy are even worse. The rapidly increasing population place heavy obstacles in the path of educational planning. Despite the substantial progress which has been achieved in the expansion of educational facilities, the targets laid down for elementary education have not been fulfilled.

3. Health and Medical Services:

Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well being. It is not nearly absence of diseases. It is an important aspect of quality of life; that can be improved by the provision of efficient medical services. One of the indicators of the coverage of population by health and medical services is the ratio between those services and the population. The Health Survey and Planning Committee had recommended that there should be one doctor for a population of 3500 and one hospital bed for a population of 1000. In India it can be seen that only in very few states there is one doctor for 3500 or less population.

The hospital bed population ratio in India in 1984 was not very satisfactory. There was one hospital bed per 1330 population. Very few states have achieved this ideal. Kerala and Meghalaya leading the way with one hospital bed for a population of only 591. Bihar is the worst in the respect, with one hospital bed for a population of 3097.

A rapid population growth slows down the growth of per capita income. It also restricts the growth of the gross National Product (GNP), by holding down the rates of savings and capital formation. Food production has to be given priority, the allocation of resources to other aspects of socio economic development becomes limited. Rapid population growth also tends to perpetuate the disparities in income distribution. With rapid population growth, the number of new entrants to the labour force increases each year. Country’s economy finds it difficult to provide jobs for all entrants. The surplus labour force compelled to work in available suture. And the availability of cheap labour inhibits the development of technology.

POPULATION GROWTH IN INDIA

The population of India as of 1 March 2011 was 1,210,193,422 persons. This implies an increase of 17.65 % in the ten-year period since the 2001 population census. The population increase in the country has continued to slow down and the rate of retardation in population growth appears to have increased. In terms of the average annual growth rate, the population of the country increased at a rate
of 1.63 % per year, well below the average annual increase of 1.94 % per year during 1991-2001. After achieving the peak growth rate of 2.22 % per year during the period 1961-71, population growth in the country has slowed down in every decade and appears to be picking up the momentum.

As the result of the slowdown in the population growth, the net addition to the population decreased in India for the first time during the period 2001-2011. This decrease in the net addition to the population is perhaps the most remarkable feature of population transition in India during the period 2001-2011. This is an indication that the population growth in the country has now started shrinking.

1. Birth and Death Rates:

Birth and death rates in India are high compared to most countries in the world. The %age decadal growth during 2001-2011 has registered the sharpest decline since independence. For 2001-2011, the decadal growth has become 17.64 %—a decrease of 3.90 % from 21.54 % for the period 1991-2001.

2. Density of Population:

Density of population implies average number of people living per square kilometer. Density of population in a country is measured by dividing its total population by total area. The population density of India from 1901 to 2011 has been the density of population of India was as low as 142 persons per sq. km. and this steadily increased from 267 in 1931 to 382 in 2011.

3. Growth Pattern:

The total population of India in 1901 was about 238 million which rose to 361 million in 1951 and 843 million in 1991 in March 2001, India’s population was 1,027 million, which became over 1210 million in March 2011. The annual growth rate since 1971 has been over 2 %, while the growth %ages in 1991 and 2001 over the base year of 1901 were about 254 and 331 % respectively. Between 2001 and 2011, however, the growth rate declined to 1.76 %.

The %age decadal growth rates of the six most populous states have declined during 2001-2011 compared to 1991-2001:

(i) Uttar Pradesh (25.85% to 20.09%)
(ii) Maharashtra (22.73% to 15.99%)
(iii) Bihar (28.62% to 25.07%)
(iv) West Bengal (17.77% to 13.93%)
(v) Andhra Pradesh (14.59% to 11.10%)
(vi) Madhya Pradesh (24.26% to 20.30%)

(vii) During 2001-2011, as many as 25 states/UTs with a share of about 85 % of the country’s population registered an annual growth rate of less than 2 % as compared to 15 states/UTs with a share of about 42 % during the period 1991-2001.
(viii) 15 states/UTs have grown by less than 1.5 % per annum during 2001-2011, while the number of such states/UTs was only four during the previous decade.

(ix) Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state with almost 200 million people, which is more than the population of Brazil.

(x) The combined population of Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra (the second most populous state), at 312 million, is substantially greater than the population of USA.

(xi) Three-fifths of India’s population live in the following seven states: Uttar Pradesh: 199.6 million

(xii) Maharashtra: 112.4 million Bihar: 103.8 million West Bengal: 91.3 million Andhra Pradesh: 84.7 million Madhya Pradesh: 72.6 million Tamil Nadu: 72.1 million

(xiii) The least populous state is Sikkim.

(xiv) Among the union territories, NCT of Delhi is the most populous.

4. Population 0-6 Years:

(i) The total number of children in the age group 0-6 years is 158.8 million (-5 million since 2001).

(ii) Twenty states/UTs now have over one million children in the age group 0-6 years. On the other extreme, there are five states/UTs in the country which are yet to reach the 1,00,000 marks.

(iii) Uttar Pradesh (29.7 million), Bihar (18.6 million), Maharashtra (12.8 million), Madhya Pradesh (10.5 million) and Rajasthan (10.5 million constitute 52 % children in the age group 0-6 years).

(iv) The proportion of child population in the age group 0-6 years to total population is 13.1 %, while the corresponding figure in 2001 was 15.9 %. The decline has been to the extent of 2.8 points.

(v) The share of children in the EAG states, at 53.2 % in 2011, has increased by about 1.3 % compared to 2001.

(vi) The proportion of child population in the age group 0-6 years to total population is indicative of fall/rise in fertility.

5. Sex Ratio:

Sex ratio is defined as the number of females per 1,000 males. In fact, all over the world, males outnumber females. Sex ratio in the world is 986 females to 1,000 males.

According to 2001 census, sex ratio in India was 933 females to 1,000 males which increased to 940 in 2011.
The sex ratio in India is highly skewed. This is largely attributed to women’s lower status in society which has contributed to their higher mortality rate in all age groups up to 45.

The fluctuating trend of sex ratio may be seen from the fact that in 1901 there were 972 females per 1,000 males, which declined to 930 in 1971, 934 in 1981 and 927 in 1991.

In 2001 the sex ratio was, however, 933 recording an increase of six females per 1,000 of males which rose to 940 females per 1,000 males in 2011.

In India, it is in the state of Kerala, where females have outnumbered males. According to the census of 2001, the sex ratio in Kerala was 1,058 females per 1,000 males which became 1,048 in 2011.

The lowest sex ratio was recorded in Haryana (877: 1000). The overall sex ratio at the national level has increased since 2001 census. This is the highest ever sex ratio since 1971. Increase in sex ratio is observed in 29 states/UTs. Three major states, viz., J&K, Bihar and Gujarat, have shown decline in sex ratio.

The child sex ratio at India level (914) is lowest since independence. Increased trend in the child sex ratio (0-6) is seen in Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Mizoram and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In all the remaining 27 states/UTs, the child sex ratio shows decline over the 2001 census.

Sex ratio in Russia is 1140, followed by France 1050, Japan 1041, USA 1031 and China 940.

The overall deficiency in sex ratio in India can be attributed partly to higher mortality of females and partly to their under enumeration in the census.

Females in India have always suffered from a lower status, right front the time of conception. Women’s lower status in Indian society results in early marriages, lower literacy, poor nutrition and higher fertility and mortality levels, especially during the reproductive age.

Recently, the large metropolitan cities of Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, Chennai and Bangalore have experienced increasing incidence of female foeticide with the use of ultrasonography. The states of Haryana and Punjab are also having high incidence of female foeticide.

6. Fertility:

The fertility rate in India has been declining steadily. If there had been no contraception, the total fertility rates among married women might now be close to nine children.

The increase in natural fertility is mostly due to the relaxation of many traditional checks on fertility that prevailed in Indian society for ages and kept the fertility levels of Indian women well below the biological maximum, or the levels observed in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries.

7. Literacy:

Any person above the age of seven years, who can read and write in any language, is treated as literate.
According to the 2011 census, over 74% of the total population of India aged seven years and above is literate and remaining 26% illiterate. Literacy rate has gone up from 64.88% in 2001 to 74.04% in 2011, showing an increase of 9.21%.

The literacy rate of males and females works out to be 82.14% and 65.46% respectively.

The increase in literacy rate in males and females during 2001-2011 has been of the order of 6.88 and 11.79% respectively. The highest literacy rate is in Kerala being 93.91%. The lowest literacy rate is in Bihar (63.82%). The female literacy rate is also highest in Kerala (91.98%).

The literacy rate at the state level has been plotted it may be observed that the highest literacy is in Kerala (93.91%), followed by Lakshadweep (92.28%) and Mizoram (91.58%).

The states of Bihar (63.82%), Rajasthan (67.06%), Andhra Pradesh (67.66%), Arunachal Pradesh (66.95%) Jharkhand, J&K and Uttar Pradesh have low literacy rates than the national average (74%).

It may be seen that the highest male literacy was in Kerala (96%), followed by Mizoram (93.7%) and Tripura (92.2%). The overall male literacy rate was 82.1%.

The average female literacy rate is 65.46%. The female literacy rate is also the highest in Kerala (91.98%), followed by Mizoram (89.40%) and Lakshadweep (88.25%).

Despite all these achievements, there are 272,950,015 (26%) illiterates in the country.

8. Life Expectancy/ Expectation of life:

Expectation of life refers to the average life of the people of a country. In India expectation of life of the people is very short. Currently, expectation of life in India is estimated to be 66 years as per 2011 Census. In other countries it is much longer than ours. For instance, in Australia, it is 79 years, in Japan 83 years, in England and America 79 years, in Sweden and in Canada 81 years.

The average life span of a child born in India has increased over the past four decades from 32.1 years during 1941-51 to 57.3 years in 1981-91 and about 66 years in 2011. This increase is largely attributed to the implementation of various programmes of public health and control of communicable diseases after independence.

Among the states, an expectation of life in 1991 of over 65 years has been observed only in Kerala and Punjab. Expectation of life below 60 years has been observed in Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttaranchal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttar Pradesh. These are the states where the status of women, especially the female child, has been found to be considerably lower to that of the males.

9. Age Structure/Composition:

Age structure of a population in a country indicates the extent to which the population of that country is productive from the economic point of view.
Population in the age group 15-60 years is considered as working population while population in the age group 0-14 years and above 60 years is regarded as non-working/dependent population. Higher proportion of working population is beneficial for the economic development of the country.

In India, the %age of population in the age group 0-14 years is still high. Besides, the %age of population above 60 years is also increasing, which indicates higher life expectancy and reduction in death rate in the country.

10. Rural-Urban Differentiation:

Ratio of urban population to the total population of a country is an index of the level of industrialization of that country. As industries gather momentum in a country, ratio of urban population goes on rising. India is an agricultural country, so ratio of urban population here is less than the rural population. Some important facts related to rural-urban differentiation in population of India are described as under:

(i) According to 2011 census, about 30 % population was living in urban areas. As against it, 70 % of the population was living in rural areas.

(ii) In the last 100 years, %age of urban population in the country has increased from 13 % to 30 %. It proves that in the economic life of India, role of cities have been increasing.

(iii) Compared to developed countries, the number of cities and the ratio of population living in urban areas are very low. Just about 30 % of population today lives in urban areas in India as against 80 % in England, 74 % in USA, 78 % in Japan, 83 % in South Korea, 91 % in Germany and 97 % in Belgium.

(iv) As per 2001 census, among India’s major cities, Mumbai ranked first with a population of 1.64 crore, Kolkata second with a population of 1.33 crore, and Delhi third with a population of 1.28 crore.

Two main causes of rise in urban population in India are: (i) Migration Effect: Rural life in India suffers from many difficulties, such as less opportunities of employment, low level of income, lack of educational and training facilities, lack of health and medical facilities, etc. In order to get rid of these difficulties rural people migrate to urban areas.

NATURE OF POPULATION PROBLEM IN INDIA

The demographic profile of India portrayed above helps us to bring in a clear perspective the nature of the population problem being faced by us. Some of the salient features that emerge from it are as follows:

- India has a large population base. It is already densely populated; the population is projected to increase further in future.

- The growth rate of population in India since the fifties of the last century has been consistently high and has been caused by (a) persistence of high fertility, and (b) declining mortality.
• Of late, death rate has reached its plateau; birth rate in over a dozen states has reached the replacement level. Therefore, currently, population growth can be attributed to birth-death rate differential in remaining states.

• Persistence of high birth rate and death rate for a fairly long time has resulted in a bottom-heavy age pyramid; the dependency ratio in the economy has been very high.

• Of late, the age composition has been becoming more favourable for growth as the proportion of population in the working age group is on the rise.

• The country shows a rising masculinity with the proportion of women in the total population gradually falling.

• The rural sector dominates the economy. It is indicative of the overall low productivity.

• About one-third of the total population is illiterate which speaks of the very poor quality of human capital in the country.

Causes of Growth of Population

The major causes responsible for the fast growth of population during the last five decades can be classified into two groups: (A) those responsible for the persistence of high fertility as indicated by the high birth rates, and (B) those responsible for declining mortality as indicated by the falling death rates.

High Birth Rate: A high birth rate is a function both of social and economic factors.

Marriage a Universal Phenomenon in India: Historically, the Indian women have married relatively early and only a very small proportion have remained spinsters beyond the end of the reproductive period, i.e., age 50. Three factors are important in this connection and deserve our attention:

— The proportion of women in the child bearing age, 15 – 49, has been hovering around 47 % of total female population.

— 84.53 % of the total female population in the reproductive age group, 15 – 49, was married in 1961; the proportion, presently stands at about 81 %.

— The average age at marriage among females was 15.6 years in 1951 and 1961. It has gone up marginally to 18.3 years in 2008. Although, the age at marriage has been going up and the once widespread child marriage has become relatively infrequent, the rise in mean age at marriage has been slow.

In short:

• the number of women in the reproductive age is large;
• the number of married women in the reproductive age is large; and
• the average age of marriage among females is very low.
All these factors contribute to high fertility rate – defined as the average number of children a woman bears in her lifetime – and the prevailing high birth rate in the economy.

Rise in Natural Fertility: A number of studies within India have revealed that the marital fertility rate among young married women below age 30, who did not use contraceptives, rose steadily during the period 1951-91 in among younger women has been associated with three major factors.

- Improved biological fecundity of couples because of better nutrition and health;
- Relaxation of traditional cultural checks on fertility that prevailed earlier such as through sexual abstinence by couples on a number of days in a month because of religious and social reasons;
- Reduction in the duration of breast feeding of infants by mothers due to assimilation of urban values that promote bottle feeding.

All these changes are necessary consequences of early stages of modernisation and every country with a strong cultural heritage goes through it. However, this early phase of modernisation, when natural fertility tends to rise, has to be passed over quickly wherein widespread use of modern methods of contraception do quickly and effectively replace the traditional checks on fertility.

It is only in the 2001 census that a reversal of trend is seen when the total fertility rate is estimated to have come down to 3.2. Presently, it is being estimated at 2.8. It gives a clear indication that India is passing through the last phase of fertility transition, moving towards moderate to low fertility.

Declining Death Rate: As far as death rate is concerned, India has almost approached the rate that obtains in the developed world (World average death rate in 2000: 9 per 1000).

✓ The technology of disease control and death control has so much advanced during the last few years that many dreadful and chronic diseases no longer hold a threat. Among these plague, smallpox, typhoid which used to take a toll of full villages together are no longer dreaded. Antibiotics and other life-saving medicines are now freely available that casualties resulting from these diseases have been drastically reduced.

✓ The growing awareness and facilities for sanitation and cleanliness, help to reduce the incidence of mortality. The provision of better maternity and post-natal care as also spread of education have helped to bring down the infant mortality rate.

✓ Food shortages and scarcities which used to cause dreaded famines in the past are themselves a phenomenon of the past. These things do not happen now, partly because of responsible administrative arrangements and primarily due to the availability of the vast network of transport and communication facilities.

In brief, it is an accepted fact that any improvement in material well-being meets with a reduction in mortality.
Effects of Growth of Population

Faster population growth is a handicap, like extra weight carried by a racehorse. This would be clear from a brief discussion of the various problems that the growth of population in India has caused.

Cassen’s Argument: While talking about the ‘Macro-economics of population’, R.H. Cassen has drawn attention to two main relationships through which population growth affects the economy. These are: (i) savings effect, and (ii) composition of investment effect.

✓ The savings effect argues that savings are reduced by population growth because of the increase of the so-called ‘burden of dependency’: with high fertility, and declining mortality in younger and older age groups, the population acquires an increasing proportion of people in the non-working age groups relative to those of working age. Since all must consume while relatively fewer produce, consumption per head must rise and savings per head must fall — even if productivity is rising, savings are less than they would be with a smaller number of dependants per worker.

✓ The investment argument says that, with an increasing population, a share of investible resources has to be devoted to reproducing for additional people ‘unproductive’ facilities – particularly social overhead capital – which would be unnecessary if the population were not growing. The composition of investment is altered in an unproductive direction instead of additions to capital going to raise the productivity of the existing labour force; investment becomes merely ‘demographic investment’ instead of real investment.

Coale and Hoover’s Argument: Coale and Hoover mentioned three demographic forces adversely affecting development:

i) the size of population,
ii) growth rate, and
iii) age structure.

These three forces have three different types of impact on the economy. Firstly, there will be a capital shallowing effect as rapid population growth leads to a fall in the ratio of capital to labour. Secondly, the age-dependency effect creates a worsening dependency ratio due to a rise in the young population which will ultimately erode the savings in the household. Finally, the investment diversion effect leads to a large amount of money being spent by the government on the social sector rather than for productive, growth-oriented investment. The Coale and Hoover argument suggests that declines in fertility promote growth through decreases in the dependency ratios.

Adverse Effect on Quality of Population

The rapidly rising population also adversely affects the quality of population. It works in two ways.

On an individual level, the available empirical evidence shows an inverse relation between numbers of children and ‘resource intensity per child’, suggestive of a trade-off between the number of children and their average quality desired by parents.
On an aggregative level, such health technologies as have been invoked so far are, largely, what may be called death-control strategies, which have served to reduce death rates and ensure better survival. But between the point of ‘survival’ or escape from death on the one hand, and the point of optimal health and nutrition on the other, there is a distance to be covered. Unfortunately, investments in HRD have not been adequate to cover fast this crucial distance.

The country is, therefore, now caught up in a dangerous twilight phase of development wherein large numbers of the poor who might have otherwise died without the benefits of modern health technology are now being ‘saved’, but these survivors continue to live in a state of substandard health, poor nutrition and poor educational attainment. It is this ever-expanding pool of substandard survivors that is eroding the quality of human resources. It is also this large pool of substandard survivors, because of its poverty, illiteracy and under development, that is most resistant to family-planning programmes.

In the social sphere, unchecked growth in population causes a vicious circle. There is a large-scale exodus of rural causes unplanned urbanisation. The rising population of unemployed young people is prone to adopt anti-social activities. Such people tend to perpetuate the cycle by having more children themselves. Paul Ehrlich was probably right when he remarked in his best-selling book, ‘Population Bomb’: ‘You are poor because you are too many.’

**POPULATION POLICY AND FAMILY PLANNING IN INDIA**

An overview of the population problem in India underlines the necessity for a direct attack on the problem that should aim at a rapid reduction in the birth rate. In the North, this result was achieved gradually and spontaneously, after a slow process of change in sociological and cultural patterns resulting from economic development and industrialisation. Based on experience of the North, economic development and industrialisation are quite often stressed as the best contraceptives.

*An important argument in support of the inter-linkage between economic development and fertility reduction has been provided by the demand theory developed initially by Becker and carried forward...*
by other economists of the household economics, as it is popularly called. The demand theory has heavily emphasised various socio-economic indicators of development as factors responsible for bringing changes in fertility behaviour at the micro level. The major socio-economic variables identified in the demand theory are the level of family income and the opportunity cost of the mother’s time.

An increase in the level of family income, the demand theory postulates, reduces fertility demand, as parents with increasing income aspire to improve the quality of investment on each existing child.

An increase in the opportunity cost of the mother’s time say by increase in the labour force participation by married women raises the cost of a child care as the mothers have to forego a larger sum to bring up each additional child. This in turn reduces the demand for a large number of children. Extending this argument the demand theorists have explained the fertility transition in the North as result of the falling demand for children.

Therefore, a case has been sought to be made in favour of the thesis, known as the ‘re-distribution position’ that states that “population problem is basically a problem of economic development and social transformation and not just of controlling numbers.” This is to be contrasted with the neo-Malthusian ‘Incrementalist Theory’ that stated that rapid population rise hinders economic growth.

However, this type of reasoning fails to take note of the fundamental differences that exist between India at present and the Northern countries when they were at the comparable level of development towards the end of the last century.

None of the Northern countries was as densely populated as India is now;

In none of the Northern countries, mortality decline was as sharp and rapid as has been witnessed in India;

Most of the Northern countries had outlets in the form of emigration, India does not have;

Most of the Northern countries had free access to large markets and easy availability of agricultural and mineral raw materials during the initial stages of their development, India does not have.

Once these fundamental differences are understood, the fallacy of equating India with other Northern countries becomes very clear. In India a similar process of slow adjustment appears impossible. In any case, it would not meet the urgent need for a drastic change. In short, we need not place ourselves in an egg-first-or-chicken-first syndrome, should development precede population control, or should population control precede development. From our point of view, population control is a necessary condition for accelerating the pace of economic development, and hence the population policies appear to be a legitimate object of government intervention.

Components of Population Policy

The population policy should emphasise the following:
1) Increase the rate of employment by such figure as will do away with unemployment among the population of working age.

2) Controlling the growth of population.

Objective of Full Employment: Full employment is accepted by the Indian Government as the desired goal of economic planning. The difficulties in the way of securing full employment in India are too well known to merit specific mention, but we could take up some of the major constraints.

For securing full employment in India, not only is there a need for more capital and an increase in domestic purchasing power, but also labour-intensive technology for bringing about the desired increase in employment.

It will also mean creating additional employment to the workers living in villages so that migration to urban areas will be lessened through rural industrialisation and thus save the country from the enormous cost of financing the needs of additional urban centers.

There is a huge mismatch in terms of skills. These will throw up challenges of education; training and retraining that cannot be under-mined.

In any case, it will take some time, may be a couple of decades, before we can achieve full employment of people in working age.

Remedies for Population Growth: Population growth can be contained only by fertility reduction, popularly known as adoption of family planning. Family planning implies two things:

1. limiting the number of children to be born to a couple to one or two;
2. determining the spacing of children.

In other words, family planning means bearing of a child by choice and not by chance. Modern developments in health science have made it possible for couples to exercise this type of choice. The availability of contraceptives and other such facilities has made it easy to popularise family planning. India is the first country in the world that has adopted family planning as an official policy.

**EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S POPULATION POLICY**

India was one of the first countries to recognise the population problem and adopt an official national programme on family planning in 1952. Concern over the rise in population in India started well before independence, in the 1930s. Between 1881 and 1931, India’s population grew from 27.7 million to 279.0 million; and between 1931 and 1940, it grew from 279.0 million to 318.7 million. The rise was phenomenal, from 10% in the first decade to a 14% in the second. This growth was unprecedented, primarily because of the measures taken to control epidemic and famine situations. The concern over the rise of population was more among the social reformers, intellectuals, and the Congress party than in the British government. The British government was cautious in raising the issue, as they had witnessed the reaction of people to birth control back in Britain and also because they did not want to create conditions of unrest among the Indians over the issue.
Most Congress workers, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, were against birth control measures. The use of contraceptives was considered sinful; it was seen as a method to offset the procreative role of sex. But many leaders, scholars and trainees of the Indian Civil Service, who had been to England and were acquainted with the Malthusian theory, considered India as a likely casualty of the ‘positive’ checks — wars, famines and epidemics — due to overpopulation and poverty. The Neo-Malthusian League was established in Madras (present Chennai) as early as in 1929. The League brought out a propaganda journal titled The Madras Birth Control Bulletin. It was in Mumbai that birth control was for the first time seen not as a means to control the population, but as a method of liberating women from the frequent and difficult task of childbearing, preventing unwanted pregnancies, and improving the health of women. Professor R.D.Karve in Mumbai made it his life long mission to campaign for the rights of women and educate people about birth control. He later became the member of the Family Planning Association of India formed in 1949. In 1935, the All India Women’s Conference also took up the issue of birth control in the annual meeting held in Thiruvananthapuram (Kerala) and adopted a resolution to uphold birth control with the view to improve the status of women in society.

The Bengal famine, in which over 1.5 million people died, and the inquiry that followed brought to light the effect of a rising population on the economy and poverty. Similarly the Bhore Committee Report of 1949 also related issues of public health, sanitation, and prevention from communicable diseases with population control. Both the reports formed the foundation for the family planning programme after independence and its inclusion into India’s five-year development plans. The First Five-Year Plan (1951-6) stated its intention as follows, “the reduction of birth rate to the extent necessary to stabilize the population at a level consistent with the requirements of the national economy” (Srinivasan 1995: 30). Clearly, the intention was not just to reduce population, but also to stabilise population growth rate at a level that can be sustained by the national economy. But population control was pursued as an independent agenda, separate from the concerns of development and social change.

The National Family Planning Programme was launched in 1952 with the objective of “reducing birth rate to the extent necessary to stabilise the population at a level consistent with requirements of national economy.” It was started on an experimental basis with a clinical approach to provide services to those who were so motivated. The infrastructure for family planning was created in 1961-62 by adopting an extensive approach for motivating couples and making family planning services available near the homes of the people. The family planning programme consists of the following:

✓ using various means of communication to persuade people to adopt the small family norm of one or two-children;
✓ making available family planning methods through different outlets in urban, semi-urban and rural areas;
✓ setting up of family planning centers to make available the various services related to family planning;
✓ financial assistance to acceptors and motivators of family planning methods like sterilisation;
✓ making health services available to lower mortality among infants;
✓ provision of nutrition, immunisation and other protective and preventive measures against diseases, etc.;
✓ promoting female education and employment;
✓ arrangements for education in health and biology of reproduction;
✓ promotion of delayed marriages;
✓ creating greater awareness of the opportunities for legal termination of pregnancies; and
✓ more intensive research in family planning methods and practices.

In short, family planning is an instrument of social transformation: it aims at creating better parents, healthier children, better homes; seeks to inject social responsibility into married life. The family planning programme, therefore, has been redesigned as the family welfare planning programme.

The programme, it came to be perceived, got entrenched in what has come to be called the HITTS model, i.e., Health department-operated, Incentive-based, Target-oriented, Time-bound and Sterilisation-focussed programme. This made it imperative to bring about a change in the approach and policy.

No numerical targets or demographic goals were set in the First and the Second Plan (1956-61) and people were expected to go to the clinics and seek family planning services. Besides providing the regular methods of birth control such as diaphragm, condoms, vaginal foam tablets, sterilisation services were also provided. The Third Plan (1961-66) replaced the clinic-oriented approach with an extension-education approach, which aimed at taking the message of birth control to the people instead of waiting for them to approach the government clinics. The message to the people was to adopt the small family norm, which was not only a sensible choice in terms of giving their children a better future and improving the health of women, but also the need for building a healthy and prosperous country. The family planning programme was officially made a part of the public health departments and peripheral health workers such as the Auxiliary Nurses-Midwives (ANMs) were appointed in primary health centres to inform, motivate and encourage villagers to adopt family planning methods. By the Fourth Plan (1969-74), targets for sterilisation were set and camps were held to operate on people to meet targets. Although 61% of the target was achieved, population growth increased at the same rate, which perplexed policy makers and administrators.

It was in the Fifth Plan period (1974-79) that the National Population Policy (1976) was formulated. Concerted effort was made to improve the organisational structure of the health department and increase its efficiency in achieving family planning goals. Government offices, villages and urban centres were targeted for sterilisation. The Emergency that followed soon after, as per many analysts, brought out the uninhibited and obsessive side to this drive of bringing down the population. The emergency created a fear among people about forced sterilisation, and the newly elected Janata government changed its approach to pacify people’s fear regarding birth control. It adopted the term “family welfare” instead of “family planning” to suggest a malleable character of the programme. The concentration was now on educating people and thereby motivating them to adopt family welfare measures. A number of recommendations of the 1976 policy were nonetheless adopted. For example, the age of marriage of boys and girls was raised to 21 and 18 respectively. The Sixth Plan (1980-85) set long and short-term targets, which persisted through the Seventh Plan (1985-91); the long-term goals focussed on reducing the size of the family, the birth, infant mortality and death rates, while the short-term goal was to encourage sterilisation, use of Intra-Uterine Devices (IUDs) and other conventional contraceptives.

The Plans demonstrated, time and again, that enacting laws or implementing birth control programmes was unable to deliver the desired results. The deeper analysis of the population puzzle reveals that the accompanying measures to reduce poverty levels, economic and social disparities in the country were not effectively translated into practice. Most remained on paper; the goal of employment for all, improving the quality of life of people by providing efficient and regular basic
services of education, health and sanitation, and water and most importantly strengthening the capacity of people to procure these services without difficulty are yet to be achieved. High population growth rate is found in the northern states of India in comparison to the rest of the country. Interestingly, Kerala, which is one of the states that has brought down its fertility rates, is still one of the most economically backward states in the country. The Kerala experience illustrates how economic growth is not the only important condition for population regulation. In fact, the case of West Bengal, the other communist stronghold in the country has not been able to achieve the success of Kerala, primarily due to the lack of attention given to female literacy.

An analysis of states like Goa, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, which have registered a drop in population growth, demonstrates other supposedly “extraneous” reasons for the same. Goa despite the strong presence of the church has never been averse to family planning propaganda. It has like Kerala always recorded high female literacy level. The age at marriage of women has been higher than the rest of India. Kerala with a communist state in power for over two decades in the State and a strong workers’ movement was able to direct economic and social change. Land reforms, regularisation of minimum wages in agriculture and the organised sectors, and premium attention to primary and secondary education ensured social justice and reduction of poverty levels, and thereby created conditions for fertility regulation and decline in population growth.

Tamil Nadu’s experience reveals the role of a strong bureaucracy and political will in popularising the family planning programmes. Known for the self-respect movement spearheaded by Periyar and his strong radical views on caste, status of women and education, marriage and contraception in the 1920s, the political and social climate was already set for implementing birth control programmes. The bureaucracy in Tamilnadu pioneered the family planning programmes and developed a comprehensive maternal and child welfare programme in the state. The ‘camp approach’ was also systematically institutionalised in the state. The programme was also decentralised to the district level and was made a special responsibility of the district administrators. Components of teaching or awareness building, extension of instructions about contraceptive services and ‘after care’ services to persons who undergo vasectomy was included in the programme. Popular initiatives (funded by International agencies) like midday meals for over 9 million school children, which also generated employment for over two hundred thousand women in the villages, further helped in building a mass base for the programme. Evidently the supply driven services of fertility and population regulation have to be complemented by the principle of demand for these services. The demand or motivation for fertility regulation has to be created by concerned citizens, organisations and the government. Increasingly it is clear that a target-oriented programme of population control is narrow and does not address the larger social, political and economic issues that perpetuate conditions of poverty, illiteracy and ill health. Any policy framework for population control has to create favourable conditions for economic, social and political equality as well as environment friendly economic growth. Bureaucratic efficiency and good governance are also at the heart of a successful delivery system of health services. Unless this multi-pronged approach is adopted and implemented with right earnest, containing population growth will be difficult, if not impossible.

The government launched the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) programme on October 15, 1997. The programme was the centerpiece of the Tenth Five Year Plan. It was designed to implement a different approach to address the population problem — one that locates family planning services within the larger context of reproductive health.
The National Population Policy of India, 2000, explicitly argues for a pro-poor, pro-nature and a pro-women population programme, which views people as active partners in dealing with the population problem rather than the source itself. Initiatives by the Indian government to decentralise development concerns to the lowest levels of administration and thereby involving the elected representatives of the village councils and non-governmental organisations in implementing health programmes, as well as mainstreaming alternative medicine systems and health delivery systems within the government have been attempts to evolve a multi-pronged approach to population and development. The policy changes, however, have to be supported by a strong political will and a sense of social responsibility.

Milestones in the Evolution of India's Population Policy

1946: Bhore Committee was set up by the government of India in 1943 to investigate and recommend improvements to the Indian Public Health system. It made many landmark recommendations in its report.

1952: India became the first developing country to adopt positive population policy, marked by launching of National Family Planning Programme.


1983: Both the above statements were laid on the Table of the House in Parliament, but never discussed or adopted. The National Health Policy of 1983 emphasized the need for "securing the small family norm, through voluntary efforts and moving towards the goal of population stabilisation". While adopting the Health Policy, Parliament emphasized the need for a separate National Population Policy.

1991: The National Development Council (NDC) appointed a Committee on Population with Shri Karunakaran as its Chairman. The Karunakaran Report (Report of the National Development Council Committee on Population) endorsed by NDC in 1993 proposed the formulation of a National Population Policy to take a "long-term, holistic view of development, population growth and environmental protection" and to "suggest policies and guidelines for formulation of programs" and "a monitoring mechanism with short, medium and long-term perspectives and goals" (Planning Commission, 1992). It was argued that the earlier policy statements of 1976 and 1977 were placed on the table. However, Parliament never really discussed or adopted them. Specifically; it was recommended that "a National Policy of Population should be formulated by the Government and adopted by Parliament".

1993: An Expert Group headed by Dr. M. S. Swaminathan was asked to prepare a draft of a national population policy that would be discussed by the Cabinet and then by Parliament.

1994: Expert Group headed by Dr. Swaminathan prepared a Report on a National Population Policy. This report was circulated among Members of Parliament, and comments requested from central and state agencies. It was anticipated that a national population policy approved by the National Development Council and the Parliament would help produce a broad political consensus.

with the direction that this be placed before Parliament. However, this document could not be placed in either House of Parliament as the respective Houses stood adjourned followed by dissolution of the Lok Sabha.

1999: Another round of consultations was held during 1998, and another draft National Population Policy was finalised and placed before the Cabinet in March 1999. Cabinet appointed a Group of Ministers (headed by Dy. Chairman, Planning Commission) to examine the draft Policy. The GOM met several times and deliberated over the nuances of the Population Policy.

2000: On the basis of suggestions, a fresh draft was submitted to Cabinet which formed the basis for National Population Policy, 2000.

National Population Policy, 2000

The policy was announced on February 15, 2000.

✓ The immediate objective of the policy has been described as meeting the unmet needs for contraception, health care infrastructure, health personnel and integrated service delivery.
✓ The medium-term objectives were outlined as bringing the total fertility to replacement levels — two children per couple — by a vigorous implementation of inter-sectoral strategies.
✓ The long-term objective is stabilisation of population by 2045.

The policy has outlined 16 promotional and motivational measures to implement it vigorously. Among these, the more important are as follows:

✓ Reward Panchayats and Zila Parishads for promoting small family norm;
✓ Strict enforcement of Child Marriage Restraint Act and Pre-natal Diagnostics Techniques Act;
✓ Health insurance cover of Rs. 5,000 for couples below poverty line, with two living children, who undergo sterilization
✓ Rewards for couples below poverty line, who marry after legal age, have first child after the mother reaches 21, accept small family norm and undergo sterilisation after birth of two children;
✓ Funds and soft loans for providing ambulance services in rural areas;
✓ Strengthening abortion facilities scheme;
✓ A National Commission on Population, headed by the Prime Minister, has also been set up. The commission will monitor implementation of the new policy.
✓ A National Population Stabilisation Fund, renamed as the Janasankhya Sthirata Kosh (JSK), has been set up. The Fund will support projects, schemes, initiatives and innovative ideas designed to help population stabilisation, and provide a window for canalising monies through voluntary contributions.

Achievements and Limitations: It has been estimated that 320 million births have been averted during the period 1956-2011 through the family welfare programme. The number of acceptors of family planning methods peaked at 62.9 million as at the beginning of 2011. The couple protection rate has gone up to 48.0% (against the world average of 61%).

A recent study on the comparative performance between States and districts has clearly brought out that in many parts of the country the programme performance has been extremely good and in several
other parts quite satisfactory. Double Income Single Child or DISC model is already in the thing in urban families. The resulting differential impact on fertility level and, therefore, on population growth rate, is clearly reflected in the results of 2011 census.

It brings out that demographic transition has already set in India and is moving swiftly to its final stage. India will reach the threshold of the Net Reproduction Rate of 1 within a decade from now. The desired family size is already close to replacement level in 10 states. In other states it is much lower then the actual number of children born.

All this suggest that the efforts mounted in the country in the last five decades at various levels have not gone waste; that the various determinants of demand for children are moving in the ‘right direction’ and that there are unprecedented opportunities that we can exploit it on a war footing.

Suggestions to Popularise Family Planning

The success of the family planning programme depends ultimately on both demand for smaller families and supply of family planning services.

✓ ‘Demand’ represents the basic determinants of fertility.

Broadly, there are five categories of variables that ultimately determine the level of demand for smaller families: education, economic status, health, urbanisation and status of women. As the values of these variables increase, a larger proportion of women want fewer children and, therefore, the demand for family planning information and services and use of contraception services.

✓ ‘Supply’ represents the necessary mechanism through which demand gets expressed in actual reproductive behaviour.

Some of the important suggestions that can be made to popularise family planning are as follows:

Provision of Credible Security: The first and foremost essential condition for propagating the small family norm is the provision of a credible security system, or what economics call ‘subsistence security’. Once the state steps in to provide such a safety net, it helps break new ground where children are not viewed as indispensable for survival.

Expanding Basic Education: Expanding the education opportunities, especially for females, results in lowered fertility. (A recent World Bank study reaches the conclusion: Husband’s schooling exerts a smaller effect than does the wife’s schooling on contraceptive use and fertility.) It has both direct and indirect effects. Directly, education is supposed to affect family size by influencing a broad spectrum of psychological attributes, including freedom from tradition, heightened aspirations, firm views concerning ideal family size, contraceptions, and other modern values.

Indirectly, it works through the following ways:

Schooling tends to delay the age of marriage for girls, and thus reduces their total number or child-bearing years (Studies indicate that if the average age at marriage of girls in India is pushed up by two years, it may result in lowering the birth rate by about 25 %.)
Schooling enhances a girl’s prospects of finding employment outside the home that may compete with raising a large family.

Parents with an education themselves desire an even better education for their children and realise that if these aspirations are to be achieved, family size will have to be limited.

Similarly, fertility regulation is increasingly seen as a route to achieving illiterate parents’ rising educational aspirations for their children.

Education leads to lowered fertility too, by reducing infant and child mortality. Parents who had some schooling are likely to be more careful about basic sanitation and the value of inoculations and antibiotics. Such a mother is more confident that her own children will survive, and is less likely to want additional children merely as insurance against some dying.

Education makes possible for both men and women the acquisition of information on family planning. It increases their exposure to mass media and printed material, and enables them to learn about modern contraceptives and their use. Past experience has shown that the birth rate is lower in those States where female literacy is high. Undoubtedly, “education is the best contraceptive”. It is, as one recent study describes it, ‘the key of keys’.

Educated members of a community pass on their knowledge and preferences about fertility to the uneducated.

Indeed, summers rightly concludes that investing in the education of girls could be the one investment with the highest return. We find ourselves in agreement with another observer who comments: “Put all the girls in school, India’s problems are off.”

It needs to be mentioned that a package consisting of improvements in preventive and curative health care, education, women’s status and access to the labour market, together with family planning, produce a far bigger impact on family size (and hence population growth) than any element working alone.

Indeed, instead of asserting that “Contraception is the best way for development” it has already begun to be said that “Development of women is the best contraceptive”.

**DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND**

**Window of Demographic Opportunity**

An interesting and rapid shift in dependency burden occurs during demographic transition from high to low mortality and fertility. In the first phase of the transition, populations are very young and the size of the under 15 population (young dependents) is very large compared to the working population (15-59). In the second phase, the share of the old dependents in the population gradually rises. What is of interest is the transition from the second stage to the third stage. The large generation of infants in the second stage is fairly large compared to the initial generation of infants in the third stage. When the former grows up it results in a population structure in which the share of the working age
population is relatively high in comparison to both the young and old dependents. Many UDCs which have experienced rapid fertility declines in recent years, are currently passing through this phase of demographic transition in which the labour force grows more rapidly than total population.

Countries passing through this phase of demographic transition, therefore, have a “demographic dividend” or a “window” of “demographic opportunity”. It can create an atmosphere conducive to economic growth mainly due to following reasons, among others.

First and foremost is the increased saving expected during the age structure transition. The increase in saving rate happens primarily due to the low dependency rate and increased life expectancy.

Secondly, with the decline in fertility women are more likely to enter into the labour market during this stage. This will result in increased economic activity and would lead to a spurt in economic growth.

Thirdly, it is also pointed out that people invest more on their own health when children are fewer in number, leading to better productivity and economic benefits to the household.

Finally, the government also will be in a position to spend and invest in more productive activities with the decline in the number of children as public spending on education and health can be diverted to more productive activities.

However, the demographic dividend cannot guarantee economic growth automatically. To capitalise on the demographic dividend, countries must implement favourable policies and invest in key areas such as education, health, gender equality and employment generation. This should be coupled with good government institutions and functioning markets. If governments fail to implement such programmes, countries may struggle with social unrest of unemployed youths and end up in a position when demographic dividend will turn into a demographic disaster.

The demographic dividend does not last forever because the window of opportunity opens only once and closes within a generation. Over time, the age distribution changes again, as the large working population moves into old dependent age groups and is followed by smaller working populations born during fertility decline. When this occurs, the dependency ratio rises again. This time the elderly outnumber children, while the middle generation has to look after both. This seems to be the experience of both Europe and Japan.

As brought out by a recent WHO initiative called SAGE (Study on Global Ageing and Adult Health) the nations that are truly challenged by ageing may be those where the cognitive performance among seniors is poor, as is the case with several developed countries with an ageing population. In other words, the better cognitive performance of some countries implied that even though their citizens were older, they could be better workers than their peers and thus more useful to their national economies. In view of this, serious effort need be put to make the best use of the demographic opportunity available to us presently.
EMERGING ISSUES

AGEING

Demography of Indian Ageing

The large increase in human life expectancy over the years has resulted not only in a very substantial increase in the number of older persons but in a major shift in the age groups of 80 and above. The demographic profile depicts that in the years 2000-2050, the overall population in India will grow by 55% whereas population of people in their 60 years and above will increase by 326% and those in the age group of 80+ by 700% - the fastest growing group (see table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total Population (millions)</th>
<th>60+ (millions)</th>
<th>80+ (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1/8th of the Worlds Elderly Population lives in India. Most of them will never retire in the usual sense of the term and will continue to work as long as physically possible. Inevitably though the disability to produce and earn will decline with age. The absence on savings will result in sharp declining in living standards that for many can mean destitution. Therefore this is the challenge of old age income security in India.

As a result of the current ageing scenario, there is a need for all aspects of care for the Oldest Old (80+ years) namely, socio economic, financial, health and shelter.

A man’s life is normally divided into five stages namely: infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood and old age. In each of these stages an individual’s finds himself in different situations and faces
different problems. Old age is viewed as an unavoidable, undesirable and problem ridden phase of life.

Ageing in India is exponentially increasing due to the impressive gains that society has made in terms of increased life expectancy. With the rise in elderly population, the demand for holistic care tends to grow. By 2025, the geriatric population is expected to be 840 million in the developing countries. It is projected that the proportion of Indians aged 60 and older will rise from 7.5% in 2010 to 11.1% in 2025. In 2010, India had more than 91.6 million elderly and the number of elderly in India is projected to reach 158.7 million in 2025. An aging population puts an increased burden on the resources of a country and has raised concerns at many levels for the government in India. The aging population is both medical and sociological problem. The elderly population suffers high rates of morbidity and mortality due to infectious diseases. The demographic transition in India shows unevenness and complexities within different states. This has been attributed to the different levels of socio-economic development, cultural norms, and political contexts. Hence it will be a herculean task for policy makers to address the geriatric care that will take into account all these determinants. Care for the elderly is fast emerging as a critical element of both the public and private concern.

The apparent success of the medical science is invariably accompanied by several social, economic and psychological problems in older persons, in addition to the medical problems. It needs to be understood that many of these problems require lifelong drug therapy, physical therapy and long-term rehabilitation. The elderly tend to be cared for in a variety of settings: home, nursing home, day-care centre, geriatric out-patient department, medical units or intensive care unit depending on the nature of the clinical problem. Care of elderly necessitates addressing several social issues. The needs and problems of the elderly vary significantly according to their age, socio-economic status, health, living status and other such background characteristics. Their social rights are neglected and they are profusely abused which goes unreported.

Lack of Infrastructure With increasing longevity and debilitating chronic diseases, many elder citizens will need better access to physical infrastructure in the coming years. Lack of physical infrastructure is a major deterrent to providing comfort to the aged. Many elder citizens need better access to physical infrastructure, both in their own homes and in public spaces. Unattended chronic disease, unaffordable medicines and treatment and malnutrition are part of old age life in India as there is no system of affordable health care. Emphasis on geriatrics in the public health system is limited with few dedicated geriatric services. The other issues of the public health system are lack of infrastructure, limited manpower, poor quality of care and overcrowding of facilities due to insufficient focus on elderly care.

Changing Family Structure The traditional Indian society with an age-old joint family system has been instrumental in safeguarding the social and economic security of the elderly people. The traditional norms and values of Indian society also laid stress on showing respect and providing care for the elderly. However with the emerging prevalence of nuclear family set-ups in recent years, the elderly are likely to be exposed to emotional, physical and financial insecurity in the years to come. There is an upward trend in the living arrangement pattern of elderly staying alone or with spouse only from 9.0% in 1992 to 18.7% in 2006. Family care of the elderly seems likely to decrease in the future with the economic development of the nation and modernization.

Lack of Social Support The elderly in India are much more vulnerable because of the less government spending on social security system. The elderly in urban area rely primarily on hired domestic help to meet their basic needs in an increasingly-chaotic and crowded city. Social isolation
and loneliness has increased. Insurance cover that is elderly sensitive is virtually non-existent in India. In addition, the preexisting illnesses are usually not covered making insurance policies unviable for the elders. Pension and social security is also restricted to those who have worked in the public sector or the organized sector of industry. In a study by Lena et al., almost half of the respondents felt neglected and sad and felt that people had an indifferent attitude towards the elderly. It was also found that 47% felt unhappy in life and 36.2% felt they were a burden to the family.

**Social Inequality**

Elderly are a heterogeneous section with an urban and rural divide. They are less vulnerable in rural areas as compared to their urban counterparts, due to the still holding values of the joint family system. All the elderly are not seen in the same view as the needs and problems of elderly are rejected to a vast extent as government classifies these people based on caste and other socio-cultural dimensions. In a case study, it was found that a major proportion of the elderly women were poorer; received the lowest income per person; had the greatest percentage of primary level education; recorded the highest negative affective psychological conditions; were the least likely to have health insurance coverage and they recorded the lowest consumption expenditure.

**Availability, Accessibility and Affordability of Health Care**

Due to the ever increasing trend of nuclear families, elder care management is getting more difficult, especially for working adult children who find themselves responsible for their parents’ well-being. Managing home care for the elderly is a massive challenge as multiple service providers – nursing agencies, physiotherapists and medical suppliers – are small, unorganized players who extend sub-optimal care. In India, health insurance coverage is essentially limited to hospitalization. The concept of geriatric care has remained a neglected area of medicine in the country. Despite an aging population, geriatric care is relatively new in many developing countries like India with many practicing physicians having little knowledge of the clinical and functional implications of aging. Not many institutes offer the geriatrics course, and even takers are few. Most of the government facilities such as day care centres, old age residential homes, counselling and recreational facilities are urban based. The geriatric outpatient department services are mostly available at tertiary care hospitals. Reaching to 75% of the elderly that reside in rural areas with geriatric care will be challenging. Dhar has pointed out the relative neglect in provision of facilities for patient care as well as training and development in geriatrics in the Indian context. As pointed by Dey et al., the key challenges to access and affordability for elderly population include reduced mobility, social and structural barriers, wage loss, familial dependencies, and declining social engagement. The stigma of aging is another social barrier to access of health in addition to the health and social conditions the elderly commonly face such as dementia, depression, incontinence and widowhood.

**Economic Dependency**

As per the 52nd round of National Sample Survey Organization, nearly half of the elderly are fully dependent on others, while another 20 percent are partially dependent for their economic needs. About 85% of the aged had to depend on others for their day to day maintenance. The situation was even worse for elderly females. The elders living with their families are largely contingent on the economic capacity of the family unit for their economic security and well being. Elderly often do not have financial protection such as sufficient pension and other form of social security in India. The single most pressing challenge to the welfare of older person is poverty, which is a multiplier of risk for abuse. Also due to their financial dependence, elderly persons though are most vulnerable to infections have low priority for own health. Migration of younger generation, lack of proper care in the family, insufficient housing, economic hardship and break-up of joint family have made the old age homes seem more relevant even in the Indian context.
Feminization of Ageing  The sex ratio of the elderly has increased from 938 women to 1,000 men in 1971 to 1,033 in 2011 and is projected to increase to 1,060 by 2026 (with some variations across states) given the insignificant decline in mortality among males particularly during adult and older years.

Frequent outcome of feminization of ageing is the discrimination and neglect experienced by women as they age, often exacerbated by widowhood and complete dependence on others. Loss of spouse in old age adds significant vulnerability in later years. The marital status distribution of the older persons as per 2011 Census data shows that nearly 66 percent are currently married, 32 percent are widowed and about 3 percent are separated or divorced. Among the older men, 82 percent are currently married while among older women only 50 percent are currently married. About 48 percent of older women are widowed while only 15 percent of older men belong to this category.

Ruralization of the Elderly  According to 2011 Census, 71 percent of the elderly live in rural India. In all the states, except the two smaller states, Goa and Mizoram, a higher proportion of the elderly lives in rural areas than in urban areas (Figure 1.7). Many rural areas are still remote with poor road and transport access. Income insecurity, lack of adequate access to quality health care and isolation are more acute for the rural elderly than their urban counterparts. It is also noted that poorer states such as Odisha, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have a larger percentage of the rural elderly.

More 80-plus Women  Projections indicate that during 2000–2050, the overall population of India will grow by 56 percent while the population 60-plus will grow by 326 percent. During the same period, the population 80-plus will grow 700 percent with a predominance of widowed and highly dependent very old women. The number of older women compared to the number of older men will progressively increase with advancing ages from 60 through 80 years. The special needs of such oldest old women would need significant focus of policy and programmes.

Migration and its Impact on the Elderly  Migration of younger working age persons from rural areas can have both positive and negative impact on the elderly. Living alone or with only the spouse is usually discussed in terms of social isolation, poverty and distress. However, older people prefer to live in their own homes and community, which is why ageing in place is often a preferred option. Further, this puts some funds in the hands of older persons at a time when they need physical support for health care and to manage household chores. It is also recognized that new technologies are helping the rural elderly stay in touch with their children who can even reach home more easily than in the past.

Elder Abuse  Elder abuse refers to any intentional or negligent act by a caregiver or any other person that causes harm or a serious risk of harm to a vulnerable adult. Abuse of older persons is considered a global public health problem, seriously impairing the well-being of the elderly. Old, vulnerable and frail persons, dependent on others for their daily needs, are routinely abused, neglected, and exploited world wide and India is no exception. The perpetrators are generally family members, relatives, friends, or trusted caregivers. Pan-India information on elder abuse is limited. The BKPAI survey conducted in 2011 collected information on elder abuse from seven states of India. HelpAge India in 2014 also conducted a survey on elder abuse in select urban centres of the country. The results of the study by Help Age India, published in 2015, showed that about half of the elderly population in the country face some form of abuse, more in case of women than men.
Verbal abuse, disrespect and neglect were the common forms of abuse generally perpetrated by the daughter-in-law and the son. However, the data from BKPAI indicated a lower proportion (11%) of elder abuse. While these are not comparable data sets, the levels of abuse reported show that elder abuse is prevalent and that it is an issue that requires further attention. BKPAI data showed that in general, abuse was more toward elderly who lived alone and had low levels of education and poor economic status. Here, the major perpetrators were family members and neighbours.

Problems of old age may be considered under 5 heads:

1. Physiological Problems:

Old age is a period of physical decline. Even if one does not become sans eyes, sans teeth, sans everything, right away, one does begin to slow down physically. The physical condition depends partly upon hereditary constitution, the manner of living and environmental factors. Vicissitudes of living, faulty diet, malnutrition, infectious, intoxications, gluttony, inadequate rest, emotional stress, overwork, endocrine disorders and environmental conditions like heat and cold are some of the common secondary causes of physical decline.

Due to the loss of teeth, the jaw becomes smaller and the skin sags. The cheeks become pendulous with wrinkles and the eye lids become baggy with upper lids over hanging the lower. The eyes seem dull and lustreless and they often have a watery look due to the poor functioning of the tear glands. Loss of dentures affect speech and some even appear to lisp.

The skin becomes rough and looses its elasticity. Wrinkles are formed and the veins show out prominently on the skin. Perspiration is less profuse and other skin pigmentation appears as the age advances. The hair becomes thin and grey, nails become thick and tough. Tremors of the hands, forearms, head and lower jaw are common. Bones harden in old age, become brittle and are subject to fractures and breaks.

Changes in the nervous system have a marked influence on the brain. Atrophy is particularly marked in the spleen, liver and soft organs. The ratio of heart weight to body weight decreases gradually. The softness and pliability of the valves change gradually because of an increase in the fibrous tissue from the deposits of cholesterol and calcium. The aged are also prone to heart disease, other minor ailments and chronic diseases.

Due to the weakening regulatory mechanism, the body temperature is affected. Therefore the old persons feel the change in climate more profoundly than others. They suffer from digestive troubles, insomnia. Due to dental problems they are not able to chew or swallow well.

The old are more accident prone because of their slow reaction to dangers resulting in malfunctioning of the sense organs and declining mental abilities, the capacity to work decreases. Eyes and ears are greatly affected Changes in the nerve centre in the brain and retina affect vision and sensitivity to certain colours gradually decreases. Most old people suffer from farsightness because of diminishing eye sight.

With advancing age, the sexual potency decreases along with a waning of secondary sex characters. Women go through menopause generally at the age of 45 – 50 years accompanied by nervousness, headaches, giddiness, emotional instability, irritability and insomnia. The movements of the aged are
fewer co-ordinates. They get fatigued easily. Due to lack of motivation, they do not take interest to learn new skill and become lethargic. Above all visits to the doctor becomes a routine work for them.

2. Psychological Problems:

Mental disorders are very much associated with old age. Older people are susceptible to psychotic depressions. The two major psychotic disorders of older people are senile dementia (associated with cerebral atrophy and degeneration) and psychosis with cerebral arterio sclerosis (associated with either blocking or ruptures in the cerebral arteries). It has been observed that these two disorders account for approximately 80% of the psychotic disorders among older people in the civilized societies.

(1) Senile Dementia:

Older people suffer from senile dementia. They develop symptoms like poor memory, intolerance of change, disorientation, rest lessens, insomnia, failure of judgement, a gradual formation of delusion and hallucinations, extreme-mental depression and agitation, severe mental clouding in which the individual becomes restless, combative, resistive and incoherent. In extreme cases the patient become bed ridden and resistance to disease is lowered resulting in his days being numbered.

(2) Psychosis with cerebral Arteriosclerosis:

This is accompanied by physiological symptoms such as acute indigestion, unsteadiness in gait, small strokes resulting in cumulative brain damage and gradual personality change. Conclusive seizures are relatively common. This is also associated with symptoms such as weakness, fatigue, dizziness, headache, depression, memory defect, periods of confusion, lowered efficiency in work, heightened irritability and tendency to be suspicious about trivial matters. Forgetfulness is one of the main psychological problems of old age. General intelligence and independent creative thinking are usually affected in old age.

3. Emotional Problem:

Decline in mental ability makes them dependent. They no longer have trust in their own ability or judgements but still they want to tighten their grip over the younger ones. They want to get involved in all family matters and business issues. Due to generation gap the youngsters do not pay attention to their suggestion and advice. Instead of developing a sympathetic attitude towards the old, they start asserting their rights and power. This may create a feeling of deprivation of their dignity and importance.

Loss of spouse during old age is another hazard. Death of a spouse creates a feeling of loneliness and isolation. The negligence and indifferent attitude of the family members towards the older people creates more emotional problems.

4. Social Problems:

Older people suffer social losses greatly with age. Their social life is narrowed down by loss of work associated, death of relatives, friends and spouse and weak health which restricts their participation in social activities. The home becomes the centre of their social life which gets confined to the interpersonal relationship with the family members. Due to loss of most of the social roles they once performed, they are likely to be lonely and isolated severe chronic health problem enable them to become socially isolated which results in loneliness and depression.
5. Financial Problems:

Retirement from service usually results in loss of income and the pensions that the elderly receive are usually inadequate to meet the cost of living which is always on the rise. With the reduced income they are reversed from the state of “Chief bread winner to a mere dependent” though they spend their provident fund on marriages of children, acquiring new property, education of children and family maintenance. The diagnosis and treatment of their disease created more financial problem for old age.

Policy Response to Ageing in India

Indian government’s commitment to population ageing concerns is evident in two important ways:

(a) being a signatory to all the global conferences, initiatives on ageing as well as the Regional Plans of Action; and (b) formulation of the National Policy on Older Persons (NPOP) in 1999, well ahead of Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (MIPAA), the United Nation (UN) sponsored International Plan of Action. The National Social Assistance Programme for the poor is also an outcome of the Directive Principles of our Constitution (Articles 41–42) recognizing concurrent responsibility of the central and state governments in this regard.

India’s national response can be seen as evolving along with many multilateral initiatives under the aegis of the UN which spearheaded global attention while encouraging country action to address ageing concerns. The projection scenarios produced by the UN and the attentive ear lent to the voices of elderly men and women contributed to better understanding and clarity on ageing issues. The government also recognized that some of the key concerns of our senior citizens could be best addressed only in partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). India’s association with incremental global understanding of ageing issues has been significant—starting from the 1982 Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing, followed in 1991 by the development of 18 principles for older persons (grouped under five quality-of-life attributes: independence, participation, care, self-fulfilment and dignity) and then the Second World Assembly on Ageing held in Madrid in 2002. As mentioned above, the NPOP formulation in India preceded MIPAA by about three years and has in some ways influenced the Madrid Action Plan.

India also shared with other countries and international NGOs the serious lack of attention to ageing in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The post-2015 development goals called the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in general and SDG-3 in particular has given attention to ageing. In the most recent 2016 UN General Assembly, India further ratified its commitment to SDGs and reported streamlining them into national development indicators. Indian policy response to ageing has also gained from the work of the World Health Organization (WHO) on Active Ageing, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) resolution of January 2010 on older women, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) work on social-economic implications of ageing through the initiative Building a Knowledge-base on Population Ageing in India (BKPAI)\(^1\), the work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on income security and social pensions as well as the large data collection efforts under Longitudinal Ageing Study in India (LASI) and Study of Global Ageing and Adult Health (SAGE).

It is important to understand the social aspects concerning aged in the country as they go through the process of ageing. Increased life expectancy, rapid urbanization and lifestyle changes have led to an emergence of varied problems for the elderly in India. It must be remembered that comprehensive care to the elderly is possible only with the involvement and collaboration of family, community and
the Government. India should prepare to meet the growing challenge of caring for its elderly population. All social service institutions in the country need to address the social challenges to elderly care in order to improve their quality of life. There is a need to initiate requisite and more appropriate social welfare programmes to ensure life with dignity for the elderly. In addition, there is also a need to develop an integrated and responsive system to meet the care needs and challenges of elderly in India.

National Policy for Senior Citizens 2011

The new policy is based on several factors. These include the demographic explosion among the elderly, the changing economy and social milieu, advancement in medical research, science and technology and high levels of destitution among the elderly rural poor (51 million elderly live below the poverty line). A higher proportion of elderly women than men experience loneliness and are dependent on children. Social deprivations and exclusion, privatization of health services and changing pattern of morbidity affect the elderly. All those of 60 years and above are senior citizens. This policy addresses issues concerning senior citizens living in urban and rural areas, special needs of the “oldest old” and older women.

In principle the policy values an age integrated society. It will endeavour to strengthen integration between generations, facilitate interaction between the old and the young as well as strengthen bonds between different age groups. It believes in the development of a formal and informal social support system, so that the capacity of the family to take care of senior citizens is strengthened and they continue to live in the family. The policy seeks to reach out in particular to the bulk of senior citizens living in rural areas who are dependent on family bonds and intergenerational understanding and support.

The focus of the new policy include:

1. Mainstream senior citizens, especially older women, and bring their concerns into the national development debate with priority to implement mechanisms already set by governments and supported by civil society and senior citizens’ associations. Support promotion and establishment of senior citizens’ associations, especially amongst women.

2. Promote the concept of “Ageing in Place” or ageing in own home, housing, income security and homecare services, old age pension and access to healthcare insurance schemes and other programmes and services to facilitate and sustain dignity in old age. The thrust of the policy would be preventive rather than cure.

3. The policy will consider institutional care as the last resort. It recognises that care of senior citizens has to remain vested in the family which would partner the community, government and the private sector.

4. Being a signatory to the Madrid Plan of Action and Barrier Free Framework it will work towards an inclusive, barrier-free and age-friendly society.

5. Recognise that senior citizens are a valuable resource for the country and create an environment that provides them with equal opportunities, protects their rights and enables their full participation in society. Towards achievement of this directive, the policy visualises
that the states will extend their support for senior citizens living below the poverty line in urban and rural areas and ensure their social security, healthcare, shelter and welfare. It will protect them from abuse and exploitation so that the quality of their lives improves.

6. Long term savings instruments and credit activities will be promoted to reach both rural and urban areas. It will be necessary for the contributors to feel assured that the payments at the end of the stipulated period are attractive enough to take care of the likely erosion in purchasing power.

4) Employment in income generating activities after superannuation will be encouraged.

5) Support and assist organisations that provide counselling, career guidance and training services.

6) States will be advised to implement the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and set up Tribunals so that elderly parents unable to maintain themselves are not abandoned and neglected.

7) States will set up homes with assisted living facilities for abandoned senior citizens in every district of the country and there will be adequate budgetary support.
DECLINING SEX-RATIOS

In 1901 there were 3.2 million fewer women than men in India – a hundred years later the deficit increased over 10 times to 35 million at the time of Census 2001. The most disturbing decline is seen in the age group 0 -6 years. The sex ratio (number of girls for every 1000 boys) within this age group plunged from 1010 in 1941 to 927 in 2001. The sex ratio in the age group 0 - 6 years plunged from 1010 in 1941 to 927 in 2001.

India has fewer women than men and fewer girls than boys

Most societies in the industrialized world have a healthy 0-6 child ratio i.e. there are roughly the same number of girls and boys in the 0 – 6 age-group. In India however, the rapidly declining sex-ratios are turning into a demographic nightmare of frightening proportions.

The sex ratio of 927 in the 0 – 6 age group is only the national average for India. There are areas within the country where the ratio has dropped to well below 900. The ratios for some of the states are: Himachal Pradesh 896, Punjab 793, Chandigarh 845, Uttarakhand 906, Haryana 819, Delhi 865, Rajasthan 909, and Gujarat 879. These are not the most economically backward areas of the country. On the contrary, Punjab, with the lowest 0 – 6 sex-ratio in the country, is the most economically prosperous state of India. Delhi, the national capital region of India, has a declining 0 -6 sex-ratio. In fact, some of the poorest states have a sex-ratio well above the national average.

Several reasons are attributed to the decline in the number of girls – neglect of the girl child, high maternal mortality, female infanticide and now, female foeticide. Sex-selective abortions have been greatly facilitated by the misuse of diagnostic procedures such as amniocentesis that can determine the sex of the foetus.

The prejudice against the girl child continues to be an issue of concern for UNICEF in India, which, together with its partners conceptualized the project ‘Initiative to Reduce Sex determination & Pre-
Birth Elimination of Females’ to address the problem of female foeticide. As a result of the project activities in Mandya district in the state of Karnataka, the issue of sex selection and female foeticide was put on the public agenda and created mass awareness among the people in both rural and urban areas.

Recognising the importance of the trends emphasized in the Census 2001 data, the Planning Commission of India incorporated gender equity as an integral part of the broader strategy. Despite the efforts of the government, civil society organizations, NGOs, UN agencies and the media to keep the issue of female foeticide high on the public and policy agenda, little or no desired results have been forthcoming.

Government of India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has undertaken several measures to implement the ‘Pre Conception & Pre Natal Diagnostics Technique Act (PC & PNDT Act). The Act provides for the prohibition of sex selection and for the prevention of misuse of diagnostic techniques for sex determination leading to female foeticide. It also prohibits advertisements regarding facilities of pre-natal determination of sex of the foetus. All clinics in the country using pre-natal diagnostic techniques require to be registered. Violation of the Act is punishable with imprisonment. The State Medical Council of Punjab recently suspended the registrations of four doctors for violating the PC & PNDT Act.

As a part of the awareness campaign, religious and spiritual leaders have been approached to speak against sex selection, video spots on girl child and sex selection aired on national and private television networks. Brand ambassadors have been used for the Government’s ‘Save the Girl Child’ campaign. ‘Atmaja’, a serial on the plight of the girl child has been telecast on the National Network.

The Department of Women and Child Development has supported workshops to raise awareness on the issue of the girl child, while the Registrar General’s Office has been promoting birth registration and introduced mechanisms to monitor sex ratio at birth among institutional deliveries.

However, despite the efforts of the government, civil society organizations, NGOs, UN agencies and the media to keep the issue of female foeticide high on the public and policy agenda, little or no desired results have been forthcoming. There is a dire need to review the strategies and re-examine the efforts to arrest the declining sex ratio.

Sex ratio and child Sex ratio

Female gender discrimination due to a cultural preference for males is a common global problem, particularly in Asian regions. India is no exception. Gender discrimination manifesting as increased female mortality, female infanticide, and sex-selective abortion has received considerable attention in recent years. The sex ratio trend in India indicates a growing imbalance, with estimates from the 2011 census indicating approximately seven million fewer girls than expected in the 0-to-6 age group (Bharadwaj & Lakdawala, 2013; Chamarbagwala & Ranger, 2010; Jha et al., 2011; Sahni et al., 2008).

Sex ratio, defined as the ratio of one sex to another (Last, 2001) is the statistic most often reported to describe this phenomenon. Most epidemiologic literature uses the term sex ratio to denote the number of males per 1,000 females in a given population. However, in India, the sex ratio is calculated on the number of females per 1,000 males in the defined population (Joshi & Tiwari, 2011).
At birth, boys in India naturally outnumber girls by 3% to 7%, meaning the expected female-to-male sex ratio is 0.93 to 0.97. However, when the sex ratio at birth is skewed in favor of male babies, it indicates human meddling by means of sex identification and sex-selective abortion (Singh, 2010). India is one of several countries where such concerns are persistent and significant (Guilmoto, 2012). Numerous laws intended to prevent discrimination on the basis of gender have been passed over the years in India (Basu, 2009), yet the distorted female-to-male sex ratio seems to show worsening tendencies (Jha et al., 2011).

At birth, boys naturally weigh more than girls (whether in the West or Asia), yet boys’ mortality rate also is inherently higher (Hong et al., 2007; Singh, 2010). Therefore, when the mortality rate of infants and children is higher for females, nurses should be aware this is a warning sign that neglect of the female child may be occurring (Singh).

A normal adult sex ratio of at least 1.05, women-to-men, is based on countries where equal care is received. In India, the 2013 estimated sex ratio for adults aged 25 to 54 in India was 0.94 women-to-men (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). Croll (2000) points out that the sex ratio of females-to-males is even more disturbingly low among the 0-to-10 age group, particularly among those 0 to 4 years of age. According to the 2001 Census of India, the child sex ratio (0–6 years of age) was 0.927, declined from 0.945 in 1991 (Paul et al., 2011). This declining pattern continues, as the provisional results of the 2011 Census of India indicate the child sex ratio (0–6 years) is 0.914 (Government of India, 2013). The National Family Health Survey-2 data indicate that among Indian women, who had ultrasound or amniocentesis during antenatal care, an estimated 6.4% of female fetuses were likely aborted (Paul et al.). This is done to increase the number of male babies born within the family, thus obtaining the desired family composition of having more sons than daughters (Agrawal, 2012). Given these data, there are realistic fears that prenatal sex determination and the old practices of female infanticide combine in today’s Indian society (Guilmoto, 2012; Jha et al., 2011).

Based on European history, demographic experts had anticipated decreased son preference with India’s strong economic development. However, in Asia, son preference has actually increased with economic development, decreased fertility rates, and small family size. The difference in how son preference continues to evolve in Asia is due to deep cultural roots regarding gender identity (Croll, 2000; Das Gupta et al., 2003). Indeed, in India, son preference is present across differing groups of socioeconomic status, education levels, castes, tribes, religions, and state of residence (Paul, 2011).

Likewise, Sev’er (2008) notes gender discrimination across the female lifespan in India, and compellingly links the dowry (bride price) system and sex selection practices. Sev’er notes that areas where violence related to dowry dispute is highest, adult and child sex ratios are the most skewed. The dowry system casts daughters as a liability, a net loss or economic ruin of her family. This entrenched way of thinking is rooted in Hindu culture and perpetuated by maxims such as “raising a daughter is like watering a neighbor’s plant” and “a son spells rewards, a daughter expense” (Hedge, 1999, p. 18).

**SEX DETERMINATION**

If sex determination sonography is utilized, a woman may be forced to undergo an abortion by the family, resulting in female feticide (Puri, Adams, Ivey, & Nachtigall, 2011). If the baby’s gender is unknown until birth, a female child is at risk of infanticide. Sev’er (2008) succinctly summarizes the vicious cycle of female life and death in India, stating that “the problem lies in the attitudes toward women, the lower status of girl children and the fear of the dowry burden”.

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Sahni et al. (2008) note the continuing importance of using hospital records for collecting data on sex ratio at birth that is not influenced by female feticide and neglect of girl children. A distorted sex ratio at birth may be considered indirect evidence of prenatal sex determination, followed by sex-selective abortion (Pham, Hall, & Hill, 2011).

Though it is difficult to find alternate explanations for distorted sex ratio at birth, interpretation must be carefully considered. Chamarbagwala and Ranger (2010) noted regional variations across India, as well as other patterns. For instance, larger families (≥3 children) had greater gender equality than smaller families. This may be because if sons are born first, the couple may choose not to have any more children, whereas other couples continue having children until the desired number of sons is attained. In a qualitative study, respondents indicated that couples often continue to have children until they have at least one son (Chor, Patil, Goudar, Kodkany, & Geller, 2012).

Inconsistent birth registry or incomplete vital statistics system in India could influence the calculation of sex ratio at birth in various regions (Manchanda, Saikia, Gupta, Chowdhary, & Puliyel, 2011). Poor data quality and availability complicate the interpretation of sex differences (Sawyer, 2012).

Also, technology has made preconception sex determination possible by two methods: X and Y sperm separation and preimplantation genetic diagnosis. These methods were touted as more ethical means of ensuring the birth of a boy. However, these preconception methods have contributed very little to India’s skewed sex ratio, likely due to their invasive nature and high cost (Madan & Breuning, 2014).

**ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS**

Alternative explanations for a skewed sex ratio of the general population include human trafficking (Madan & Breuning, 2014), and decreased fertility rates (Guilmoto & Duthé, 2013). However, outside of specific biologic phenomenon such as ionizing radiation, as hypothesized in Cuba and Russia (Scherb, Kusmierz, & Voigt, 2013), it is much more difficult to explain a distorted sex ratio at birth in India. Underreporting or undercounting, blamed on the inadequate vital registration system, does not explain the continued decline of the sex ratio among 0-to-6 year olds in India (Madan & Breuning). The regularity of this decline indicates true imbalance rather than artifact (Guilmoto & Duthé). The Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India reported that the low 0-to-6 year old child sex ratio was primarily due to the low sex ratio at birth (Chandramouli, 2012). As Guilmoto and Duthé put it, outside of “a freak biological phenomenon that alters the sex ratio at birth” (p. 2), human meddling (preconception or sex-selective abortion) is the only explanation for an imbalanced sex ratio at birth.

The convergence of culture, son preference, and reproductive technology are complex issues of gender discrimination resulting in skewed sex ratios with lower than expected numbers of females (Agrawal, 2012). The worsening gender discrimination, evidenced by the trend in sex ratio, can only be reversed through social change. Nurses are critical in addressing this complex issue. Public policy alone has failed. Nongovernmental organization (NGO) and other organizational schemes have failed. As noted by Rajaram and Zararia (2009), rights in law books must cross over to rights perpetuated by social norms within local communities, in order to positively impact the lives of poor women.
CHILD AND INFANT MORTALITY

The infant mortality rate (IMR)—the probability of dying before one year of age expressed per 1000 live-births and under-five mortality rate (U5MR)—the probability of dying between birth and age 5 expressed per 1000 live-births have been used as measures of children’s well-being for many years.

Infant and child mortality rates are considered as sensitive indicators of living and socio-economic conditions of a country. This recognition has made the international organizations as well as National Governments to intensify their efforts to reduce infant mortality and improve child survival. As a result, there have been considerable improvements in the infant and child mortality rates for the world as a whole in recent years.

In India, evidence of child health inequalities exist along several dimensions. There are huge differentials across states and socio-economic groups in terms of health outcomes, access to health services and utilization of health services. Disparities in health outcomes are explained not only by disparities in utilization of services but also by the differential pace of economic and social development, differentials in the distribution of the benefits of development and the inadequacy of the public health care systems to deliver equitable health services.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the United Nations in the year 2000 project the efforts of the international community to “spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty.” The MDGs include eight goals which were framed to address the world’s major development challenges with health and its related areas as the prime focus. In India, considerable progress has been made in the field of basic universal education, gender equality in education, and global economic growth. However there is
slow progress in the improvement of health indicators related to mortality, morbidity and various environmental factors contributing to poor health conditions.

One of the 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted after millennium summit in 2000 is to reduce child mortality (MDG 4). Donors and Development agencies, the United Nations and National Governments around the world committed themselves to the goal of reducing the under-five mortality rates by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015 (UN Millennium Declaration). Two of the key indicators of monitoring progress towards this goal are the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) and the infant mortality Rate (IMR) (UN Development Group, 2003).

**Initiatives by the Government to Reduce IMR and Child Mortality Rates**

The Government of India aimed to achieve IMR of 60 by the year 2000, after the Alma Ata declaration of 1978. Since then, a lot of efforts have been put into the child survival programmes over the years. The Sixth and Seventh Five-Year Plans had aimed at nationwide programmes to realize this goal.

The twenty-point programme included rapid improvement in the conditions of women and children. In 1979, the Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI) was established to provide the tetanus toxoid (TT) vaccine to pregnant women, and BCG, DPT, polio and measles vaccine to children.

National Health Policy 1983 envisioned significant reduction in IMR, NMR & CMR by 2000. All the child health programmes are directed towards achieving these goals. Universal Immunization Programme against six preventable diseases, namely, diphtheria, pertussis, childhood tuberculosis, poliomyelitis, measles and neonatal tetanus was introduced in the country in a phased manner in 1985, which covered the whole of India by 1990. Significant progress has been made under the Programme in the initial period when more than 90 per cent coverage for all the six immunisation was achieved.

Universal Immunisation Programme (UIP) become a part of the Child Survival and Safe Motherhood (CSSM) Programme in 1992 and Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) Programme in 1997. Under the Immunisation Programme, infants are immunised against tuberculosis, diphtheria, pertussis, poliomyelitis, measles and tetanus. Universal immunization against six vaccine preventable diseases (VPD) by 2000 was one of the goals set in the National Health Policy (1983).

The National Population Policy (2000) and National Health Policy (2002) addressed the issue of child survival and maternal health and increase the outreach and coverage of the comprehensive package of RCH services through the government, voluntary and non-government sectors in partnership.

National Charter for Children, adopted on 9th February 2004, emphasizes Government's commitment to children's rights to survival, development and protection. It also stipulates the duties for the State and the community towards children and emphasizes the duties of children towards family, society and the nation.

The National Plan of Action for Children, 2005 commits itself to ensure all rights to all children upto the age of 18 years. To ensure child survival, the goals set up in the National Plan of Action for Children were: to reduce infant mortality rate to below 30, child mortality below 31 and neonatal mortality below 18 per 1000 live births by 2010. These goals were to be achieved by: reducing neonatal mortality rate to 26 by 2007; eliminating maternal and neonatal tetanus by 2007; promoting breast-feeding as a measure for ensuring early childhood nutrition; reducing deaths due to measles by
half by 2007; ensuring full immunization of all children against vaccine preventable diseases; eradicating poliomyelitis by 2007; reducing deaths due to AARI by one third and due to diarrhea and cholera by 50 percent by 2010.

In 2005 Government of India launched National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) to improve the availability and quality of accessible health care, especially for those residing in rural areas, including poor, women and children. The Major goals of the mission are to reduce the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR), improve universal access to public health services such as women’s health, child health, water, sanitation and hygiene, immunization and nutrition; and enhance the prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable diseases. Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) Programme -II was subsumed within NRHM. GOI has adopted ambitious targets related to children that are in line with, and at times more ambitious than, the MDGs. Centrally-sponsored schemes have increased public resources to key sectors, notably the Reproductive and Child Health Programme II, the National Rural Health Mission and the Integrated Child Development Services. The challenge remains to convert these commitments and resources into measurable results for all children, especially those belonging to socially disadvantaged and marginalized communities.

Child mortality trends, differentials, and determinants in India have been the subject of many studies. These studies have provided a framework for analysing factors that contributed to it. These included proximate factors (such as nonmedical factors and medical care during the antenatal period, care at birth, and preventive and curative care in the postnatal period); maternal factors (age, parity, and birth intervals); and household- and community-level factors (water, sanitation and housing). These studies concluded that a substantial decline in infant mortality rate is possible without significant improvement in economic development. They propose increased access to a minimum package of essential services that would significantly reduce high infant mortality rates: reproductive health services; perinatal care; improved breastfeeding practices; immunization; home-based treatment of diarrhea; and timely introduction of supplementary foods.

Infant mortality rate (IMR) and under-five mortality rate (U5MR) have been used as measures of children’s well-being for many years.

Levels and trends in infant and under-five mortality rates

2. One of the MDG goals is to reduce the mortality rate by two third among children under five between 1990 and 2015. Under-five mortality comprises of infant mortality (death before one year of age) and child mortality (death in the 1-4 year age group). The present Infant mortality rate stands at 40 per 1000 live births in 2013. Infant and child mortality in India have declined substantially over the past two decades. According to SRS data, infant mortality declined by 50% between 1991 and 2013. Though the Infant Mortality Rate is decreasing 2-3 points annually but the slow pace of reduction in the IMR is a major worry for the country as it is still higher than expected and India may not achieve the millennium development goal of 27 per 1000 live births by 2015.

3. Infant Mortality Rate comprises of two components - Neonatal Mortality Rate (Number of infant deaths of less than 29 days per thousand live births during the year) and Post Neonatal Mortality Rate (Number of deaths of 29 days to less than one year per thousand live births during the year). Neonatal mortality rate was recorded as 51 in 1991 which declined to 28 in 2013. The
present level of neonatal mortality indicates that about two-third of infant deaths occur within the first month of life.

4. Between the two components of infant mortality i.e. neonatal and post neonatal mortality, during the period 1991 to 2013, post neonatal mortality rate declined more rapidly than neonatal mortality rate as a decline in post neonatal mortality by 58.6 percent was recorded in comparison to 45 percent decline in neonatal mortality. The level of Neonatal mortality is greatly affected by biological and maternal factors including nutritional status of the mother. Although concerted national efforts have been made to improve child mortality, especially in the post neonatal phase, less attention has been given to determinants of peri-natal and neonatal mortality.

5. Early neonatal mortality refers to the deaths in the first week of life. Early neonatal mortality rate (ENMR) is an indicator of quality of peri-natal care. As observed among all the components of the under-five mortality, early neonatal mortality has been slowest to decline which has been constantly contributing to slow decrease in IMR over the years.

6. Peri-natal mortality rate (PNMR) is the number of fatal deaths after 28 weeks of pregnancy and infant deaths under 7 days of age in given year per 1000 total births in that year. The peri-natal mortality rate has declined from 46 in 1991 to 26 in 2013. From 2001 to 2009, it showed almost stagnant trend, however, after 2009 there was a declining trend.

7. The under-five mortality is the probability (expressed as a rate per 1000 live births) that a child born in a specific year or time period will die before reaching the age of five, subject to current age specific mortality rates. Since 1990, a rapid decline was seen in the U5MR and from an estimated level of 125 in 1990, fell to a level of 49 in 2013. Given to reduce under-five mortality rate to 42 per thousand live births by 2015, as per the historical trend, India may be missing the target. However, considering the continuance of the sharper annual rate of decline witnessed in the recent years, India is likely to reach near the target.

8. Under-five mortality has declined because of reductions in the neonatal, post neonatal and child mortality rates. Proportionately, child mortality rates has declined more than infant mortality and similarly post neonatal mortality has declined more than neonatal mortality, increasing the relative importance of peri-natal and neonatal mortality.

9. Comparison of estimated infant mortality rates based on three rounds of NFHS indicates that the infant mortality rate declined by 22 deaths per 1,000 live births in approximately 13 years. This implies an average reduction of 1.7 infant deaths per year. Neonatal mortality has declined from 49 for the period 1988-92 to 39 for the period 2001-2005 and the post natal mortality declined from 30 to 18 between the same time periods. It is observed that the decline was more in the post neonatal (12) and child mortality (15) as compared to neonatal mortality (10).

**Inter- State Differentials in IMR and U5MR**
10. Among the states, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Delhi, Punjab, Maharashtra, Goa, Manipur, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura, in 2013 the IMR have been estimated below the Millennium Development Goal (27) set for the year 2015. Also, Karnataka (31), West Bengal (31), Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand (32) are likely to achieve the reduction of IMR to the level of MDG by the year 2015. In the States of Assam (54), Madhya Pradesh (54), Odisha (51), Uttar Pradesh (50), Rajasthan (47), Chhattisgarh (46), Bihar (42), Meghalaya (47) and Haryana (41) the IMR was recorded more than the national level (40) in the year 2013 which is far away from the target. In Andhra Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh and Mizoram, the infant mortality rates were recorded between 35 and 40 and may not achieve the target by 2015. In all the Union Territories, IMR has been recorded below 27 except Dadra & Nagar Haveli (31) which is likely to achieve the target by 2015.

11. The under-five mortality rate as per SRS was estimated 49 at national level in 2013 and there were considerable inter-state variations. Among the bigger States, highest U5MR was in Assam (73) and lowest in Kerala (12). Assam (73), Madhya Pradesh (69), Odisha (66), Uttar Pradesh (64), Rajasthan (57), Bihar (54) and Chhattisgarh (53) have U5MR higher than the national average (49). The States of Kerala (12), Tamil Nadu (23), Maharashtra & Delhi (26), Punjab (31), Karnataka and West Bengal (35), Jammu & Kashmir (40), Andhra Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh (41) have already achieved the given national level MDG target to reduce U5MR to 42 per thousand live births by the year 2015. Gujarat and Haryana (45) are likely to achieve the national target by 2015.

Infant and Under-five Mortality in EAG States and Assam

12. AHS was conducted in 2010-11 with baseline survey and followed by two updating rounds in 2011-12 and 2012-13 in 8 Empowered Action Group (EAG) states and Assam. AHS provided data on infant and child mortality for 9 States.

13. Among the EAG States and Assam, the infant mortality rate was highest in Uttar Pradesh (68) and lowest in Jharkhand (36) in 2012-13. The percentage of decrease in IMR from 2010-11 to 2012-13 was lowest (4.2%) in Uttar Pradesh which indicates the lower performance of NRHM and other health interventions in the state. Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Jharkhand have recorded a decrease of 13.2 percent, 12.7 percent and 12.2 percent respectively in IMR from 2010-11 to 2012-13 showing the better progress in these three States. More attention is required in the States of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Odisha and Assam besides Uttar Pradesh for success of various health interventions including NRHM.

14. Highest under-five mortality rate in 2012-13 was estimated in Uttar Pradesh (90) followed by Madhya Pradesh (83), Odisha (75), Rajasthan (74), Assam (71), Bihar (70) and Chhattisgarh (60). The national target set by the Government to reduce under-five mortality to 42 by 2015 is far away from the current level of U5MR in these states except the states of Uttarakhand (48) and Jharkhand (51) where it is closer to the target.
15. Annual Health Surveys also indicate that the infant and child mortality rates are higher in rural areas as compared to urban areas. Maximum difference in rural and urban areas is seen in Assam where the mortality rates in rural areas are nearly double of the urban areas.

Maternal Determinants of Infant and Child Mortality

16. The demographic characteristics of both mother and child like age at marriage, mother’s age at child birth, birth order of the child, birth interval, and child’s weight/size at birth and sex of the child have been found to play an important role in the survival probability of children. As per SRS data, the percentage of effective marriage below the legal age of marriage i.e. 18 has declined from 20.3 percent in 1993 to 2.2 percent in 2013.

2. Age of the mother at the time of child birth has an important bearing on the survival of the child as children born to adolescent mothers are at higher risk. Infant and under-five mortality rates are highest among mothers below 20 years of age, whereas children born to mothers aged 35 and above are likely to have the increased risk of mortality.

18. The effect of maternal age on mortality is highest during the neonatal period, and progressively diminishes during the post-neonatal and 1-4 year age-group. Based on NFHS-3, the effect of young age of a mother (<20 years) on neonatal mortality was 1.58 times higher than the child born to mothers whose age was between 20 and 30 years. Similarly the children born to mothers above 40 years of age have 1.25 times higher risk of death within first month of birth in comparison to mothers of age 20-29 years.

19. As per NFHS-3, 2005-06, the first order children have 57 percent higher risk of dying in the first month of life as compared to birth order 2 and 3. There is no increased risk of dying for first order birth beyond the neonatal period. In fact, child mortality is lowest among first order births and increased with the order births. Fourth to sixth order children have 37 percent higher risk of dying in the neonatal period, 26 percent in the post neonatal period and 53 percent during 1-4 year age as compared to birth order 2 and 3. Children in birth order 7 or more have 86 percent higher chances of dying before fifth birthday. According to DLHS-3, 2007-08 more than two third children of fourth and higher order were born to mothers whose age was above 35 years. Though declining trend in percentage of fourth and higher order births have been seen as it decreased from 24.2 percent in 1991 to 10.5 percent in 2013, but more efforts in implementation of the family planning programme are required. With higher birth order, decreased utilization of health services by mothers and children like ANC, delivery in a health facility, vaccination and vitamin A supplementation has been observed.

20. The interval between two births shows a strong effect on infant and child mortality rates. The shortest birth interval, less than two years, carries the greatest risk of mortality and the risk of mortality decline with increased birth interval. Mothers whose births are spaced too closely may not
recover their health before becoming pregnant and this can hinder the growth and development of the foetus and a child born too soon after the first may divert time, attention and resources of the caretakers from the first child.

21. According to Sample Registration System, among the children born in the year 2013, 31 percent were with previous birth interval less than 24 months and another 30 percent with an interval of 24-36 months. Among the children born between 2001 and 2005, the infant mortality rate was 2.9 times higher for the children with previous birth interval below 24 months and 1.7 times higher for the interval 24-35 months than the birth interval 36-47 months. It is revealed that previous birth interval is one of the important determinants of IMR and U5MR. The IMR and U5MR is considerably low when the previous birth interval is 36-48 months, therefore, the IMR and U5MR can be reduced significantly by spacing births.

22. Any birth when the mother’s age is less than 18 years or more than 34 years; where the previous birth interval is less than 2 years or the birth order is more than three can be categorized as high risk. Total 46 percent births in the preceding five-year from NFHS-3 (approximately from 2001 to 2005) were in an avoidable risk category. These births had nearly twice the risk of dying than those which were not in any high risk category. Among the avoidable high risk category, 35 percent births were in single high risk category and 11 percent of the births in multiple high-risk category.

23. Neonatal and post neonatal mortality was found highest when the deliveries were conducted at home by traditional birth attendants. NFHS data revealed that neonatal mortality is lowest among the children delivered at home by health professionals. Thus maximizing the number of deliveries assisted by trained health personnel can be helpful in minimizing the risk of dying in neonatal and post neonatal period.

24. Mother’s nutritional status affects the nutritional status of babies and the infant mortality. The risk of having a baby with low birth weight is also higher for mothers who are short. Based on NFHS-3, 11 percent women in the age group 15-49 had height below 145 centimeter, 16 percent were moderately/severely thin (BMI <17.0), 20 percent mildly thin (BMI 17.0-18.4) and 13 percent were overweight/obese. Fifty five percent of women whose haemoglobin level was tested were found to be anaemic. Thirty-nine percent women were mildly anaemic, 16 percent were moderately anaemic and two percent were severely anaemic.

Child Determinants of Infant and Child Mortality

25. As per SRS data, in the year 1991, the IMR was marginally higher for male as compared to female but after that the IMR for female was higher than male and in the year 2013, the IMR was 39 for male and 42 for female. It is observed that mortality rate for female was lower than male during neonatal period as per three rounds of National Family Health Survey which can be attributed to biological advantage of girls, however, during this period the narrowing gap in neonatal mortality between male and female has been seen. The data shows the reverse trend of increasing mortality rate among female children after neonatal period and the difference between male and female is more in the age group 1-4 years.
26. A variety of cultural and traditional factors may be responsible for the higher mortality among girls beyond neonatal period as the parental care of the child affects the mortality beyond this period. Traditionally, preference is given to sons over daughters in terms of food, prevention of diseases and treatment of illness resulting in higher post neonatal and child mortality among girls.

27. The vaccination received by male and female children of 12-23 months, based on NFHS and CES, revealed that a little higher percentage of male children received all vaccinations, whereas, among the children who did not receive any vaccine percentage of female was comparatively higher.

28. As per NFHS-3, almost half of children under five years of age (48%) were stunted and 43 percent were underweight. The proportion of children who were severely undernourished (below -3SD from the median of the reference population) was also notable – 24 percent according to height-for-age and 16 percent according to weight-for-age. Wasting was also quite a serious problem in India, affecting 20 percent of children under five years of age. Under nutrition was substantially higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Even in urban areas, 40 percent of children were stunted and 33 percent were underweight.

29. National Family Health Survey, 2005-06, reveal that 70 percent of the children below 5 years were anaemic, including 26 percent mildly anaemic, 40 percent moderately anaemic and 3 percent severely anaemic.

Socio-Economic Determinants of Infant and Child Mortality

30. Despite substantial progress in reducing under-five deaths, children from rural and poorer households remain disproportionately affected. The SRS data for the year 2013 shows that children in rural areas are about 1.6 times more likely to die before their first birthday and 1.9 times more likely to die before fifth birthday than those in urban areas. During the period 1991 to 2013, neonatal mortality declined by 53 percent in urban areas as compared to 44 percent in rural areas. In 2013, the neonatal mortality rate was about double in rural areas as compared to urban areas.

31. As per NFHS-3, in rural areas 28 percent mothers did not receive any ANC as compared to 9 percent mothers in urban areas. Among the women who delivered during 12 months preceding CES, 2009, in urban areas 82.7 percent women received more than three ANCs, 89.4 percent received two doses of TT injections and 39.7 percent women areas consumed IFA tablets/syrup for 100+ days as compared to 63.3 percent, 85.9 percent and 27.6 percent respectively in rural areas. Full ANCs were received by 26 percent women in rural areas and 36 percent in urban areas.

32. Urban women (70.4%) were more likely to receive ANC in the first trimester than rural women (54.9%). About 12 percent women in rural areas and 4 percent in urban areas did not receive any antenatal checkup. A significant increase in institutional deliveries from 28.9 percent (NFHS-3, 2005-06) to 68 percent (CES, 2009) has been observed in rural areas which may be attributed to interventions like NRHM, JSY and JSSK.
33. It was observed that higher percentage of children in urban areas received vaccination and vitamin A supplementation than in rural areas. Though the immunization coverage increased in subsequent surveys but still more efforts are required to cover all children.

34. Mother’s education is often just a good indicator of other socioeconomic factors that affect under-five mortality directly. A mother’s education is important because it facilitates her integration into a society impacted by traditional customs, exposes her to information about better nutrition, spacing births, childhood illnesses and treatment.

35. The data revealed that children born to a mother with secondary or higher education have lowest rates for all types of childhood mortality. IMR and U5MR among children born to illiterate mothers have been consistently higher than those born to mothers with any education. Under-five mortality was highest (94.7) among children whose mothers were uneducated which decreased with each higher level of education and was lowest (29.7) among children of mothers who completed 12 years or more education.

36. It was observed that the level of utilization of health services like ANC, assistance of skilled health personnel during delivery, immunization of children etc. depended on educational level of mother.

37. Some of the effect of religion on mortality may be due to differences in life-style based on traditions and beliefs. Such differences may include customary practices related to childbirth, infant feeding, and health care. According to NFHS-3, highest rate of infant mortality was found among Hindus and it was lowest among Christians. Though, the level of complete antenatal care was low among all religious groups, it was seen that Christian mothers were more aware of receiving antenatal care. Majority of children belonging to Hindu, Muslim and Sikh religion received prelacteal feed (something other than breast milk during the first three days of life). Immunization of children and vitamin A supplementation was lowest among Muslims.

38. Besides socio-economic differences, the cultural patterns of unique social groups can be quite varied and different groups may be at different stages of transition in the process of cultural change. In general, scheduled caste and schedule tribe children have higher levels of under-five mortality than others. The infant mortality rate was 36 percent higher among scheduled castes, 27 percent higher among scheduled tribes and 16 percent higher among other backward classes as compared to others. Between NFHS-1 (1992-93) and NFHS-3 (2005-06), about 37 percent decline in infant mortality was recorded among Other Castes and Scheduled Castes but during the same period only 21 percent decline was recorded among Scheduled Tribes.

39. Under-five mortality rate was 49 percent higher among scheduled castes, 62 percent higher among scheduled tribes and 23 percent higher among OBCs in comparison to others. Although scheduled tribes had a lower infant mortality rate (62) than scheduled castes (66), the child mortality rate (1-4 years of age) was higher among scheduled tribes (36) than among scheduled castes (23).
40. Lowest proportion of ST women received ANC, assistance during delivery and post natal check up followed by SCs and OBCs. As observed, among the Scheduled Tribes, least proportion of children received all vaccines and the Under-five mortality rate among them is highest and on the other side among other caste children, most children received all vaccines and U-5MR is least among them. It emphasizes the role of immunization in reducing child mortality particularly in the age group 1-4 years. More efforts are required to encourage the women particularly those who belong to Scheduled Castes and Tribes to avail antenatal care services, institutional deliveries and to get their children fully immunized.

41. Wealth Index or Economic status (as measured by Standard of Living Index) affects the infant and child mortality directly. As observed, Under-five mortality and its components vary inversely with economic status of the household, as measured by the Standard of Living Index (SLI): children born in low SLI households had the highest mortality rates, and those born in high SLI households had low mortality rates. The infant mortality rate is 70 among children in households in the lowest wealth quintile, 58 in the middle wealth quintile households, and only 29 in the highest wealth quintile households. Households in the highest wealth quintile experience the under-five mortality rate only one-third of households in the lowest quintile.

42. As observed, the level of utilization of health services like antenatal care, deliveries assisted by skilled health personnel, early initiation of breast feeding, immunization of children, and vitamin A supplementation depended on the economic status of the household.

Environmental Determinants of Infant and Child Mortality

43. It is acknowledged that availability and distribution of water is essential for good health status of people. There have been many policies that have helped in proper distribution and accessibility of water in India. As per Census, 2011, at the National level, only 32 percent households are availing tap water from treated sources, whereas 33.5 percent using water from handpumps, 8.5 percent from tubewells and 1.6 percent from covered wells. Also, 46.6 percent households have source of drinking water within the premises and 17.6 percent were bringing the water from a distant place.

44. In Bihar, Nagaland, Assam, Odisha, Jharkhand and Lakshdweep only upto 10 percent households and in Uttar Pradesh, Tripura, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and Kerala 10 to 25 percent households were using tap water from a treated source in 2011.

45. Access to an improved toilet (flash or pit) is potentially an important determinant of infant and child mortality in India. Roughly, 53 percent houses were without latrine facility within the premises. Among them 3 percent households were using public latrine and 50 percent were still going to an open place for defecation. There have been various governmental policies like Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan that have helped in increasing toilet facilities for rural and urban populations but much more efforts have to be made to provide improved toilet facility for having a good health status of the people and specifically to reduce child mortality.
46. Studies have revealed that the type of cooking fuel used in a household could affect under-five mortality as the use of cooking fuel that emits harmful smoke could elevate their risk of respiratory disease and children born to mothers who have exposure to smoke during pregnancy are more likely to be low birth weight and therefore at a higher risk of death. As per census 2011, firewood was used for cooking purposes by 49 percent households, 9 percent households were using crop residue and another 8 percent used cow dung cake. LPG and kerosene were used by 28.6 percent and 2.9 percent households respectively.

47. In conclusion, this analysis confirms the hypothesis that the infant and under-five mortality and associated determinants vary among different States and households with different socio-economic background. To enhance child survival, many determinants such as age at marriage, age at child birth, intensive antenatal and delivery care to pregnant women, spacing the birth interval, complete immunization of children, nutritional status of women and children and child care practices can be modified by child survival programs.

48. Factors contributing to slow decline include the lower social, cultural and health status of women in India. Thus, improving female education and nutrition, as well as increasing the use of health services during pregnancy and delivery, would lower child mortality. The level of child morbidity and mortality is higher for girls aged one month to 5 years than for boys. Eliminating gender differences in mortality rates would significantly reduce infant and child mortality overall. An initiative by Government of India ‘Beti Bachao Beti Padhao’ aims to create awareness among masses to eliminate discrimination to girl child at all stages.

49. Child health policies should be reviewed to sustain the achievements that have already been made, enhance quality and efficiency and address specific gaps in neonatal care. Existing child health programmes and strategies, including initiatives for the eradication of vaccine-preventable childhood diseases, and specific health and nutrition interventions, need to be examined in the context of socio-economic and State specific approaches. It is revealed from the above discussion that the economic status of the household is an important factor of the infant and child mortality rates. To reduce infant and child mortality not only the health services, water and sanitation facilities be improved by proper implementation of the programmes but also the poverty elimination programmes be implemented effectively.

SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH

Sexual and reproductive health was given an international consensus definition at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994. At its core is promotion of reproductive health, voluntary and safe sexual and reproductive choices for individuals and couples, including decisions on family size and timing of marriage. Sexuality and reproduction are vital aspects of personal identity and are fundamental to human well being fulfilling relationship within diverse cultural contexts.

Sound reproductive health is integral to the vision that every child is wanted, every birth is safe, every young person is free from HIV, and every girl and woman is treated with dignity. Implicit in this vision is the idea that men and women will be able to exercise their rights to information on and access to safe, affordable and acceptable methods of fertility regulation as well as quality health care services. The latter will enable women to experience safe pregnancy and childbirth, across the world.
Poor women, especially in developing countries, suffer disproportionately from unintended pregnancies, maternal death and disability, sexually transmitted infections including HIV, gender based violence and other problems related to their reproductive system and sexual behavior.

There are several reproductive health concerns in India which need to addressed in order to improve reproductive health status of people. In the following paragraphs, an attempt has been made to highlight some of the major concerns.

**High unwanted fertility**
- As per the National Family Health Survey III - 2005-2006 (NFHS-III), nearly 21% pregnancies are either unwanted or mistimed.
- Total fertility refers to mean number of children born per woman in the age group of 15-49 years. Total wanted fertility represents the level of fertility that will result theoretically, if all unwanted births are prevented. Total wanted fertility rate in urban areas is 1.6 and in rural areas 2.6, while total fertility rate is 2.06 in urban areas and 2.98 in rural areas.
- Unmet need for family planning is an important indicator for assessing potential demand for family planning in India. There is a high unmet need for family planning, with 6.2% for spacing and 6.6% for limiting methods among currently married women. Unmet need is also high amongst the illiterate and in the lowest wealth quintile.
- Male participation in sharing responsibility for contraception is low. As per NFHS –III, male sterilisation was accepted by only 1% of currently married couples.

**High maternal mortality**
India’s maternal mortality ratio is unacceptably high at 230 per 100,000 live births (2008) as per UN estimates. Nearly 63,000 Indian women, accounting for almost 18% of estimated global maternal deaths, die every year due to causes related to pregnancy and childbirth. The lifetime risk of maternal mortality is 1 in 70; i.e. one in every 70 pregnant women is at risk of death, even as she gives birth. Available data also indicates that a significant proportion of women suffer from obstetric morbidities.

**Sexually Transmitted Infections/Reproductive Tract Infections**
Several studies highlight the widespread prevalence of sexually transmitted and reproductive tract infections. In a nation-wide community-based study, prevalence was nearly 6% in the 15-50 years age group. The problem is further compounded by the prevailing culture of silence, as women are generally reluctant to seek medical treatment for these symptoms.

**Government policies/programmes**
In 1951, India became the world’s first nation to launch a family planning programme. Decades later, when the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) prompted a paradigm shift in population programmes, with the advocacy of client-centered and quality-oriented reproductive health approaches, India formulated appropriate policy and programmatic responses:

- The National Population Policy was formulated in the year 2000. It affirms the government’s commitment to promote voluntary and informed choice, and continuation of the target-free approach in family planning service delivery.
• The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) was launched in 2005. It aims to revamp the public healthcare delivery system and seeks to provide accessible, affordable and quality healthcare to rural population.

• A national level Reproductive and Child Health Programme II (RCH II) was introduced in 2005 and focuses on addressing reproductive health needs of the population through evidence-based technical intervention through wide range of service delivery network. There is implicit emphasis on addressing the equity dimension in coverage, while maintaining focus on quality.

• Conditional Cash Transfer schemes like Janani Suraksha Yojana (for promoting institutional deliveries) were introduced to help address economic barriers for access to services.

Better access to services is the key

Reproductive health programmes must place emphasis on improving access to quality reproductive health services by gender sensitive providers. Maternal death and disability can be reduced dramatically if every woman has access to health services throughout her lifecycle, especially during pregnancy and childbirth. The highest priority needs to be given to ensuring that women have access to skilled birth attendants at the time of giving birth and that women who develop life-threatening complications during pregnancy, childbirth or post partum can immediately access treatment at adequately-equipped facilities.

The focus needs to be on eliminating delays in decision-making to seek services, ensuring timely transportation to proper facilities and enabling prompt treatment on arrival at facilities.

The importance of Family Planning: The number of unwanted and closely spaced births can be drastically reduced by providing access to quality contraceptive services. It is vital that services are available to women and men from lower income quintiles, especially in rural areas, which are currently under serviced.

Moreover, a set of emerging issues, such as infertility, reproductive cancers, morbidities such as prolapse and gender based violence, need to be studied and addressed.

In addition, programmes need to focus on preventing and treating reproductive tract and sexually transmitted infections and meeting unmet reproductive health needs of underserved groups, such as adolescents and people living with HIV/AIDS with special reference to information, counseling and services.
CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Environmental Concerns and Contemporary Social Theory

The more recent concern of the causes and consequences of the present ecological crises are significant to modern social theory. The relation between human beings and nature and the deleterious effect of human action upon the latter, a hitherto neglected area, has emerged as a major issue. Another important issue in contemporary theory is the growth of environmental politics/movements which pose a challenge to the modern industrial/capitalist mode of production and consumption which are essentially environmentally destructive.

Air and soil pollution are important environmental problems in India

Anthony Giddens, in his later works, attributes environmental problems to the modern industrial societies and the industrial sectors in the developing countries. Whatever the origin of the crisis, the modern industry, shaped by the combination of science and technology is responsible for the greatest transformation of the world of nature than ever before.

Ulrich Beck distinguishes the modern society from the earlier ones as the risk society, characterised by its catastrophic potential resulting from environmental deterioration. In the pre-industrial societies, risks resulting from natural hazards occurred and by their very character could not be attributed to voluntary decision-making. The nature of risk changed in the industrial societies. Industrial risks and accidents at work sites, or dangers of unemployment resulting from the changes in the economic cycles, could no longer be attributed to nature. These societies also developed institutions and methods to cope with the dangers and risks, in the form of insurance, compensation, safety, etc. The risk societies are characterised by increasing environmental degradation and environmental hazards.
“At the center lie the risks and consequences of modernisation which are revealed as irresistible threats to the life of plants, animals, and human beings. Unlike the factory-related or occupational hazards of the 19th and first half of the 20th century, these can no longer be limited to certain localities or groups, but rather exhibit a tendency to globalisation.”

In the face of environmental risks and hazards of a qualitatively different kind, both real and potential, earlier modes of coping with them also break down. Yet when large-scale disasters like “Chernobyl” occur, protests do break out which challenge the legitimacy of the state and other institutions that appear powerless to manage the problems.

Giddens offers two explanations for the emergence of environmental politics— as a response to the ecological threats and thus “a politics mobilized by ideal values and moral imperatives”. Ecological movements, he observes, compel us to confront those dimensions of modernity, which have been hitherto neglected. Furthermore, they sensitise us to subtleties in the relation between nature and human beings that would otherwise remain unexplored.

Habermas sees the ecology movements as a response of the life-world to its colonisation. Since they are an expression of the reification of the communicative order of the life-world, further economic development or technical improvements in the administrative apparatus of government cannot alleviate these tensions. For Habermas, capitalism is the primary cause of environmental degradation.

All these social theorists emphasise the need for democratization of state power and civil society. Giddens suggests that not just the impact, but the very logic of unchecked scientific and technological development would have to be confronted if further harm is to be avoided. He argues that since the most consequential ecological issues are global, forms of intervention would necessarily have a global basis. New forms of local, national and international democracy may emerge and form an essential component of any politics that seeks to transcend the threats of modernity. Habermas, while recognising the limitations of modern state power, argues for the creation and defence of a public sphere where rational democratic discourse can occur. Beck argues for an ecological democracy as the central political response to the dangers of the risk society. Research agendas, development plans and introduction of new technologies must be made open for discussion and at the same time legal and institutional controls on them must be made more effective. All the above scholars point to the limitations of the pre-dominantly representative rather than participatory character of liberal democracy being an essential pre-condition for creating environmental sustainability.

A sociological perspective in the analysis of environmental issues is still emerging. Responding to the demands of social reality, sociologists are just beginning to explore the many dimensions of the environmental problems of our times.

The ecological/environmental perspective opens up the unexplored dimension of some of the important areas of sociological concern. As powerful critique of the modernisation/development agenda, this perspective brings out the unsustainability of the project. The industrial capitalist mode of production and consumption destroys the very resource base necessary for its existence, but even more, threatens human life itself.

With the growth of ecological politics and movements, a new area of sociological enquiry has opened up, which transcends the conventional dichotomy of the right and left politics, that cuts across class divisions and even national boundaries and creates spaces for activism within the civil society using the popular initiative. In a fundamental sense, it calls for a redefinition of the relation between
human beings and their natural environment and a reconsideration of the effect of human action upon nature.

**Consequences of Development on Ecology and Environment**

The tremendous impact of human ecology is well manifested in the life-support systems including air, water, land and energy. As the human population grows, there appear imbalance of food production and crisis of space leading to environmental pollution which unfavorably alter our surroundings. Survival in such circumstances calls for an expansion or movement to a different place and destruction of the natural forest for human existence and comfort. These human activities in due course lead to all sorts of unfavourable alteration of our environment (pollution), which is now a worldwide concern. These human activities are discussed here.

a) Water Pollution

The major sources of water pollution are:

i) Industrial effluents (wastes) or toxic by-products.

ii) Sewage wastes: This contains decomposable organic matter and pathogenic agents directly discharged into rivers, streams, lakes, etc.

iii) Agricultural pollutants: there are excessive agricultural nutrients such as fertilizers, disease controlling chemicals (pesticides, herbicides, insecticides and fungicides).

These pollutants damage not only human beings but plants and animals alike. However compared to the other two, industrial effluents cause much greater pollution.

b) Air Pollution and Noise: The sources are:

i) Industrial manufacturing processes: steel, chemical plants, oil refineries, fertilizer factories, etc.

ii) Combustion: Industrial and domestic combustion of coal, oil, forest fires, etc; through smoke, dust, carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, etc.

iii) Automobiles: These emit carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, suspended particulate matter.

iv) Miscellaneous: Agricultural activities such as crop spraying for pest control, nuclear energy programmes, etc.

v) Radiation pollution: For example the one happened in Chernobyl or Gas tragedy in Bhopal

Here too, the omission of gases from industries, manufacturing and in radiation cause the greatest pollution.

c) Soil Pollution

i) Solid fallout from explosion of nuclear devices.

ii) Agricultural activities- over application of inorganic manure and different chemical-based pesticides.

d) Destruction of Forest

7, Basement, Apsara Arcade, near Karol Bagh Metro Station Gate # 7, Karol Bagh, New Delhi
Large-scale deforestation leads to flood, soil erosion, silting of rivers, contraction of agricultural areas and desertification. We see more deforestation through forest contractors than from local villagers who use the wood as fuel. All these types of pollution affect human health directly or indirectly through environment, other flora and fauna, recreational amenities and productivity.

**Ecology Movements and Survival**

The contemporary period is characterised by the emergence of ecology movements in all parts of the world which are attempting to redesign the pattern and extent of natural resource utilisation to ensure social equality and ecological sustainability. Ecology movements emerging from conflicts over natural resources and the people’s right to survival are spreading in regions like the Indian sub-continent where most natural resources are already being utilised to fulfill the basic survival needs of a large majority of people. The introduction of resource and energy-intensive production technologies under such conditions lead to economic growth for a small minority while at the same time undermines the material basis for the survival of the large majority. In this way, ecology movements have questioned the validity of the dominant concepts and indicators of development.

Third World ecology movements, which resist the destruction caused by State managed market development, are challenging the concepts of politics and economics as defined within the narrow confines of the market. They reveal that there is a notion of democracy, which is wider and deeper than the market democracy. This is the ecological concept of democracy of all life based on the recognition of the right to life of non-human nature and all segments of human society, including those large numbers which do not and cannot produce and consume within the market, and who are treated as dispensable in the logic of the market. The Third World ecology movements highlight the way in which issues of ecology and equity, sustainability and justice are intimately linked to one another.

The intensity and range of ecology movements in independent India have continuously widened as predatory exploitation of natural resources to feed the process of development had increased in extent and intensity. This process has been characterised by the massive expansion of energy and resource-intensive industrial activity and major development projects like large dams, forest exploitation, mining and energy intensive agriculture.

Among the various ecology movements in India, the “Chipko Movement” (embrace the trees to oppose fellings) is the most well known. It began as a movement of the hill people in the State of U.P. to save the forest resources from exploitation by contractors from outside. It later evolved into an ecological movement that was aimed at the maintenance of the ecological stability of the major upland watersheds in India. A spontaneous people’s response to save vital forest resources was seen in Jharkhand area, the one in Bihar-Orissa border region as well as in Bastar areas of Madhya Pradesh where there were attempts to convert the mixed natural forests into plantations of commercial tree species, to the complete detriment of the tribal people. Inspired by the Chipko Movement, the “Appiko movement” in the Himalayas is actively involved in stopping illegal over-felling of forests and in replanting forest lands with multipurpose broad leaved tree species. In the Aravalli Hills of Rajasthan there has been a massive programme of tree planting to give employment to those hands which were hitherto engaged in felling of trees.

The exploitation of mineral resources, in particular, the open-cast mining in the sensitive watersheds of the Himalayas, the Western Ghats and Central India have also resulted in a great deal of environmental damage. As a consequence, environmental movements have come up in these regions.
to oppose the reckless mining operations. Most successful among them is the movement against limestone quarrying in the Doon Valley.

Large river valley projects, which are coming up in India at a very rapid pace, is another group of development projects against which people have organised ecology movements.

The large scale submersion of forest and agricultural lands, a prerequisite for the large river valley projects, always takes a heavy toll of dense forest and the best food growing lands. These have usually been the material basis for survival of a large number of people in India, especially tribal people. The ecological movement against the Tehri high dam in the UP Himalaya exposes the possible threat to people living both above and below the dam site through large-scale destabilisation of land by seepage and strong seismic movements that could be induced by impoundment.

**Development Projects as Ecological Concerns**

In this section we shall present a few projects that have been widely discussed in recent years as threat to ecology and environment in India.

**a) Tehri Hydroelectric Project**

The controversial Tehri dam is a classic example of the wanton destruction of the Himalayan geosystem and ecology wrought by the demands of development. The idea of setting up a high dam in the lesser Himalayas to harness its power and water potential was conceived way back in 1949 and a site chosen on river Bhagirathi, 1.5 km downstream from the 1000 year old holy town of Tehri, 1550 m above sea level. Serious doubts were raised about the viability and location of Tehri dam.

Tehri dam is located in the central Himalayan Seismic Gap where the Indian plate is crashing into the Asian mainland at a speed of 2 cm per year. The geological disturbances being created by the construction of the dam may hasten and intensify the earthquake. The rocks lining the walls of Bhagirathi gorge are prone to seepage and the accumulating water may exert immense pressure on the hill slopes. This along with the constantly eroding shale of the river bed will weaken the dam’s foundation which is said to be lying on a fault.

Further, the Tehri dam will obstruct the natural flow of the massive volumes of sediments raising the river beds upstream and endangering the populous settlements. It will inundate several villages and displace its inhabitants who have been living there for generations.

More precious land in this already dended land had to be cleared for those ousted, compelling them to surrender their fertile fields in return for barren patches. The rehabilitation scheme ignored the village as the unit for relocation and settled them as individual families thus taking away their collective bargaining power and destroying community culture. People in the Garhwal Himalaya have been against the project and their opposition coalesced into a movement. A fresh review of the project and closer scrutiny of the dam construction is being done.

**b) Narmada River Valley Project**

The Narmada river valley project, the largest in the country, envisages construction of 30 major dams — 10 on Narmada and 20 on its tributaries — as well as 135 medium and 3000 minor dams. Of these the two mega-dams are the Sardar Sarovar and Narmada Sagar. Some 21 million people dwell in this enormous basin covering 98,796 km sq. Around 80% of the population, with a sizeable number of tribals, live in villages and are dependent on agriculture and forests.
The Narmada Sagar and Sardar Sarovar dams were to be built in tandem, but the former estimated to submerge 90,000, was and thus never got underway being enmeshed in controversy from its inception. Construction of the latter, however, was taken up with zeal at the instance of the Gujarat government.

People affected adversely from the project are numerous and ever increasing. Hundreds of villages need to be evicted for the project resulting in the villagers and tribals being displaced and dispossessed.

Their traditional sources of livelihood are lost and rehabilitation does not necessarily recreate the same. The farmers of Nimar thrive on horticulture and when moved out of fertile plains, where will they grow their flowers?

It has been contended widely that there will be serious ecological consequences as a result of the building of these dams. Massive water logging and increased salinity of the soil would compound the problem.

Activists such as Medha Patkar and several other have drawn attention to these negative impacts on the environment. Protests in the form of strikes and indefinite fasts have emerged. Construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam has been stalled due to several anomalies which have been found in the project report of the government.

c) Bhopal Gas Leak

The Bhopal gas disaster, unparalleled in Indian history, reveals the mindless exploitation of developing countries by the multinationals for profit. Union Carbide Plant set up for pesticide formulations expanded despite posing environmental hazard. The Plants’ safety system was not up to the mark which caused the lethal leak and deadly chemicals were released in the atmosphere. The mushroom cloud which dissipated over an area of 40 km sq in Bhopal city, shed its toxins over the people, the poor being affected largely. Hundreds died while others suffer from chronic diseases, a result of the toxics, even today.

The Bhopal genocide is only a link in the chain of lethal pesticides and chemicals being developed by big industries and multinationals in their search for profit. It is the Third World countries where they dump hazardous products and experiment with deadly chemicals. Cities and towns especially the congested localities inhabited by the poor are the potential powder kegs, ready to ignite at the drop of a match. International dealers in pesticides, agrochemicals and petrochemicals, batteries, synthetic flares are swarming in, which without safety precautions and mindless exploitation poses a threat to the environment.

d) Chilika Shrimp Farm

Chilika, situated in Orissa, is the largest brackish water lake in India. It is a protected bird sanctuary, provides sustenance to thousands of farmers and fisher folk and has innumerable species of fish and marine life. Aquatic plants thrive in this unique ecosystem, making it an ideal spawning ground for shrimps.

Its natural propensity to breed prawns makes its blue waters irresistible to big business houses. Integrated Shrimp Farming Project (ISFP) in the backwaters of Chilika has been conceived by some
corporate giants. When the project gets underway, a part of Chilika will be enclosed by a 13 km embankment to form an artificial lake. It will then be parcelled into small ponds which will be filled up with seawater or freshwater as and when required. To breed 250-300g shrimps in 30-40 days as proposed in the project, protein-rich feed, chemical fertilizers and pesticides will be pumped into the waters. The poisonous effluents will be dumped into the creek joining Chilika with the sea.

The natural ebb and flow of Chilika is set to lose its rhythm with the ISFP embankment which will dislocate the fish route. Chemicals and pesticides will destroy the spawning grounds and the pumps will scare away the birds. Cattle will not be able to graze on the new grass on the islands springing up in the arid seasons. There will be water logging, salinity and consequently ecological balance will be disturbed.

**Participatory Approach for the Management of Natural Resources**

Different conceptions and debates on environment-development connections by conservationists, developmentalists, women activists, tribals and other marginalized groups reveals that each one has a different position or emphasis on issues such as conservation, subsistence needs of the poor, particularly women; economic growth models and sustainability of critical resources, threats to ecosystems and issues of equity and distribution of costs and benefits in the management of natural resources. The focus on the environment-development connection has reframed the issues of control and management of natural resources as it reflects the demands of the global economy which are pitted against the peoples’ claim to traditional rights and their livelihood. As political and economic battles intensify, livelihood interests and commercial interests are locked in never ending contradictions and may not be easily reconciled.

Over the years, various approaches for natural resource management have been outlined — both formal and informal arrangements — to support participatory processes on the grounds of efficiency, involving local people and building a partnership between the state and the community through appropriate institutional arrangements. Within the agenda of decentralised management of natural resources, one can identify several institutional arrangements such as self-initiated user groups, formal community groups established through government initiatives (Joint Forest Management or Watershed Management) and institutions of Local Self-Government (Panchayati Raj institutions). These local institutional arrangements shape the choices, priorities and bargaining systems to change state-community dynamics.

Community management of local resources or a decentralised strategy has assumed importance as it is expected to protect livelihoods and lead to a more sustainable management of resources. Another argument often made in defence of community management of natural resources relates to the indigenous/women’s knowledge systems, which are embedded in a particular community or context. Shiva argues “Third World women tribal and peasants act as intellectual gene pools of ecological categories of thought and action” (Shiva 1988).

Women’s responses to environmental issues are mediated by their livelihood systems, division of labour and unequal access to productive resources, and knowledge and information. Local NGO’s have tried to build alternatives for the management of the local resource base and link issues of gender equity to issues of social justice, poverty and indigenous people’s rights. The arguments for social justice and local people’s rights are based on the premise that local communities have a greater stake in the sustainable use of resources and are better positioned to respond and adapt to specific social and ecological conditions and incorporate local interest and preference. They are also conversant with the
local ecological practices and processes and can manage the resources through traditional forms of access and management.

During the last two decades, natural resource management and bio-diversity conservation have emerged as major priorities within countries and among donor agencies. People-oriented rhetoric and community-based natural resource management have become part of a strategy for bringing nations into line with global resource management initiatives (Neumann 2005).

DAMS AND DISPLACEMENT

Dams and Development: Background

Water, as the saying goes, is life itself. Human civilisation has grown on the banks of rivers. Dams are as old as human civilisation and have been considered as one of the oldest techniques of storing and channelling water. Patrick McCully (1998) presents a succinct history of dams. According to him, the earliest dam in the world was built in Jawa town, presently in Jordan, around 3000 BC. It was a system of ten reservoirs made of rock and earth that collected the water from a fall, which was channelled through a canal. The largest dam was more than 4 metres high. Egypt’s ‘Dam of the Pagan’ across a seasonal stream near Cairo was known to be 14 metres high and 113 metres long, but was washed away after a decade of its construction. Spain is home to a surviving Roman dam, built in the late first millennium B.C. A number of dams were built during this period all over the world, in the Middle East, China, and Central America and around the Mediterranean. The King of Sri Lanka, Parakrama Babu, also known for his despotic rule, built a 14 kilometres long dam. No other dam in the region could equal its volume. The king was supposed to have restored and built more than 4000 dams. McCully (1998) quotes the famous anthropologist, Edward Leach, on the large dams in Sri Lanka, stating that these dams ‘are monuments and not utilitarian structures’. The Sri Lankan villagers depended more on artificial ponds called ‘tanks’ than on dams for irrigation.

In fact, this is true for most of south Asia. Irrigation in India was largely dependent on traditional hydraulic infrastructure built and maintained locally, which included wells, ditches and tanks. Given the local caste-based social set up, it was difficult for the state to intervene in local customs. Nonetheless, the state did provide tax subsidies to promote water conservation. For example, in Gujarat, local officials had the authority to revise taxes and grant tax concessions. There were instances when tax on crops grown through irrigation from a recently constructed well was reduced till the cost of constructing the well was recovered (Hardiman 1998). Both the Mughals and the Marathas assessed tax on the basis of the ecological conditions of the region and climatic fluctuations. Local traditional elites were obliged by custom to regularly invest in public resources such as water. They were expected to build tanks, repair wells, etc. from time to time. China unlike India relied on an integrated hydraulic system for irrigation. Village level farming in north China depended on the local level drainage, which in turn was connected to the regional networks of dikes, levees and master canals. This system was closely interlinked to the massive central public works project. Flood control, canal management and local irrigation formed an integrated whole and the collapse of one could lead to the collapse of the entire system. Local irrigation was therefore state sponsored, with many of the wells and ditches built under the supervision of state officials.

Clearly, the role of the state, however minimal (as in the case of India), was crucial in establishing and maintaining a hydraulic system. Water was an important resource and its management was not left to chance and a good monsoon alone. Colonialism however played havoc with the local system of water management. Colonialism brought with it a stringent system of revenue assessment, which was
unsympathetic to local social and political dynamics and to climatic fluctuations. Likewise, the priorities of the colonial government were markedly different from the previous rulers. In India, expenditure on public works took a backseat with the British trying to consolidate its position after the bloody 1857 mutiny. The post mutiny period was characterised by greater investiture in military installations and the railways. Of the expenditure that was set aside for irrigation, 90% was spent on major irrigation projects based in Punjab. The British were keen on encouraging commercial crops such as cotton, opium, sugar cane and wheat. This interest in commercial agriculture was at the expense of subsistence-based agriculture and the small farmers managed irrigation systems of wells, tanks, small channels and dams.

**Dam building displaces whole communities forcing people to migrate**

Unlike the Mughals, the British did not subsidise construction of wells and tanks. Moreover heavy land tax did not leave any surplus to invest in irrigation systems. The new revenue system of the British granted water rights with land titles, thereby legally legitimising private appropriation of water resources. Those without water resources in their lands faced regular water shortage, especially during poor monsoons. Privatisation of water and land cut into the local system of maintaining irrigation systems. The situation in China was worse with the state withdrawing its role in the maintenance of the centralised hydraulic system. The area under irrigation decreased drastically, to the extent that only 6.8% of cultivated acreage in north China was irrigated in 1932 (The Corner House 2002). Between 1876-79, Asia (India, China, Java, Philippines and Korea), South Africa, Brazil, Algeria and Morocco reported recurrent drought and famine conditions. Never in the history of the world had famine and drought been registered simultaneously in so many nations. Millions died due to malnutrition and hunger. Evidently, “Climate risk…is not given by nature but…by ‘negotiated settlement’ since each society has institutional, social and technical means for coping with risk…Famines [thus] are social crises that represent the failures of particular economic and political systems” (Watt). The occurrence of famines across Asia, Africa and South America at the same time is not only proof of the effects of colonialism in that it created chronic conditions of poverty, hunger
and ill-health, but also announced the break down of local institution systems that usually rescued people from situations of crises.

Dams and in particular large dams gained in popularity in the 19th and the 20th century. Dams perform two important functions that make them supposedly ‘indispensable’ in the modern world. One, they store river or surface water to overcome the inconsistencies in the demand for water and its availability. Two, the differential height between the water collected in the dam in the upstream and the river downstream create hydropower and generate electricity. The dam thus not only provides electricity to industrial units and households but also supplies water for agriculture, industries and mass consumption. Rivers were the untapped resource for harnessing energy. Around 200 dams were built in Britain in the 19th century to provide water to its expanding cities. The dams built around the 1900s were earthen embankments and were built on a trial and error basis. Many of the dams built during this time in the world collapsed. The collapse of Johnstown Pennsylvania dam in 1889, St. Francis Dam of Los Angeles in the 1900s, and the water supply dam of Yorkshire in 1864 killed thousands of people and destroyed entire townships.

Large dams unlike local irrigation systems are huge structures, and are an outcome of centralised planning. That is why almost all large dams are state ventures, involving large investments and resources, both human and material. They are an integral part of the larger agenda to harness water resources for economic growth and development. The fascination with dams in the United States can be traced to the quest to irrigate the semi-arid regions in the west. In 1902, the famous National Reclamation or ‘Newlands’ Act was passed to reclaim land in the Western United States. Irrigation projects were seen as a way to turn arid lands into fertile plains, which would attract the landless from the east to migrate and settle in the west. The west however saw the rise of large landlords who benefited from the patronage of the state subsidies. The biggest disaster known in the history of the US is the collapse of the Hoover dam in 1931, though the latter did not dissuade the faith in large dams in solving the problem of water and power.

The former United Soviet Union (USSR) was no exception in this regard. Motivated by the conviction to build a strong socialist nation, dams were viewed as important structures of centralised resource mobilisation. As in the United States, it was a grand state project staffed by numerous engineers, officials, junior staff and workers. Damming of rivers claimed vast stretches of fertile land, marine life as well as the occupation of hundreds of fishermen (McCully 1996). Following the revolution, dam building was an integral part of Mao Zedong’s project of ‘Great Leap Forward’. Large dams to hold floodwater put the traditional system of containing floodwater through levees and canals redundant. Hydrologists were sceptical of the enthusiasm shown by the economic planners and their cynicism was not ill judged. Thousands of dams burst and created conditions of chaos and led to one of the worst known famines in the world. China has embarked on a new venture of constructing the Three Gorges Dam in 1996. Seismologists have drawn attention to the disastrous seismic consequences of building the dam in the region.

India too has had its share of involvement with dams. Jawaharlal Nehru’s words are quoted ever too often in praise of the Bhakra Nangal Dam, claiming big dams to be ‘modern day temples’. But Nehru too overcame his fascination for big dams subsequently, as is evident in the following statement, “I have been beginning to think that we are suffering from what we call we may call disease of gigantism” (Ibid: 23). In newly independent India, big dams, power centres, factories and industrial units came to symbolise the magnanimous presence of the state and its will to build a prosperous and a modern India. Dams were the official solution to generating water resources for industries, irrigation and harnessing energy. The focus was on increasing agricultural production and generating
hydropower to fuel industrial production. Interestingly, despite the crores of rupees spent on building large dams, most of India survives by exploiting ground water. Surface water or rivers cater to less than 10% of the water requirements in the country. The next section analyses the impact of dams on development in India, whether large dams facilitate development and, if they do, at what cost (human and ecological), and finally, whether this development was uniform or uneven across classes, castes and regions.

Arguments Against Large Dams

There are various debates on the impact of dams on economy, society, ecology and environment. These debates have brought forth arguments both in favour and against the construction of large dams. Let us examine some of these arguments.

a) Resistance and Displacement

Large dams have evoked more resistance than approval. The construction of Hirakud was marked by thirty thousand people, comprising of local politicians, bureaucrats and the people who were going to get evicted from the dam site taking to the street, in 1946. Hirakud was in this sense a forerunner of protests against dams in other parts of the country. Even while these protests focused on specific projects, the arguments raised for and especially against dams have been common. In the newly created tribal state of Jharkhand, there have been thirteen large irrigation projects, hundred and eight medium irrigation projects and six thousand eight hundred and twenty small water projects till date. Most of these projects have failed. Some are incomplete and have been abandoned. Most of these projects have been notorious for high levels of corruption and red tape. Large dam projects, notably the Subarnarekha Project and the Koel-Karo Project, faced tremendous resistance from the local tribal population.

The Koel-Karo Project was commissioned despite the fact that it would have destroyed 200 tribal villages and submerged 45,000 hectares of arable land. The Subarnarekha Project has been the site of police atrocities and the high level of illegal transactions of funds within the project has been common knowledge. JOHAR, a Human Rights Organisation in Jharkhand, has some very appalling findings on the state initiated nine minor irrigation projects within 1960-90 in West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand. The entire capital outlay of these projects was 14 crores. The government had claimed that 47,764 acres of land would gain through the irrigation facility of these projects on their completion. According to JOHAR’s research, the nine projects ‘do not exist’ and there is no accounting for the public money spent on these projects. Till 1997, 22.5 lakh acres of land had been procured from the local tribal population in the name of minor and major irrigation projects. Lakhs have been displaced from their land and have turned towards wage labour in mines and factories in the surrounding areas for employment.

The campaign that drew attention of the world to the politics of large dam construction and its harmful impact on the environment is the Narmada Bachao Andolan or the movement to save the river Narmada. Narmada runs through the three States of India, i.e., Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat. Worshipped as a holy river, Narmada is the lifeline of thousands of villages and her importance is illustrated in the folk traditions of the region. In 1985, the World Bank approved $450 million Sardar Sarover Multi-Purpose Dam Project on the Narmada. According to World Bank estimates, the project was to generate 1300 million cubic-metres per year of water for civic and industrial purposes, an installed capacity of 1450 MW of electricity and provide irrigation to 1.9
million hectares of land. The project was to submerge 13,744 hectares of forestland, 11,318 hectares of fertile agricultural land, and displace over 100,000 people, mostly persons and families belonging to the category of scheduled tribes and the rural poor. The sheer magnitude and size of the project raised concern among concerned citizens and specialists. The planners according to the Narmada Bachao Movement had not critically and realistically assessed the ecological, human and financial consequences of undertaking this project. Let us explore the three main areas identified by the movement as arguments against large dams.

b) Ecological Consequences

The most apparent ecological effect of large dams is the permanent destruction of vast expanse of forests, wetlands, and wild life. The dam would submerge vast tracts of rich forest cover. But the lesser-known consequences are equally disturbing. The forests are routes of migration of many animals, the wetland attract various migratory birds, while the river is a channel for migratory fishes. The destruction of the routes of migration of animals, birds and fishes not only affect the ecosystem, but also affect the lives of the local population. Fish forms an integral part of the staple diet of local populations; embankment blocks their movement downstream as well as intercept the cycle of breeding among them. In places like Jharkhand and Chattisgarh, the cutting down of forests has forced the wild animals to wander into villages in search of food, often attacking and killing the locals. Dams convert rivers into reservoirs, which has environmental implications on its entire drainage area - upstream, downstream and the command area of the reservoir. Embankment restricts the river water to flow downstream. The upstream in the process collects the sediment, which increases the water level and can cause floods in the area drowning people and property. The river downstream, denied of its regular quota of water and sediment is, according to McCully (1998), ‘hungry’ and eats away the plains along its course. The plains are also denied of the rich alluvial content of the river, which affects the fertility, quality and the productivity of the soil. The river downstream also experiences sudden fluctuations, with water being thrown out periodically from the command area to reduce the pressure of water. Often this may destroy vegetation along its way as well as settlements that take over the land vacated by the river after the construction of the dam. The reservoir by holding large quantity of water encourages high rate of water evaporation. This leads to the increase in the salinity of water, which can have a long-term effect on the quality of water.

c) Human Consequences

One of the most obvious and visible unwarranted outcomes of dam projects is the displacement of people from their habitat. This means that not only are persons living in and around dam sites asked to vacate their homes and settle in other places, but also that they are expected to give up their land, their homes that they have nurtured all their lives and surroundings they have been familiar with so that the dam could be built for the anonymous beneficiaries. It is difficult for the ousted to comprehend the benefits of dams, as to how it can possibly bring prosperity and well-being. Large numbers migrate to the already overcrowded and overburdened towns and cities in search of work and live in dismal urban conditions. Many subsist by working at the dam site. They labour under severe work conditions. The construction site is especially susceptible to infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and influenza. Once the work at the dam is over, very often the locals have to be physically forced to leave the site. In the late 1950s, when Mexico’s Maztec Indians refused to vacate their homes from the site of the Miguel Aleman Dam, their houses were set on fire and the army was called in to quell the unrest. Similarly, in erstwhile USSR, the displaced population were often forced to take part in bringing down their homes, churches, and orchards and disinter the coffins of their dead relatives (McCully 1998).
Besides the number of people that dam projects displace, it is noteworthy that majority of the persons who are displaced belong to the category of tribes or constitute the rural poor, with marginal or no land. A document brought out by the Ministry of Rural Development of India Government, in 1996, suggests that over one crore sixty lakh persons have been displaced due to mining, dams and canals, industries, sanctuaries and national parks. Of these, about thirty-nine lakh have been rehabilitated. According to Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste Commission report (1990), almost forty percent of the displaced population belongs to the scheduled tribe category. The Sardar Sarovar Dam project in Gujarat, Koel-Karo Dam project, Subernarekha and the Kuju Dam project in Jharkhand, Balimela project and the Machkunda Dam in Orissa are some of the better-known instances where tribal rights to land and forests have been disregarded to fulfil the larger interests of the State and the general population.

d) Financial Consequences

Dams have entailed huge financial investments, which to its critics are most uneconomical investments by far. The Sardar Sarovar Dam’s total final cost as per official estimates (1987-88) is Rs. 11,154/- crores and this estimate does not include other expenses and recurring costs to be incurred on account of treatment of catchment area, delays caused in completing the project, compensatory afforestation among many others over the eight years within which the project has to be completed. Even this ‘modest’ estimate was more than the centre and state’s Plan expenditure in the entire seventh five-year plan period. As per the Government of India, Department of Environment and Forest note to the Prime Minister, the total environmental loss due to the project was a colossal 40,000 crores (Alvares and Billore 1988: 46-7). Almost all large dam projects the world over has been financed by the World Bank at a heavy interest rate of 10.75% per annum. The Bank agreed to extend a maximum loan of Rs. 700 crores. The rest of the finances were being sought from Japan; ONGC agreed to extend a loan of Rs 200 crores at the interest rate of 14.5% per annum. The Gujarat government even issued tax-free bonds to raise the required money and managed to raise about a paltry sum from the public (Amte, Baba 1990). The key question is as to how will the Gujarat Government raise this money and how does it propose to pay up the interests on the loans. What about it’s other development commitments as well as social welfare responsibilities of providing health care, education and employment?

Dams and Displacement: Persons and Values

The government of India has tried to rescue the situation by its rehabilitation package, although there was no national level policy for resettlement and rehabilitation till 2004. In February 2004 the central government promulgated the National Rehabilitation Policy for the Project Displaced Persons. Even before that certain states such as Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh have evolved state- level policies on resettlement and rehabilitation. Most rehabilitation efforts have been to provide alternative land titles to the evictees or compensate them in cash. As for the monetary compensation, the evictees are forced to go through the arduous bureaucratic procedures to procure what is rightfully their due. The land in the case of the Sardar Sarovar Project had been assessed according to old land records, which under- price its present value. Often, the land provided by the government has been of poor quality. The evictees are required to produce land deeds, which many don’t possess. Compensation through cash has also not been an appropriate form of compensation, as it has been observed that the beneficiaries often spend the money on short-term requirements and are left without money and are homeless in a matter of a few months of rehabilitation.
In cases of rehabilitation through alternative land titles, the problem faced by the government has been of locating land to settle the displaced. Large parts of forest of other areas have been cut down to distribute land to the displaced, as is evident in Nandurbar district of Maharashtra. The rehabilitated population in Nandurbar have still not received formal, registered copies of the land they have been settled on. The forests have been encroached upon by the rehabilitated population, much to the resentment of the local tribes who derive large part of their sustenance from the forests. There is a direct relation between environment destruction and the impoverishment of the evictees. For one, both are victims of dam projects. Secondly and most importantly, forests are the alternative lifelines of the rural poor. Much of the subsistence is derived from forest products. Forests also help them pull through the seasonal lean period, as they make do with fruits, herbs, green leaves and game available in the forests. This fact has not been given serious thought while considering the issue of rehabilitation. Growing tensions between the rehabilitated population and the local tribes has become a cause for concern. 40% of the forest in Nandurbar has been declared as degraded. The policy of ‘land-for-land’ is based on the premise that there is excess public land available for distribution among the evictees, which is questionable. The land available most often than not is poor quality land or non-cultivable. This premise also reveals the linear perception of livelihood options. As illustrated above, livelihood includes a host of economic activities (as quite often, land holdings are small) and there is no one activity from which livelihood is derived. Compensation of land then is only a partial remuneration of the losses incurred by the evictees. Ideally the replacement of the livelihood lost only can provide any kind of relief to the displaced people. Neither the National Policy nor the State policies/laws have provision for this.

The debate on large dams has focused on displacement and its effect on the ecology and human beings. Large dams however represent a larger purpose or vision of society. They were considered as symbols of a modern, progressive world. They demonstrated the capacity of human intelligence and ingenuity to tap and use natural resources for human advancement. They stood for the ability of modern science and technology to overcome the constraints of nature for the benefit of humankind. The issue, which is equally important and often overlooked, is as to what is the type of society that was and is sought to be ‘displaced’ by this modern vision of progress and development. Also, who are the people most adversely affected by this displacement? As mentioned earlier, the peoples and communities who are displaced through development programmes live on the margins of society such as tribes, pastoralists and subsistence agriculturists. These groups have inhabited forests and survived in the fringes of the mainstream civilisation for centuries. The benefits of development programmes rarely accrue to them. Although monetary compensation is provided to them (the evaluation of loss is yet again a contentious issue), scant attention is given to their customs and traditions while rehabilitating them. The rehabilitation policies reveal intolerance to cultural and social issues. The displaced are a ‘number’ among the large mass to be rehabilitated.

The reasoning that has predominated the issue of rehabilitation of displaced persons is largely economic. Economic issues are supposed to be survival issues, while the destruction of culture is considered as secondary. Economic and cultural rehabilitation are seen as distinct from each other. In most traditional, agricultural societies, it is difficult to separate the two. Economic skills are disseminated through cultural practices and the process of socialisation, while culture is renewed and reinstated in society in the process of economic production. Needless to say, almost all festivals and ritual functions in traditional societies mark different stages of work over the various seasons in the year. In such a scenario, the prioritisation of the economic over the cultural aspect of life demonstrates the secularisation and modernisation of life evident in modern industrial society. Displacement through large dams then has not just meant moving people from one place to another, but has also
entailed destroying an entire way of life built over generations, economic and cultural skills accumulated through ages to survive in, often, the harshest of environmental conditions.

In an unrelenting effort to find solutions to the problem of poverty, the development planners have evolved projects involving unimaginable expenses, encouraged investments in agricultural and industrial production, which has created drought-like conditions in many parts of the country as well as increased economic inequality. Thus in a quest to dispel poverty, poor are displaced and rendered homeless. In an attempt to deal with the drought-like conditions and the crisis of water for drinking and irrigation, they have acquiesced to destroy existing natural resources to create new ones. This circuitous attempt at development or the pursuance of modern development that aggravates the resource crisis while simultaneously addressing the problem by further exploiting existing resources has caused greater harm than gain. It has proved to be unsustainable, both in terms of environmental consequences and as a model for alleviating poverty. Rather, it has come to symbolise a politics of development that is highly materialistic and aggressive, catering to the needs of a select population.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Historical Context

The early roots of the concept of sustainable development can be traced back to the development-environment debate. The economic growth model of development, its adoption by most of the countries in the world and realisation of the consequences it produced in various forms of environmental degradation has provided the historical context for the rise of the development-environment debate.

The economic growth model of development is characterised by the use of modern technology, the factory system of production and rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. The Western countries initially followed this model of development and prescribed it for the less developed ones. The predominant underlying belief was that the underdeveloped countries would eventually catch up with the industrialised countries, provided they emulate the economic and social systems of the West. The less developed countries adopted the western model of development rather uncritically.

The consequences of adoption of the western model of development by the less developed countries were not all positive. Economic growth occurred, but it was accompanied by a widened gulf between the countries in the North and the South, and it also helped to promote economic disparities between the rich and the poor sections within particular societies. It was realised that “development” conceived simply as “economic growth” was an inadequate notion, and that economic growth does not necessarily lead to the development of the lower strata of society. This realisation caused a shift in development thinking and eventually led to the inclusion of some additional criteria of development such as distributive justice or equity, and improvement in the overall quality of life of the masses (Dhanagare 1996: 7-9).

Moreover, it is more important to note that the examination of the impact of the western model of development on the quality of the global environment has led to the critical reconsideration of this model of development. It is realised that the reckless pursuit of industrialisation and the use of resource exploitative modern technology for development have resulted in environmental deterioration to such an extent that the very existence of all the living species is endangered. There is a general agreement that the economic expansion, especially during the post-war period, has had alarming consequences for the global environment (Munshi 2000: 253). Industrialisation required a continuous supply of energy and materials from nature. It led to the constant accumulation of wastes.
that resulted from accelerated industrial production and increasing level of consumption. There was a gradual deterioration of nature.

\[\text{Sustainable development implies a harmonious relationship between man and nature}\]

The “modern, industrial form of production induced increasingly severe degrees of social inequality and growing environmental instability and degradation... which, together, have more recently been conceptualised as the “crisis of modernity” (Eduardo and Woodgate 1997: 85). The environmental degradation that has occurred is marked by a large-scale extraction of finite natural resources. Loss of forests, extinction of animal and plant species, depletion of the ozone layer, air, water and soil pollution, loss of marine life and bio-diversity etc. have occurred at an alarming rate and have posed a serious threat to the very survival of life on this planet.

While examining the consequences of the Western model of development in the context of ecosystems and economies of developing nations, Sunita Narain (2002: 13) comments that, the “western economic and technological model is highly material and energy intensive, it metabolises huge quantities of natural resources and leaves a trail of toxins, with highly degraded and transformed ecosystems in its wake. It is this model that developing nations are also following for economic and social growth, leading to an extraordinary cocktail of poverty and inequality side by side with growing economies, pollution and large-scale ecological destruction”. It is recognised that the “western development model in its most triumphant moments appears to be neither desirable nor universally applicable because it is simply not sustainable” (Bernhard 1997: 113). Thus, the two basic assumptions of the Western model of development, i.e. “first, development could be universalised in space and, second, that it would be durable in time” (Sachs 1997: 71), had lost their validity.

Due to the strategies adopted for economic growth, environmental degradation and exploitation of natural resources have become global phenomena. Eventually, the increasing awareness of environmental problems has led to the emergence of environmentalism. It is important to note that
environmentalism has added an important dimension to the ongoing development discourse. In fact, it has caused a paradigm-shift in our vision of development. It has compelled the intellectuals concerned to think about what is being done to the eco-system of this planet in the name of development. The worsening environmental situation has led to the re-examination and re-consideration of the policies, strategies and programmes for development. As a result, the environment – development debate emerged and became intensified in due course of time.

Initially, Development and Environment were seen as distinct entities. There was a sharp division between those who supported development over environment and those who argued for environment over development (Baviskar 1997: 196). As another scholar observes, there emerged two different camps of protagonists who inhabited two different mental spaces and regarded themselves as opponents (Ibid: 71-72). This gave rise to the dichotomy of development versus environment.

However, eventually, there also emerged an increased awareness about the fact that human beings need both “development” and “environment”. As Balletmus has expressed, there was “a growing recognition that the overall goals of environment and development are not in conflict but are indeed the same, namely, the improvement of human quality of life or welfare of the present and future generations (cf Mohanty 1998:82)”. Such thinking led to the view that “development” versus “environment” is a false dichotomy. This view is well articulated in World Development Report 1992 — Development and the Environment. It is argued in this report that the, “economic development and sound environmental management are complementary aspects of the same agenda. Without adequate environmental protection, development will be undermined; without development, environmental protection will fail...income growth will provide the resources for improved environmental management” (World Bank 1992: 25). In fact, such a view underscored the need of reconciliation between “development” and “environment”. The concept of “sustainable development”, as defined in the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), titled “Our Common Future” (1987), represents such an attempt to reconcile the goals of development as well as that of environmental protection. Before we study the definition and meaning of this concept, let us look at its genesis and evolution.

**Sustainable Development: Genesis and Evolution**

According to Eduardo Sevilla-Guzman and Graham Woodgate (1997: 86-87), the concept of “sustainable development” was the result of a dynamic gestation. Hence, they have attempted to trace its genesis in “official international discourse”. They have reviewed various international events and publications and schematically brought out their discovery/product and character (See Box 4.1). Adopting a similar approach, a brief review of the major international events/ documents and their contribution to the making of the concept of “sustainable development” is outlined here.

In 1972, the United Nations Conference on “Human Environment”, took place in Stockholm, Sweden. The Stockholm Conference was historical in the sense that environmental problems received a formal recognition for the first time at the global level. The modern industrial societies could realise that there is only “one world”. It was also recognised that environmental problems are global problems requiring international solutions, although the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South do not necessarily share the same environmental concerns.

A report titled Limits to Growth - the work of the Club of Rome (1972-74), has been credited as the first official study on global environmental deterioration. In this report, there is ecological analysis of industrialism. The report also focused on the predicted results of continuing levels of resource
depletion, pollution and population growth. Due to this report, a sense of realisation grew that infinite growth was impossible with finite resources. Then, a diagnosis of the factors of global environmental deterioration brought out in a report titled Global 2000 — commissioned by the U. S. President, Jimmy Carter and published in 1980 — underscored that northern lifestyles cannot be reproduced globally.

Diagrammatic representation of the concept of Sustainable Development

Then, in the year 1981, the concept of “sustainable development” appeared for the first time. It was enshrined in the title of a key document - World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development, published by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and UN Environment Programme (UNEP). According to the Strategy’s definition, “for development to be sustainable it must take account of social and ecological factors, as well as economic ones; of the living and non-living resource base; and of the long term as well as the short term advantages and disadvantages of alternative actions” (Starke 1990: 8-9).

In 1983, the United Nations set up the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway, as an independent body. Its objective was to re-examine the critical environment and development problems on the planet and to formulate realistic proposals to solve them, and to ensure that human progress will be sustained through development without bankrupting the resources of the future generations. The WCED published its report titled “Our Common Future” in the year 1987. This report presented the first official definition of the concept of “sustainable development”. The contribution of “Our Common Future” (1987), is threefold: i) it offers the first official definition of sustainable development, ii) it suggests, for the first time, an international strategy for confronting the crisis of modernity, and iii) it brings about a paradigm change in conventional thinking regarding the notion of “development”.

Another document, “Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living” (published by IUCN, UNEP and WWF, in 1991), has suggested a revised global strategy for the conservation of nature. More importantly, it was recognised by this work that global nature conservation requires the participation of local people.
In 1992, representatives of over 150 countries met in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), popularly known as the “Earth Summit”. The Earth Summit established important linkages between environment and development and contributed to the further development of the concept of “sustainable development”. It produced the “The Earth Charter” - a code of conduct or plan of action for the 21st century i.e. Agenda 21, and Local Agenda 21 (LA21), an interpretation for local issues (which came later); the Climate Convention — a convention to control climate change due to atmospheric pollution, and the Biodiversity Convention — a convention to promote the conservation of bio-diversity. The Rio Declaration also set out the framework of principles of conservation and use of forests and, established important steps that needed to ensure an environmentally stable and sustainable planet (The Hindu Survey of the Environment 2002: 5-6).

Correspondingly, at the international level, many nation-states have been trying to go ahead with the notion of “sustainable development”. They are striving to find out economic and political solutions for environmental problems. One also notices periodical attempts to take stock of the progress made by the nations in the direction of “sustainable development”. For instance, in 1997, “Rio+5” meet was held in New York in order to assess the progress towards “sustainable development”. Again, as a further step, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was held at Johannesburg, from 26th August to 4th September 2002. The Johannesburg Summit is recognised as “Rio+10”. The agenda for this international meet was much beyond the review of the progress made in the direction of sustainable development in the 10 years since Rio. The agenda included every possible issue related to environment and development: energy, water and sanitation, health, forests, consumption patterns, poverty, trade, globalisation etc. Thus, the scope of “sustainable development” was broadened.

Sustainable development was seen as comprising three components: economic development, social development and environmental protection (Reddy 2002: 10). The newspaper reports which appeared during the Summit period highlighted that, there were discussions and debates over many issues.
which include: call for reduction of poverty, saving the planet’s fast-dwindling resources from further plundering, criticism against the European and American pattern of agricultural subsidies and a need to eliminate the trade distorting subsidies, dispute on the definition of globalisation and demands by the Third World countries for more aid, finance and fairer trade.

Thus, various international events and publications have contributed to the making of the concept of “sustainable development”. Let us now understand the definition and meaning of the concept of “sustainable development” as formulated and elaborated in “Our Common Future” (1987).

Concept of Sustainable Development as Defined in Our Common Future (1987)

The definition of the term sustainable development, its meaning, requirements, policy objectives, and suitable strategy, as mentioned in the report Our Common Future, have been briefly dealt with below. (The text inserted within quotes is adapted from the chapter from the Commission’s report, Our Common Future (1987), reproduced under the title Towards Sustainable Development in Science Age, August 1987: 30-38).

a) Sustainable Development: Definition and Meaning of the Concept

The definition of the concept of Sustainable Development put forward in the report titled Our Common Future (1987) is: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

It contains within it two key concepts:

• the concept of “needs”, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and

• the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs” (cf Science Age 1987: 30).

In order to understand the meaning of the definition, let us understand the core issues addressed in the above definition. First is the issue of economic growth. The economic growth is not only considered essential for poverty reduction but also for meeting human needs and aspirations for better life. Second is the issue of limitations of the environment’s ability to meet the needs of the present and future generations. Due to the pressures generated by growing societal needs, societies are using modern technologies for extracting and utilising natural resources, which are limited. If we continue to exploit existing limited natural resources, future generations will not be able to meet their own needs. Thus, environment’s ability to meet present and future generations’ needs has certain limits. This realisation is clearly reflected in the definition. Thus, the concept of “sustainable development” is based on an integrated view of development and environment; it recommends pursuance of development strategies in order to maximise economic growth from a given ecological milieu on the one hand, and to minimise the risks and hazards to the environment on the other; for being able to meet the needs and aspirations of the present generation without compromising the ability to meet those of the future generations.

In short, the above definition of “sustainable development” implies that: (i) we should direct our efforts towards redressing the damage already done to the environment by earlier unsustainable patterns of economic growth and, (ii) we should follow such a pattern of development which avoids further damage to the planet’s ecosystem and ensures meeting of the needs of present as well as future human generations.

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b) “Sustainable Development”: Requirements

While elaborating the concept, the report Our Common Future (1987) also brings out the requirements of “sustainable development”. For a better understanding of the concept, some of the important requirements of “sustainable development” can be highlighted:

Sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life………………the promotion of values that encourage consumption standards that are within the bounds of the ecologically possible and to which all can reasonably aspire………that societies meet human needs both by increasing productive potential and by ensuring equitable opportunities for all…… demographic developments are in harmony with the changing productive potential of the ecosystem……..At a minimum, …development must not endanger the natural systems that support life on Earth: the atmosphere, the waters, the soils, and the living beings……the world must ensure equitable access to the constrained resource and reorient technological efforts to relieve the pressure……that the rate of depletion of non-renewable resources should foreclose as few future options as possible……the conservation of plant and animal species………… that the adverse impacts on the quality of air, water, and other natural elements are minimized so as to sustain the ecosystem’s overall integrity”.

It is also added that, in essence, sustainable development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations”.

Criticisms of the Concept of Sustainable Development

The concept of sustainable development, as defined by the Brundtland Commission, has been subjected to critical scrutiny by many scholars. The criticisms not only point out the logical contradictions and semantic ambivalence in the term, but also center on its vagueness/ambiguity of the terms/phrases included in the definition, point towards difficulties at the operational level and attempt to uncover implicit assumptions and political motives.

a) Sustainable Development: Logical Contradiction and Semantic Ambivalence

Scholars like Ramesh Deewan, take an extreme stand and express the view that the concept of sustainable development represents contradiction in the term itself. He remarks that, development and sustainability are not only incompatible with each other, they are contradictory as well. In other words, sustainable is not development (cf Dhanagare 1996: 10). Such a view clearly implies that, the term development used in any sense — say economic growth or growth with equity or improvement in quality of life or modernisation — inevitably leads to an increase in the level of consumption and also to the exploitation of natural resources.

According to Wolfgang Sachs, the linkage of the term sustainable to development has created a terrain of semantic ambivalence. In his words, within the new concept, the locus of sustainability has subtly shifted from nature to development; while sustainable previously referred to natural yields, it now refers to development. And the perceptual frame also changes, instead of nature, development becomes the object of concern and, instead of development, nature becomes the critical factor to be watched. In short, the meaning of sustainability slides from conservation of nature to conservation of development” (Sachs 1997: 73).
b) Definition of Sustainable Development: Vague and Ambiguous

In the opinion of Sukhamoy Chakravorty, the phrase sustainable development … says nothing precise and, therefore, means anything to anybody. Anil Agarwal adds: for a logging company it can mean sustained projects; for an environmental economist it can mean sustained stocks of natural forests; for a social ecologist it can mean sustained use of forest; and, for an environmentalist it can mean a clean heritage for our children. But surely confusion cannot be more productive than clarity”.

The observations of William F. Fisher show persons with different viewpoints, holding different philosophical positions, having different goals in mind and advocating different means to achieve desired ends use the same moral vocabulary of social justice and the same economic rhetoric of sustainable development. In his view, sustainable development has become a term that is used to justify whatever one does and, by implication, criticize those with differing goals, strategies, and opinions (1997). Widely debated Sardar Sarovar Project in India is the case in point. Fisher writes, dam proponents and opponents seem sincere in their commitment to goals of sustainable development and social justice, but what they mean by these terms differs.

V. Ratna Reddy (1995), referring to the concern for meeting the needs of future generations expressed in the Commission’s definition says, “at the conceptual level it is difficult to circumvent the conflicts between the present and future generations’ interests. While needs are conceived differently from one environment and culture to another in the same generation, how future generations will conceive of their needs may well be beyond our imagination…”.

C. R. (2002) Reddy comments that, “while an entire U.N. machinery has been created around ‘sustainable development’, the world is still waiting for an operational meaning of what is an intuitively appealing but yet fuzzy concept”.

In a similar vein, William F. Fisher (1997) observes that, “while widespread commitment to the term ‘sustainable development’ might suggest a growing worldwide consensus on the need for development that is sustainable, there is no agreement about the specific goals of sustainable development or the appropriate means to achieve them.’

K. R. Nayar (1994) looks at the concept of “sustainable development” as a political instrument and is critical of many aspects of the Commission’s definition. He argues that, “the concept of sustainable development has emerged from those countries which themselves practice unsustainable resource use”, and further adds that “the politics of ‘sustainable development’ is that at present it is anti-south, anti-poor, and thereby anti-ecological”.

Nayar also comments that, “the need” with reference to sustainable development is affluence rather than basic, or opulence rather than squalor. Because, when basic needs become an integral component of a developmental model, the question of unsustainability does not arise”. He further adds, “the cyclical relationship between poverty and environmental degradation is conceptualised in simplistic terms”.

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POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION

Poverty is a broad concept with many aspects to it. Here, poverty is viewed as a level of living that is so low that it inhibits the physical, mental and social development of human personality.

India is home to widespread poverty and deprivation

Concept of Poverty

The problem of poverty has been with the human culture and civilisation since ages. In the beginning the human beings were dependent on nature for the fulfillment of even their basic needs for survival such as food, clothing and shelter. The society was at a low level of social organisation and technological development. The state of poverty was general in nature faced by all members of society.

Gradually, there occurred great progress in social organisation and technological development. Human beings started producing food and clothes and building houses for themselves. They also produced various other articles for maintaining a comfortable life. This conquest of the human being over nature has gone a long way over the ages. However, the fruits of socio-economic progress have not been equally shared by all sections of society. Society has been broadly divided into two classes i.e. the rich and the poor. The rich people are economically rich, politically dominant and socially superior. But the common masses are economically poor, politically dominated and socially inferior. On the one hand, we find affluence of the ruling class and poverty of the mass on the other. This type of poverty of the weaker sections of society is a social product. It is intrinsically related to the prevailing socio-economic structure of society. The poverty of the masses is generated and perpetuated by the social system. It has been called ‘artificial’ poverty (Joshi 1986: 213). This means that poverty is a socially created state. It is multi-dimensional in nature comprising economic,
political, social and cultural aspects. But economic poverty constitutes the basis and gets reinforced and perpetuated by political, social and cultural backwardness.

**Approaches to Understand Poverty**

Poverty has been defined differently in the developed and the developing countries because of their different levels of economic development. There are two main approaches to the problem of poverty-the ‘nutritional’ approach and the ‘relative deprivation’ approach.

i) The Nutritional approach

This approach has been adopted in the developing countries. In this case, poverty is measured on the basis of minimum food requirements. This is calculated in terms of consumption of adequate calories (generally 2250 calories) to maintain working capacity of a person. People who are unable to fulfil this bare minimum in food consumption due to their low income are placed below the ‘poverty line’. The concept of poverty line is used to demarcate the poor from the non-poor. It is formulated in terms of an income level, which is considered to be adequate for enabling a person to maintain a minimum level of consumption of goods and services. Persons whose income level is below the poverty line are identified as poor. This is a measure of ‘absolute’ poverty i.e. poverty defined with reference to some predetermined standard or norm.

ii) The Relative Deprivation approach

In case of the developed countries, the ‘relative deprivation’ approach has been adopted for measuring poverty because fulfillment of minimum need of food is not the major problem. Here, poverty is seen in terms of relative deprivation of a class or a section of population against the privileged ones. Poverty is perceived in terms of an exclusion of a class or section of population from average living patterns, activities and participation in social life because of lack of resources e.g. wealth, income, education and political power. The emphasis is more on social inequalities than nutritional requirements.

The ‘nutritional’ approach to poverty is highly deficient in nature because it excludes essential non-food requirement for human living. In defining poverty, we must include essential non-food requirements like clothing, housing, education and health-care facilities, which are as important as the essential food requirements for an average human life in a civilised society. We cannot reduce human life to sheer animal life, which is concerned only with basic survival needs.

Against this backdrop of the concept of and approaches to poverty, we will now look at the phenomenon of rural and urban poverty in India. This discussion will be in terms of a historical perspective.

**HISTORICAL DIMENSION**

While discussing the historical dimension of poverty in our country, we will view this phenomenon in ancient, medieval and colonial periods of Indian history.

**Ancient Period**

The roots of contemporary rural and urban poverty in India go deep down the history of the country. The Rigvedic society was basically tribal, semi-nomadic, pastoral and largely egalitarian. According to Sharma (1980) it was a pre-class society at a very low level of socio-economic development.
Poverty was a general problem of the people. In the third book of the Rigveda a prayer is offered to God to drive away poverty and famine. But the varna-based inequalitarian society developed during the Later Vedic period and onwards with the growth of agrarian settlements, towns and cities. A full-fledged class-based social order was formed in the age of the Buddha and has continued ever since. Thus, we witness a change from a stage of general state of poverty to a stage of socially-generated poverty during the ancient period.

In the ancient Indian society the king, nobles, holders of land grants, and rich merchants constituted the privileged class. They belonged to the Brahman, Kshatriya and a section of the Vaisya varna. They enjoyed a prosperous life through appropriation of surplus produced by the working people. They did not directly participate in the process of production. But the common people comprising peasants, artisans, craftspersons, labourers, servants and slaves were very poor. They belonged to Vaisya and Shudra varna and the untouchable castes. They suffered from multiple disabilities and deprivations e.g. economic, political, social, religious and cultural. The peasants had to pay heavy taxes to the privileged ruling class with little left for their survival. The artisans and craftspersons also suffered from exploitation and oppression of the rulers. The servility of the Shudra assumed various forms. They worked as domestic servants and slaves, agricultural slaves, hired labourers and artisans. Manu mentions seven kinds of slaves - a captive of war, a slave of maintenance, a son of a female slave, one purchased for money, a slave obtained as a present, a hereditary one, and one condemned to slavery for any offence (Punit 1982). The masses lived in absolute poverty, which was created by inequitable distribution of social resources and reflected in their utter misery. Kalhana, a Kashmiri poet in ancient India, in his book “Rajatarangini” refers to a drought in the beginning of the eighth century as follows.

One could scarcely see the water in the Jhelum, entirely covered as the river was with corpses soaked and swollen by the water in which they had been long lying... The King’s ministers and guards became wealthy as they amassed riches by selling stocks of rice at high prices.

Medieval Period

During the medieval period, socially created poverty of the masses was perpetuated in the kingdoms and empires ruled by both the Muslim rulers and the Hindu rulers. The ruling class comprising the king, nobles, zamindars (landlords), jagirdars and the rich merchants and traders thrived on the surplus produced by the working people and lived a highly ostentatious life. But peasants, craftspersons, artisans, labourers, servants and slaves lived a miserable life despite their hard labour. Nikitin, a foreign traveller, who visited the Vijayanagar empire which was ruled by the Hindu rulers, observed that the land was overstocked with people; but those in the country were very miserable while the nobles were extremely opulent and lived in luxury (Punit 1982).

Moreover, the severity of drought and famines forced people at times to barbarism. Abdul Hamid describes in Badshahnama that in one of the bad years of the so called ‘golden age’ of the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan, ‘destitution at last reached such a pitch that men began to devour each other, and the flesh of a son was preferred to his love’. Economic misery of the common people continued unabated along with their socio-political deprivations. Poverty of the masses amidst affluence of the privileged ruling class could be a valid description of the medieval period as was the case in the ancient period.
Colonial Period

The British colonial rule over India added an alien exploiter and oppressor. This accentuated the problem of poverty of the country in general and the Indian masses in particular. Indian economy was subordinated to serve the interests of British capital. In the previous two units of this Block we looked at these aspects. A huge amount of wealth was drained out of India to enrich the British ruling class. The peasants were ruthlessly exploited and oppressed by the zamindars, money-lenders and the state under the new land revenue system. Rural artisans suffered from the decline of rural household industries. Urban craftsmen were exploited and oppressed by the British traders and their agents. A number of towns and cities, which were famous for their manufactures, declined and became desolate. Reporting on the decline of urban handicrafts William Bentinck, the Governor-General, said in 1834-35 “the bones of the cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of India” (Chandra 1977: 184). The growth of modern machine-based capitalist industries also resulted in exploitation of the workers by the capitalists.

Further, the occurrence of frequent famines and the high losses of life in them reflect the high magnitude of poverty and starvation, which had taken root in India during this period. According to William Digby’s estimate, over 28,825,000 people died during famines only in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1943, nearly thirty lakh (three million) people died in the famine of Bengal. Moreover, the grim situation of India’s poverty in the nineteenth century was recognised by many English officials in India. Charles Elliot remarked “I do not hesitate to say that half the agricultural population do not know from one year’s end to another what it is to have a full meal”. William Hunter observed that “forty million of the people of India habitually go through life on insufficient food” (Chandra 1977:194 - 95). The condition became worse in the twentieth century. The quantity of food available to an Indian declined by as much as twenty-nine per cent in the thirty years between 1911 to 1941 (Chandra).

POVERTY IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA

The problem of poverty in India after Independence can be described in terms of the social classes, castes or groups afflicted with poverty in rural and urban areas. It can also be discussed in terms of magnitude of the problem and the linkages between rural and urban poverty.

Rural and Urban Poor

In India, large sections of the population live in abject poverty. The poor live in rural and urban areas. In the rural areas, they consist of small landholders, agricultural labourers, artisans and craftsmen. They mainly belong to the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward castes.

In urban areas, the poor people are usually engaged in the unorganised sector and some low paid jobs in the organised sector. They are employed in unskilled, semi-skilled and also some low-income skilled jobs. They work as wage earners in industries, trade, commerce, transport and construction industry. A large number of them are also engaged in self-employed activities as rickshaw-pullers, shoe-repairers, vendors, owners of teashop and pan-bidi shop and even beggars. The urban poor living as slum dwellers and pavement dwellers are found in abundance in Indian towns and cities. Figure 12.1 shows the predicaments of both rural and urban poverty.

The condition of both the urban and the rural poor is miserable. They own very few or negligible assets. Their income and expenditure are very low. Their wages are meagre. Many of them are unemployed and underemployed, which enhances their pangs of poverty. The rate of literacy is lowest.
among them. They do not enjoy much of the benefits of available health facilities. They do not get even enough food to eat. Their housing condition is sub-human or inhuman. They are severely exploited and oppressed by the privileged class both in the rural and urban areas.

**Magnitude of Rural and Urban Poverty**

The magnitude of poverty in India has been estimated in terms of the nutritional criterion, which takes into account only the minimum food intake of a person to maintain working capacity. But some non-food items such as clothing, housing, education and health-care are also equally essential for a minimum standard of human living and hence must be considered while analysing poverty. Moreover, in a developing country like India, we find that the privileged class enjoys all available modern amenities and also indulges in conspicuous consumption. This means that they buy goods and services which enhance socio-economic status and which are not affordable to the poor. The majority of the people are, on the other hand, not able to fulfil their minimum needs. There is a situation of wide socio-economic inequalities. Therefore, a proper approach to the problem of poverty has to take into consideration the prevailing inequalities with regard to distribution of assets, income and consumption expenditure both in the rural and urban areas.

Several economists and planners have estimated the number and proportion of people living below poverty line. The ‘poverty line’ as mentioned in the earlier section 12.2 is expressed in terms of an income level which is considered to be adequate for sustaining a minimum level of consumption. For instance consumption of food items giving 2250 calories of energy to a person per day is deemed necessary for maintaining working capacity. This is one norm against which poverty line is defined. Presently in our country, following the recommendations of Expert Group on Proportion and Number of Poor separate deflators are used for rural and urban areas of different states. The State-specific consumer price index of selected commodity groups for the agricultural labourers was used as price deflator for the rural areas and State-specific retail price movement of consumer price index for the industrial workers was used as price deflator for the rural areas and State-specific retail price movement of consumer price index for the industrial workers for the urban areas.

In India we find differences in the estimates of poverty. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, the analysts have adopted different methodology in their calculation. Secondly, fluctuation occurs in the level of poverty due to rise, in the level, in periods of bad agricultural growth and decline in the time of good harvest. However, there is complete unanimity on the fact that the absolute number of the poor has increased over the years from 131 million in 1960-61 to about 273 million in 1984-85 (Datt and Sundharam 1988: 294). The proportion of people below the poverty line is also very high. It was about forty per cent of the population after forty years of Independence even if we take the official figure of the plans. Moreover, the number of the rural poor is more than four times the number of the urban poor. During 1993-94 the absolute number of rural poor was 244 million (24 crore and 40 lakh) whereas the number of urban poor was 76 million (7 crore 60 lakh) (Ninth Five-Year Plan 1997-2002). Rural poverty directly affects urban poverty because most of the urban poor are migrants from the villages. These people have been driven out of their villages due to poverty there (Datt and Sundharam 1988).

At the national level, the incidence of poverty on the Head Count Ratio declined from 44.48 per cent in 1983 to 26.10 per cent in 1999-2000. It was a decline of nearly 8.5 per cent points in ten year period between 1983 and 1993-94 (NSS 50th round, 1993-94), followed by a further decline of nearly ten per cent points in the period between 1993-94 to 1999-2000. In absolute terms, the number of poor declined from about 323 million in 1983 to 260 million in 1999-2000. The decline has not been uniform either across states or across rural and urban areas. While the poor in the rural areas
declined from 45.65 per cent in 1983 to 27.09 per cent in 1999-2000, the decline in urban areas has been from 40.79 per cent 23.62 per cent during this period (NSS 55th round, 1999-2000). Although there is a broad consensus among the scholars (Deaton 2002, Sundaram and Suresh 2002) that poverty had indeed declined substantially in the 1990s, the magnitude of the decline remains a point of contention because the official estimates based on the NSS fifty-fifth round are not likely to be comparable with earlier rounds of NSS, due to changes in the design of the fifty-fifth round consumption module. According to Deaton’s estimates in 1999-2000, 29 per cent of India’s population live below the official poverty line (Deaton 2003). The Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-2007) aims to reduce the poverty ratio by 5 per cent points by 2007. This means bringing down the poverty ratio in the country to 21 per cent from the 26.1 per cent in 1999-2000.

Now let us look at those factors, which explain the nature and extent of rural and urban poverty. The factors considered here are (i) unequal distribution of wealth (ii) the pattern of per capita expenditure on consumption (iii) the pattern of possession of assets (iv) illiteracy and health and (v) regional differences in the patterns of poverty.

i) Poverty and Unequal Distribution of Wealth

Estimates of distribution of personal income made by various reputed organisations and noted scholars reveal the existence of concentration of economic power in both the urban and rural areas in the country. This is reflected in the prevalence of a wide range of variation between the income of the top and the bottom levels of the population. According to the estimate of the Reserve Bank of India from 1953-54 to 1956-57, in the rural areas, the top five per cent of the population had seventeen per cent of the aggregate income while the bottom twenty per cent had only about nine per cent of the income. Moreover, in the urban areas, the top five per cent of the population had twenty six per cent of the aggregate income but the bottom twenty per cent had only seven per cent of the income. Hence, the gap in income between the top and the bottom income group is wider in the urban areas than in the rural areas. Moreover, it is also evident that the fruits of economic development have been appropriated over the years by the rural and the urban rich. Similar trend has been observed in other studies (Datt and Sundharam 1988).

ii) The Pattern of Per capita Expenditure on Consumption

The pattern of the per capita expenditure on consumption among the rich and the poor section of the population is another indicator of the magnitude of economic inequality, poverty and the gap in the standard of living. There has been an increase in average per capita real consumer expenditure both in the urban and rural areas. Despite this increase the condition of the bottom forty per cent people in the urban areas and five per cent in the rural areas has worsened in the absolute sense. This is reflected in decline in their real consumption expenditure over the years. Moreover, the disparity in the level of expenditure between the top five per cent and the bottom five per cent of the population has been gradually increasing and in the urban areas it is becoming more acute than in the rural areas (Bose 1980:17). As per the results of the National Sample Survey fifty-fifth round on household consumer expenditure in 1999-2000, the average per capita monthly expenditure in urban India has grown to Rs. 529 as against Rs.486 in 1994-95 (an increase of 15.6 per cent) and that of the rural India it has grown to Rs.304 from Rs.281 (an increase of eight per cent) during the same period. At the same time the NSS data shows a higher incidence of unemployment in both rural and urban areas (NSS fifty-fifth round, 1999-2000). It is clear that the gains of economic progress have been cornered by the rich
people. On the other hand, the standard of living of the lower income groups has either remained stationary or has positively deteriorated over the years.

iii) The Pattern of Possession of Assets

The pattern of possession of assets in rural and urban areas also gives an idea about the extent of poverty in India. The people living below the poverty line have very few or almost negligible assets. The structure of landownership would reveal the highly inegalitarian nature of asset distribution in rural areas. Data on ownership of land during the 1950’s shows that about 47 per cent of the population owned either no land or less than one acre of land and accounted for about 1.38 per cent of the total land resources. Various land reform measures have been adopted by the government. However, the heavy concentration of land has remained practically unaltered. The twenty-sixth round report of the National Sample Survey for the year 1971-72 shows that about two per cent of the rural households own about twenty-three per cent of the land areas while about forty-five per cent of the households own only two per cent of the land (Chattopadhyay 1989: 123). Moreover, it has also been observed in some studies that in the two decades between 1961 and 1981 the proportion of cultivators came down from 52.3 per cent to 41.5 per cent while during the same period the per centage of agricultural labourers increased from 17.2 per cent to 25.2 per cent of the total labour force. This reflects an increasing incidence of pauperisation of the rural poor (Chattopadhyay 1989: 123). During the period 1983 to 1999-2000, the per centage of persons in the labour force at the national level declined from 66.5 per cent in 1983 to 61.8 per cent in 1999-2000 (NSS fifty-fifth round, 1999-2000). The deterioration in the employment situation will augment the incidence of poverty.

Moreover, in the urban areas there are large sections of pavement dwellers who possess very few or almost no assets. The decaying tenements of the slum dwellers and the hutments of squatters are the burning examples of urban poverty. According to the 1971 Census, sixty-six per cent of the households in cities with a population of more than one lakh live in one room tenements. In 1981, at the national level, nearly seventy-three per cent of the households were living in houses with two or less rooms and this rate declined marginally to seventy one per cent in 1991 (National Human Development Report 2002). The National Building Organization (NBO) has estimated that the shortage of housing units increased from 14.5 million in 1971 to 16.7 million in 1977 (De Souza 1983: xxi). On the other side we witness a large increase in the assets of the privileged section of the urban population. For example, the total assets of top twenty large industrial houses increased from rupees 1,346 cores in 1963-64 to 20,138 crores in 1985 (Datt and Sundharam 1988: 348).

iv) Illiteracy and Health

Regarding educational facilities we find that it is mainly the poor people who are illiterates both in the rural and urban areas. In 1981, it was observed that about sixty-four per cent of India’s population were illiterate. The rate of illiteracy was seventy per cent in rural areas and forty-three per cent in the urban areas in 1981. The national illiteracy rate was around forty eight per cent and thirty-four per cent in the years 1991 and 2001, respectively. Moreover, the absolute number of illiterates has also increased from 300 million in 1951 to 438 million in 1981 according to a report of the Institute of Economic Growth published in 1988. Further in the case of health facilities, it was found that fifty-five per cent of the rural population was not served even by primary health centres. The urban poor also could hardly afford expensive medical treatment in towns and cities. Both illiteracy and poor health status generate living conditions which reflect poverty.
Poverty Estimation

Planning Commission was the nodal agency of the Government of India for estimation of poverty. The incidence of poverty is measured by the poverty ratio, which is the ratio of number of poor to the total population expressed as percentage. Planning Commission estimates levels of poverty in the country on the basis of consumer expenditure surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Office of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. The methodology to measure poverty, as devised by Y K Alagh in 1979 has been improvised by Lakdawala in 1993 and then by Tendulkar in 2009.

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History of poverty estimation in India

Pre independence poverty estimates: One of the earliest estimations of poverty was done by Dadabhai Naoroji in his book, ‘Poverty and the Un-British Rule in India’. The poverty line proposed by him was based on the cost of a subsistence diet consisting of rice or flour, dal, mutton, vegetables, ghee, vegetable oil and salt. In 1938, National Planning Committee estimated a poverty line ranging from Rs 15 to Rs 20 / capita / month. NPC also formulated its poverty line based on ‘a minimum standard of living perspective in which nutritional requirements are implicit’. In 1944, the authors of the ‘Bombay Plan’ (Thakurdas et al) suggested a poverty line of Rs 75 / capita / year.

Post independence poverty estimates: In 1962, the Planning Commission constituted a working group to estimate poverty nationally, and it formulated separate poverty lines for rural and urban areas – of Rs 20 and Rs 25 / capita / year respectively. Dandekar and Rath made the first systematic assessment of poverty in India in 1971, based on National Sample Survey data from 1960-61. They argued that the poverty line must be derived from the expenditure that was adequate to provide 2250 calories / day in both rural and urban areas.

Alagh Committee (1979): YK Alagh Committee constructed a poverty line for rural & urban areas based on nutritional requirements & related consumption expenditure (1973-74 prices)

Lakdawala Committee (1993): Lakdawala made the following suggestions: (i) consumption expenditure should be calculated based on calorie consumption as earlier; (ii) state specific
poverty lines should be constructed and these should be updated using the Consumer Price Index of Industrial Workers (CPI-IW) in urban areas and Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labour (CPI-AL) in rural areas.

**Tendulkar Committee (2009):** It recommended 4 major changes: (i) a shift away from calorie consumption based poverty estimation; (ii) a uniform poverty line basket (PLB) across rural and urban India; (iii) a change in the price adjustment procedure; and (iv) incorporation of private expenditure on health and education while estimating poverty.

It based its calculations on the consumption of the following items: cereal, pulses, milk, edible oil, non-vegetarian items, vegetables, fresh fruits, dry fruits, sugar, salt & spices, other food, intoxicants, fuel, clothing, footwear, education, medical (non-institutional and institutional), entertainment, personal & toilet goods, other goods, other services and durables. It concluded that the all India poverty line was Rs 446.68 / capita / month (rural) and Rs 578.80 /capita/month(urban) in 2004-05.

**% BPL population as per Lakdawala Committee & Tendulkar Committee for 2004-05**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lakdawala Committee</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendulkar Committee</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National poverty line (in Rs/ capita/ month) for various years (Tendulkar)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>446.7</td>
<td>578.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>672.8</td>
<td>859.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>816.0</td>
<td>1000.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RANGARAJAN COMMITTEE(2012-14)** recommendations are as follows:

i. Poverty line should be based on certain normative levels of adequate nourishment, clothing, house rent, conveyance & education, and a behaviorally determined level of other non-food expenses.
ii. It computed the average requirements of calories, proteins and fats based on ICMR norms differentiated by age, gender and activity for all-India rural and urban regions to derive the normative levels of nourishment. Accordingly, the energy requirement works out to 2,155 kcal / person / day (rural) and 2,090 kcal / person / day (urban). Rangarajan views the Calorie norm as an average in band of +10% of these values.

iii. The protein and fat requirements have been estimated as 48 gms and 28 gms / capita / day, respectively (rural); and 50 gms and 26 gms / capita / day (urban).

iv. A food basket that simultaneously meets all the normative requirements of the 3 nutrients defines the food component of the proposed poverty line basket. These nutrient norms are met for 25-30% persons in rural areas and for 15-20% in urban areas in 2011-12. The average monthly / capita consumption expenditure on food in these fractile classes is Rs.554 (rural) & Rs.656 (urban).

v. Median fractile (45-50%) values of clothing, rent, conveyance & education expenses are treated as the normative requirements of the basic non-food expenses. This works out to Rs.141/capita/month (rural) and Rs.407 (urban). The observed expenses of all other non-food expenses of the fractile classes that meet nutrition requirements are considered as part of the poverty line basket. This works out to Rs.277 (rural) and Rs.344 (urban).

vi. New poverty line thus work out to monthly / capita consumption expenditure of Rs.972 (rural) and Rs.1,407 (urban) in 2011-12. For a family of five, this translates into a monthly consumption expenditure of Rs.4,860 (rural) and Rs.7,035 (urban).

vii. Rangarajan estimates that the 30.9% of the rural population and 26.4% of the urban population was below the poverty line in 2011-12. The all-India ratio was 29.5%.

viii. Rangarajan uses the Modified Mixed Recall Period (MMRP) consumption expenditure data of the NSSO as these are considered to be more precise compared to the MRP, which was used by Tendulkar and the URP, which was used by earlier estimations. 67% of the increase in the rural
poverty line and 28% of the increase in the urban poverty line is because of the shift from MRP to MMRP.

ix. The poverty ratio has declined from 39.6% in 2009-10 to 30.9% in 2011-12 in rural India and from 35.1% to 26.4% in urban India. The decline was thus a uniform 8.7%age points over the two years. The all-India poverty ratio fell from 38.2% to 29.5%. Totally, 91.6 million individuals were lifted out of poverty during this period.

POVERTY ALLEVIATION

After independence, the Government has launched several poverty alleviation programmes, some of these are as follows:

1. Legal elimination of bonded labourers.
2. Preventing the centralisation of wealth by modifying the law.
3. Antyodaya plan.
4. Small Farmers Development Programme (SFDP)
5. Drought Area Development Programme (DADP)
6. Twenty point programme
7. Food for work programme
8. Minimum needs programme (MNP)
9. Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP)
10. National Rural Employment Programme (NREP)
11. Rural Labour Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP)
12. TRYSEM scheme
13. Jawahar Rojgar Yojna (JRY)
15. National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP)
16. Rural Housing Programme.
17. Indira Awas Yojana.
18. Pradhan Mantri Rojgar Yojna.

19. Nehru Rozgar Yojna (NRY)

20. Self-Employment Programme for the Urban Poor, (SEPUP)

21. Prime Minister’s Integrated Urban Poverty Eradication Programme (PMIUPEP)

**NITI Aayog’s Taskforce on Elimination of Poverty in India**

**Employment-Intensive Sustained Rapid Growth**

An integral part of a well-rounded and holistic anti-poverty strategy must be sustained rapid growth. Conceptually, sustained rapid growth works through two channels to rapidly reduce poverty. First, it creates well-paid jobs and raises real wages. Both factors raise incomes of poor households thereby directly denting poverty. Increased incomes help in another way: households are able to purchase and access education and health services. Second, rapid growth leads to growth in government revenues. In turn, enhanced revenues allow the expansion of social expenditures at faster pace.

**Centrality of Agricultural Growth**

Any strategy for poverty reduction must tackle the issues facing rural India, which accounts for 68.8 per cent of the population. About 80% of India’s poor live in rural areas, and livelihood of most of them is dependent directly or indirectly on the performance of agriculture. Agriculture and allied activities employed 49% of the total workforce in India. But the share of agriculture in the GDP at 2004-05 prices that year was only 14.4 per cent. One of the reasons for this skewed distribution of labour force in agriculture is the paucity of alternative livelihood opportunities either at village level or in the nearby townships and cities.

To break this cycle of poverty in rural areas, a two-pronged strategy is required: we must improve the performance of agriculture and create jobs in industry and services in both rural and urban areas.

**Making Growth in Manufacturing and Services Employment Intensive**

While faster agricultural growth that raises rural wages and incomes is an effective means to bringing relief to the rural poor, we must bear in mind that bringing shared prosperity in the longer run requires healthy growth of employment-intensive manufacturing and services. In India, the fastest agriculture has grown over a continuous ten-year period in the recorded history is 4.7% during the 1980s. In order that those employed in agriculture today may share in the prosperity of tomorrow, it is important that industry and services create jobs for them. This is how South Korea and Taiwan eliminated poverty during 1965-90 and China more recently.

However, successful sectors in India are not Employment Intensive- Fast growing manufacturing sectors such as auto, auto parts, two wheelers, engineering goods, chemicals and petroleum...
refining use very little low-skilled labor per unit of investment. Other fast growing sectors such as software, pharma, telecom and financial services use mostly skilled labor. Sectors such as clothing, textiles, footwear, food processing and electronic goods, which employ lots of low and semi-skilled workers in which China has excelled have not done well in India. These employment intensive sectors are lagging in India because:

• These employment intensive sectors lack critical mass of large firms.
• This has impaired India’s ability to capture the vast export markets
• In so far as large firms operate in the world markets, they catalyse technological change and high product quality.
• Their absence has meant low productivity of small and medium firms as well in these sectors.

What Must be Done?

1. Effective implementation of Make in India i.e. Infrastructure (esp. power, roads and ports), Ease of Doing Business (including trade facilitation), Credit access for MSMEs, More flexible labor laws, Reform of the Land Acquisition Law, A Modern Bankruptcy Law, Skill Development & Tax certainty

2. Making anti-poverty programs more effective

✓ Plugging Leakages- Aadhaar based verification of transactions, choice between subsidized Cereals and cash transfer
✓ Better balance in diet- Intensive information campaign, shift to cash transfers
✓ Need for reorientation of the subsidy- As per the SECC (Rural), 40% of the rural households satisfy one or more exclusion criteria. This greatly weakens the case for subsidy to more than 60% of the rural households under NFSA.

Nutrition: Midday Meal Scheme
• Poor convergence of MDMS with the school health program.
• State specific guidelines are required for improved quality and safety of food
• 25% of schools lack kitchen sheds and prepare food in open. This is a major cause for concern as it impacts the safety of food students eat.

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)
• Skill Development
• Durable assets
• Enforce the 60:40 wage: materials ratio to be maintained at the district level and allow contactors in the materials part of the expenditures
• Shortage of farm labour in peak season- Allow farmers to hire MGNREGA workers if they are willing to pay bulk of wages
• Consider MGNREGA holiday during peak season
Housing for All (Rural)

• The scheme has progressed well overall but can be improved.
• Faces major challenge in selection of beneficiaries; SECC may be deployed to identify them.
• Gaps in reporting by the States on completion of houses against the physical targets and the updated progress is not reflected in the reporting system.
• States have to come forward with larger resources to meet the objectives of ‘Housing for All by 2022’ in the rural areas.
• Explore the scope for prefabricated houses

Housing for All (Urban)

• Challenges of finding land for urban housing. Urban Land Ceilings and Regulation Act, low FSI and difficulties in the conversion of land from one use to another pose challenges.
• Integration between land and transport planning is needed so that affordable housing is linked with public transport.
• Low-rent housing requires serious thinking since migrants can rarely afford to buy houses and, absent proper rental housing, seek recourse to slums.

New Approaches

3. Targeting Five Poorest Families in Each Village
   • SECC based BPL list may be used for selection
   • Gram Panchayat to ensure all Government program benefits reach them
   • A modest cash transfer for a pre-specified time may top these benefits
   • Aim - to ensure the target families become capable of earning & sustaining above-poverty level of income within 5-7 years
   • Similar efforts in urban areas – 100 families in a municipality

4. Towards Cash Transfers: Jan Dhan Yojana, Aadhaar, Mobile (JAM) trinity

JAM could play a vital role in widening the reach of government to vulnerable sections as:

1. Jan Dhan Yojana promise to eventually revolutionize the anti-poverty programmes by replacing the current cumbersome and leaky distribution of benefits under various schemes by the direct benefit transfers (DBT).

2. Aadhar linked accounts permit aggregation of the information, the government would have an excellent database to assess the total volume of benefits accruing to each household.

3. It could pave the way for replacing countless schemes with consolidated cash transfers except in cases in which there are other compelling reasons to continue with in-kind transfers.
Human Development Index

The HDI is a summary measure for assessing progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. A long and healthy life is measured by life expectancy at birth. Knowledge level is measured by mean years of education among the adult population, which is the average number of years of education received in a life-time by people aged 25 years and older; and access to learning and knowledge by expected years of schooling for children of school-entry age, which is the total number of years of schooling a child of school-entry age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child's life. The standard of living is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in 2011 international dollars converted using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates.

To ensure as much cross-country comparability as possible, the HDI is based primarily on international data from the UN Population Division, UNESCO and World Bank.

The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. Economic growth is a mean to that process, but is not an end by itself. The HDI can also be used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with different human development outcomes. These contrasts can stimulate debate about government policy priorities.

HDI was developed by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq for the UNDP. The index is based on the human development approach, developed by Ul Haq, often framed in terms of whether people are able to "be" and "do" desirable things in life. Examples include—Beings: well fed, sheltered, healthy; Doings: work, education, voting, participating in community life. It must also be noted that the freedom of choice is central—someone choosing to be hungry (e.g. during a religious fast) is quite different to someone who is hungry because they cannot afford to buy food.

The explicit purpose of HDI is "to shift the focus of development economics from national income accounting to people-centered policies". Haq believed that a simple composite measure of human development was needed to convince the public, academics, and politicians that they can and should evaluate development not only by economic advances but also improvements in human well-being.

2016 Human Development Report draws from and builds on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that the 193 member states of the United Nations endorsed in 2015—and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) the world has committed to achieve.

Criticism The Human Development Index has been criticized on a number of grounds, including alleged lack of consideration of technological development or contributions to the human civilization, focusing exclusively on national performance and ranking, lack of attention to development from a global perspective, measurement error of the underlying statistics, and on the UNDP's changes in formula which can lead to severe misclassification in the categorisation of 'low', 'medium', 'high' or 'very high' human development countries. The HDI is also criticized as it
simplifies and captures only part of what human development entails. It does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment, etc.

**India’s HDI** India’s HDI value for 2015 is 0.624— which put the country in the medium human development category— positioning it at 131 out of 188 countries and territories.

Between 1990 and 2015, India’s HDI value increased from 0.428 to 0.624, an increase of 45.7%. Table A reviews India’s progress in each of the HDI indicators. Between 1990 and 2015, India’s life expectancy at birth increased by 10.4 years, mean years of schooling increased by 3.3 years and expected years of schooling increased by 4.1 years. India’s GNI per capita increased by about 223.4% between 1990 and 2015.

**Table A: India’s HDI trends based on consistent time series data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Life expectancy</th>
<th>Expected years</th>
<th>Mean years</th>
<th>GNI per capita</th>
<th>HDI value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>0.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>0.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>0.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>0.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>0.624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 below shows contribution of each component index to India’s HDI since 1990.

**Figure 1: Trends in India’s HDI component indices 1990-2015**
Progress relative to other countries

The human development progress, as measured by the HDI, can usefully be compared to other countries. During the period between 1990 and 2015 India, Bangladesh and Pakistan experienced different degrees of progress toward increasing their HDIs (figure 2).

Figure 2: HDI trends for India, Bangladesh & Pakistan (1990-2015)

India’s 2015 HDI of 0.624 is below the average of 0.631 for countries in the medium human development group and above the average of 0.621 for countries in South Asia. From South Asia, countries which are close to India in 2015 HDI rank and to some extent in population size are Bangladesh and Pakistan, which have HDIs ranked 139 and 147 respectively (see table B).

Table B: India’s HDI and component indicators for 2015 relative to selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HDI value</th>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (PPP US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium HDI</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6,281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) HDI is an average measure of basic human development achievements in a country. Like all averages, the HDI masks inequality in the distribution of human development across the population at the country level. The 2010 HDR introduced the IHDI, which takes into account inequality in all three dimensions of the HDI by ‘discounting’ each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality.
The IHDI is basically the HDI discounted for inequalities. The ‘loss’ in human development due to inequality is given by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI, and can be expressed as a %age. As the inequality in a country increases, the loss in human development also increases. We also present the coefficient of human inequality as a direct measure of inequality which is an unweighted average of inequalities in three dimensions.

India’s HDI for 2015 is 0.624. However, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls to 0.454, a loss of 27.2 % due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices. Bangladesh and Pakistan show losses due to inequality of 28.9 % and 30.9 % respectively. The average loss due to inequality for medium HDI countries is 25.7 % and for South Asia it is 27.7 %. The Human inequality coefficient for India is equal to 26.5 %.

Table C: India’s IHDI for 2015 relative to selected countries and groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IHDI value</th>
<th>Overall loss (%)</th>
<th>Human inequality Coefficient (%)</th>
<th>Inequality in life expectancy at birth (%)</th>
<th>Inequality in education (%)</th>
<th>Inequality in income (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium HDI</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gender Development Index (GDI)  GDI is defined as a ratio of the female to the male HDI. The GDI reflects gender inequalities in achievement in the same three dimensions of the HDI: health (measured by female and male life expectancy at birth), education (measured by female and male expected years of schooling for children and mean years for adults aged 25 years and older); and command over economic resources (measured by female and male estimated GNI per capita).

The female HDI value for India is 0.549 in contrast with 0.671 for males, resulting in a GDI value of 0.819, which places the country into Group 5. In comparison, GDI values for Bangladesh and Pakistan are 0.927 and 0.742 respectively (see Table D).

Table D: India’s GDI for 2015 relative to some countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean yrs of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita</th>
<th>HDI values</th>
<th>F-M ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gender Inequality Index  

GII reflects gender-based inequalities in three dimensions – reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity. Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent birth rates; empowerment is measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by women and attainment in secondary and higher education by each gender; and economic activity is measured by the labour market participation rate for women and men. The GII can be interpreted as the loss in human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in the three GII dimensions.

India has a GII value of 0.530, ranking it 125 out of 159 countries in the 2015 index. In India, 12.2% of parliamentary seats are held by women, and 35.3% of adult women have reached at least a secondary level of education compared to 61.4% of their male counterparts. For every 100,000 live births, 174 women die from pregnancy related causes; and the adolescent birth rate is 24.5 births per 1,000 women of ages 15-19. Female participation in the labour market is 26.8% compared to 79.1% for men. In comparison, Bangladesh and Pakistan are ranked at 119 and 130 respectively on this index.

Table E: India’s GII for 2015 relative to selected countries and groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GII value</th>
<th>GII Rank</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio</th>
<th>Adolescent birth rate</th>
<th>Population with at least some secondary education (%)</th>
<th>Labour force participation rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>35.3 61.4</td>
<td>26.8 79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>42.0 44.3</td>
<td>43.1 81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>26.5 46.1</td>
<td>24.3 82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>36.9 58.6</td>
<td>28.3 79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium HDI</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>40.4 57.6</td>
<td>37.2 79.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multidimensional Poverty Index MPI identifies multiple overlapping deprivations suffered by households in 3 dimensions: education, health and living standards. The education and health dimensions are each based on two indicators, while standard of living is based on six indicators. If the household deprivation score is 33.3% or greater, the household is classified as multidimensionally poor. Households with a deprivation score greater than or equal to 20% but less than 33.3% live near multidimensional poverty. Finally, households with a deprivation score greater than or equal to 50% live in severe multidimensional poverty.

In India (2006), 55.3% of the population are multidimensionally poor while an additional 18.2% live near multidimensional poverty. The breadth of deprivation...
(intensity) in India, which is the average deprivation score experienced by people in multidimensional poverty, is 51.1%. MPI is the share of the population that is multi-dimensionally poor, adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations. India’s MPI is 0.282. Bangladesh and Pakistan have MPIs of 0.188 and 0.237 respectively.

Table F compares multidimensional poverty with income poverty, measured by the %age of the population living below PPP US$1.90 per day. It shows that income poverty only tells part of the story. The multidimensional poverty headcount is 34.1 %age points higher than income poverty. This implies that individuals living above the income poverty line may still suffer deprivations in education, health and other living conditions. Table F also shows the %age of India’s population that lives near multidimensional poverty and that lives in severe multidimensional poverty. The contributions of deprivations in each dimension to overall poverty complete a comprehensive picture of people living in multidimensional poverty in India.

Table F: The most recent MPI for India relative to selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey year</th>
<th>MPI value</th>
<th>Headcount (%)</th>
<th>Intensity of deprivations (%)</th>
<th>Population share (%)</th>
<th>Contribution to overall poverty of deprivations in (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18.2 27.8 21.2 32.5 22.7 44.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Bangladesh  | 2014      | 0.188         | 40.7                          | 46                    | 19.6 16.0 1
| Pakistan    | 2012/2013 | 0.237         | 45.6                          | 52                    | 14.9 26.5 6.1 32.3 36.2 31.6 |

What is “Feminization of Poverty”?

The “feminization of poverty” is an idea that dates back to the 1970s. It was popularized at the start of the 1990s, not least in research by United Nation agencies. The concept has various meanings, some of which are not entirely consistent with its implicit notion of change. We propose a definition that is in line with many recent studies in the field: the feminization of poverty is a change in poverty levels that is biased against women or female-headed households.

More specifically, it is an increase in the difference in poverty levels between women and men, or between households headed by females on the one hand, and those headed by males or couples on the other. The term can also be used to mean an increase in poverty due to gender inequalities, though we prefer to call this the feminization of the causes of poverty.

The precise definition of the feminization of poverty depends on two subsidiary questions: what is poverty? and what is feminization? Poverty is a lack of resources, capabilities or freedoms that are commonly called the dimensions of poverty. The term “feminization” can be used to indicate a gender-biased change in any of these dimensions. Feminization is an action, a process of becoming more feminine. In this case, “feminine” means “more common or intense among women or female-headed households”.

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India has also experienced feminization of poverty

Because it implies change, the feminization of poverty should not be confused with the prevalence of higher levels of poverty among women or female-headed households. Feminization is a process, whereas a “higher level of poverty” is a state. Feminization is also a relative concept based on a comparison of women and men, including households headed by them. What is important here is the difference between women and men at each moment. Since the concept is relative, feminization does not necessarily imply an absolute worsening in poverty among women or female-headed households.

If poverty is reduced sharply among men and only slightly among women, there would still be a feminization of poverty.

Relative changes in poverty levels can be measured in terms of poverty “among female-headed households” and “among women”. These indicators, however, do not reflect the feminization of poverty. Both these and “feminization” capture a gender dimension of poverty, but in distinct ways. They differ by the unit of analysis and by the population included in each group, and obviously they have different meanings. There are reasons to consider both. The goal of headship-based indicators is to show what happens to specific vulnerable groups of women and their families, and thus their unit of analysis is the household. The population considered includes both men and women (and children) living in those households. It excludes women and men living in other household formations.

Indicators of poverty among females completely separate men and women as individuals, and include or exclude children as a gendered group in their aggregations. In determining the feminization of poverty, interpretation of results drawn from individual measures of poverty may not be accurate. Since poverty is usually measured at the household level, male poverty is intrinsically associated with female poverty and vice versa.

The feminization of poverty can also be defined as “an increase in the share of women or female-headed households among the poor”. In contrast to our proposal, this definition focuses on changes in the profile of the poor and not on poverty levels within gender groups. Thus it has a potential
disadvantage. It is difficult to interpret the results from this approach because measures of the feminization of poverty can be affected by changes in the demographic composition of the population. For instance, the impoverishment of female-headed households can be offset by a decline in the total number of such households, and thus the result in terms of feminization can be zero. The definition we propose gives rise to indicators that are not affected by these composition effects, which can be analyzed separately.

The feminization of poverty combines two morally unacceptable phenomena: poverty and gender inequalities. It thus deserves special attention from policymakers in determining the allocation of resources to pro-gender equity or anti-poverty measures. If poverty is not being feminized, resources can be redirected to other types of policies. Of course, whether or not the feminization of poverty is occurring in each country is a matter of empirical analysis.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Violence against Women in India

Social history and novels in many Indian languages record violence against married women in India, mainly perpetrated by their husbands. Yet, only in the last two decades has a systematic effort been made to estimate the magnitude of violence, its determinants and reasons, the forms in which it is manifested, and its health, social, legal and economic consequences.

Survey-based studies have indicated that anywhere from 35 to 75% of women in India face verbal, physical, or sexual violence from their partners or other men known to them (see Jejeebhoy 1998; Mahajan 1990; Karlekar 1998; Jain et al 2004; Visaria 2000). Qualitative in-depth studies have thrown light on a range of issues such as women’s support-seeking behaviour, intergenerational effects, the culture of silence, and the adherence to social norms that encourage tolerating, accepting, and even rationalising domestic violence for the sake of preserving family honour (Hassan 1995; Miller 1992; Jaisingh 1995; Koenig et al 2006). However, most of these studies were conducted with small samples and the findings could be generalised only for the states in which they were conducted. Also, very few studies have been carried out to examine these issues from the perspective of the perpetrators of violence.

To overcome this limitation, the second National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2), conducted in 1998-99, took the bold step of nationally canvassing a few questions related to domestic violence, essentially to assess whether women in a large survey would respond to them. The questions were rather general and tried to measure the prevalence of violence and understand the situations in which ever-married women justified wife-beating. The respondents were read out six situations where wives transgressed their traditionally accepted roles or social norms. Women’s responses were sought on whether their husbands were justified in beating them if they deviated from their perceived “duties”. The success with canvassing these relatively sensitive questions emboldened the coordinators and advisers of the third NFHS (2005-06) to canvass an entire module on domestic violence with 25 key questions besides the ones on wife-beating (IIPS and Macro International 2007). In NFHS-3, two more situations were added and one dropped in the wife-beating question. The two new situations were arguing with the husband and refusing to have sexual intercourse with him. The situation of the woman’s family not providing the expected money, jewellery or other goods (implying dowry) was dropped separate module was prepared and canvassed only to one woman in each household, not to all the eligible women if there were more than one. More importantly, the respondents were clearly instructed to answer the violence module only if they were ensured complete privacy. Although
estimates of lifetime physical violence are available for all the states as well as the background characteristics of women respondents in the NFHS-2 and NFHS-3, it would not be prudent to discern a time trend given the variations in the mode of data collection.

Aspects of Violence against Women

To contextualise the three issues that are examined in the following sections, I briefly present some of the salient findings on the extent of violence reported by women and the differentials in accordance with their background characteristics and the region in which they live. Compared to women in the 15 to 24 age group, a greater proportion of older women experienced lifetime violence. A higher percentage of rural women (36%) were subjected to violence than women living in urban areas (28%), and a significantly greater proportion of women with little or no education experienced violence compared to their educated sisters. Only 14% of women with 12 or more years of schooling reported experiencing violence while the figure for illiterate women was 44%. Violence was reported by a higher percentage of currently married women (37.4%) than never married women (16.1%). But 66% of divorced, separated or deserted women reported having experienced physical violence. Violence was much more prevalent among women from the scheduled castes and tribes (39-42%) than among those from the higher castes (27%). Violence was also inversely related to the wealth index.

Violence against women varied hugely among the states. More than 40% of women aged 15 to 49 reported having experienced physical or sexual violence in the relatively backward states of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. Interestingly, among the big states, the percentage was only a tad lower in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. On the other hand, less than 20% of women reported experiencing violence in states like Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, and Karnataka. It appears that rather than the economic development of a region, it is the attitude towards women, societal norms and perceptions about their worth and position in the household, and men’s notions of self-esteem that influence husbands’ behaviour, for better or worse. In spite of these differentials, it is important to
note that one in five women from the wealthiest group and one in seven women with education of 12
or more years reported being subjected to violence within the home, almost always by the spouse.

A relatively high percentage of Tamil women reported violence compared to those from many other
states and this merits attention. An in-depth study undertaken in the slums of Tamil Nadu’s capital,
Chennai, reported that the men held that women should be disciplined. They required their wives to
be chaste, submissive, respectful and accepting of their imperfections (Go et al 2003). Wife-beating
was condoned to ensure that women behave themselves and stay under the control of men. According
to NFHS-2, while 21% of ever-married women in the country as a whole said they had experienced
lifetime violence, the percentage for Tamil Nadu was 40, the highest in the country (IIPS and ORC-
Macro, Tamil Nadu, 2001). According to the NFHS-3, almost the same percentage (39%) of Tamil
women reported experiencing physical or sexual violence.

Further, acceptance of violence as a justifiable behaviour was also greater in Tamil Nadu. According
to the NFHS-2, in the country as a whole, about 56% of ever-married women said their husbands were
justified in beating them if they failed to perform certain duties such as showing respect to their in-
laws or attending to their children and household. In Tamil Nadu, 72% of women accepted violence
as a justifiable act, thereby testifying that gender inequality was quite pervasive there (Kishor and
Gupta 2004). According to NFHS-3, nearly two in three Tamil women agreed that in certain situations
husbands were justified in beating their wives. An in-depth exploration of the acceptance of domestic
violence by the women of Tamil Nadu would help understand the cultural and social norms that
govern conjugal relationships in Tamil society. However, there are almost no such behavioural
guidelines or restrictions apply to men in any Indian society.

Risk Factors

Husbands tend to exercise control over their wives by clearly indicating how they should behave. In
NFHS-3, information was sought from ever-married women on six specific situations: whether the
husband became jealous or angry if they talked to other men; whether the husband accused them of
being unfaithful; whether the husband would not permit them to meet their female friends; whether
the husband tried to limit contact with their natal family; whether the husband insisted on knowing
where they are at all times; and whether the husband did not trust them with money. These situations
reflected different dimensions of women’s lives, ranging from economic independence and mobility
to freedom to interact with friends and men known to them without arousing suspicion. While many
women may not personally approve of such controlling behaviour, their acceptance of it or inability to
reject it indicate they are not empowered even within their marital home.

The responses of women, classified by their background characteristics, are presented in Table 1. A
little over a quarter of ever-married women reported that their husbands (or ex-husbands if the
respondents were not currently married) became angry or jealous if they talked to other men. Some
micro studies have also reported this controlling behaviour to be fairly widespread in many states of
India (Jain et al 2004; Visaria 2000). Husbands show their anger or displeasure even when women
reportedly talk to their brothers, male cousins or other male relatives from their natal villages, or
neighbourhoods in the case of urban areas. A married woman having a male friend or visitor almost
amounts to blasphemy and it becomes the subject of gossip not only in rural areas but also in many
urban settings. A greater proportion of younger, recently married women in rural areas, with little or
no education, who belonged to poor households, and those who were divorced or separated, faced the
wrath of their husbands (or ex-husbands) on this count than better educated older women or urban
women. The logic seems to be that women’s behaviour has to be checked when they are young and
newly married so that they learn to behave (that is, not be familiar or friendly with other men) according to social or family norms.

The anger, jealousy or suspicion of husbands sometimes manifests itself in accusations that the wife is being unfaithful or having illicit relations with other men. Nearly 9% of women reported that they were frequently accused of being unfaithful. Again, the differentials were in the same direction as with jealousy. The husbands of nearly 12% of women insisted that they know where their wives were at all times. This desire to know their wives’ every movement largely stems from wanting to check that they do not see other men or talk about family problems to others. Less educated younger women, those living in rural areas, and those divorced, separated or remarried from the lower wealth group faced this more than women belonging to other categories.

Further, nearly 16% of women reported that they were not permitted to meet even female friends. In areas or communities where exogamy is practised and marriages are arranged by parents or other elders, women do not always have many acquaintances from their places of origin or areas near their marital home. The restriction enforced on women interacting with other women known to them is a very harsh controlling measure. Almost 10% of women also reported that their husbands tried to limit their contacts with members of their natal families. This is manifested by not allowing women to visit their natal family, except when it is absolutely essential, or not welcoming members of their family, or showing displeasure when they visit.

Table 1: Percentage of Ever-Married Women Aged 15-49 Whose Husbands Exercised Marital Control, according to Select Background Characteristics (2005-06)

| Background | Percentage of Women Whose Husband | | | | | |
|------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|           | Accuses Her of Being Unfaithful   | Does Not Permit Her to Meet Female Friends Known to Her | Insists on Knowing Where She Is | Tries to Limit Her Trust in the Mone with Her | Display Jealousness of To Other Unfaithful Men | Does Not Display Trust in the Mone with Her | 
| Age       |                                    |                                 |                                |                                         |                                 |                                |                                | 
| 15-19     | 33.6                               | 11.7                            | 19.3                           | 12.3                            | 16.1                           | 20.9                           | 17.2                           | 49.5                           |
| 20-24     | 27.7                               | 8.2                             | 15.9                           | 10.3                            | 12.7                           | 18.5                           | 12.7                           | 56.3                           |
| 25-29     | 27.1                               | 8.7                             | 16.1                           | 9.8                             | 12.7                           | 18.0                           | 12.4                           | 55.9                           |
| 30-39     | 25.8                               | 8.5                             | 15.9                           | 10.0                            | 11.2                           | 18.8                           | 12.0                           | 57.5                           |
| 40-49     | 23.5                               | 7.7                             | 14.9                           | 8.7                             | 10.4                           | 17.1                           | 10.4                           | 59.8                           |
| Residence|                                    |                                 |                                |                                         |                                 |                                |                                |                                |
| Urban     | 20.5                               | 6.4                             | 14.3                           | 8.0                             | 9.3                            | 17.1                           | 9.6                            | 63.7                           |
| Rural     | 29.0                               | 9.4                             | 16.6                           | 10.7                            | 13.0                           | 18.9                           | 13.3                           | 54.0                           |
| Education|                                    |                                 |                                |                                         |                                 |                                |                                |                                |
| Illiterate| 32.3                               | 1.08                            | 16.5                           | 11.4                           | 13.4                           | 19.3                           | 14.5                           | 51.5                           |
| < 5 years | 28.3                               | 9.7                             | 19.7                           | 11.6                           | 14.8                           | 21.2                           | 14.8                           | 53.1                           |
| 12+ years| 9.6                                | 2.6                             | 12.4                           | 4.5                             | 6.2                            | 14.0                           | 5.0                            | 73.8                           |
When women are married to men from the same village or town, they may experience greater freedom or find ways to visit or interact with their family members without being noticed. But when distance is a factor, this restricting or controlling behaviour tends to have a detrimental effect on women, mainly because they have no opportunities to share their problems with their family members or near ones.

Not granting even a modicum of economic independence, especially to women who have no other source of income, is another controlling behaviour. It leads to husbands saying women cannot be trusted with money, implying that they do not know how to spend money judiciously. A little over 18% of ever-married women indicated that their husbands do not trust them with money. This controlling behaviour is expressed by asking women to explain how every rupee is spent and reprimanding them if something is spent on what husbands consider unnecessary. Background characteristics hardly made a difference in the case of this controlling behaviour, which stems from the general notion that women are not careful about what they spend money on.

The NFHS-3 estimates that 12% of women reported three or more controlling behaviours by their husbands. The differences when background characteristics were taken into account were not very significant, except that women from poor households faced more controlling behaviour than those belonging to better-off households. Instead of grouping any three types of controlling behaviour, it would be interesting to group the three types of behaviour that prompt husbands to suspect and mistrust their wives when they deal with other men, even their male kin. In a sense, such behaviour undermines the very basis of a marital relationship.

Interestingly, the differences between women belonging to various socio-economic groups were very small when it came to restrictions on meeting female friends and handling money. The former controlling behaviour very likely stems from the fear that women will share news about family matters that husbands or in-laws do not want divulged to outsiders. The underlying fear is that women may do so until their loyalty to the family of their in-laws is established. So, young women, even educated ones, are not trusted.

Table 1 also shows that 57% of women reported that their husbands do not display any of such specific controlling behaviour, implying that they are trusted by their spouses. Conversely, 43% of women reported that their husbands show at least one type of controlling behaviour, and they were asked their opinion about this. As expected, the extent of trust was greater among older women (some
of whom may have experienced greater control over their behaviour when they were younger; with the passing of time, they gain the trust of their husbands and in-laws), better educated women and among those belonging to better-off households.

The extent of violence experienced by women was also examined on the basis of some characteristics of the husband and selected indicators of women’s empowerment. The data presented in Table 2 show that a greater proportion of husbands who are either illiterate or have little education inflict violence (physical, sexual or emotional) on their wives than husbands who are better educated. All the same, women’s education has a much stronger association with violence than men’s education. One in four men with 12 or more years of schooling used violence against their wives but only 15% of women with the same level of education reported being subject to violence by their spouses. It is only education beyond 12 years of schooling that appears to empower women and act as a protective factor. Also, as evident in Table 2, women who have the same level of education as their husbands are least likely to suffer either physical or sexual violence compared to those who are illiterate or have less education than their husbands.

Drinking alcohol is very significantly associated with both physical and sexual violence. Seven out of 10 men who get drunk subjected their wives to violence as against three out of 10 men who did not drink. Also, a quarter of men who get drunk inflicted sexual violence on their wives. The combination of sexual desire and alcohol increased women’s risk to violence if she refused sex. A study conducted in south India indicated that the risk of wife abuse increases significantly with alcohol consumption by the husband (Rao 1997). Another study carried out in Karnataka reported that independent of caste and economic status, alcohol consumption by husbands was found to be significantly associated with violence (Krishnan 2005). More than moderate consumption of alcohol by men definitely increases the chances of violence against women.

In addition, 81% of men who displayed five or all of the six controlling behaviours inflicted physical or sexual violence on their wives. Two out of five men who exercised a high degree of marital control also sexually violated their spouses. The controlling behaviours stem from a lack of trust in women and leads to violence against them.

Table 2: Percentage of Ever-Married Women Aged 15–49 Whose Husbands Have Subjected Them to Physical or Sexual Violence, according to Select Husbands’ Characteristics, and Empowerment Indicators (2005–06)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Physical Violence</th>
<th>Sexual Violence</th>
<th>Physical or Sexual Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 years</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 years</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12+ years</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s alcohol consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not drink</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gets drunk sometimes</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gets drunk very often</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To understand women’s participation in decision-making in the household, the NFHS-3 asked women whether they participated in decisions related to their own health, major household purchases, purchases for daily household needs, and on visits to their family and relatives. If women did not participate in any of these decisions, they received a score of zero. Those who participated in one or two decisions were viewed as moderately empowered and those who had a voice in three or all four decisions were viewed as highly empowered. As evident in Table 2, empowerment has no clear relationship to prevalence of violence. This belies the expectation that women who participate in household decisions, and therefore have egalitarian gender-role attitudes, are less likely to experience violence.

On the other hand, 42-44% of women who indicated that wife beating was justified in any one of the six situations were themselves recipients of physical or sexual violence compared to 30% of those who said none of the situations excused violence. Overall, well-educated women and women in marital relationships where the husbands did not display controlling behaviours were the ones most likely to escape violence.

**Intergenerational Effect**

In the NFHS-3, ever-married women were asked a question on whether their mothers were beaten by their fathers. Responses to this reflected the extent to which young girls who witness parental violence, knowingly or unknowingly, accept violence as a part of their own married life. The data presented in Table 3 show that two-thirds of women who knew that their mothers were beaten by their fathers experienced some form of violence at the hands of their husbands. For nearly 60%, the violence was physical or sexual. The probability of children who have witnessed parental violence...
inflicting the same on their spouses when they grow up is quite high and a cause for concern. A third of women who said they had not seen any parental violence also reported being subjected to violence by their husbands. It is likely that some women who said that they were not aware of, or did not know about, parental violence were reluctant to disclose what happened between their parents.

A fairly large study carried out to understand the behaviour of men in Uttar Pradesh reported that husbands who had witnessed their fathers beating their mothers as children were 4.7 times more likely to beat their own wives and three times more likely to sexually coerce them than men who had not witnessed such violence (Koenig et al 2006). Martin et al (2002) showed that witnessing violence between one’s parents while growing up is an important risk factor for the perpetration of violence on one’s partner in adulthood. Compared to men raised in non-violent homes, men from violent homes were significantly more likely to believe in the right to control their wives and to physically and sexually abuse them. The study also demonstrated that non-violence in the earlier generation was strongly predictive of non-violence in the second generation.

Although the NFHS-3 included only one question on the inter-generational effect of domestic violence, this is an area which needs much more exploration in-depth. The effect of witnessing violence on the minds of children, the internalisation of the prevailing norms related to violence, the subsequent behaviour and the rationalisation of that behaviour all need to be investigated while addressing the issue of violence and ways to break the cycle of violence.

**Help-Seeking Behaviour**

In the NFHS-3, all women who reported physical or sexual violence were asked a number of questions on whether they sought help to try and end the violence. Women who said that they did seek help were asked from whom they sought it. Also, those who reported that they did not seek any help were also asked questions on whether they took anyone into confidence and shared their plight with them. Table 4 shows some of the data classified according to the background characteristics of the women. Only about one in four women (23.8%) sought help to end the violence they experienced. Two out of three women neither sought help nor did they tell anyone (family members or friends) about experiencing violence.

What is quite striking is that there are virtually no differentials in telling others about the violence, or seeking help from someone, whatever the background characteristics. Neither education nor family wealth act as protective factors in this regard. In fact, better educated women and those belonging to families with a better economic status were more unlikely to share their experience of violence with others.

**Table 3: Percentage of Ever-Married Women Aged 15-49, Who Reported that Their Father Beat Their Mother, Experiencing Violence by Their Husbands (2005-06)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent’s Father Beat Her Mother</th>
<th>Physical Violence</th>
<th>Emotional Violence</th>
<th>Sexual Violence</th>
<th>Any of the Three Forms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Per Cent Distribution of Women Aged 15-49 Years Who Told Someone about Experiencing Violence and Sought Help to End It, according to Background Characteristics (2005-06)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Characteristics</th>
<th>Never Told Anyone</th>
<th>% Who Told Someone</th>
<th>Sought Help from Any Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 5 Years</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 Years</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 or more years</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caste/tribe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>Wealth index</td>
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<td>Lowest</td>
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<td>Middle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>67.8</td>
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<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of violence</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical only</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual only</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both physical and sexual</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
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</tbody>
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Women who experienced sexual violence were even more reticent about talking to others about it or seeking help from anyone. The silence surrounding violence in general and sexual violence in particular has been reported in other micro and in-depth studies (Visaria 2000 and Visaria 2002). This has to be understood in the context of women trying to preserve the family’s honour by not disclosing something that happened within the home, and also in the context of the sense of shame associated with being abused by someone known to them and with whom they share intimate or conjugal relations.

In such a situation, from whom do battered women seek support? In the NFHS-3, ever-married women were asked this question. The majority of women who experienced violence and sought help reported that they did so from their natal family; 71% turned to their parents and other family members for support. Nearly 30% sought help from husbands’ families.7 Neighbours were resorted to by 15% and 9% turned to friends. Many a time, neighbours witness the violence and occasionally also get involved in an attempt to ease the situation. Hardly any women opted to report cases of violence to formal organisations or the authorities, presumably because they feared being ostracised and shamed by the communities in which they live. The fear that they themselves will be blamed for provoking husbands to use violence is all too real. It is the reality of Indian society that women who summon the
courage to challenge their abusers in a court of law or seek the support of social service organisations have to be prepared to face a long and humiliating battle with little sympathy from the authorities or family members, and even the media. Interviewing women survivors of abuse in New Delhi, Prasad (1999) demonstrated that the legal system and procedures designed to enhance women’s access to the law actually inhibited it, and that the state as such showed a tolerance of domestic and sexual violence.

Conclusions

A significant proportion of women, regardless of socio-economic background, subscribe to power differentials based on sex and accept that men have a right to discipline them, especially when they fail to fulfil gender-specific duties such as taking care of the house and children or cooking food on time in a manner that pleases the husband. Further, women who are beaten or otherwise physically abused tend to justify their husbands’ behaviour, as a way of rationalising the treatment meted out to them.

Admittedly, the subordination of women and the dominance of husbands when they are perceived to be transgressing from their wifely duties is not unique to India and cuts across cultures and nations. Nonetheless, the experience of violence, or even the threat of violence, and controlling behaviour by their spouses tends to lower women’s self-esteem, instil fear in them and further lower their ability to fulfil daily tasks to the satisfaction of the members of the family. The controlling behaviour that prompts husbands to suspect the moral character of their wives and mistrust their dealings with other men, including their male kin, undermines the very basis on which a marital relationship rests.

Witnessing violence between one’s parents while growing up has been found to be an important risk factor for the perpetration of violence on partners in adulthood. Men from violent homes are significantly more likely to believe in husbands’ rights to control their wives, and to be physically and sexually abusive towards them. The internalisation of the prevailing norms related to violence, and the subsequent behaviour and rationalisation of that behaviour need to be examined while addressing the issue of violence and the means to break the cycle of violence.

As in other surveys, in the NFHS-3 hardly any women reported that they sought redress or support from formal organisations or the authorities to deal with the violence meted out to them for fear of being ostracised and shamed by the communities in which they live. The fear that they themselves will be blamed for provoking men to use violence against them looms large. In the absence of supportive shelters or other avenues, it is very difficult for battered women in India to gather the courage to challenge their abusers in a court of law or seek the support of the few social service organisations that exist. The humiliation that those who approach the judiciary face because of long court battles, and having to deal with an insensitive police and others with little sympathy unnerve most women. They choose to suffer in silence in their homes, which become dysfunctional.

Even education does not empower women to enter the public arena for support. Better educated women or those belonging to better-off families who experience violence are least likely to share their experiences or seek support from others. This needs to be understood in the context of a culture of silence where women try to not disclose what happens within the home environment. Equally important is the sense of shame associated with being abused by someone known to them and with whom they share intimate or conjugal relations. Even when physically injured, women remain silent and suffer it alone. Further, societal norms that tolerate and accept violence are widely prevalent in Indian society and an adherence to them prevents women from seeking care. Finally, an in-depth
examination of the widespread acceptance of spousal violence among women of Tamil Nadu would help understand the prevalent cultural and social norms that govern conjugal relationships in Tamil society.

Violence against Women via Cyberspace

Cyber Identities and Images

New technologies enable a transgression of the boundaries of “physical” or “real” identities, and in these fluid spaces, individuals forge new relationships and networks, navigating new, and often times, multiple identities. These identities become essential to understand social relationships in cyberspace, and consequently, the relationships that can become abusive and violent. The anonymity and forays into new self-expression identities may not necessarily overlap, the former are not necessarily bound to the same social context or rules that the latter might operate under.

Images, especially of women, have enormous currency in digital spaces, thanks to their widespread and easy access. The porn industry, in this context, has unprecedented reach, both in terms of audience and exploitation, sustained mostly through the images of willing and unwilling women. In the Indian context, images on the internet or through mobile telephones have often been used by stalkers to denigrate, intimidate and harass women on- and off-line. For example, women who are raped are often revictimised when the images of their rape are recorded and used against them to perpetuate the cycle of violence. Similarly, images of rape are often released online as a tool to further intimidate and silence women victims. The sophistication of new technologies enables morphing and the construction of fake images or videos which are often perceived to be “real” and “authentic”. The internet is seen as a masculine space (used primarily by and for heterosexual males). This has several implications for the participation of women in cyberspace. For example, in the case of morphed images posted on extremely violent pornographic sites, the violence would not just be contained within digital spaces, but actually extend to a loss of the freedoms that the internet offers to women.

If women engage online in sexual acts of their own volition, they can still be booked under the ITA 2000, because the consent of the parties involved is not considered. The only provision that considers consent is the matter of images taken via phone. The lacunae in the law also relate to the ownership of images. For example, if a woman has consented to her pictures being taken, but does not want them to be publicised, what are the rules of ownership involved in these debates, and how can these rules of ownership be legislated and enforced? Such issues are especially relevant in the context of the queer movement in India, where the Internet has provided a visible and vibrant space for sexual minorities to communicate and network.

Policy choices need to avoid narratives of fear around new technologies that can effectively constrain women’s freedom to use digital spaces. There is the tendency to characterise women victims of cybercrime as “emotionally weak or unstable” and the paternalism prevalent in policies, implementing -institutions, and the justice system that imposes restrictions on women’s freedoms online in the name of safety and security. There is an urgency to build a wider dialogue around the interface of technology with culture, institutions of family and marriage, sexuality, body, privacy and freedom of expression.

Changing Public Sphere

The discourse of technology abuse to perpetrate violence against women is no doubt a useful point of departure for a feminist unpacking of technologies, but it is only a partial and hence, inadequate
strategy to grasp the totality of the relationship between new ICTs, gender and development. Feminist constructs need a wider kaleidoscope that problematises “digital personhood”, and the ways in which such personhood is gendered in digital spaces. This not only has implications for debates around women’s privacy and anonymity on the Internet, but also for the examination of ontological shifts in digital spaces that are empowering. Feminist interpretations of new ICTs also call for a rigorous unravelling of the normative structures and processes through which paternalism and patriarchal discourses are reproduced, and also, challenged in digital spaces – how, for instance, notions of womanhood, modesty, shame, honour are reconstructed in the relationship architectures of digital spaces and how these given categories may also be subverted. Essentially, an institutional-relational analysis is of foundational value in framing a gender and ICT discourse. Such an analysis, using an “information society” lens, would underscore a new techno-social reality where relationships and institutions are being reconfigured.

Gender and development theory, by and large, looks at ICTs as tools that can be used or misused. But the transformative social paradigm of the information society needs to be understood distinctly from the technological artefacts that represent this radical transformation. The meaning of social change in the contemporary context lies in the changing public sphere, analysing the various phenomena that can provide new avenues for feminist inquiry. The slippages between the private and the public that have come to fundamentally reconfigure the spatialities of social transactions and communications characterising contemporary life dislodge the basic conceptions of feminist thought around the public and private. For example, private communication on the Internet actually occurs on platforms that are essentially public (such as chat rooms or Facebook). On one hand, concerns about digital dangers are born as a result of the nebulous nature of spatial boundaries in defining relationships in the information society. And on the other hand, it is precisely the transformative nature of these slippages that allow for new kinds of publics to assemble momentarily, which in turn, can redefine the meaning of social protest (as we saw in the sms-based protest against the court verdict in the Jessica Lal murder case) and for building global communities of solidarity. So how do we grasp the changing public sphere?

Furthermore, corporatised governance regimes in digital spaces – such as of Facebook Inc, which defines the rules and norms of the Facebook social networking space – not only represent the paradoxes of what we know to be an egalitarian internet, but has also recast social and legal discourse in emphatic ways. As an example of this growing trend of the influence, recently, Google disallowed advertisements for abortion clinics in several nations, some of which do not prohibit abortions. A more grounded, southern information society perspective would lead us to a crucial insight: that “non-users” of new ICTs are impacted by the changing institutional order as much as “users”. In the emerging institutional order that is scaffolded by ICTs, the network society creates new exclusions that can exacerbate the structural disadvantages of those on the peripheries, while strengthening the power of local elites, totalitarian states, and the transnational hold of corporate capitalism. Women’s access to ICTs is thus not only a question about access to tools that can be appropriated for individual change, rather, more importantly, their disenfranchisement in the new global polity where voice and participation and the very enjoyment of many rights depends on their digital citizenship.

A Feminist Response

How can a feminist analysis shape policy frameworks in respect of ICTs? New ICTs provide radical choices for empowerment and new pathways to citizenship, especially for marginalised women. For instance, in respect of the Right to Information Act (RTI) or the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), information architectures supported by ICTs catalyse a push for
institutional transparency and accountability. Yet, as development interventions increasingly adopt ICTs to democratise information, the technological architectures supporting these processes also have to provide safeguards for privacy. Information society-related policies to protect and further women's rights must address both negative and positive rights, protecting individual privacy, while enabling highest transparency in government. At the same time, the protection of women’s rights to information and communication emphasises the need to balance concerns of self-expression with concerns of protection from exploitation. While there is no doubt that policies are needed to address online violence, the boundaries of state involvement in effecting such protection becomes critical. While the government should be able to prosecute those engaged in violence against women, a right to surveillance in general, without adequate basis is likely to infringe on women’s privacy. The state's duty to intervene and prosecute violence when it happens online should not become an excuse for surveillance over the Internet. Thus, policy approaches need to recognise both women's “public”, political rights as well as “private”, individual rights, especially in the context of violence against women.

Neoliberal View

By and large, ICT policies in developing countries, including India, have adopted a neoliberal, market view of ICTs and their default definition as market infrastructure and have thus marginalised the larger social significance of ICTs. Therefore, what we find is that existing legal and policy frameworks usually address the ICT “economy”. As was flagged earlier from the proceedings of the consultation, an attack against the image or private life of a person is still not viewed as a form of cyber crime in many countries, including India. Since most violations involving sexual content online are directed against women, the gaps in policy and law implicitly compromise women’s rights.

Additionally, newer technologies are being employed by the sex industry not only to create more violent forms of pornographic material, but they are also used actively to circumvent the law; companies simply locate servers in countries where they will not be prosecuted. The absence of a global governance framework in relation to ICTs (and as discussed, the usurpation of technology governance by corporates) often works to the disadvantage of developing countries. In the background of poor institutional maturity of legal and policy processes in respect of information society realities, the implications of such governance deficits are obvious. The lack of territorial jurisdiction over the Internet makes it difficult for countries in the developing world to identify the abusers and prosecute the guilty. For example, lack of cooperation from foreign based web sites is one of many hindrances to the resolution of cyber crime cases.

Among the greatest challenges to a strong feminist response to issues of violence against women and ICTs is the fact that feminist analytical frameworks have to coherently address the changing realities restructuring gender relations in response to the advent of new information and communication technologies. Piecemeal efforts to tinker with policy domains like employment, education or crime may fail to add up to a cogent national response to the opportunities and challenges presented by new technologies, especially for transformative change that privileges the marginalised. Also, feminist engagement with policies needs to approach rights from the vantage of an alternative ICT discourse. Policies are needed to promote appropriate technologies that can create secure and empowering online spaces. Feminist engagement with such policies is part of the imperative that can and should shape the emerging technological paradigm. By far the most urgent feminist response that is required is to stop seeing digital and online spaces as a different realm confined to technology users, but an important site of power that requires a feminist intervention.
Feminist thought about technology binds together some distinct lines of inquiry – explorations of identity, subjectivity, and the complex representations of the self; critiques of technology and globalization, and the relationship between gender identity, body and desire. From theoretical forays that have examined the ways in which new technologies reshape dominant taxonomies and categories of gender and sexuality (Stanley 1995), and identity (Haraway 1990) to critiques of capitalism that problematise the embodied and embedded experiences of women in the context of globalisation and the information society (Braidotti 1994), newer arenas of enquiry (or rather, new expositions of a contemporary feminist grand theory) have urged a disruption of thinking that can bring the symbolic and material together in interpretations of present realities. These evolutions are no doubt exciting but also beseech a grounding in third world feminist practice. In the emerging technosocial milieu of the third world, the “troubling” of given categories is especially significant to discourses of resistance, agency and empowerment. Southern feminist interpretations – a reimagining of the female technosocial subject – are, therefore, critical both for appropriating the emancipatory content of the emerging technological paradigm and to interrogate its patriarchal and capitalist systems, institutions and representations.

CASTE CONFLICT

Reasons for Caste conflict in Bihar

Agriculture has been the most important source of livelihood in Bihar. Nearly 80% of the State's population is engaged in agricultural pursuits. Hence there is an absolute necessity that the peasant class should be prosperous and content. But the ground realities in Bihar are just the opposite -- taking the form of caste war to mitigate agrarian tensions.

Land reforms

The successive state governments have not implemented land reforms or minimum wages for agricultural labourers. The conflict that originates in these failures is particularly intense in Bhojpur district, where the CPI-ML is an important force and where it has, over the last three decades, aggressively taken up the cause of landless labourers.

Dalits and the lower rung of backward castes, who constitute an overwhelming majority of agricultural labourers, remain completely assetless. According to a study by the AN Sinha Institute, Patna, roughly 61 per cent of the lower backward castes and 69.5 per cent of the schedule castes in Bihar's central plains are landless.

Even the Union Home Ministry team which visited Bihar after the Shankarbigha massacre could not avoid saying that in the State which had nearly 40 lakh landless labour and where nine lakhs acre of land still remain undistributed, the land reform needed to be followed up.

The Ranvir Sena wants to stall land reforms and push the clock back on land redistribution that has already been carried out by a reluctant state, says social scientist and expert on Bihar, Arvind N Das. It has been aided in this by successive rulers of Bihar.

One of the declared top priorities of states has been to break up large feudal landholdings and divide the surplus land among the poor. Yet successive governments have lacked the political courage to do so. The Rashtriya Janata Dal, which rules Bihar, rose to political prominence by championing the interests of traditionally repressed lower castes. But the RJD is also accused of inaction on land reforms and of covertly supporting the Ranvir Sena.
Das says the massacres have more to do with a sharpening agrarian crisis than with caste differences. "The downtrodden are saying no to oppression and exploitation," he says.

Under the Bihar Land Ceiling Act, a rural household cannot hold more than about seven hectares. But upper castes, specially Bhumihars are known to own far in excess, says Das. A Bihar government survey after a caste masssacre in 1999 in Jehanabad district found that most low caste families there were landless. In contrast, some upper caste landlords were found holding more than 30 hectares each, even as official records showed them owning half this.

According to the New York-based Human Rights Watch, a particularly violent phase of caste violence in Bihar began in the early 1970s with a land-grab movement backed by left extremists. "Sharecroppers began harvesting crops on upper-caste land in Bihar's central districts as Naxalite cadres burnt grain storages and imposed economic blockades on hundreds of acres of land that landlords forcibly kept them from cultivating," notes the Watch report, Caste Violence Against India's Untouchables.

Inadequate police force

The State crime branch had made another startling revelation to the Government regarding huge quantity of licensed firearms being piled and used by the private armies of all hues. The liberal policy of granting arms licence within the State and also allowing people to retain arms on basis licence procured from other States have created a new kind of problem.

The State police is totally incapable of handling the situation. The latest crime statistics reveal that on an average, 16 persons are killed or kidnapped or looted in Bihar every hour. The reasons for such a demoralizing and incapable force are many.
The national average of the police-public ratio is about 1.3 policemen per 10,000 citizens. However, the availability of policemen in Bihar per 10,000 people is meager 0.9 i.e hardly a policeman for 10,000 people.

It is pertinent to mention here that other backward States like Orissa and west Bengal have a much better police-public ratio as compared to Bihar.

It has also been alleged that there is a nexus between the police and the Ranvir Sena in Naxal killings. According a survey conducted by the People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR), "The police actively participated in the killings of seven people by the Ranvir Sena in Ekwari."

To further strengthen the contention, the PUDR has quoted the observations of the then Director General of Police recorded in the police document, "There was a tendency among the police functionaries to encourage the defence groups (Senas) to organize themselves in order to fight out the Naxalites… this was the very negation of police performance which resulted in the rise of different caste Senas in Bihar."

Political patronage

Intelligence sources points out that influential Bhumihars belonging to practically all the mainstream political parties support the Ranveer Sena. They receive financial and moral support from upper caste politicians of all political parties. In fact the Sena represents the aspirations of all elements fighting against the Naxalites.

The postulation is further strengthened by the recovery of a diary after the arrest of Ranvir Sena chief Brahmeswar Singh. The diary contains the names and telephone numbers of several upper caste politicians, journalists and police officers, according to a report.

The diary, which belonged to Ranvir Sena chief, along with a document explaining the Sena structure, was recovered from the office of an affiliated outfit, Akhil Bharatiya Rashtrawadi Kisan Mahasangh, at Exhibition road in Patna, from where Singh was arrested on August 29.

Former Bihar Chief Minister and president of the ruling Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Laloo Prasad Yadav commenting on the arrest of Ranvir Sena chief in Patna, said that "the arrest could politically be a turning point since many of the politicians who had links with the organisation would now be exposed."

Caste Clashes in South Tamil Nadu

South Tamil Nadu appears to be in a state of great social turbulence. The erstwhile Tirunelveli district, now bifurcated into V O Chidambaranar and Nellai Katta-bomman districts and the present Kamarajar district, have recorded several incidents of violence in the last few years. The atmosphere is so charged that even an apparently trivial incident is enough to trigger off violence. Those involved in these clashes are maravars, a dominant agricultural caste and pallars or devendrakula vellalars, a chronically oppressed dalit caste. The continual violence which has rocked this region, on closer study, betrays a deep social malaise.

A small section of the pallars, who had long remained landless agricultural labourers, have been recently empowered, to at least a small extent, as a consequence of access to education and
government jobs. The passing of land to a few paltars as evidenced in the resurvey of Slater's Gangaigondan village (Chidambaranar district) conducted by the Madras Institute of Development Studies is explained by this development. The relative affluence of certain dalit villages, Kodiyanthum (Chidambaranar district) for instance, is attributed to monetary repatriation from Gulf countries, where some of the dalits have managed to find employment. Another aspect to the assertion of the dalits, mainly those of the paller caste, is the emergence of political organisations among them. K r i s h n a s w a m y ' s Devendrakula Vellalar Federation, John P a n d i a n ' s Devendrakula Vellalar Sangam and the Thiagi Immanuel Peravai (named after the martyr of the 1957 Muthukulathur events) have to a great extent politicised the paltars, unlike other dalit castes like parayars and chakkiliyars. After Krishnaswamy's election to the provincial legislature even those who had distanced themselves from such organisations have begun to Pally behind him in a big way.

The emergence of assertive paltars has meant that they would not take discrimination lying down. South Tamil Nadu has its own share of discrimination against dalits. Many village wells and temples are still out of bounds to dalits, while separate places of worship and deities also exist. In effect, municipal schools tend to cater exclusively to dalit children, while children of other caste Hindus, notably maravars, generally abstain from such public schools. Though stainless steel tumblers have replaced coconut shells or aluminium cups, dalits continue to be served separately in tea stalls. In Tirunelveli region, the district Arivoli lyakkam, which is a part of the National Literary Mission, had to conduct separate classes for maravars and dalits. In many villages dalits have no access to maravar streets. They are not permitted to use the cement benches in bus stops. They have no approach road to their cremation ground. Numerous stories about upper caste deception especially regarding government subsidy-loan for milch cows are rife in this region. More abominable is the case of panchayat unions. Dalit members of these councils are made to sit on the floor as a matter of routine. A woman, the dalit panchayat union president, complained to this writer that the members belonging to non-dalit castes were not attending the regular meetings she convened because she was a dalit.

The State Minimum Wage Act for agricultural labourers is enforced only in the breach. Even the labour-oriented political parties despite their best efforts could not organise the agricultural labourers into a movement as in Thanjavar. This is because caste appears to be the dominant identity which overrules all other identities here. The maravar agricultural labourers refuse to associate themselves with an organisation that gives membership to dalits. As a result, the landlords could not be forced to implement the State Minimum Wage Act. Lowest wages for the most onerous work have, over time, forced the dalits into systematic degradation. It should be noted that the dalits who continue to be agricultural labourers and dependent on maravars for livelihood have tended to remain submissive. Similar is the case of paraiyars and chakkiliyars, two dalit castes which are a minority in this region.

As for maravars, they are numerically far more important than the other agricultural castes of the region. Land reforms, like the zamindari abolition, Tenancy Acts of 1950s helped the rich maravar farmers to promote their interests. They have also been the main beneficiaries of government agricultural policies providing institutionalised credit and liberal and subsidised agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, seeds, water electricity, etc. A sizeable number of others making use of their political clout have earned quick money through illicit brewery, contract works and moneylending. However, it should be remembered that a vast number of maravars also work as agricultural labourers and wage earners.

In the last 20 years systematic efforts have been made to unite all the three clans of thevarcommunity, namely, kallar, agmudiyar and maravar Pasumpon U Mutharamalinga Thevar has been declared and used as a symbol to bring all the groups under one single banner. The government classification of
'thevar' community as the most backward class helped bring about this unity. In Tirunelveli villages where there was not much reverence for Muthuramalinga Thevar, his statues were erected in 1980s. Even the Virasigamani village statue which was disfigured - an event responsible for caste riots in July 1995 - had been installed only in 1986. The thevar peravai leadership had cultivated strong caste sentiments among the maravar youth by erecting thevar statues everywhere.

It was against this background, the caste clashes since 1995 are to be studied. What started off as a wordy duel on July 26, 1995 between a bus driver of the state-owned Kattabomman Transport Corporation and a group of school students led to a string of violent incidents. The driver, Thangavelu, a dalit from Vadanathampatti (Tirunelveli-Kattabomman district) was subsequently beaten up by the maravars. In retaliation, dalits (Devendrakula Vellalars) attacked the maravar-dominated Virasigamani village in the process disfiguring the statue of Muthuramalinga Thevar. The news of this disfigurement spread far and wide and extremely provocative posters scurrilously abusing pallars were put up all over the region. Angry young maravar youths could be seen stopping buses and plastering them with these abusive posters. The ubiquitous posters carried the picture of Karthik, a film actor, along with that of Muthuramalinga Thevar, indicating that it was the handiwork of Karthik Fans Association, a caste outfit in the region.

The stage was thus set for the unleashing of violence on the dalits. Roving mobs chose dalit targets, both life and property, for attack. In the week-long riots, at least 18 people lost their lives and property worth a few crores of rupees (apart from the scores of public transport buses that were torched or damaged) was destroyed.

An important feature of the riots this time around was the dalit attempt to defend themselves and even counter-attack. But the entire course of events showed the complete inability of the state machinery and polity to respond to the situation. The state government maintained a deafening silence and the law and order collapsed for days together. If we compare this with the government handling of such a situation in Ramanathapuram district in 1957, the inept handling will be too obvious. On September 14, 1957, a police party sent to nab the accused in the murder of dalit leader Immanuel was confronted by a mob of about 500 armed thevars at Kilathoval (Muthukulathur taluk). In order to disperse the surging violent mob intent on attacking the police, six rounds were fired, in consequence of which five persons were killed. Subsequently the police had to open fire on a maravar mob on September 19 at Keeranathai in which three persons were killed and at Narikudi on September 20 in which four persons were killed. By September 21 the situation was brought under control. In all these incidents shooting was resorted to to prevent the maravar mobs from setting fire to the dalit settlements. An enquiry was ordered and S Venkateshwaran, a civil servant who conducted the enquiry justified the police action and held that the firing was necessary to give protection to the weaker sections of society. In contrast, in Tirunelveli and in Rajapalayam it was the role of the police which was the most distressing. At many places while the rampaging mobs attacked dalits, policemen were silent onlookers. Little was done to prevent or take action against people involved in disseminating provocative posters which was an important cause for the spread of violence. Absence of prompt police action made the dalits of Mangapuram in Rajapalayam (Kamarajar district) flee their habitat and take shelter in Sundrarajapuram in June 1997. The district collector himself is reported to have advised the dalits to evacuate. The acts of police and bureaucracy should concern everyone who values human rights.

Another aspect which needs to be thrashed out is the prejudiced behaviour of the police against the dalits. This has been reprimanded even by the Supreme Court in its recent judgment on the police
high-handedness in Nalumoolai Kinaru (Chidambaranardistrict) in 1992. While the people were asleep, police went to the village at about 4.30 am and attacked the dalit men and women brutally causing severe injuries to many persons. The police also damaged and looted their properties. The police, under the pretext of an all out search for suspects and weapons, conduct such midnight raids in dalit villages. Kodiyankulam represents the high watermark of such police high-handedness. The police ostensibly on a search mission went berserk. The Kodiyankulam incident evoked great public indignation and the villagers demonstrated their anger by openly campaigning against the then ruling party in the general elections of 1996. They also succeeded in electing a dalit leader, Krishnaswamy, to the state assembly exclusively on a dalit political platform.

When caste violence of unprecedented nature erupted in Tirunelveli in 1995, one of the dalit leaders suggested that the government set up an office of the inspector general of police in Tirunelveli to tackle the tricky situation. It sounded an odd suggestion then. Now the present chief minister has translated this idea into reality and so it looks as though the state has decided to treat the clash between maravars and dalits as a law and order issue. The fact that K Vijay Kumar IPS, known to be a man of stern stuff, has been appointed the inspector general of police (law and order, southern region), reinforces this perception.

But the present clashes cannot be dismissed as law and order problems. A visit to the riot-hit villages reveals that existing social relationships have broken down. In the 1930s, when the dalits first defied their maravar landlords and in the 1950s when the dalits launched an agitation against their oppressors (maravars) it was an agrarian conflict. Regrettably, on both the occasions the political parties failed to politicise the dalits and organise them on class lines as happened in Kerala. Vested interests made use of the failure of political parties to perpetuate casteist tendencies. Curiously the places where conflicts took place then remain calm now. The present clashes cannot be solely considered an agrarian conflict. Take for an instance the case of Mangapuram in Rajapalayam. The dalits are agricultural labourers and the maravars are construction and mill workers. Yet they have clashed. The estrangement between the two caste groups is total today. In villages where the dalits have clung to the land for their subsistence, they feel that they are culturally treated as second class citizens. Often these dalits have to bear the brunt of maravar fury in times of clashes. These dalits who constitute the majority of the downtrodden today are to be pulled out of the moorings of misery, ignorance and idleness. This will alone engender social transformation necessary for the total emancipation of dalits.

When we analyse the caste clashes that have taken place since 1995, it is known that youths prominently take part in the riots. Vadanathampatti is 3000-strong dalit village. There are about 300 graduates without employment. They constitute combustible material. In fact they played a leading role in attacking the maravars of Virasigamani village in July 1995. The same is the case with the maravar youths. When there was violence in Thuraiyur of Tirunelveli - Kattabomman district, calm prevailed in Thuraiyur of Chidambaranar district (near Kovilpatti). The panchayat union chairman who happens to be a maravar explained that there was no disturbance in his village because all the youths had been gainfully employed. The frustration and despair caused on account of unemployment have driven the youth to take pan in gang violence without regard for the foreseeable consequences: punishment, physical injury and material damage.

Thus, there exist many objective conditions for the generation of caste violence in south Tamil Nadu. Instead of eliminating such conditions, the government, both the previous and the present one, by its tactless moves has aggravated them in the last couple of years. Unless basic structural transformation is attempted, through drastic land reforms thereby changing the production relations, violence will
continue to escalate and even spread. As sociologists point out wherever people are living under unjust social conditions and are therefore deprived of the chance to realise their human poten-tialities, structural violence is inevitable. On our part we have to distinguish the violence of the dominant class from the violence of the oppressed class, because the former impedes the advance of historical forces, whereas the latter's violence is used only in the interest of the emancipation of the entire humanity.

ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The Problem of Ethnicity

Ethnic activity and separation came in a big way in the post colonial, newly emerging nations like Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria etc. This was easily and crudely explained away as tribalism, backwardness etc. But ethnic activity affected even the developed West; the problem of Welsh and the Scots, Wallon-Flemish conflict in Belgium, the Basques in Spain, to name only a few. Even the seemingly egalitarian conflict-free melting pot America has been shattered by black ethnic activity. The erstwhile Socialist block, now, and for a long time, has been cauldron of ethnic crisis, with Crotian, Serbians, Bosnians, Slovak, Czech etc. in a conflict. In fact, ethnicity has now become a worldwide phenomenon.

The problem of ethnicity and national building has been widely discussed over the past few decades. The phenomenon of ethnicity has become all intrinsic component of the socio-political realities of multi-ethnic or plural cultural societies, specially in a country like India.

In India, with its variety of pluralities, in terms of language, race, religion and so on ethnic conflict has become a part of the political scenario. In most countries, including ours, the processes of development and change have generated conditions for ethnic conflict, as the fruits of these development processes have come to be distributed unevenly. Also the nature and character of the lower structure and rule of the political leadership have their role to play.

Definition of Ethnicity

The definition of concept in any field of social science is usually difficult. And a term such as ethnicity is loaded with meanings, values and prejudices and therefore, is even more difficult to define.

Ethnicity pertains to the word ethnic which is a distinction of mankind based on race. Ethnicity has now lost the original connotation. “It is now employed in a broader sense to signify self-consciousness of a group of people united, or closely related, by shared experience such as language, religious belief, common heritage, etc. While race usually denotes the attributes of a group, ethnic identity typifies creative response of a group who consider themselves marginalised in society” (Barun De and Sunanjan Das, 1992: 69). Barth and Benedict Anderson feel that boundary is an important criterion for self definition by ethnic group, to separate themselves from ‘others’.

Ethnic Identity : A Psycho-sociological Reality

William G. Sumner observed that people have their own group as the center of their lives, and rate all other groups with reference to their own. He called this tendency of individuals to cling to their clan ethnocentrism. It is a generalised prejudice.

Why do human beings slip so easily into ethnic prejudice? Human beings have a natural tendency to form generalisations, concepts and categories. Their categories are close to their first-hand
experiences. They also categorise basing on hearsay, fantasy and emotions. This process of social
categorisation leads to the formation of an “in-group” and “out-group”. All groups develop a way of
living with characteristic codes and beliefs. Therefore, the formation of ethnic attitude is functionally
related to becoming a group member. According to the social categorisation theories given by H.
Tajfel (1981) as well as J.C. Turner (1982), every social group attempts to achieve an identity in
contradiction to the “out-group” Identity can be broadly characterise as the process by which an
individual is bound to his/her social group and by which he/she realises his/her social self. In the
context of the Indian political identity, such a formulation has several implications. The emotional
fervour associated with linguistic issues can perhaps be viewed in the context of this definition of
social identity structure of the different language groups in the country.

The normative character of ethnic prejudices involve far more than the fact that attitudes are shared by
members of a majority or minority group. Each member is expected to hold such attitudes and various
kinds of pressures are brought on those who fail to conform to it. A sense of identity is a very natural
human tendency but when an ethnic identity is consolidated and used as a reference point for
mobilisation to share in the power structure, the mobilisation becomes far more effective.

While ethnic attributes are categorisation for the purpose of classification which is a static
formulation, ethnicity is a dynamic process, whereby a group of people or community regroups itself
as an adaptive strategy in response to specific demands of the situations.

**Some Characteristics of Ethnicity**

Following are some of the characteristics of ethnicity.

1) Ethnicity relates to ascriptive identities like caste, language religion, region etc.

2) Inequality in terms of sharing power between two ethnic groups results into conflict. The
ethnicity is socially mobilised and territorially confined. It has numerically sufficient population, and
is a pool of symbols depicting distinctiveness. It has a reference group in relation to which/whom a
sense of relative deprivation (real or imagined) is aggregated

3) Being left out of the developmental process or even being a victim of uneven development,
ethnicity causes ethnic movements.

4) Ethnicity is manifested in Indian politics not merely due to grassroot discontent but is also a
creation of vested political interest.

5) Ethnic groups that use ethnicity to make demands in the political arena for alteration in their
status, in their economic well-being, etc. are engaged very often in a form of interest group politics.

Before we try to understand the role of ethnicity in Indian politics, it is important to stress that
whatever the difference between ethnic groups, the focus of their interaction finally boils down to the
centrality of politics of who gets what, when and how? As already stated the focus of interests of an
ethnic group, is to get some benefits for itself. The group often uses ethnic criterion like religion,
language or caste to mobilise itself to give identity to itself which separates it from other group or
groups. Thus, delineation of boundary of an ethnic group of community is an important aspect of
ethnicity markers. But exactly which one will get projected at a specific point of time would usually
depend on where or how the person draws the boundary. Since delineation of the nature of boundary
rests on the conditions existing at a given moment, the whole exercise becomes a response to the
specific conditions. This adds fluidity to the situation and makes the identity projection a dynamic
phenomenon. The nature of identity shifts along with changing circumstances and calls for change in boundary or a change in identification. The seeming singularity of identity, by and large, conveys a notion only. In reality, plurality of identities appears much more widespread than it ordinarily appears to be.

Patterns of Ethnic Conflict in the North-East: A Study on Manipur

While studying ethnic conflicts in the ‘north-east of India’, one cannot but look at Manipur which exhibits as many problems that could possibly appear in the discourse of collective conflict. Perhaps it is the only state in the entire north-east which experiences such varied forms of issues and problems. A study on the state will show the complexity of ethnicity and politics that a composite culture would possess. Identity formation by more than 30 communities and tribes harping on exclusivity, integration and dominance, often results in several forms of conflict that would provide ground for several observations and narratives, that may not even have meeting points. This is not to show pessimism but to highlight the difficulties – that of drawing possible unity of observations. The added advantage, however, is quite clear – not because ethnic conflict is most widespread in the state but of the nature of demographic composition and identity formation. The pace in which the assertions of identities, of ‘nation’ or ‘subnation’ characters, have been floated often mutually exclusive is fast and alarming. This development calls for serious reflection, not only for the state of Manipur but also for the Indian state, which is more than willing to come out with quick political solutions. The complexity of ethno-demographic relationships and subsequent conflicts in Manipur can however provide a wider theoretical framework explaining a particular pattern of conflict. It is a different issue if such a pattern would successfully explain all other instances of ethnic conflict in the region or the country, but the attempt is to provide a generic picture of conflict as it seems in a territorial entity having multi-ethnic,
multi-lingual, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-sub-national identities. Manipur is a case in point, the most appropriate miniature of the Indian state. The paper further proposes to highlight the factors behind emergence of such patterns of conflict. The emphasis is on the form of relationship that exists between composition and distribution of population on the one hand and nature of ethnic violence on the other.

The logic behind targeting Manipur as the laboratory of experiment lies in seeing the state as ‘miniature Indian state.’ Multiplicity in ethnic composition and demographic variations in the state have substantive similarities with the kind of equation, mainland India has with the rest of the country. A major difference, however, lies in land-and-people relationship, which is extremely unequal in the state. Out of a small population of 2.38 million (2001 Census) by the Indian standard, the demographic composition of Manipur shows several ethnic communities and tribes found all over the state either exclusively confined or scattered or coexist. The majority Meiteis comprise of 56.9 per cent of the total population, who mostly profess Vaisnava faith, are confined to the valley. The valley all surrounded by hills is only one-tenth of the total geographical area. The state’s land act does not allow the Meiteis and other non-tribals (by the schedule list) to buy land in the hills and settle. That is, nine-tenth of the state’s area has been reserved for the scheduled tribes. On the other hand, density of population shows a contrasting picture. While the two most populous districts of Imphal east and Imphal west put together have a density of 607 per sq km, the least populous district of Tamenglong is 19 per sq km The total population of tribes in the state is little more than 0.71 million. The tribal population comprises of 29 tribes in the scheduled list and many other smaller tribes and sub-tribes who are included in the category of ‘unspecified tribes’ in the list. The two major tribes by current nomenclature are the Nagas and the Kukis. Most of the 29 tribes in the scheduled list are clubbed under either of these groups. The fate of those tribes who prefer to maintain their distinct identities, not to be called either as Naga or Kuki, has to face threats and at times severe atrocities in the hands of those who want to encompass them into the larger folds of ethnic identity. For instance, while Hmars and Koms have been able to retain their separate identities, other tribes like Paite, Lamkang, Maring, etc, have called themselves as Naga-Meiteis. Most of the instances of such assertions are marked by the politics of survival rather than ideological influences. Apart from the respective dialects, Manipuri serves as the lingua franca for most of the communities and tribes in the state. Recently it was found that some tribes within the Naga fold, particularly Tangkhuls, have expressed their reservation over making Manipuri as official language of the state though it is altogether a different matter that two different tribes (in the state) within the Naga fold may speak Manipuri as the lingua franca. The issue is more political in nature. The demographic distribution as of present is that Naga and Kukis inhabit in the three north-western and northern districts of Tamenglong, Senapati and Ukhrul, and partly in the south-eastern district of Chandel. Kukis mostly inhabit in the south-western district of Churachandpur and partly in the district of Senapati. The tribal population mostly are Christians with some traces of Rongmei, Purum and few other tribes practising their traditional religions. The Meitei Pangals (Manipuri Muslims), constituting a substantive part of the state’s population (1,67,204 by 2001 Census), speak Manipuri as the mother tongue and are scattered mainly in the valley and adjoining hills. Given such a complex picture, one is bound to visualise possible tensions and conflicts that are in store for such material entity having varied forms of ethnic composition and settlement.

Patterns of Conflict

The complexity of demographic configuration, emerging community conflicts, and violence erupting out of such conflicts, shapes into particular forms or patterns. It will be worthwhile to study the conflict taking both mediate and immediate factors into account rather than study the violence and its occurrences in isolation. The mode of violence has close interlinkages with other issues mentioned
earlier. The series of ethnic conflicts in the state; first the long years of Naga-Kuki clash, followed by the Kuki-Paite clash, and currently the much covert Meitei-Naga tension, find causal reference to the type of demographic configuration giving rise to different identity formation and subsequent clash of interests. Unless one sees these either in totality or in continuity, talking about ‘pattern’ will make little sense.

The nature of conflict largely marked by violence is twofold. In one form or pattern, conflict is not confined at one place but spreads over all other areas where both tribes cohabit. This pattern has broad similarities with those found in a communal clash. The Naga-Kuki clash was not confined to Chandel district alone but spread over all other places where both tribes cohabit. The state boundary does not operate in such a conflict for the discourse of conflict is beyond electoral administrative boundary, is ethnically defined and marked by a sense of fraternity. Kukis in Senapati district extended the Naga-Kuki conflict from Chandel district to their area of dominance. So have Zeliangrong Nagas to Tamenglong district. The majority of the warring groups initiate the clash in the areas where they dominate. This is true of both warring groups. Though Naga-Kuki clash started over control of Moreh town of Manipur in the Indo-Mayanmar border, it spread over all the Naga and Kuki inhabited areas not only in the state of Manipur, but also to the adjoining states of Nagaland and Assam. Moreh is a commercial town mainly flourishing on border trade where wide range of smuggling operates starting from household items to drugs and narcotics. The town is the financial nerve centre of the insurgent organisations, particularly the Nagas and the Kukis. It was over control of this town that the tussle started between these two groups. Chandel district, where Moreh is located, is mainly inhabited by Thadou Kukis and Maring Nagas. With the UNC’s increasing anti-Kuki stand, the outburst took place on May 12, 1992 when NSCN (IM) burnt down Kuki villages at Molphei. Subsequently, on May 30, 1992 Kuki National Army (KNA) collected tax from the Maring villages, an amount of 30,000 kyats with further reports of atrocities [NPMHR 1992]. On June 3, 1992, some armed groups believed to be cadres of NSCN (IM) attacked a Haokip Kuki village killing the village headman and few others. Kukis retaliated by attacking Maring villages in Chandel district (Yamthang nd). Thus chain of massacre started. Immediate reasons behind Naga-Kuki clash are:

(i) control and occupation of Moreh, (ii) tax on Kuki residents in Naga territory by the Naga militants and refusal by the Kukis, and (iii) refusal to renew the land agreement by the Nagas to the Kukis [Laba 1994].

The second pattern operates in an intriguing manner. Though it is difficult to see a clearcut causal relationship between two or more than two instances of conflict, the type of discourse is similar – all on ethnic line. However, the relationship between such two instances of conflicts in this pattern is not influenced by a sense of fraternity. The parties involved in these instances are of different ethnic identities. Though Naga-Kuki clash was followed by Kuki-Paite clash, the causal factor is determined not by extension of fraternity among the warring groups but by other factors largely material in nature. This is of course not to undermine the importance of the fast emerging political consciousness among these communities. The much covert Meitei-Naga tension shows the complexity of the relationship and the factors determining the same. The conflict, rather tension, between the two is not related to any extension of fraternal feelings from the Naga-Kuki conflict. The prominent cause for the development in the latter is due to fast expanding ‘Naga nationalism’. This is quite different from ‘fraternity feelings’ of two tribes under one ethnic bond. The Meitei-Naga tension emerging posterior to the Naga-Kuki clash does not share the causal fraternity bond of Meiteis siding with the Kukis.

The difference between the two patterns can be highlighted through the example quoted above, viz ‘fraternity feelings’ and ‘expansion of nationalism’. Naga-Kuki clash, which initially started between
the Maring Nagas and Thadou Kukis, was joined by other Nagas and Kukis in different parts of Manipur. Once the conflict takes shape through a chain of fraternity it spreads beyond the Manipur to adjoining states where the two populations coexist. While in the former the conflict is exclusively between two groups having distinct (ethnic) identities spreading over places of their habitation, the latter is in reality different conflicts, though not completely unrelated. Take for instance the cases of Naga-Kuki conflict and Naga-Meitei tension. I would see these two cases, which otherwise are two different instances, as a result of an ever increasing Naga nation’s expansionism. The factors determining the latter are much more complex and bear far-reaching consequences. Though these two patterns bear different natures, there are few common factors determining these events.

Relationships between these distinct events of conflict are tied by what I would call, ‘semi-causal connectives’. This may be seen as a formal construct, a kind of objective relationship that exists between two or more than two spacio-temporally distinct events of conflict. The relationship is neither completely determined by the change of event or by praxiological intervention, but somewhat a combination of both. This is where I emphasise on the role of human praxis guided by material conditions. I am not in search for an ideal-type. I have only been trying to capture the complexity of the nature of conflict many of which may not be ethnic at all. Studying the conflicts of the latter form, there seems to exist a chain of relationships where a preceding conflict ignites the succeeding one. But this is not to draw a hypothesis that the connectives are drawn exclusively by a collective social consciousness determining the very nature of the connectives. That would be drawing too much out of collective praxis. Yet one should not completely rule out the possibility of such a consciousness operating behind the political moves and social celebrations of few communities and tribes in the last few decades. I would propose a sort of (weak) hypothesis on collective consciousness moving the praxis. But importance of material factors that determines these connectives cannot be overlooked. Of course, material conditions are man-governed.

Observing the intensity of violence, not only the barbarism involved but also the ideological messages that are so strongly meted out, one may conclude with certain amount of confidence that causal factors are extremely strong and often have a reaching impact in future inter-ethnic relationship. When causal reference is made to demographic configuration, it is not to mean the demographic configuration per se. Demographic configuration with all its forms in the region is a historical fact as much as inter tribal rivalry and conflicts are [Singh 1989]. But the nature of conflict as witnessed today is a more recent phenomenon. Rather than the facts per se, it is the way in which facts are being perceived and projected that is the igniting ground for conflict. This I shall take up little later. The formation of identities by the tribes and sub-tribes, and more importantly in few cases assertion of tribes to form community identity, not necessarily ethnic though often claimed, is also an equally important causal factor. At least, at present, I see these two as all-important factors leading to rise of conflict and subsequent violence. Problem of migration and settlement as constituting sub-factors within the demographic factor will be taken up. Though highlights may be of demographic composition and distribution these are more generic, the core issue being contentions on migration and settlement.

**Question of Identity**

Collective consciousness has emerged among the tribes in the region through formation of separate political identities. In addition to their earlier existing identities both as a cultural and political unit, a new form of assertion attempting internalisation of new political ethos is in the process. The tribes in the state are not only trying to redefine themselves through this new consciousness, but many (larger) tribes are moving out of tribal identity to that of ethnic community identity. (This is not to
miserstand with the identity of a tribe as earmarked by the government of India’s scheduled list.)

As compared to a tribe, an ethnic community is more politicised, ideologically structured with a matured form of communication network. Emergence of Naga as an ethnic identity can be seen as the most recent development drawing attention of the social thinkers. Let me take ‘tribe’ as more or less a homogeneous group of people having a closely-knit way of life, with relatively simpler means of production, to be somewhat falling under a close/communicable speech community. On the other hand, it is politiscisation of a tribe with certain ideological construct as goal that gives birth to an ethnic community. Formation of ethnic community is primarily political. It may later provide ways for the emergence of a ‘more unifying’ cultural identity. The tying bond of cultural oneness in a community is so strong that we tend to see such an identity as pre-given, almost as the source for all other identity formations. Considering this formulation, it is too early to talk of Naga as a cultural identity though Naga as a political identity is already in operation, perhaps much more actively than any other community in the region.

A little more clarity is perhaps called for on the functional distinctions between cultural identity and political identity. Both the terms ‘Naga’ and ‘Kuki’ as functional categories came into use with records of the British military officers and administrators [Mackenzie 1884, 2001]. Though the names may be in use earlier, self-appropriation of identities with these names came much later. Take for instance, the name ‘Naga’ which is more of a British creation in the 1880s. It is an identity projected for better administrative purposes – to club different tribes under one administrative umbrella. It was much later that the first self-appropriation came into being with the creation of Naga club. It initially started, in the same colonial fashion like that of Indian National Congress, with the participation of English educated Nagas serving under the British Indian army. This name as a political identity became clearer in 1947 when British left its south-east Asian colonies. Phizo, as the champion of Naga self-determination, called for a separate Naga state outside the Indian dominion. Thus came the projection from the Naga national workers that Nagas achieved independence one day before India did. Creation of Naga political identity is still in process, latest being the inclusion of tribes like Anal, Moyon, Monsang, Maring, Paite into a common ‘Naga’ identity, etc, this being a major achievement of the NSCN (IM). These entries are the latest, in the 1990s. Notwithstanding these entries, tribes like Aoos, Angamese, Tangkhul, Zeliangrong, Mao, who are already clubbed as Nagas still have little in common among them so far as their dialects, customs and traditional world views are concerned. Further, inter tribal rivalry [Singh and Singh 1989] was a dominant feature. Yet with the appropriation of Naga as a political identity efforts are being made to have a common political platform where equal participation of the constituting tribes are sought. This is a major political achievement among the Nagas. This is where I see ‘Naga’ more a political identity rather than cultural. It may of course be possible to have all the tribes under the Naga fold to develop one common language and custom to integrate into one cultural block. Celebration of ‘Lui-ngai-ni’ as the common festival of the Nagas, particularly in Manipur, is an effort towards this end.

The problems with the Kukis are, however, different. Though the term ‘Kuki’ is also a creation of the British, the tribes constituting this category has close cultural affinity – linguistically as well as by custom. Of course, it would be an over exaggeration if one projects these tribes under one cultural head. Unlike the Nagas, Kuki as a political identity has not yet been fully appropriated. It remained more as a convenient name coined by the British administrators. Though attempts were made for unification of all the tribes under ‘Kuki’ it was shortlived. By the half of 1940s three major divisions took place within the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group of Manipur, viz Mizo Union (predominantly constituted by Hmars), Kuki national assembly (initiated by Thadous and Haokips), and Khul union (initiated by Paite, Vaiphei, Simte, Gangte, Kom, etc). This was followed by creation of political parties based on
community lines by 1950. Kuki as a political concept got a major setback by these groupings marked by exclusivity along tribal lines. This break up was ignited by William Shaw’s note on the Thadou which was based on Jamkinthang Sitlou’s book Under the Wings of Thadou where supremacy of Thadous over other Kuki tribes was propounded. This narrative of imposing hegemony under the ‘wings of Thadous’ faced stiff resistance from the other constituting partners. The inevitable followed – the disintegration of Kuki identity and emergence of three major groupings mentioned above. Failure to integrate the Kuki tribes, either through equal participation or dominance of one over others, also shows the thin fabric which fails to tie them as a cultural unit or block. It further shows the difficulty of seeing Kuki as a cultural identity before being a political one. Recent attempt by some scholars to float the concept of ‘Zale’n-gam’ [Haokip 1998] by including all these tribes into Kuki once again is yet another attempt to create Kuki both as a political identity and cultural identity. Success or failure is yet to be seen. My contention here is that projection of political identities by groups of tribes is much recent, a post-independence (of India) phenomenon. Projecting cultural identity under the same name is still a distant possibility.

It is a matter of fact that these new identities-in-formation have started using the discourse of western liberal democracy and its ideological constructs though it is hard to presume if those values have really been internalised. Political consciousness in its collective form becomes not only exclusive in approach, but also takes violent turns – ethnic conflicts being its outcome. ‘A factor which, perhaps, contributes towards a violent expression of aspirations for political independence is the absence of a language native to a community in terms of which to generate a complex, nuanced, authentic and imaginative articulation of the idea of freedom. In the absence of such a language, the articulation takes place in the language of ideologies fashioned elsewhere and not internalised to any appreciable degrees’ [Miri 1999]. Let me not go into the issue of ‘not having a native language for discourse’ but on the issue of lack of internalisation, though perhaps the former is the cause for the latter. Rise of violence in its varied forms emerges mainly because of non-internalisation of the borrowed discourse. This doubt on internalisation remains even after conceding the arguments by many in the ‘south’ that borrowed categories of the west no more remains the same while in operation in the developing countries. That concept like ‘secularism’ in the Indian context has to be understood differently for the discourse has totally changed from the place of its origin. This line of argument has already been conceded while studying the idea of ‘nation’ as used in the political discourses in the region. However, the success or failure of these identity formations in terms of achieving the spirit of democratic values is yet to be accounted.

The ideas of ‘nation’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘human rights’ that all the major tribes and communities in the state use in their respective discourses are in the midst of strong tribal kinship and bond. The idea of a Naga nation or a Kuki (and for that matter, pan-Manipuri) draws legitimacy from the same discourse, that of the western liberal democracy. Interestingly, each of these identities emerges with consciousness which are opposed to the idea of India as a nation state though both the Indian state as well as these ethnic ‘nations’ borrow their legitimacy, again, from the same discursive context [Akoijam 2002]. The very complexity of these identities lies where Naga ‘nation’ and Kuki ‘nation’ operating within the territory of Manipur are, in addition to their opposition to Indian nation state, mutually opposed to which is also targeted towards Manipuri as a ‘nation’. This is indeed alarming that instead of being accommodative these identities have turned exclusive and hostile. At present, the wider ‘world view’ remains more in symbolism than in content. Yet I see this, particularly of the Nagas and the Kukis, as a struggle to come out of tribal moorings, failure being only a pathway.

Emergence of political consciousness cannot be seen as the only factor determining the process of identity formation and subsequent conflict. Increasing awareness of land as the only long-term
reliable capital for all development purposes in the state has slowly been realised by the tribes/communities. It is this realisation, of course under certain conditions, that also triggers an atmosphere of conflict. The ‘quit notice’ served by the United Naga Council (UNC) to the Kukis in October 1992 is indirectly influenced by this factor. Though the issue of land as ‘capital’ does not surface in the political debate that clearly, it is but obvious from the mode of debate initiated in the whole discourse. For instance, the anti-Tipaimukh dam agitation recently intensified by five Naga organisations tells the story. Another significant case has been the proposal for the creation of Sadar Hills district, the major point of contention being that of power over land. Though land as ‘capital’ is bracketed for the time being, it is the fear of others using the capital that each tribe is haunted with. The debate on migration and settlement is carried forward to justify the claim over the land-capital. The idea of ‘nativity’ carries legitimacy in the debate on the issue of ownership. Dismissing the issue of land-as-capital will only involve rational arguments based on economy and compromise which none of the ethnic groups at present is ready for. Adopting a method of adjustment is considered suicidal at the moment, more so for the winning group.

**Question of Land**

Instead of sloganeering land as ‘capital’, the ‘right of the peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 1803) has been projected as the starting point for political campaign. Projecting ‘possession of native land’ as an inalienable rights not only unifies tribes under panNaga identity because of common practical interest of inheritance of each tribe, but this strategy also serves as good ground for wiping out the enemy. Legitimacy is drawn from international declarations like UN covenants and charters. Physically liquidating the Kukis may not be justified but pushing intruders out of the ‘occupied land’ certainly is. The stark irony however is that violence of any form under such circumstances rarely gets deserving international, and even national, attention. (Naga-Kuki clash could hardly reach headlines in national dailies). Violence often is seen as the unavoidable means of realising the community’s inalienable rights. Whether it is East Timor or northern Sri Lanka or Northern Ireland, the story has all been the same. Naga-Kuki story is nothing different in this regard. What is worth studying is the adoption of political moves which not only integrates the constituting groups within a party but also finds rational ground for justifying certain strategic means which otherwise are morally as well as legally unjustified. ‘Migration’ and ‘settlement’ have been projected as the best-suited themes to enhance Naga unification move.

Though migration is a universal phenomenon, locating the migrant is an upheaval task. Where do we draw the historical line of demarcation? Who are to be termed the natives and who the migrants? Layers of migrations and subsequent settlement by the hordes or wondering tribes are proven facts. It is also a fact that a relatively settled life is shaped by the geographical contours (a river, sea, or plains). The same has happened in Manipur, too. Historiography of Manipur has the record of migration to the valley of Manipur as early as 33 AD narrated in the text Poireiton Khunthok, where a tribe from Khamnung Sawa headed by its chief, Poireiton, migrated and settled in the north-western part of the Imphal valley. There are several other instances of such tribes migrating and settling in the Imphal valley, which over a period of time merged into the Meitei confederation. Though I have used the term ‘confederation’ for lack of appropriate word, it is difficult to assess the political locus standi of the Meitei community during the time it absorbed many other tribes into its fold. For there are records of some tribes of the valley whose population got divided, few were absorbed into the Meitei confederation while few others assimilated to other hill tribes. There are at present as many as 29 ‘scheduled’ tribes in Manipur most of them inhabiting the hills. Many of these tribes trace their origin to some earlier existing tribes in China and adjoining places [Lal Dena 1999]. Going by these sources, it is but natural to presume that most of them have migrated from different places. I would go...
to the extent of challenging the thesis of historical rootedness, the idea of ‘nativity’, of a community or a tribe over the land it proposes to hold/control beyond the areas where their mode of production operates. I see the nature of such assertions more political than historical. Considering the debate on migration, it is but obvious that conflict(s) is bound to take place. The conflict inevitably emerges between the so-called ‘earlier settled tribe’ with the ‘later migrants’.

Though migration is followed by settlement, interlinkages between the two with collective conflict seek further attention. Sociology of politics and sociology of economics divide the two otherwise inseparable events. While the issue of migrationTis projected as the point of departure for distinguishing the native from the outsider, that of separating ‘we’ from ‘they’, it is the settlement which covertly generates the fear (of being made insignificant) in one or the other tribe, of being robbed of the land-capital. Political and ideological theories are then construed out of this fear. However, to my mind, process of identity formation does not give cognisance to the forces of land-capital in the whole issue. The reasons need to be further deliberated upon. Ignoring of land-capital in the entire deliberation will not only fail to address the issue of conflict in its entirety but also lead towards political solutions which are but partial. To clarify my position, let me here emphasise on the differentiation between land as capital and land as place of habitation.

As long as land was in plenty, beyond the control of a tribe, beyond the matrix of its handled technology and worldview, neither migration nor settlement was considered worth considering an issue. Perhaps earlier, the idea of conflict lay on external invasion and the relationship of dominance and subservience. To draw a case in point, one may study the idea of loipot kaba, which was an administrative/military practice of the Meitei kings to their subjects, not directly under their day-to-day administrative fold, but to those they have conquered, defeated or controlled. The victims have been hill tribes like Maring, Anal, Tangkhul, Mao, etc. Thus the equation of power was more about one community/tribe defeating the other militarily – but not necessarily settling down in the conquered territory or militarily guarding the controlled land. The idea of territorial control is measured in terms of battles fought and subjecting others to accept defeat.

The concept of conflict has drastically changed in the recent times. It is no more between the invader and the invaded, but between the native and the migrants. It is the settlement, which begins peacefully by stray migration of a handful of people in batches over untrodden land that later ignites the tension. The infamous Naga-Kuki conflict started with the issue of settlement, more accurately with UNC’s ‘quit notice’ as mentioned earlier. The argument of the Naga apex body supported by many others was that Kukis have been residing in the land ancestrally owned by the Nagas, that they are intruders, and hence have no rights over the ‘Naga territory’. Its further claim, as mentioned earlier, seeks justification from declarations like the UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources,’ etc. The justification further seeks legitimacy through the fact that, at present, barring some areas at Chandel and Kangpokpi there are no Kukis in the Naga inhabited areas. The claim can be ascertained after a decade long Naga-Kuki conflict where Kukis have been driven out of the districts of Tamenglong and Ukhrul, and partly from Chandel and Senapati. Starting from early 1990s till the end of the decade as many as 750 Kukis were massacred in the state, excluding those in Nagaland and Assam.10 Casualty, of course, had been in both ends. In total, nearly 1,14,300 Kukis and Nagas were displaced [Haokip 2001]. The expression ‘Naga dominated areas’ is now converted into ‘Naga inhabited areas’. The change in the expression not only pictures the present state of affairs but also takes a step towards verifying the claim of the Nagas over their ‘ancestral land’, that the demo-graphic composition is exclusively Nagas.
What worries most is exaggerating interpretations of international covenants and declarations serving the interest of the concerned parties. There have been enormous amount of arguments and counter-arguments propagated through the media justifying group actions to the extent of upholding acts of violence of the meapest form. It needs to be spelt out that context-free nature of international declarations does not entail interpreting texts beyond the paradigm of discourse. Justifying genocide11 is one such instance witnessed in the recent times. It is a serious matter to be looked into. Some forms of tribunal, internationally or within the country, needs to be enacted to look into the nature of group actions and validity of claims and counter claims.

The events witnessed in the last few decades in the state have slowly changed the equation of power and process of participation in the political dialogue of ethnic communities. What had been so far termed a Meitei centric confederation is turning towards tribe-centric movement [Ranjit 1988]. Till withering away of the colonial rule, history has been written by and for the winning parties. Losers find no or little place in it. It is to be seen as time passes how the history of conflict is written and its consequences determine the process of history writing in the region – of the land and its people. Of present, the centre stage in the politics of Manipur is enjoyed by the Nagas and the Meiteis as two poles in the entire ‘balance of power’. The place of the lesser-known tribes is still to be ascertained. It is worth noting how the shift has taken place in the balance of power in recent times. Post Naga-Kuki clash in the 1990s has tilted the point of fulcrum. Naga political movement has taken a giant leap tilting the position Meiteis have enjoyed so long. The current process of dialogue between GOI and NSCN (IM) is the ultimate height Naga assertion in Manipur has reached in its history. It not only got its legitimacy over the land it has been claiming but more directly targeted the Meiteis. The real perception of threat by the Meiteis could be seen in the anti-ceasefire agitation that left the state assembly in ashes with 18 protesters losing lives. The aftermath of ‘ceasefire extension’ marks a point of shift in the equation of power. Several issues, in addition to the demand of greater (and southern) Nagaland, such as claims for Sixth Schedule, union territory, claiming additional power for the autonomous district councils under the existing Fifth Schedule, and formation of Sadar Hills district, are the current highlights in the process of political discourse. This can be seen as the sign of a fast emerging pace of political consciousness among the various tribes in the state. Readjustment of political space is fast taking place.

The end of Naga-Kuki clash has not stopped the process of ethnic conflict. Instead of collective participation of ethnic communities (under the proposed constituted praxis), earlier existing power structure seems to remain undisturbed, the only change being increase in the number of players in the power centre. Possibility of meaningful political dialogue is overshadowed by the game of dominance and subservience. Rather legitimacy to play the game has been won as the result of the earlier conflict. Subsequent conflict was witnessed between the Kukis and the Paites. A much more complex tension has also emerged between the Nagas and the Meiteis. A trend seems to be already set.

The problem of migration and settlement continued even after the Naga-Kuki clash in the district of Churachandpur between the Kukis and the Paites. Following the same trend, fear became the focal point of conflict. The fear in the Paites was that of being demographically overshadowed, land being snatched, and politically dominated by the increasing Thadou Kuki migration in the so-called ‘Kuki home’. In the process unarmed civilians were the casualties. In such an ethnic strife, identity of an individual becomes immaterial. Each is seen as belonging to either of the warring tribes.

The disturbing note is the continuation of the same trend set in the Naga-Kuki conflict. Fear in the Paites, whether founded or unfounded, was triggered by the issue of land and power. Abrupt increase of Thadou Kuki population was seen as a beginning of their share of land being captured by the
Thadou Kukis and politically outnumbering other tribes. (In addition, there have been several other immediate factors.) Similar was the issue that triggered Naga-Kuki conflict. No lesson seems to have been learnt. What turned out to be a chain-look-alike separate phenomena is perhaps what signifies the Manipur conflict scenario from the rest of the region.

Continuing the strife in a more covert and complex form is that between the Meiteis and the Nagas. Projecting a common enemy is an easier way to consolidate otherwise scattered groups through which new community identity is formed. Naga identity formation in Manipur engages this particular method largely based on anti-Meitei sentiment. Initial means of unification was through anti-Kuki sentiment. The propagation of its political standpoint is marked by what is often stated as the past ‘ill doings of the (hinduised) Meiteis to the hill people’. Often quoted instances are of ‘untouchability’ exercised by the Meiteis to the tribes. While it is not the intention here to completely deny such historical episodes, such a practice as has been often quoted need proper scrutiny. Many of the instances of ‘untouchability’ turn out to be an exercise to control power exerting hegemony by the Meitei ruling class to its subjects, both the tribes as well as the Meitei peasants. In fact Meitei peasants faced harder atrocities in the hands of Rajkumars (feudal lords) and the Bamons (brahmins). Exploitation took place in terms of several taxes based on religious purity and impurity. There had been cases when suddenly the maharaja declared all his subjects ‘impure’ and that they had to pay purification fee to the king to be conducted by the priests. There were taxes like ‘Chandon senkhai’ (tax on use of chandan by the Hindu subjects) and ‘Pothang’ system (exploitative administrative law associated with four types of free community labour) [Lokendra 1998: 83]. The so-called exploitation by the Meiteis of the hill people turns out to be acts of the Manipuri king and the ruling class. Unfortunately what has been projected in the discourse on Naga identity politics is purely on ethnic lines, Meiteis are seen as the oppressor and Nagas the oppressed. Naga political strategy seems to perceive social reality from the prism of ethnic contradiction. Equating Meitei ruling class with the Meitei people would be to commit a major conceptual fallacy.

The fact is that Vaisnavism has put a halt in the process of Meiteisation of different tribes, so a new approach for unity has to be looked for. Christianisation has also put a check on the process of Meitei centric worldview. Neither is the Naga centric worldview, which take recourse to Christian worldview, the answer. Hegemony of any kind, be it by the Meiteis or the Nagas, can no longer work. The answer, lies in finding an alternative model of integration. What Jean Paul Sartre (1982) termed as ‘constitutive praxis’ forming the constituted praxis seems to be ideal and most workable answer. This has to be translated in terms of political participation and economic development aiming at removing regional imbalances. Unless such a method is adopted a chain of conflict is bound to take place. Conflict in the state has by and large arisen out of (i) non-governance [Oinam 2002] and (ii) tendency to subsume the other within one’s own fold. Dominance and subservience still work under cover which have to stop. Unless sincere efforts are made towards ending the politics of dominance and hegemony, problem of conflict, and subsequently violence, is still a far away dream. This applies not only to the state of Manipur but also to the entire region.
COMMUNALISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM

Definition of Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is not monolithic, but it has enough common elements for us to try to define it. It is also not confined to the followers of any one religion and is to be found among Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus and Sikhs, though its strength among followers of different religions varies for historical reasons in terms of time and space and the formation and structure of different religions.

First of all, the fundamentalists argue for return to the fundamental tenets of a religion, for return to the original formulations and meanings given to a religion at the time of its foundation in its first texts. These texts have, moreover, to be literally understood, applied or implemented. There is to be no interpretation of or debate about their meanings. Consequently, all later developments, exegeses, interpretations, etc., are to be rejected and wiped out. Since the texts are seen as God’s own actual words, their meaning is bound to be clear and unambiguous as also changeless. How can then they be interpreted? And, of course, the question of later generations thinking originally does not arise. Thus for Christian fundamentalists, God’s words are permanently given in the Old and New Testaments and for the Muslim fundamentalists in the Koran and the Sunnah (The Prophet’s sayings). Some Hindus regard the Vedas as God’s immutable words. Similarly, many Sikhs so regard the Gurbani. In fact the fundamentalists regard all efforts to interpret, not to speak to amend, the original texts in the light of modern social conditions and state of human knowledge as blasphemous, as acts of enemies within. And, of course, any effort to read them as mytho-realities or allegories is damned as worse than heresy.

Second, fundamentalists assert that all aspects and areas of life are to be governed by the true, revealed religion as embodied in the original texts. God’s words and law are to be the basis of society, economy, polity, culture, and law and the entire domestic and personal life of the believer.

Some Examples

As Gary North, one of the American fundamentalists, has put it, the Bible contains answers to all problems a person faces today including “the concrete, day-to-day problems of economics, family relationships, politics, law, medicine, and all other areas of life”. Similarly, Judge Abdul-Jawed Yasin rejects the modern secular notion that religion pertains only to one area of a person’s life, that is, his personal spiritual life. It is wrong to hold, he says, that “just as there are economic affairs, social affairs, political affairs, foreign affairs, family affairs, legal affairs, administrative affairs...there are religious affairs too...confined to rituals and piety.” This, he says, reduces religion to “a mere aspect among life’s many aspects” and to “a mere specific need among man’s many other needs”. “Religion,” he argues, “is not a side affair among life’s many affairs, but the divine ‘way’ according to which man runs his individual and collective affairs of life. It is the method drawn by God for the community: for its economic affairs, social affairs, political affairs, legislative affairs, psychological affairs, internal affairs, external affairs and any other affairs that it may have.” A Muslim fundamentalist has put this view as follows: “God’s final religion contains all the legislations required by any society, any place, any time and in all spheres of life”. The fundamentalists consequently totally reject the pluralist principle of “many Gods, many moralities, many laws”.

Politics, Religion and Education

More specifically, the fundamentalists attack the separation of religion from politics and state, and therefore, the idea of the secular state. If God is supreme over all, then the political rule is also His
domain, and how can then the state be outside the religious realm? The state, in fact, has to be a theocracy.

Similarly, the fundamentalists insist on religious control over education so that not only is true religion taught in schools and colleges but nothing contrary to it is taught. The famous encyclical, The Syllabus of Modern Errors, issued by Pope Rius IX in 1864, and one of the first modern statements of religious fundamentalism, after damning the view “that from civil law descend and depend all the rights of parents over their children, and above all, the right of instructing and educating them”, condemns those “most false teachers” who “endeavour to eliminate the salutary teaching and influence of the Catholic Church from the instruction and education of youth, and miserably to infect and deprave by every pernicious error and vice the tender and pliant minds of youth”. The fundamentalists, therefore, advocate boycott of modern state-run or state-supported schools and their replacement by schools where the traditional religious system of teaching is followed. Some even argue that only that much education is needed as is sufficient to read and follow religious texts or to meet “a practical and real need” in terms of worldly affairs.

In particular, all laws have to be derived from the earliest or founding texts. The Muslim fundamentalists, in particular, demand that all laws must be derived from the Koran and the Sunnah. Even here, the fundamentalists tend to emphasize primarily the harsh ancient penal codes, such as amputation of hands and feet, stoning of the guilty, public flogging, and death punishment for a large number of crimes, some quite petty. For example, some of the American fundamentalists advocate death penalty for the following crimes, among other crimes, on the basis of Mosaic, i.e., God’s Laws in the Old Testament: “murder, adultery, unchastity, sodomy, bestiality, homosexuality, rape, incest, fornication, incorrigibility in children, Sabbath breaking, kidnapping, apostasy, idolatory, blasphemy, sacrificing to false Gods, propagating false doctrines, false pretension to prophecy, witchcraft and sorcery”.

Fundamentalism and Equality of Religions

The fundamentalists do not believe in the equality of all religions or even the grant of liberty to all religions to exist, for how can false religions be treated as equal to the true religion or be given the liberty to preach and practise falsehood? The same logic leads the fundamentalists to oppose the concept of the unity of all religions. In fact, most of them urge the prohibition and suppression of religions other than their own in countries where 6 followers of their religion constitute the majority. One slightly different but in fact the same aspect of this is the demand of the Viswa Hindu Parishad that all Islamic religious or cultural influences should be removed from the country. Of course, missing the irony or the absurdity of the situation, the fundamentalists demand the liberty to preach and practise their own religion where they happen to be in a minority They also, in that case, often demand separation of the state from religion, i.e., the religion of the majority.

We may also take note of a few other features of fundamentalism. It is opposed to reason and rationalism, humanism and secularism. It is anti-science and denies the validity of all human knowledge which is outside the religious realm. As Prof. Sadik J. Al-Azim has pointed out: “Both (Christian and Muslim fundamentalists) invest efforts in what they call the re-Christianization and/or re-Islamization of human knowledge. As a consequence, both find themselves compelled to elaborate theories about and concoct recipes of Biblico-Christian and/or Koranico-Muslim foundations and principles of natural science, economics, history, law, government, politics, sociology, psychology, and so on.” In India, the Hindu fundamentalists have been, in the last few years, making claims for Hindu mathematics and so on.
Sovereignty and Religion

The fundamentalists are also opposed to the idea of popular sovereignty and the resulting practice of democracy and constitutional government. This is, in a way, inevitable, for if sovereignty belongs to God and all laws and policies should be based on God’s words as revealed in the holy texts, then where is the scope for constitutions and for the people to determine.

Even though sharing some common features, fundamentalism is different from devout belief, or religiosity or religious orthodoxy, or belief in the fundamental beliefs and values of one’s religion. For the religiously orthodox are not intolerant of others’ religious beliefs. Take, for example, both the firmness of religious belief and the high degree of catholicity towards others’ beliefs among the Sufis and Vaishnavites in our own country. In fact, both would be declared to be ‘practitioners of error’ by the fundamentalists of their own religions.

Definition of Communalism

Let us now define communalism. This is best done historically, that is by a study of its development in modern India. Communalism in India developed through three stages, each stage providing its own definition of communalism and merging into the next stage.

Communalism developed during the last quarter of the 19th century when the view was put forward that followers of a religion in the whole of India have in common not only their religion and religious interests but also some political, economic, social and cultural interests. This view led to the notion that in India, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians form distinct communities and that India or the Indian nation is formed by these distinct communities. These communities have their own leaders, for example, Hindu leaders and Muslim leaders, who defend and fight for the interests of their communities. Unfortunately many nationalists accepted and began to use the terminology of religion-based communities even when they did not accept its basic communal content. Thus they talked and wrote about Hindu community, Muslim community, etc. Communalism entered a second stage in the beginning of the 20th century, when communalism proper made an appearance.

The communalists now argued that followers of a religion have, as a community, some interests separate from those of the followers of other religions; that is, many of the economic and political interests of the followers of different religions diverge and are sometimes opposite because of their following different religions. At the same time, the communalists agreed that Indians, belonging to different religions, also have many common economic and political interests, in particular vis-à-vis the colonial rulers. Thus, these communalists, who may be described as liberal communalists, accepted that Hindus and Muslims have common interests; but, they argued that, as communities, they have additional and separate interests of their own. They usually held that Indians can and should fight together for political freedom and economic development, once their separate communal interests are recognized and adjusted or settled through mutual compromise and give and take.

Two Nation Theory

Communalists of the third stage argued that the secular interests of the followers of different religions were not only different, but mutually totally antagonistic. What was good for Hindus was bad for Muslims, what was good for Muslims was bad for Hindus and so on. Hindus and Muslims could never form one nation or live together as equals and fellow-citizens—there was nothing in life to unite them. Thus was born the two-nation theory in its two communal versions. According to the Muslim League and Mohammed Au Jinnah, Hindus and Muslims in India formed two different
nations because they followed two different religions—and the two must separate and form two separate nation-states because their interests clashed totally.

According to the Hindu communal version of the two-nation theory, put forward by VD. Savarkar and M.S. Golwalkar, Hindus alone formed or constituted the Indian nation. Muslims were not a part of this nation, and they should, therefore, live in India not as equal citizens but on the sufferance of Hindus and as perpetual foreigners. As is clear, there was no difference between the Hindu and Muslim communalists’ conception of the nation or citizenship and they both in effect adopted a two-nation theory. The two communalists now talked the language of animosity and warfare towards the followers of other religions. They spread hatred among the people and cultivated feelings of violence.

**Fundamentalism and Communalism**

Fundamentalism and communalism have certain ideological elements in common. On the other hand, they also differ from each other. Both attack the concept of separation of religion from politics and the state. Both oppose the concept of equal truth in all religions or the unity of different religions. Both advocate control over education by the followers of the dominant religion. Both believe in restoration of the past values and ‘greatness’ rather than in progress towards the unknown so that ‘greatness’ and progress lie in the future. Both share the notion that their societies had achieved near-human perfection in the very early centuries when their religions were founded and were practised in their pristine purity and then declined and ‘fell’. Both oppose secularism and believe that it corrupts society. Both oppose secular nationalism and the anti-imperialist and nationalist view of his.

But these common features do not make the two the same. To take a very different example, it is clear that indigenousism and post-modernism have many ideological positions in common with fundamentalism, especially opposition to science, reason, progress, secularism and nationalism, but they are basically poles apart.

**Differences of Perception**
The communalist and the fundamentalist differ in many ways, though in a multi-religious society a fundamentalist tends to be communal while communalists are quite often not fundamentalists. For example, in India, the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS, the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Muslim League, and the Akali Dal were and are communal parties but they were not and are not fundamentalist. Similarly, Pakistan and to a certain extent Bangladesh are communal states but they are no fundamentalist states. If we look at the programmatic, policy or ideological statements and propaganda of the communal parties, the difference becomes clear, for not many of the fundamentalist tenets would be found in them.

The fundamentalists seriously urge the actual revival of the pristine past and its religious, social, cultural, legal and political practices. This is not the case with the communalists who may appeal to the past as ideology or nostalgia but whose gaze is clearly fixed on the modern world.

The relationship of the fundamentalists and the communalists to religion is also only superficially similar. The former are deeply religious, their entire ideology relates to religion and they want to base the state, society, and daily life of the individual on religion. The communalists, on the other hand, have hardly much to do with religion, except that they base their politics on religious identity and thus use religion for the purposes of struggle for political power. The communal state is thus not necessarily a theocratic state. For example, even when declared to be Islamic states, Pakistan and Bangladesh are communal states and not theocratic states. Interestingly, only a minority of the communalists in Pakistan or Bangladesh demand the literal application of the ancient laws (according to the Shariah), and hardly any Hindu or Muslim communalist does so in India.

Similarly, the fundamentalists want to Christianize or Islamize or Hinduize the whole world. Not so the communalists; they only want to communalize and can only communalize their own society.

It is, therefore, not accidental that in our country the communalists have often not only not been fundamentalists but have not been even religious. Thus M.A. Jinnah or Liaqat Ali Khan or Feroze Khan Noon were not very religious, and V.D. Savarkar was an atheist. And by no stretch of imagination can L. K. Advani, Bal Thackeray or Atal Behari Vajpayee be considered fundamentalists. In pre-independent India only the followers of Maulana Maudoodi among the Muslim communalists were fundamentalists, and, interestingly, they were opposed to the demand for the partition of India.

**Targets of Fundamentalism and Communalism**

The targets of fundamentalism and communalism are also very different. The fundamentalists basically target fellow believers who do not agree with them, while the targets of the communalists most often are the other religious communities.

There is a major critical reason why the communalists are seldom fundamentalists and can even oppose the latter. They make every attempt to communalize and unite the members of their religious community. That alone can bring them into political power, especially in a democratic polity. But it is in the very nature of fundamentalism to divide and constantly fragment the followers of a religion. This is for two reasons. First, not many can adopt fundamentalism in practice or even in belief. Second, by rigid definitions, they tend to exclude rather than include. Anyone who does not agree with their definition of true religion becomes a nonbeliever and, therefore, sooner or later an enemy. When they talk of annihilating the infidels, they are often referring to their own co-religionists. In fact, such is their extreme religious fanaticism that they constantly divide among themselves to split and fragment.
The communalists, therefore, tend to shy away from fundamentalism. In fact, V.D. Savarkar coined the word ‘Hindutva’ to avoid emphasizing any religious definition of Hindu communalism, for, as he put it, seeing Hindu communalism through the eyes of any particular Hindu sectarian stand would divide and not unite Hindus. This is also why pucaArya Samajists forget all about Swami Dayanand’s anti-idolatry dicta when taking up the cause of temples at Ayodhya or anywhere else.

**Conclusion**

In the end, let me explain why I believe that it is absolutely necessary to differentiate between fundamentalism and communalism. To confuse the two with one another is unscientific, but it is also politically extremely dangerous for it is then easy for the communalists, who pose the main danger to our democratic and secular polity and the unity of the nation and the people, to show that one part of the charge is wrong, that they are not fundamentalists. Moreover, because, for historical reasons, fundamentalism is and would remain weak among Hindus, while it is at present a strong phenomenon among Muslims, the Hindu communalists can and do argue that the Hindus cannot be fundamentalists and, therefore, communal while Muslims are prone to being both. The reality is that while Muslim communalism is rampant and is dangerous to both Muslims and the Indian polity, it is Hindu communalism which poses the main danger, the fascist danger, to the Indian people. Thus, to confuse fundamentalism with communalism is to provide the latter with an alibi.

It should also be clear by now that by not calling the communalists fundamentalists I am not praising them or giving them a good chit. The real reason to distinguish between the two is to know them better and, therefore, to fight them better. The two are to be opposed differently because they pose two different types of danger.

I may also very briefly explain why the confusion between the two terms has arisen. The western journalists and even academics started using the two terms synonymously because of the ease of expression; their readers do not understand what communalism means, while fundamentalism is a current coin. And we have borrowed the confusion because we seldom look western gift-horses in the mouth. And, not surprisingly, this is true even of those who are politically radical—because they continue t be ideologically colonized.

**DISPARITIES IN EDUCATION**

Education has been assigned high priority in the development policy of India. The provision of free and compulsory education to all children in the age group 6-14 years is also a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India. The National Policy on Education (1986) was an important landmark in the journey towards this Constitutional commitment. The policy discourse in this context received a renewed impetus with the adoption of Millennium Development Goals in 2000. The demand for universalisation of elementary education was finally endorsed with the enactment of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act in 2009.

However, India has not shown appreciable progress in education sector. In the last ten years, school enrolment has increased and more adults have been declared (functionally) literate than ever before; yet more than one third of the population continues to remain deprived of education. The age-old disparities stemming from class, caste and gender also manifest in the educational attainments among people across the country. In fact, unequal access to educational opportunities for people from the vulnerable sections has emerged as a major challenge for the policymakers in the country.
Gaps in literacy rate across gender and social groups has declined substantially over time, but sizable differences still remain.

PUBLIC PROVISIONING FOR EDUCATION: AN INSTRUMENT TO ADDRESS INEQUALITY

Provisioning for education, both for its coverage as well as quality, requires significant amount of financial resources. Given the crucial importance that education plays in the development of a society and a country’s economy, public provisioning for education has been recognised as an effective strategy for ensuring inclusive education. In 1966 the Kothari Commission report was probably the first of its kind to review the country’s policies recognising the significance of adequate public investment in education; and it also made an attempt to quantify the level of investment that would achieve the target of universalisation of education by 1986.

The total public expenditure (Centre and States combined) on Education as a proportion of GDP in India was around 3 percent in the year 2004-05. It has increased over the last decade, but the pace of increase has been very modest. The present level of total public spending on education (including the expenditure of all Education departments at the Centre and the States and also the other departments that spend on education) works out to 4 percent of GDP in 2012-13 BE. This proportion of 4 percent of GDP falls, much short of the 6 percent of GDP recommended by the Kothari Commission, as a benchmark for total public spending on education to be reached by 1986.
The picture looks more dismal, if the figures for India are compared with the rest of the BRICSAM1 countries. Except for Indonesia, all other BRICSAM countries spend much higher amounts as public spending on education. Brazil, one of the examples among developing countries having achieved universal education, spends nearly 6 percent of GDP on education.

EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF INDIA: AN INTER AND INTRA COUNTRY COMPARISON

One of the reasons for the relatively lower level of educational achievement in India is its lower base in terms of literacy. Figure 2 shows that the position of India among BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in terms of adult literacy rate is not very impressive.

Figure 2 clearly shows that Russia has achieved universal adult literacy. China with the largest population, has adult literacy rate of over 92 percent; whereas India ranks last in the literacy ladder. Further, the literacy gap between India and the rest of the BRICS countries is 30 percentage points or higher.
Aggregated literacy figures at the national level give us a partial picture. It does not reveal the different levels and types of disparities that exist in this vast country. The disparity is stark at the State level where the gap between the lowest (Bihar) and the highest (Kerala) literacy State is substantial.

Gaps in literacy rate across gender and social groups has declined substantially over time. Yet a gender gap of 20 percentage points in rural India and about 10 percentage points in urban India still persist (Figure 4). Again, the literacy rate for urban female is 20 percentage points higher than rural female. The disparities are wider for girls belonging to SC/ST communities. Clearly, the literacy statistics portray various dimension of inequality—rural-urban, male-female, SC-ST. It also reveals that differences in literacy growth rates across these categories of the population are reducing at a slow pace.

**Education: A Progress Report**

India has made notable progress in increasing the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER). It has achieved universal enrolment in primary (I-V) education (116 percent) and near universal enrolment (85.5 percent) in upper primary education (VI-VIII) both for boys and girls. While these are significant achievements, the anomaly is that GER starts falling with increase in the level of education. It is evident from the fact that at the secondary level (IX-X) the GER is 65 percent, and at higher secondary (XI-XII) level it is only 39 percent (MHRD, 2013). The figures for access, attendance, retention and school completion rate are much lower than enrolment and it significantly varies between a range of sub groups like girls and boys, upper caste and lower caste, urban poor and urban rich, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, etc. Despite the strong argument that returns to education increase with rising education levels, there exists a paradoxical situation in India where participation at the secondary and higher level of education has been declining.

Out of every 100 children who enroll in grade I, about 30 drop out before reaching grade V and more than 40 before reaching grade VIII. It is also important to note that the rate of dropout is less among girls in primary education but at the upper primary level, it is higher compared to the dropout rates for boys. Nearly 45 percent of SC children and 55 percent of ST children drop out from school before completing grade VIII and this proportion increases...
to 60 percent for SC children and 70 percent for ST children before reaching Grade X (Figure 5).

**Figure 5: Dropout Rates in School Education in India, 2010-11 (in %)**

Source: Statistics of School Education, 2010-11, MHRD

**WHY DO CHILDREN DROP OUT FROM SCHOOLS?**

An analysis of the determinants of participation (or non-participation) in schooling reveals three sets of influencing factors: (a) household economic factors (b) school environment (including quality of physical and human infrastructure and quality of instruction) and (c) social and cultural/traditional factors (Tilak, 20023).

**Economic Constraints:**

Economic factors constitute the single most important reason for children not attending or dropping out of school. The need to spend on education necessarily constrain poor families in sending their children to schools. Further, even in case of governments offering free education, children are kept out of school to supplement household income. Boys, in particular, are withdrawn from school for wage work and for participation in other economic activities, whereas girls are withdrawn to attend to and perform domestic activities (NSSO, 2010).

**Persistence of Quality Gap in Physical Infrastructure of Government Schools:**

Inspite of significant expansion of schooling facilities, some basic deficiencies continue to affect Indian schooling system. A large number of government schools do not have some of the basic infrastructural facilities like school buildings, additional classrooms, drinking water, toilets, ramps, electricity and so on. Sometimes, even when the infrastructure is in place, they are not functional. Only eight percent schools comply with all the infrastructure norms mentioned under the RTE Act. The infrastructure bottlenecks, especially, inadequate number of upper primary and secondary schools in the vicinity and absence of girls’ toilets are the two major reasons for school dropouts especially among girls. There are also concerns relating to quality of curriculum, assessment of learning achievement, efficacy of school management and above all shortage of trained teachers and teacher absenteeism.
Shortage of Qualified Teachers:

At present there are 8.3 percent primary schools with single teachers. Under the SSA 19.8 lakh posts for teachers were sanctioned till 2012-13; but only over 14 lakh were recruited up to 2013. Among the existing teachers in government schools, about 20 percent teachers are untrained and the proportion of trained and qualified teachers has been almost stagnant for the last five years (RTE State Report, MHRD, 2013).

Contractual vs. Regular Teachers: Debate over Quality of Education

With an objective of universalisation of elementary education within a limited resource envelope, the Central Government as well as many States have carried out major changes in teacher recruitment policy over the last decade. Launching of the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) in the 1990s and subsequently the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) brought in this new dimension to the discourse as well as practices related to teacher management in school education. Instead of regular cadre teachers, the policy reform veered towards recruitment of contractual teachers, popularly known as ‘para teachers’ with significantly reduced salaries and benefits.

In the last 15 years, there has been an enormous expansion in the cadre of para teachers in many States. According to District Information System for Education (DISE) data, in 2013-14, total number of contractual teachers at the elementary level stood at 5.01 lakh. Among them merely 56 percent have professional teacher training.

The significant presence of contract teachers has raised questions about the impact on the quality of education being imparted. This concern is largely due to the lower educational qualifications required for someone to become a contract teacher and the little or no pre-service and in-service training that they receive. On the other hand, weak accountability of regular teachers as reflected in their high absence rates and low teaching activity when present in schools, have also been an issue of serious concern.

There is also a debate around the issue of the impact of performance-based contracts that para teachers are given. Such contracts can be cancelled if their performance is adjudged dissatisfactory by the village education committee or other local community bodies, which also have the authority to hire them. One view is that such contracts provide stronger motivation to perform. The other view holds that lack of job security and lesser salary can actually decrease motivation and lead to absenteeism. On the whole, whatever be the debate on regular vs. contractual teacher, it is clear that the government’s short term cost efficient policy measures have not led to any improvement in learning outcome.

Quality Gap in Learning Achievements:

Attending classes and being promoted in the educational ladder do not necessarily translate into equal participation in the education process. Even after five years of implementation of the RTE Act, it has been argued that children are still dropping out of school, not for labour, but because they are not learning anything in schools (UNICEF report)4.

Learning outcomes in India are dismal both when compared globally as well as when compared across years. Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) result (Figure 6) shows the two most educationally advanced States of India, Himachal
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, ranked lowest in both reading and mathematical ability among the BRICSAM countries (72nd and 73rd out of a total of 74 tested entities for which results were reported).

According to Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2013, only 41 percent of the children in standard V in government schools can read the texts of standard II.

**Figure 6: Performance of BRICSAM Countries and Indonesia in Learning Ability (Score in Mean value) - 2009**

![Chart showing performance of BRICSAM countries and Indonesia in learning ability.]

Source: OECD PISA survey, Note: South Africa had not participated in this survey.

**BIAS TOWARDS PRIVATE SCHOOLS**

The deteriorating quality of learning in government schools is currently one of the most discussed issues in the realm of public provisioning for the education sector. This has also created a bias towards private schooling with the perception that quality of learning would be better in private schools. However, as per the ASER data, the quality of learning in private schools is also deteriorating. Inspite of this, parents continue to send their children to private schools that charge fees instead of public schools which are free of cost (Muralidharan).

As a result, thousands of private schools have sprung up across rural India in every State in the last decade and the share of children going to private elementary schools has increased from 19 percent in 2006 to 31 percent in 2014 (ASER, 2014).

Average expenditure on education in private aided schools is almost 5 times higher than expenditure in government schools or schools run by the local bodies. This disparity becomes 7 times higher in case of private unaided schools (NSS, 2010). The existence of pre-primary classes- a distinctive feature of private schools- is another factor that draw parents to private school (PROBE Revisited Report, 2006). However, due to unsustainable financial implications, children are often pulled out of school within a short period. Considering such high cost of schooling, private school education is often provided to the male child rather than the female child so that the boys are enrolled in private schools and girls in government schools (PROBE Revisited Report, 2006). Thus, the surge in private schooling suggests not only aggravating inequality in terms of quality of education but also severe socio-economic inequalities.

Further, the prevailing policy itself has promoted inequity among different kinds of governments schools. The inbuilt differences in the Model Schools and Kendriya Vidyalaya,
Sarvodaya Schools and Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya, has ingrained a hierarchy of high and low achieving schools; the government spends substantially higher amount in the special/higher category schools as compared to normal government run schools.

In the context of inequality in both educational opportunities and outcomes, Civil Society Organisations (CSO) can play a greater role by undertaking appropriate policy research and advocacy in support of universal, free, compulsory, quality schooling and extending opportunities for lifelong learning. At the same time, CSOs can also play a significant role in promoting transparency and accountability measures in schools.